Cоmputervision Corporation (“Compu-tervision”) appeals the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims which held that Computervision is not entitled to a refund of deficiency interest assessed and paid with respect to its 1982 tax year. The court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations barred an interest suspension claim because the plaintiff failed to file a claim with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) until more than 10 years after the expiration of the two year limitation period of 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). The court also held that an interest netting claim failed to state a claim because the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6621(d) were not met under our decision in
Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. United, States,
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On September 14, 1983, Computervision, a manufacturer of computer-aided manufacturing products, overpaid its tax liability shown on its 1982 return by $4,750,231, and elected to apply this overрayment to its 1983 tax year. 1 On September 17, 1984, Computervision overpaid the amount of taxes shown on the 1983 return by $7,329,276, and again elected to apply this overpayment to the following year, the 1984 tax year. Finally, on July 2, 1985, Computervision filed a return for the 1984 tax year showing an overpayment of $7,166,031, and requested a refund of the entire amount. The IRS paid the refund, without interest, on August 2,1985.
Following an audit, the IRS issued an “examination report” on January 7, 1986, in which it asserted that the taxpayer’s 1982 return had understated its tax liability and proposed a deficiency of $6,224,982 for the 1982 tax year. A portion of this deficiency resulted from the IRS’s determination that a subsidiary of Computervision, Computervision International, Inc. (CVI), did not qualify as a domestic international sales corporation, or DISC, during the 1983 tax year. See 26 U.S.C. § 992(a)(1) (1982). 2 Another portion of the deficiency concerned what we refer to as non-DISC issues.
On April 11, 1986, Computervision submitted a protest regarding the IRS’s position with respect to the 1982 tax year to the Boston Appeals Office of the IRS, disputing among other issues the determination that CVI was not a DISC. The non-DISC issues in the examination report were resolved by an agreement that the tax liability relating to the non-DISC issues was $2,215,952. 3 The IRS proposed a total 1982 tax deficiency of $7,886,409. Of that amount, $5,670,457 was attributable to the DISC issue, and $2,215,952 to non-DISC issues.
A 1985 net operating loss carryback eliminated all of the proposed 1982 defi *1360 ciency (except for a deficiency of $37,776 attributable to investment tax credit recapture). However, the carryback did not eliminate Computervisioris liability for interest which had accrued on the 1982 deficiency. On June 3, 1988, the IRS assessed Computervision deficiency interest totaling $4,095,974.42, plus tax in the amount of $37,776. After corrections, the $4,095,974 interest assessment was revised to $4,063,073. Importantly for purposes of this appeal, the $4,063,073 interest assessment inсluded (1) interest in the amount of $2,808,888 attributable to the still-disputed DISC qualification issue, and (2) interest in the amount of $1,254,186 attributable to the resolved non-DISC issues. The IRS computed the deficiency interest based on the entire 1982 deficiency amount, from the due date of the 1982 return to the due date of the 1985 return (when the NOL carryback offset the deficiency). Compu-tervision paid the $37,776 tax deficiency on March 7,1989. Computervision eventually also paid the deficiency interest claimed by the IRS, with the final payment of $4,045,011.64 occurring on April 28, 1989.
The statute bars suit for recovery of the deficiency interest unless “a claim for refund ... has been duly filed with the [IRS] ....” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (2000). A claim is timely filed if filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever ... expires the later .... ” 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). Within two years of the final payment, on August 4, 1989, Computervision filed a refund claim with the IRS (the “original refund claim”), in which it claimed “that portion of the interest relating to thе [DISC] disqualification issue” for the 1982 tax year. The refund claim specifically requested $2,808,888, the amount of interest assessed by the IRS on the DISC tax liability. The refund claim also included a boilerplate provision stating that:
Computervision claims as a basis for the refund of the interest paid with respect to its 1982 taxable year such other grounds as are shown to be appropriate by the tax returns, books and records and the Examination Report and related Protest of Computervision and [CVI] for their respective tax years ended December 31,1982, and January 31,1983.
