Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.
Thrеe Brazilian corporations brought suit against four American corporations and two of the American corporations’ parent companies. The Brazilian plaintiffs alleged thаt defendants submitted fraudulent petitions to the U.S. International Trade Commission and thereby induced the ITC to impose unwarranted duties on plaintiffs’ products.
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for laсk of personal jurisdiction. Because none of the defendants is located or incorporated in the District of Columbia, plaintiffs primarily relied on defendants’ petitions to the ITC (a govеrnment agency located in Washington, D.C.) to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The District Court held that the petitions to the ITC were not a basis for personal jurisdiction because, under the District of Columbia’s “government contacts” exception to D.C.’s personal jurisdiction statute, “entry into the District of Columbia by nonresidents for the purpose of contacting federal gоvernmental agencies is not a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.”
Environmental Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc.,
We agree with the District Court that plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants conspired with a trade association is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction.
The government contacts issue is more difficult. Plaintiffs arguе that the government contacts exception does not apply because defendants’ petitions to the ITC were fraudulent. Therefore, according to plaintiffs, defendants’ pеtitions to the ITC provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over defendants. The scope of the government contacts exception is unsettled, however, under the D.C. Court of Appeаls’ precedents. The D.C. Court of Appeals is of course the controlling authority for interpretation of D.C. law, and that court promulgated the government contacts exception. Wе therefore deem it appropriate to certify to the D.C. Court of Appeals a question necessary to the resolution of this case:
Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the petitioner when the plaintiff has alleged that the petition fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff?
I
In 1994, the U.S. International Trade Commission imposed duties on imports of ferrosilicon from Brazil. Ferrosilicon is an alloy used in manufacturing. In 1999, the ITC removed those duties after discovering that much of the information on which the ITC had relied in imposing the duties was false. The ITC determined that domestic producers of ferrosilicon had submitted that false informаtion to the ITC in two petitions (one filed in 1992 and a second filed in 1993), as part of a conspiracy to fix the price of ferrosilicon in the United States.
See Ferrosilicon From, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela,
Inv. Nos. 303-TA-23, 731-TA-566-570, 731-TA-641, 751-TA-21-27,
In 2001, three Brazilian ferrosilicon manufacturers brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against four domestic producers of ferrosilicon and two of the domestic producers’ foreign-owned parent companies. Plaintiffs sought damages resulting from the duties imposed on their products by the ITC, alleging that those damages were caused by defendants’ submission of the fraudulent petitions to the ITC.
The District Court stayed plaintiffs’ suit pending defendants’ appeal of the ITC’s decision. The Court of International Trade affirmed the ITC’s decision in 2008, and the Court of International Trade’s judgment was in turn affirmed by the Federal Circuit in 2009.
See Elkem Metals Co. v. United States,
In 2010, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants. We review that decision de novo.
See FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd.,
II
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ relationship with The Ferroalloys Association, a trade association that was located within the District of Columbia, establishes personal jurisdiction over the defendants because defendants conspired with that as
To establish jurisdiction based on defendants’ conspiracy with the association, plaintiffs “must plead
with particularity
the conspiracy as well as the
overt acts within the forum
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan,
Ill
Plaintiffs alternatively contend that the District Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants because of defendants’ allegedly fraudulent petitions to the U.S. International Trade Commission, a government agency located in Washington, D.C. The District of Columbia’s jurisdictional statute allows personal jurisdiction over a company “transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” provided that the claim against that company arises from business transacted in the District. D.C.Code § 13-423. Defendants do not dispute that petitiоning the ITC to impose duties on one’s competitors is “transacting business.” Nor do defendants dispute that plaintiffs’ claim arose from the filing of the petitions.
Rather, defendants assert that, under the government contacts exception to the District of Columbia’s personal jurisdiction statute, petitioning the ITC cannot establish jurisdiction over the petitioner. The en banc D.C. Court of Appeals has explained the government contacts exception as meaning “that entry into the District of Columbia by nonresidents for the purpose of contacting federal governmental agencies is not a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.”
Environmental Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc.,
If that were the end of the case law, we would apply thе government contacts exception articulated in
Environmental Research
and affirm the District Court’s ruling that there was no jurisdiction in this case. However, a subsequent decision of a D.C. Court of Appeals panel mаy have limited the government contacts exception to cases in which the contacts with the federal government were an exercise of First Amendment rights.
See Rose v. Sil
The D.C. Court of Appeals may answer certified questions from this Court that “may be determinative of the cause pending in [the] certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.” D.C.Code § ll-723(a). This Court has certified questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals when “District of Columbia law is genuinely uncertain” and the question is of “extreme public importance.”
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates,
We therefore certify the following question to the D.C. Court of Appeals:
Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the petitioner whеn the plaintiff has alleged that the petition fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff?
So ordered.
Notes
. The Ferroalloys Association was named as a defendant in plaintiffs’ complaint, but the association has since gone bankrupt and is no longer a party to this litigation.