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Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho
623 F.3d 945
9th Cir.
2010
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 grievous ambiguity that there is a conclude HOUSE, INC.; [Guidelines],” COMMUNITY uncertainty in the Marlene Smith; that, Greg Luther; Jay K. seizing “after A.

point everything from D. derived, Banta, Plaintiffs-Appellees, ... which aid can be we can make guess no more than what [the Sentencing Commission] intended.” Id. at BOISE, IDAHO; CITY OF Boise added) 138-39, (emphases 118 S.Ct. 1911 City Council, Defendant, omitted) (omission (quotation marks original). We believe that the Guidelines speak enough in clear terms Garcia’s Bieter, Mayor; Maryann David H. Jor “grievous” case is not a situation of ambi- dan; Clegg; Elaine Vernon Bister 4A1.2(k)(2)(A) § guity. See U.S.S.G. feldt; Eberle; Mapp; David Jerome (“Revocation of ... ... parole may affect Shealy; Chatterton, Alan Bruce Di 4Al.l(e) points § in respect to the rector, Planning Development recency of last release from confine- Services; Birdsall, Manager, Jim ment.”). Housing Community Develop sum, imprisonments Garcia’s for his ment, Defendants-Appellants. parole purposes violations count for the No. 09-35780. determining when he was from “release[d]

imprisonment robbery] on [his sentence.” United Appeals, States Court of Thus, Garcia was from impris- “release[d] Ninth Circuit. 20, onment on sentence” on [that] June Argued May and Submitted 2010. years less than two April before date he “committed the instant Filed Oct. offense.” Accordingly, we conclude that

Garcia “committed the instant offense less years

than two after impris- release from

onment on a sentence counted under 4Al.l](a),” §

[U.S.S.G. hold that the correctly

district coui’t added one criminal 4Al.l(e).

history point § under U.S.S.G.

Ill correctly

Because the district court add- history

ed two criminal points under 4Al.l(d) § and one

U.S.S.G. criminal histo-

ry 4Al.l(e), § point under U.S.S.G.

affirm Garcia’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

part public/private partnership of a building operated CHI homeless shelter and as low-income transitional housing. In and the City CHI agreed agreement to terminate the lease right manage building. and CHI’s City In building leased the (“BRM”), Boise Rescue Mission an organi- operates facility zation that as a home- single less shelter for men and that in- religious cludes its activities Christian pre-meal prayers. services and Belodoff, Legal Howard A. Idaho Aid purchased facility the BRM pursuant Inc., Boise, ID, Services, plain- for the option to an contained in the agree- lease tiffs/appellees. ment. Collaer, Anderson, Phillip J. Julian & agreed After CHI terminate its lease LLP, Boise, ID, Hull the defen- City’s but before the new lease with the dants/appellants. BRM, CHI, along with several individual

plaintiffs, rights complaint filed a civil un- § der 42 against U.S.C. Council, alleging, the Boise among things, anticipated other that the lease of the building to the BRM violated the First Amendment’s anti-Establishment Clause KOZINSKI, ALEX Before: Chief (“FHA”). and the federal Fair Housing Act Judge, STEPHEN Circuit S. TROTT additionally named as defendants the SMITH, Judges. N. RANDY Circuit (1) following Bieter, individuals: David (2) Boise; mayor Maryann *7 TROTT; by Opinion Judge Concurrence Jordan, Bisterfeldt, Clegg, Elaine Vernon by Judge Chief KOZINSKI. Eberle, David Mapp, Jerome and Alan Shealy, City members of the Boise Coun- OPINION (3) cil; Chatterton, Bruce the Director of TROTT, Judge: Circuit Services; Planning Development and and The underlying appeal lawsuit this (4) Birdsall, Manager Jim of Housing Boise, City arises from the of Idaho’s com- Community Development.1 and assumption twenty years ago munal almost Council, City, City and the indi- responsibility of shared for the care and vidual summary defendants moved for housing popu- of a vulnerable sector of its judgment. Of relevance to this limited lation—the homeless. appeal, the district court summary denied In City’s legislative judgment connection with the to the individual defendants as a House, objectives, Community group, determining they Inc. were not en- (“CHI”) City from in legislative qualified leased 1994 as titled either to im- convenience, mеmbers, mayor, City 1. For all refer the Boise Council and Plaintiffs-Appellees collectively as “CHI.” We municipal employees collectively the two City City and refer to Boise the Boise Council “the individual defendants.” collectively City.” as "the We refer to the House, grew quickly. Surveys Inc. v. less conducted in munity. Cmty. Boise, 1154, early 1990s showed a 20% increase in F.Supp.2d 1165-66 (cid:127) (D.Idaho2009) ”), community. II Boise (“Cmty. recog- The court homeless As in issues of material nized its Second Amended genuine determined that Complaint, Boise was in the throes of a qualified immunity on the precluded fact crisis,” claims, citizenry “homeless to which the Establishment Clause but because responded dramatic fashion. CHI de- explicitly did not the individual defendants immunity Paragraphs scribes these efforts 42-46 qualified at that time a raise claims, Complaint: FHA of its Second Amended respect to the defense with the court did not consider that issue. Id. 42.....In Director Michael sponsored Sally Hoffman actress Fields