J.A. at 1228.
Section 6532 allows the taxpayer to commence suit six months after filing a refund claim if the IRS fails to disallow the claim during that time. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a). By April 4,1990, the IRS had not acted on the matter, so Computervision filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims. The complaint alleged that “Computervision is aggrieved by the defendant’s failure to refund the interest attributable to thе purported disqualification of [CVI] as a DISC.”
Meanwhile, on November 4, 1993, Com-putervision filed a petition in the United States Tax Court disputing deficiencies that were assessed for two different tax years, 1983 and 1984—primarily on the theory that the IRS had improperly denied DISC treatment for those years. Proceedings in the Court of Federal Claims relating to the 1982 tax year interest assessment were stayed pending the resolution of the DISC issue by the Tax Court, apparently on the theory that the DISC determination for the 1983 and 1984 tax years would also resolve the issue for the 1982 tax year. On March 18, 1996, the Tax Court ruled in Computervisioris favor on the DISC issue, holding that CVI qualified as a DISC.
Computervision Int’l Corp. v. Comm’r,
*1361
Following the resolution of the DISC issue by the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims lifted its stay with respect to the 1982 tax year proceedings on June 22, 1998. Computervision and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) engaged in settlement nеgotiations relating to the 1982 DISC issue. On July 22, 1998, Congress enacted a new provision of 26 U.S.C. § 6621, requiring interest netting, that is, requiring the IRS to “apply a zero net interest rate to overlapping periods of mutual indebtedness between a taxpayer and the IRS.”
Fed. Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. United States,
On July 9, 2003, Computervision filed an amended complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, claiming $820,946.13 in deficiency interest relating to non-DISC issues on theories of interest suspension and interest netting.
The government contended that the interest suspension claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the DISC interest claim, which involved a challenge to the underlying tax liability, the claim for interest suspension did not involve any challenge to the underlying deficiencies asserted with respect to the non-DISC issues. Rather, the taxpayer contended that, even though the underlying tax liability had been properly determined with respect to non-DISC issues, interest was not owed. The taxpayer relied on the principle of interest suspension, which derives from 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a), and was formally set out in Revenue Ruling 99-40, published on October 4, 1999, more than three years earlier. 1999-
Under Revenue Ruling 99-40, interest suspension applies when (a) a taxpayer elects to credit an overpayment reported on the return for year one [here 1982] to year two [here 1983]; (b) a deficiency is subsequently determined for year one [1982]; and (c) the credit elect to year two is not “needed” to satisfy the required payments of estimated tax for year two *1362 [1983]. Rev. Rui. 99-40. Under these circumstances, interest is suspended relating to the deficiency for year one [1982]. Here, in other words, the taxpayer asserted that deficiency interest was not owed for 1982 because the tax for that year had been overpaid, and that the credit-elect transferring that payment to the 1983 tax year should be ignored for purposes of computing interest. Similarly, taxpayer’s credit elect from 1983 to 1984 was not needed to pay its 1984 liability, because the 1984 taxes had also been overpaid. 5
As part of the 2003 amended complaint, the taxpayer asserted an alternative theory for recovery of the non-DISC interest based on a theory of interest netting. “Interest netting” is set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621(d), which provides that the IRS applies a net interest rate of zero to overlapping underpayments and overpayments of tax. With respect to interest netting there is a different limitations issue (described below), but there is no issue as to whether the claim itself was timely filed with the IRS because the statute provides for retroactive relief if the statutory conditions are satisfied. See 26 U.S.C. § 6621(d), Pub.L. No. 105-206, § 3301(c)(2), 112 Stat. 741 (1998), as amended. The parties agree that interest netting provides identical relief as interest suspension.
On September 9, 2004, the Court of Federal Claims rendered a final decision.
Computervision Corp. v. United States,
The taxpayer timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
I
We first address the statute of limitations issue with respect to Computervision’s interest suspension claim.
