OPINION
On March 20, 1977, the S.S. Claude Conway sank off the coast of the United States, and one Franco Matascone, an Italian citizen, died along with numerous other crewmen. The owners of the ship, Cosmopolitan Shipping Company, instituted this limitation proceeding. See 46 U.S.C. § 185. The mother and father of the deceased together with his brothers and sisters (“Matascone claimants”), engaged the firm of Due Dodson and deGravelles (“Due Dodson”), to prosecute any wrongful death claims on their behalf. Due Dodson filed a claim in this action on May 11, 1977, seeking recovery for the wrongful death of Franco Matascone under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.
The present controversy arises from the fact that on June 10, 1977, the Public Administrator of the County of New York was appointed as the personal representative of the Matascone estate in New York and was issued temporary letters of administration by the New York County Surrogate’s Court. On June 15, 1977, the Public Administrator designated the firm of Pavia & Harcourt as attorneys for the Matascone estate, and they, in turn, engaged the firm of Eaton, Van Winkle, Greenspoon & Grutman (“Eaton”). On that date, Eaton also filed a claim in this proceeding on behalf of the Matascone estate based upon the Death on the High Seas Act, supra; the Jones Act, supra; and the wrongful death action recognized under general maritime law. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Due Dodson now seeks an order from this court confirming it as the proper legal representative of Franco Matascone in this action and requiring the withdrawal of the claim filed by Eaton. Eaton, on the other hand, argues that it is the only proper legal representative of Franco Matascone, having been designated by the properly appointed administrator of the Matascone estate — the New York County Public Administrator.
Discussion
The federal causes of action upon which Due Dodson and Eaton seek recovery on behalf of their clients all vest in the “personal representative” of the deceased seaman. Futch v. Midland Enterprises, Inc.,
In the present case, the Matascone claimants have proffered no evidence that they are the duly appointed personal representatives of the decedent’s estate. This does not compel the conclusion, however, that the Public Administrator is the only party who can pursue these wrongful death actions. Rather, the Matascone claimants, or one of them, will be given the opportunity to obtain some kind of authorization from an Italian court to pursue these actions on behalf of the decedent as his personal representative. See Fornaris v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra.
Eaton argues that even if the Matascone claimants received testamentary letters from an Italian court, they would be without capacity to sue under the federal wrongful death statutes absent their procurement of ancillary letters of administration from the New York County Surrogate’s Court. This contention is clearly without merit. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra; Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
The Second Circuit recognized that conflicts might arise where both a domiciliary and an ancillary administrator are appointed to prosecute wrongful death claims; but it also recognized that these conflicts would “not be beyond just settlement.” Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