We are now faced with the second inter- [sic], perform play that raised over locutory appeal this case. Because $70,000. Rotary Club of Boise com- appeal from a individual defendants denial $50,000 $25,000 mitted in in-kind summary on the im- judgment basis of services to address the homeless crisis munity, jurisdiction pursuant we have in Boise. § 1291 and the collateral order 28 U.S.C. York, Community

doctrine. Robinson 43. In June (9th Cir.2009). Center, incorporat- Assistance Inc. was Bylaws adopted ed and for the Mayor hold that Bieter and the We purpose raising develop donations members of the Council are entitled full continuum programs and services immunity for their legislative to absolute address the needs of the home- promoting approving actions in decent, safe, less and to establish a Community lease and sale House to the sanitary community shelter. Additionally, municipal employees BRM. January the Articles Chatterton and Birdsall as individuals are change were amended to the name of entitled to qualified because at House, corporation approved time the the lease and August Inc. In the Articles were sale, a reasonable official would not have clarify amended to purposes known that such actions would violate the corporation. Establishment Clause or the FHA. We therefore reverse and remand to the dis- agencies, 45. Social service communi- proceedings trict court for further leaders, consis- ty corporate community and the opinion. tent with this participated in fundraising, including Clinic, *8 Terry Reilly City/ Health Boise

I County Ada Housing Authority, Job Idaho, Service of Department Idaho of BACKGROUND Welfare, YWCA, Health and Idaho Vo- History Community A. The of Rehabilitation, cational Security Social Boise, cities, Administration, many like other experi- has Veterans Administration Center, enced over time a dramatic increase in its Medical Community El-Ada Ac- population. general popula- Agency, Way homeless The tion United of Ada Coun- ty, tion of Boise increased more than 22% League, Junior Child Care Connec- 1980s, tions, Boise, in driving up Army, City the late the local cost Salvation housing. employment Department, Because Boise’s Boise Police St. Luke’s opportunities keep up Hospital, Neighborhood Housing failed to with its Boise Services, growing population, the County Community number of home- Ada Ser- Services, $650,000 vices, Health nations and over from a loan un- Central District KTVB, der the Federal Home Loan Bank Devel- Oppenheimer Channel (“FHLB”) Affordable Bank, Housing Program. Morrison H.W. opment, WestOne Foundation, and FUNDSY. 1, 1994, City On November Council in- subsequent years, case and