Statutes of limitations play an important role in tax administration, benefiting both the government and taxpayers. The government’s authority to assess taxes is limited by 26 U.S.C. § 6501, under which taxes must be assessed within three years of the filing of the return. 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000). Similarly, the taxpayer *1363 must file its refund claim with the IRS “within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever ... expires the later ....” 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). 7 Here the taxpayer’s original claim for refund was filed with the IRS within the limitations period because it was filed on August 4, 1989, within two years of the date of the last payment, April 28, 1989. However, that claim did not specifically include the interest suspension claim with respect to the non-DISC issues. A formal claim with the IRS was not filed until April 4, 2002, more than 10 years after the limitations period hаd expired. Nonetheless, the taxpayer claims that for a variety of reasons the claim was timely.
Understanding the taxpayer’s contentions requires a description of the overall regulatory scheme. Section 7422(a) of the Internal Revenue Code bars a taxpayer from filing a suit for refund “until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (2000). The Secretary by regulation requires that claims for refund
“set forth in detail each ground
upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.” 26 C.F.R § 301.6402-2(b)(l) (2005) (emphasis added). Earlier regulations contained similar provisions.
See, e.g., United States v. Kales,
The requirement for filing a proper refund claim “is designed both to prevent surprise and to give adequate notice to the Service of the nature of the claim and the specific facts upon which it is predicated, thereby permitting an administrative investigation and determination.”
Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States,
The Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a taxpayer’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations even though the taxpayer did not timely file the formal, detailed claim required by the regulations.
See, e.g., Kales,
In this circuit this aggregation of rules has come to be known as the sub-
*1364
stantial variance doctrine.
See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States,
A
First, formal compliance with the statute and regulations is excused when the informal claim doctrine is applicable. Under the informal claim doctrine, a timely claim with purely formal defects is permissible if it fairly apprises the IRS of the basis for the claim within the limitations period.
The informal claim doctrine is best described in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kales,
132. There within the hmitations period the taxpayer submitted an informal letter claiming a refund of tax. The letter did not comply with the IRS’s regulations because it was not filed on the correct form. The taxpayer later filed an untimely amendment that complied with the regulations. The Supreme Court held that “a [timely] notice fairly advising the Cоmmissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim ... will nevertheless be treated as a[n effective] claim, where formal defects ... have been remedied by amendment filed after the lapse of the statutory period.”
Id.
at 194,
The informal claim doctrine is well recognized in other circuits.
9
We and our predecessor court, the Court of Claims, have specifically applied the doctrine.
See, e.g., Arch Eng. Co., Inc. v. United States,
*1365
In
American Radiator
the Court of Claims held that “[i]nformal refund claims have long been held valid” when they “have a written component ... [and] adequately apprise the Internal Revenue Service that a refund is sought and for certain years.”
In
Western Co. of North America v. United States,
The informal claim doctrine is of no assistance to the taxpayer here. Compu-tervision’s original complaint was formal, and contained no specific suggestion that non-DISC interest was in dispute. The сomplaint simply alleged that “Computer-vision is aggrieved by the defendant’s failure to refund the interest attributable to the purported disqualification of [CVI] as a DISC.” There was no further communication from Computervision to the IRS during the limitations period suggesting that Computervision was asserting a claim for non-DISC interest. As the Court of Federal Claims found, “the original claim could not reasonably provide notice to the IRS of [the interest suspension claims].”
Compu-tervision,
B
A second exception exists known as the waiver doctrine. If the taxpayer files a timely formal claim but fails to include the specific claim for relief, the claim may nonetheless be considered timely if the IRS considers that specific claim within the limitations period. The IRS’s consideration of the specific claim is held to be a waiver of the requirement of the regulation that the refund claim “sеt forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.” 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(l).
