35 Conn. 7 | Conn. | 1868
The assessors of the town of New Haven assessed the plaintiffs, by reason of their ownership of certain wharves and docks, and a certain building upon them, situated at the steamboat landing, in the city of New Haven, near the westerly terminus of the plaintiffs’ bridge, the sum of one hundred and two thousand dollars, and the defendant,
The first two claims of the plaintiffs are so nearly identical that they may properly be considered together. They are in substance that the tax in this case is grossly inequitable and unjust, because if sustained it amounts to double taxation; or, as is claimed in this case to be the fact, the property under the statutes as construed by the defendant, is taxed three or four times. This is said to be so, because the market value of the stock of the plaintiffs is to a great extent dependent upon the value of these wharves; and as the bulk of the stock is owned by the Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, the value of the wharves enhances the value of that company’s stock; and as a state tax is laid upon the value of this railroad stock, and as the stock is also taxed as the private property of its individual owners, it is therefore burdened with some three or four distinct and separate taxes. We have not deemed it important to enquire into the fact as to whether this property is subjected in some form to other taxation than such as is imposed by the statute under which the taxes in question were collected, because, as remarked by Ellsworth, J., in the case of the Savings Bank v. The Town of New London, 20 Conn., 117, “taxation at best is unequal and arbitrary, and under
Again, it is claimed that the legislature granted to the plaintiffs by their charter power to purchase a large quantity of land, in pursuance of which the plaintiffs did purchase a strip of mud flats on each side of the river, much larger than was necessary for the mere purposes of the bridge; that it must have been purchased for the purpose of constructing wharves upon it; that the plaintiffs very soon commenced constructing wharves upon these flats; that the legislature has since repeatedly had the charter of the company under consideration, and has made alterations in it, yet in no instanqe was the known use the plaintiffs were making of the property complained of; and it is claimed that thus a construction has been put upon the charter which can not now be disputed, or at least that the right has been acquired to so use this property ; and that it thus becomes a part of the appropriate business of the company to own and rent wharves; and that so, under the language of the statute, the property can only be taxed as a part of the capital of the company. We do not assent to this proposition. On the contrary we think the only appropriate business of the plaintiffs was the.erection and
Again, it is claimed that the plaintiffs have by prescription acquired the right to maintain and use the wharves and docks in question. The question in this case is not as to whether such a corporation as the plaintiffs exists. Here the existence of the corporation is claimed by the plaintiffs, and not denied by the defendant. The charter of the company is shown and relied upon as evidence of the power to hold and maintain these wharves as a part of the appropriate business of the company under it. There is, therefore, no room for prescription as to what is the appropriate business of the company as it affects the right of the public to tax its property.. That must depend upon the charter. The plaintiffs show their grant and profess to be acting under it, and at the same time are claiming power to do acts which are not authorized by it. These claims are repugnant to each other and can not be sustained.
The' remaining claim of the plaintiffs is that these wharves and docks are personal property, because, as is claimed, the charter makes them so. The charter provides that the “ bridge and all property appurtenant thereto, and vested in and be
Again, we do not think that the provision in the plaintiffs’ charter in respect to the bridge and the property appurtenant to it, declaring that it shall be considered to be personal estate, was intended to change the character of the estate, so as to make the real estate that the company purchased under its power to do so, personal estate the moment the company became its owners. At the time the charter was granted it was probably supposed that the shares in such a corporation might be considered real estate, unless some provision of this sort was inserted in the charter, as was afterwards held to be the case in respect to the shares in a turnpike company in the case of Welles v. Cowles, 2 Conn., 567; and to guard against 'this result this provision was, we have no doubt, inserted in
Upon the whole case, therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the wharves and docks were and are real estate, not used by the plaintiffs in the appropriate business which the charter authorized; and that they were therefore liable to taxation by the town and city of New Haven. We therefore advise the superior court that the defendant is entitled to judgment.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.