46. Resolution passed approved which from individuals and kind contributions the lease of House to CHI. Albertsons and corporations, including City agreed building The to lease the for Hewlett-Packard, millions amounted to per year years, for fifty keep and $1 condition, of dollars. facility good maintain the in and repairs. to make needed 1990s, City early In the of Boise formally joined community 30, 1994, this effort and parties On November en- design, began working plan, with CHI to Operating Agreement, tered into an in facility help meet City and construct a new which the agreed and CHI “to work population closely together the needs of the homeless in developing compre- 8, 1994, February City strategy problem Boise. On hensive to resolve the 12635, which, City in passed Council Resolution homelessness of Boise.” The City granted right according manage to CHI’s Second Amended Com- CHI facility months, sixty for with a plaint, “recognized importance of es- renewal Thus, sixty renewed, term if very months. tablishing facility for homeless and Operating Agreement expire by income The Resolution low individuals.” its own terms on November City’s to enter agreement set forth the partnership into a with CHI as well. The Throughout management, CHI’s Com- day, City signed and same CHI munity emergency House contained an (“MOU”) Understanding Memorandum shelter, housing, transitional single cooperative public/private to “enter into a (“SROs”). occupancy apartments residence objective partnership primary with the be- men, women, Residents included and fami- ing provide housing comprehensive rent, occupants paid lies. Some and the communi- services for the homeless our $125,000 City per year realized around ty.” facility, The new to be named Com- rental income. From 1995 to House, munity would be located Boise $200,000 City gave year in per CHI over near the corner of 13th downtown funds to run CDBG HOME Communi- parties and River envi- Street Street. House, ty totaling more than million. $2 City would own the build- sioned Operating and CHI renewed the ing and that CHI would lease it from the Agreement five-year after the initial term facility “a City. operate CHI would expired, managed building and CHI ... homeless shelter and resource center nearly years, apparently ten without provide emergency, tempo- [that would] any major City. disagreements with the rary, housing for homeless and transitional Unfortunately, the harmonious relation- families and individuals.” ship between the and CHI did not

Both the contributed to began to Disputes last. arise between the *9 Community the construction of House. regarding obligations each other’s parties City million in The contributed over agreements. under the various In a Feb- $1.6 Community Development Block Grant ruary City, 2004 letter to the CHI Presi- (“CDBG”) and Home Investment Partner- dent Deanna Watson described its situa- (“HOME”) funds, crisis,” ship saying, put and a “financial “To Program CHI tion ‍​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‍as $400,000 just nearly private bluntly, money.” do- it we are about out of contributed 2002, through it February In December CHI fired its executive make the month. On City 6, Blickenstaff, and Mаnager director. Watson described Jan for the relationship during this CHI’s business City Department Housing and Commu- time follows: nity Development, responded to Watson’s request. and [C]ity,

The concerned about the adminis- CHI’s Blickenstaff informed legal City liabili- that potential trative issues and CHI had concerns about ties, solvency, withheld federal subcontracts with reporting, CHI’s fiscal controls Board, that until it message compliance, delinquent and and audits and adequate progress saw toward resolu- requests, reimbursement and he asked stability operations, tion and it would to share City plan CHI with the its for into In binding solvency. City refuse to enter new con- order for the to consid- City Community request tracts between the and er the for funding, Blickenstaff stated, City House. would need: Enter the Boise Rescue Mission. The A plan business that includes cash private organization BRM is a Christian projections flow and a sources and uses that provided has services to the homeless sixty statement for at least the next days---- southwest Idaho since 1958. The food, goal “provide BRM’s chief is to shel- 2. A disclosure payables of current and ter, clothing, along with practical pro- insurance, delinquency including status education, grams of teaching, Christian utilities, taxes, payroll, workman’s comp and work discipline with the aim of re- insurance, etc. ... turning poor, needy, and homeless to 3. The staffing plan position with de- self-sufficient, society as productive citi- scriptions for employees the new zens.” their [Please résumés. note that fund- raising eligible is not an grant federal City Management B. The Assumes activity.] Community House City eventually agreed and CHI mid-2003, City while the and CHI replacing short-term, that with a trying were still to work out prob- their third-party manager building of the lems, approached the BRM City about help keep Community open. That House, purchasing Community and the manager interim would be the Salvation City requested that the BRM submit a Army. February On the CHI proposal. August On the BRM Board support plan voted to the interim tentatively proposed operate the build- turn opera- over to the overall ing emergency shelter; as an homeless it responsibility tional House. single residency would also contain occu- pancy and transitional apartments City agreed to “bear all costs and occupied by would be those in a year-long liabilities not covered the interim man- recovery program substance abuse or em- agement operation associated with the ployment program. The BRM it stated upkeep facility during the interim would run Community House as a men’s period.” By signing a March shelter, pursuant policy housing its mayor’s letter from the recounting office separately. men and women agreements, agreed any these Watson 2, 2004, February