The Supreme Court recognized the waiver doctrine in
Memphis Cotton,
In
Angelus Milling,
the Court held that the claim was untimely but stated that a waiver might be found where “[t]hе evidence [is] clear that the Commissioner understood the specific claim that was made even though there was a departure from form in its submission,” and “[t]he showing [is] unmistakable that the Commissioner has in fact seen fit to dispense with [the] formal requirements and to examine the merits of the claim.”
Various other courts and authorities have also recognized the waiver doctrine.
10
Our predecessor court also recognized the doctrine. In
Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. United States,
The central purpose of the waiver doctrine is “to prevent IRS agents from lulling taxpayers into missing the [limitations] deadline ....”
BCS Fin.,
However, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims that the IRS cannot waive the requirements of its regulations by conduct outside of the limitations period.
See Computervision,
Our predecessor court has similarly held that a waiver may not occur after the limitations period expires. In
Sicanoff Vegetable Oil Corp. v. United States,
The taxpayer relies on a few Excess Profits Tax cases decided in other jurisdictions for the proposition that the requirements of what is now 26 C.F.R § 301.6402-2(b)(l) may be waived after the statute of limitations has expired.
See Dale Distributing Co. v. C.I.R.,
Here there is no contention that the IRS considered the taxpayer’s claim for non-DISC interest within the limitations period. Rather Computervision contends that the IRS waived the specificity requirement nine years after the limitations period expired in an August 17, 2000, letter from the IRS to Computervision that included a set of interest computations applying interest suspension to the non-DISC interest. The letter also stated that “Revenue ruling 99-40 (Sequa) [interest suspension] is applied regarding the credit elect to 1983. No claim is necessary.” J.A. at 1405. Computervision cannot benefit from the waiver doctrine because the IRS consideration occurred long after the expiration of the limitations period.
C
A third exception, which we refer to as the general claim doctrine, exists where (1) the taxpayer has filed a formal general claim within the limitations period; and (2) an amendment is filed outside the limitations period that makes the general claim more specific. The Supreme Court described this exception in
United States v. Andrews,
Where a claim which the Commissioner could have rejected as too general, and as omitting to specify the matters needing investigation, has not misled him but has been the basis of an investigation which disclosed facts necessary to his action in making a refund, an amendment which merely makes more definite the matters already within his knowledge, or which, in the course of his investigation, he would naturally have ascertained, is permissible.
The Supreme Court thus recognized that an amendment making a general claim more specific may be permissible even when filed outside the limitations period.
The Supreme Court applied the general claim doctrine in
United States v. Factors’ & Fin. Co.,
Our predecessor court recognized the general claim doctrine in at least one case,
Cochran v. United States,
However, the general claim doctrine only applies when the original claim is general rather than specific. In
United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co.,
Here Computervision’s original claim was not general but specific. It contained a specific request for DISC-related interest which claimed “the portion of the interest paid that is attributable to the [DISC disqualification issue].” 14 J.A. at 1225.
To be sure the original 1989 claim included a secondary, general claim. The general claim was a boilerplate provision stating:
Computervision claims as a basis for the refund of the interest paid with respect to its 1982 taxable year such other grounds as are shown to be appropriate by the tax returns, books and records and the Examination Report and related Protest of Computervision and [CVI] for their respective tax years ended December 31,1982, and January 31,1983.
J.A. at 1228. In
Andrews
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the general claim doctrine was applicable under such circumstances. As here, the taxpayer’s claim in
Andrews
“not only called for redress of a specified grievance but demanded general relief as well.”
D
Where the general claim doctrine is inapplicable because the original *1370 claim was not general but specific, a related doctrine, the germaneness doctrine, may allow relief. This fourth exception only applies where the taxpayer (1) files a formal claim within the limitations period making a specific claim; and (2) after the limitations period but, while the IRS still has jurisdiction over the claim, files a formal amendment raising a new legal theory—not specifically raised in the original claim—that is “germane” to the original claim, that is, it depends upon facts that the IRS examined or should have examined within the statutory period while determining the merits of the original claim. Unlike the waiver doctrine, the inquiry here is not whether the particular legal theory for recovery has been considered by the IRS during the limitations period but whether the underlying facts supporting that legal theory were discovered or should have been discovered by the IRS in considering the original claim during the limitations period.