On Watson wrote to during period rents received this interim CHI, on behalf requesting paid would be as reimburse- $50,000 in $55,000 short-term help approximately financial to ment for the *10 munity emergency House as an paid expenses. to cover both City the had CHI’s City and transi- also with the homeless shelter a low-income agreed Board The CHI facility. continuing as formed to tional Instead of a a committee should be that facility, Advisory develop- and in mixed-use the Committee “provid[e] input expertise Community that plan management of recommended House permanent a for ing an meeting function “as asset in basic facility.” the in emergency needs of the homeless however, solution, interim This City Advisory of Boise.” The Committee take Army The Salvation did short-lived. that sharing emergency advised also shel- but, for Community House over control organizations with ter services such record, after unclear from the left reasons BRM, Army, the Salvation and local a year For next and only two weeks. might report churches be beneficial. The half, City operated facility, itself Community that recognized sale of $80,000 month to spending per around ought report House be considered. The running. Community up House and keep binding City was not intended to be on officials, help Mayor but to Bieter “in eval- Advisory The Committee C. City uating alternatives [the Boise’s] for mayor formed the Com- agreed, As Community House in the future.” Hoc munity Advisory House Ad Commit- Committee”) (“Advisory “explore tee Community and D. The Lease Sale may and strategies that enhance the role House to the BRM Community The Advi- mission of House.” the City June and CHI entered goal develop rec- sory Committee’s “was to contract, Management Agree- into a new a City that ommendations could assist the ment, which terminated CHI’s lease and future home- challenges Boise address Operating Agreement and transferred a for provide lessness and new framework City Community to the all assets of House. defining potential contributions agreed City parties The Community House make to this ef- could management all March pay costs from were six fort.” There members the programs 2004 “until are transferred vаriety of Advisory Committee with a wide entities,” manage Community to other (1) Reischl, backgrounds: Uwe a universi- long-term until a plan could be de- ty Advisory and Chair of the professor veloped, responsibility and take over on (2) Committee; Allen, architect; Greg FHLB loan. (4) (3) Dunn, corporate manager; a Jill Undaunted, Traylor, county a adminis- began exploring John executive its (5) trator; Wilson, plan Mike care options early health for such in when (6) advocate; Watson, published Request Deanna Presi- it for Interest/Re- (“RFI/RFP”). Proposal quest dent of CHI. sought any party proposals from RFI/RFP Advisory Committee issued its re- management interested direct or owner- port mayor May and the ship programs: of three facilities Recognizing that homelessness is 2004. House, Community kitchen soup run soci- enduring presence “an American Café, out of Baltes and Mello- the homeless “are often ety” Dee Thornton Childcare Center. pub- community forced to use services and very costly proposals due March lic resources inefficient Phase were Advisory required ways,” suggested Responding parties Committee interest, explain role of their describe the team that the re-examine the Com- *11 implement plan, facility the and discuss at that time a public would because auc- by necessary required tion was state statute. “funding and other resources to provide them transition the services response letter, to Chatterton’s the on an A short list of or- ongoing basis.” City BRM assured the that the shelter was ganizations would then be invited sub- anybody, “regardless available of their 2 proposals, mit Phase which were to con- religious affiliation.” The BRM also ex- sources, timetables, funding proposed tain plained why guests its male slept the budgets, manage- and a detailed staff and shelter, Front Street while women and plan. ment slept City children at the Light shelter: population The homeless difficult [a] City proposals received Phase population any serve under circum- organizations, including from several the problems stance. The are exacerbated BRM, Care, Laugh Day Giraffe Supportive gender in a mixed shelter environment. Housing Partnerships, and Innovative Inc. Further, it always appropriate is not (“SHIP”), Ada, February and El Inc. On families, particularly have families with very pro- CHI submitted short young children, sleep vulnerable posal stating City that “Boise ... must be facility the same as other members of ongoing funding partner[ beyond [an] the ] population. the homeless believe We distribution grant money,” of federal but it separate that our shelter facilities for actually any did not contain funding infor- men and women is one of the reasons mation. complete CHI submitted a more why police we have fewer calls our 17, 2005, proposal on April six weeks after Community facilities than House. document, the Phase deadline. In this Defendant Chatterton called the Boise proposed operate Community “to Police, City verified that the Front Street facility originally House as it was envi- nearly shelter had police 60% fewer calls sioned with some alterations.” House, Community than passed this City information on to the Council. proposed The BRM to renovate Commu- nity men, into a single 31, 2005, House shelter for May On City informed the who the time housed at the BRM’s BRM that it could not accept proposal its facility on Front If at that City Street. ac- time. Because the proposal con- cepted, templated House, a sale of proposal require Community City City steps described the it negotiate exclusively would have to with the take if it decided to property sell the Apparently BRM. concerned with the City stated Council would soon be men-only BRM’s policy religious and its voting on a resolution to move services, forward Chatterton, City Director of pursuant requirements. to those Services, Planning and Development asked for more information on these issues. In a law, In compliance with Idaho May letter, requested he clarifica- passed Council Ordinance 6402 on June tion policies on how the BRM’s would af- 2005, represented which superseding pol- fect “emergency shelter services” that icy approach to this issue. The Ordinance proposed the BRM to operate at the facili- First, things. did three the ordinance set ty. He asked for statistical and other decision, forth City’s as required by information on the BRM’s women’s 50-1401, shel- section to declare ter. Chatterton also informed the BRM surplus property that was underuti- that the negotiate could not exclusive- longer necessary lized and no ly with the purchase BRM for the public purposes. City gave *12 (1) it to bid City planning the that was not but its for decision: following reasons purchasing it the that would consider provid- did not include City’s core mission (2) terms services; property price if “the of there later ing shelter emergency purchasе acceptable.” in emergency [are] shelters shortage awas area, Community and use the Boise CHI, On behalf then-President Sue emergency “could an shelter House as Cobley only at the made the bid auction. (3) a community”; of the the needs meet buy property offered the for CHI to $2.5 to an emer- private entity manage trained ownership “equitable million of inter- its be better able to man- would gency shelter House, including in Community est” its shelter; emergency an age facility the as and improvements, personal prop- fixtures (4) converting property the to a use in Cobley alleged erty, accounts. the core that was “within mission accepted affidavit “auction officials the City than could cost more the City” would auction,” Community Inc. at the House bid pay. 26, July meeting, but that a “the bid, 50-1402, City Second, by rejected Council the refused required as section complete to transfer in accordance a minimum value for the the City the set requirements.” with the Ordinance Chat- million. property: $2.5 in a terton stated memorandum the Third, a City placed the deed restriction mayor and members that CHI’s council con- on which reflected its property the non-conforming bid “was auction homeless, a concern for the tinuing formal requirements” and recommended required facility that the restriction which responsive find were no Council there bids “as a kitchen years soup be for ten used stated, auction. Chatterton “CHI 12, July for the homeless.” On and shelter they have ‘equi- has demonstrated City amended deed restric- table interest’ House by passing tion Ordinance 6404. Ordi- pay facility. for the proрerty” sufficient that the be required property nance 6404 Acting authority soup as a and as within its lawful under years for ten kitchen used 50-1403, City decided to single, nego- “a minimum of section shelter for a 66[] men, lease, option, years including purchase tiate a a ages[ ] or older.” homeless[ ] City’s negotiations, with the BRM. In those reiterated intent This Ordinance a the BRM the same rent the existence of shelter for wanted $1 ensure had, homeless, is a of had while the asked market saying, shortage “There for an initially op- rate. The BRM asked designed emergency as shel- structures million. Therefore, price tion while the structure would ters. $1.8 City, meet by it could underutilized The BRM executed a lease and the community if it was sur- the needs of the initial September on 2005. The lease Moreover, plused.” Ordinance 6404 re- year, with nine re- term less than building be in a quired operated that the At year terms each. first the newal of one designed protect “the immedi- manner rent, year BRM would which pay per $1 community as a neighborhood ate and the after to market rent five escalate loitering. and from whole” from harm was million if years. option price $2 After that exercised March 2007. by sections 50-1402 and 50- required As date, sale, price to around $2.7 increased City published notice power million. retained no the auc- informing potential bidders that any control management exercise over July place tion would take facility. the BRM or the BRM informed the Before the auction required ‘dwelling,’” Section 5.2 the lease but did not decide the issue. facility an emergency BRM to use the Id. Based on that Community evidence (undеr control) Al- soup homeless shelter and kitchen. generated CHI’s up only *13 though these were the two services $125,000in annual rent from the transi- required, the lease the BRM was author- SROs, housing tional units and in which building ways, ized to use the in other such occupants resided for a up year “general programs residential uses” and half, a we had “little trouble concluding recovery. for substance abuse Minutes of part that at least facility” was in- a BRM meeting Board of Directors show tended as a residence and that therefore 9, 2005, by August that the BRM was still applied. the FHA Id. considering charging rent for on “SROs that, We held the single-men- because top floor.” only requirement contained in Ordinance City formally Council adopted Reso- facially discriminatory, CHI had 18765, lution approved which the lease to prima made out a facie case of intentional required the BRM. The Resolution that discrimination. Recognizing Id. 1050. operate facility BRM “on the terms that the FHA prohibit every does not in- generally set forth in City Boise Ordinance tentionally differential treatment and that 6404,” No. single-men- which contained the not previously “[w]e ha[d] adopted stan- only City restriction. The closed Commu- dard for determining the propriety or ac- nity 6, September House on 2005. The ceptability justifications for facial dis- reopened facility BRM in October and [FHA],” crimination under the we followed renamed it the River of Life Rescue Mis- espoused by formulation the Sixth and sion. Tenth Circuits: City repaid CHI’s outstanding To allow the circumstance of facial dis- and, so, FHLB loan “by doing obtained a crimination ... a defendant must show