The Supreme Court recognized this exception in
Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States
This doctrine also was described in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Andrews.
There, in addition to holding that the general claim was inadequate because it was accompanied by a specific claim, the court held the specific claim was inadequate because it was not “germane” to the later asserted ground.
Andrews;
Other circuits have also recognized this exception.
16
Our predecessor court has
*1371
also recognized this doctrine. In
Addressograph,
for example, the Court of Claims held that an amendment filed outside the limitations period was “proper and germane” because investigation of the merits of the original claim “would have necessarily involved a consideration of [the facts the amendment depended on].”
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. United States,
Here Computervision’s interest suspension claim as to non-DISC issues cannot benefit from the germaneness doctrine for two separate reasons. First, the amended claim was not in fact germane to the original claim. The original claim did not merely claim an identical amount under a different theory. It claimed a different amount under a different theory. Moreover, as the Court of Federal Claims concluded, “the interest suspension relief that plaintiff is seeking is not a necessary step in completing the interest computation that was explicitly placed at issue in the Original Refund Claim ....”
Computeruision,
Second, as the Court of Federal Claims held here, the formal amendment was itself filed too late.
Computervision,
The same rule necessarily applies where the taxpayer elects to terminate the IRS’s jurisdiction by filing a suit for refund. While the taxpayer has the right to file a refund suit if the IRS has not acted on the claim for six months, the IRS’s jurisdiction over the claim necessarily terminates on the date a refund suit is filed. See Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2000). 18 The IRS no longer has the authority to resolve the claim, and therefore is without power to “allow” or “disallow” it.
We recognize that, as the taxpayer urges, two of our sister circuits have adopted a different rule, holding that an amendment is effective for purposes of the germaneness doctrine after the IRS has lost jurisdiction over the claim.
Mutual Assurance Inc. v. United States,
In any event it seems to us that the Court of Federal Claims was correct here in suggesting the rule adopted by our sister circuits in
St. Joseph Lead
and
Mutual Assurance
is untenable since it would allow amendments submitted after filing the refund suit to extend the limitations period indefinitely.
Computervision,
Thus this exception does not apply to Computervisioris claim.
E
For the foregoing reasons, Computervision’s interest suspension claim must fail. There was no informal claim, and the waiver, general claim and germaneness doctrines are also inapplicable.
II
The taxpayer also asserts that it was entitled to recovery of the non-DISC interest under the theory of interest netting.
Under section 6621(d), the IRS applies a net interest rate of zero to overlapping underpayments and overpayments of tax. Section 6621(d), enacted on July 22, 1998, provides:
Elimination of interest on overlapping periods of tax overpayments and underpayments.—To the extent that, for any period, interest is payable under sub-chapter A and allowable under subchap-ter B on equivalent underpayments and overpayments by the same taxpayer of tax imposed by this title, the net rаte of interest under this section on such amounts shall be zero for such period.
26 U.S.C. § 6621(d) (2000). Computervision argues that its overpayment for the 1982 year, which arose on March 15, 1988, the due date of its 1982 return, should be netted against the subsequently determined underpayment for 1982. Although the 1982 overpayment was credited towards subsequent years, it was not needed to pay liability for those years. Thus, according to Computervision, the overpayment retained its status as a 1982 overpayment until August 2, 1985, when it was finally refunded.