release liability on behalf of both the (1) either: that the restriction benefits City of Boise and CHI.” The BRM exer- (2) protected class or it re- purchase cised option its January sponds legitimate safety concerns 2007. affected, raised the individuals rather than being based on stereotypes. Litigation E. only Id. The evidence the had submit- CHI filed suit day the same as the auc- regarding safety ted concerns was an affi- in July tion 2005. The district court de- davit from asserting Roscoe there in part request nied its preliminary for a police were fewer calls at the BRM’s sin- injunction, but a previous panel of this gle-sex facilities than at Community court reversed and remanded for reconsid- House. Although Id. 1051. this was House, eration. Cmty. Inc. satisfy insufficient at the time to our new- Boise, (9th Cir.2007) 490 F.3d 1041 ly-adopted analysis for facially discrimina- ”). (“Cmty. House I tory that, policies, recognized “at a question The initial previous ap- stage later litigation, this may peal FHA, was whether the applies which provide be able to evidence to establish only “dwellings,” applied to Community that its men-only policy justified is indeed House. Id. at n. 1048 2. We noted that the by legitimate safety concerns.” Id. Ninth Circuit had squarely “never ad- dressed the issue of temporary whether all We held also that CHI’s Establishment fit shelters within the definition of allegations [FHA’s] Clause the lease and sale —that U.S., Inc., F.3d BRM consti- sumers Union Cir.2003). (9th gov- by the religious indoctrination tuted pre- support sufficient to ernment —were Summary appropri judgment at 1059. liminary injunction. Id. discovery pleadings, where “the ate Amended Com then filed Second file, any materials on and disclosure July On on December plaint genuine no show there is affidavits summary granted the district court that the any material fact and issue as to on CHI’s to all of the defendants judgment matter as a judgment movant is entitled Clause, the the Due Process claims under 56(c). Because the law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. *14 and Real Relocation Assistance Uniform summary judg presented here on issues Act, and the Policy Property Acquisitions ones,” we need “purely legal are ment Cmty. Partnership Act. Investment Home cor only “whether the district court decide II, 1165, 1172. In at F.Supp.2d 654 House that, under the facts rectly determined addition, the de granted the district court were barred as alleged, claims [CHI’s] summary on CHI’s judgment fendants Exxpress law.” v. Clipper matter of religious claims for discrimination FHA Bureau, Inc., Motor Rocky Mtn. Tariff on disabili disparate treatment based Cir.1982). (9th 1240, 1250 We F.2d 690 not rulings are Id. at 1168-71. Those ty. facts infer accept those and reasonable us. before light in the to be drawn from them ences favorable to CHI. most judgment to summary court denied City and individual defendants FHA, remaining Establishment CHI’s Ill Clause, claims. and Idaho constitutional defendants, to the respect individual With LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY2 legisla- court neither the district held that are government Local officials applied and qualified immunity nor tive legislative immunity for their entitled to summary judgment. denied them actions, those officials legislative whether or the exec legislative are members II Scott-Harris, Bogan 523 utive branch. v. 44, 54-55, 966, 118 140 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. REVIEW STANDARD OF (1998). both to immunity This extends 79 injunc damages claims for a district claims for We review de novo Supreme v. Consum summary judg tive relief. Ct. deny decision court’s of Va. U.S., Inc., 719, im 446 U.S. legislative qualified ers Union ment based on Maui, 1967, 732-33, L.Ed.2d 641 100 S.Ct. 64 County v. munity. Kaahumanu (1980). (9th Cir.2003); Accordingly, must decide Mabe 315 F.3d 1219 lease and sale County, Bernardino 237 F.3d whether v. San Cir.2001). (9th the BRM an act within the the same House to apply We 1106 activity. Bogan, 523 sphere legislative the dis summary judgment standard 54, 118 S.Ct. Corp. v. Con- court. Motor U.S. trict Suzuki insufficient, woefully and CHI prejudiced is argues perfunctorily we should 2. CHI argument failing adequate- by immunity question be- waived the legislative has consider Facility v. Serv. ly it. Aramark Servs. "did not as- to brief the individual defendants cause Union, F.3d Employees Int'l Local Answer.” legislative in their sert (9th Cir.2008). n. 2 argument it was on how CHI's one-sentence A. The Members of the court acknowledged, and CHI does not Council dispute, that City’s actions were for- Although monitoring or adminis mally and indisputably legislative in char- trating a municipal contract is generally an II, Cmty. acter. F.Supp.2d function, executive whether an act legis 1166. In an attempt to sell Community depends lative not on defined categories of House at public auction, the City government acts but on “the character and passed Council Ordinances 6402 and 6404. effect” of the particular act at issue. Cine Ordinances passed must be by majority Burbank, Corp. City vision vote, must published be city’s official (9th Cir.1984). Moreover, newspaper, generally and must be read on question of the intent of the individual days. three different §§ Idaho Code 50- strictly defendants is off-limits in legis 901, 902. lative immunity analysis. As instructed In addition Ordinances, through- Court, the Supreme inquiry our into out the period the City was involved with whether the officials’ actions were legisla Community House, the City Council tive must “stripped of all considerations *15 passed at least three resolutions: Resolu- of intent and motive.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at tion which City’s announced the 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. CHI, partnership with Resolution privilege The would be of little value if whiсh approved CHI, the lease to [legislators] subjected could be to the Resolution approved which cost and inconvenience and distractions lease to the BRM. Council Resolutions upon of a trial a conclusion pleader, of a must also passed by be majority and, vote or to the judgment hazard of a against ordinances, like binding. are Idaho Code them upon jury’s based a speculation as § Resolutions, 50-902. however, are not to motives. subject to publication the same and read- Brandhove, Tenney v. 367, 377, 341 U.S. ing requirements as ordinances. See id. (1951). 71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 1019 City’s The actions were formally legislative We consider four in factors deter and bore all the hallmarks of traditional mining whether an legislative act is in its legislation that implemented City policy. “(1) character and effect: whether the act next consider whether We involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the for City’s applied actions merely a few indi (2) mulation of policy; whether the act viduals or public to the at large. The applies individuals, to a few or to the pub district court City’s held that the lease and (3) lic at large; whether the act formally is sale of Community House to the BRM legislative character; (4) and whether it only “CHI, affected City, BRM, bears all the of hallmarks traditional legis and the residents of Community House.” Kaahumanu, lation.” 315 F.3d at 1220 II, Cmty. House F.Supp.2d at 1166. (citation and internal quotation marks With respect, that conclusion was mani omitted). The first two largely factors are festly First, erroneous. the lease and sale related, as are factors, the last two actually an impact had larger on a group they are not mutually exclusive. Kaahu people—Boise’s homeless community. manu, 1220; 315 F.3d at San Pedro Hotel An act need not affect city’s popu entire Angeles, Los 159 F.3d lation in order to be legislative. considered (9th Cir.1998). It is sufficient that the act affects a dis The third and fourth factors are group crete of people places. or See Kaa easily satisfied humanu, (enactment this case. The district 315 F.3d at 1220 of a Co., ordinance, unlike of a Hotel 476. Because