The government does not claim that the taxpayer’s failure to file the claim within the limitations period is a bar, because the interest netting statute provides for retroactive relief under certain circumstances. However, the government asserts that the doctrine is inapplicable for a number of reasons. We need to address only one because we agree with the government that under our decision in
Federal National Mortgage Association v. United States,
The interest Computervision contests arose prior to the enactment of section 6621(d). Section 6621(d) applies retroactively only under certain circumstances. 19 Specifically, section 6621(d) is “[s]ubject to any applicable statute of limitation not having expired with regard to either a tax underpayment or a tax overpayment” as of July 22, 1998. Pub.L. No. 105-277, § 4002(d), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), amending Pub.L. No. 105-206, § 3301(c)(2), 112 Stat. 741 (1998). In FNMA, we interpreted this language to require that the statute of limitations must be open with respect to both the underpayment and the overpayment.
A claim for a refund of paid underpayment interest is barred if not filed within the later of three years from the date the return was filed or two years from the date the interest was paid. 26 U.S.C. § 6511. The underpayment interest in this case is the 1982 deficiency interest, which was paid on April 28, 1989. The limitations рeriod for the underpayment closed two years later, on April 28, 1991— *1374 several years before the July 22, 1998, date specified in section 3301(c)(2).
A claim for interest from overpayments must be filed within six years after the due date of the return that gave rise to the overpayment interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000). In Computervision’s case, the overpayment limitations periods expired on March 15, 1989, for the 1982 tax year; March 15, 1990, for the 1983 tax year; and August 2, 1991, for the 1984 tax year. All these periods were closed as of the July 22, 1998, critical date specified in § 3301(c)(2). Computervision’s argument that the limitations periods remained open indefinitely while its DISC claim was being litigated is without merit.
Thus, as of July 22, 1998, the statute of limitations was closed with respect to both underpayment and overpayment interest, and thus Computervision’s claim for interest netting fails to satisfy the requirements for retroactive application of the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims is AFFIRMED.
CONCLUSION
COSTS
No costs.
Notes
. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6402(b), the IRS permits a corporate taxpayer that has overpaid its liability in one year to claim a credit for the overpayment against its estimated taxes for the succeeding year. 26 U.S.C. § 6402(b) (2000).
. The DISC provisions allow a domestic production company to establish a DISC to handle its export sales and leases. The DISC itself is not subject to tax on its earnings. 26 U.S.C. § 991 (2000). Instead, a portion of the DISC’S earnings is taxed to the DISC’S shareholders as a constructive dividend, 26 U.S.C. § 995(b)(1), and the remaining income is not taxed to the shareholders until distributed. 26 U.S.C. § 995;
see Dow Corning Corp. v. United States,
. Apparently, this amount was later revised by agreement to $2,102,421.
. The Tax Court proceeding remains pending with respect to certain computational issues.
. The interest suspension theory is described in our decision in
Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc. v. United States,
. There is a slight discrepancy between the award of $2,997,761.42 and Computervision's original claim of $2,808,888.
. The taxpayer may file suit for refund after "thе expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim ... unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time,” and must file the suit within "2 years from the date of mailing ... to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates.” 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1).
. In many cases, the issue is whether there is a substantial variance from a timely filed claim.
See Lockheed,
.
See Kaffenberger v. United States,
.
See, e.g., BCS Fin.,
. The taxpayer also relies on
Schenley Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r,
.
See BCS Fin.,
.
But cf. Kaffenberger,
. Computervision's original claim also included an "alternative” claim regarding the computation of the so called "DISC Commission” paid by Computervision to CVI.
. In any event, as discussed immediately below, the amendment had to be filed while the IRS still had jurisdiction over the claim, and the IRS no longer had jurisdiction once the taxpayer filed the refund suit.
.
See, e.g., United States v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc.,
.
See also Andrews,
. Section 5 of Executive Order 6166 is entitled "Claims By or Against the United States,” and reads as follows:
As to any case referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense in the courts, the function of decision whether and in what manner to prosecute, or to defend, or to compromise, or to appeal, or ta abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any agency or officer, is transferred to the Department of Justice.
Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933),
reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 901 (2000);
see also Computervision,
. The requirements for retroactive application of interest netting are explained in Revenue Procedure 99-43. Rev. Proc. 99-43, 1999-