zoning the denial Pedro generally legis- discretionary was a permit, conditional use the denial the loan parcels act it affects “all public lative because on decision whether disburse area”). within covered party, to a certain decision was funds hoc: not ad unchallenged arrayed facts Part C, I, A, B, opinion D sections of this public sup- funds in disbursement disputed lease and demonstrate that port necessarily means project one City’s inseparable part of the sale were projects being that other are not funded. attempt longstanding continuing always A can legislator’s decision almost problem, community ameliorate serious funding criticized for not some wor- a city indeed “crisis.” ‍​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‍CHI’s Second thy group. precisely type This is city- itself describes a Complaint Amended legislator for which a must be decision problem many private to which as wide immunity. To given hold otherwise public responded. interests well expose virtually every municipal would on to the put ask us to blinders funding judicial decision to review. which and lease. spawned context sale Id. We held that the defendant councilman leading Only ignore everything towе was “entitled absolute for vot- up dispute could conclude ing persuading or his to vote colleagues merely affected a few the lease and sale way one approval another people. Id. loan.” is whether Our final consideration distinguish *16 attempt CHI’s to San Pedro mayor council mem the actions of the and It wholly unpersuasive. argues Hotel is policy the formulation of bers involved mayor that the and council members “have merely An “ad ad hoc decisions. were any policy evidence of to produced not particular hoc” decision is made “with a related to address homelessness purpose,” distinguished from “a end or as facially discriminatory their vote a for Inter policy.” coordinated Webster’s New men-only policy approval and of a lease for Dictionary, Unabridged national cramped a below market rent.” CHI’s (2002). decisions, as a Budgetary such limit attempts of our focus to formulation posi an employment decision to eliminate only policy inquiry the here to the men- tion, poli typically involve the formation of only stipulation and the rent These issue. cy. Rappold, Bechard v. See of a subparts two matters are but small (9th Cir.2002). hand, On the other universe, larger examining developing and specific toward individu decisions directed and of the relevant universe the context als, indemnify gov as a such a decision disputed deciding acts assist us in the normally are consid employee, ernment they legislative essentially whether were Gates, ered be ad hoc. Trevino or not. Cir.1994). (9th 1480, 1482 F.3d First, mayor the aсtions of the and coun- again, fact that lease and Once the the up including leading the viewed of context cil members and sale to BRM out the only single parcel and lease sale to BRM involved building involved a the previ- making of to continue dispositive. questions of land is not We have whether public public funds for funds” to CHI. ously held that a denial “disbursements City consistently pub- entity for The contributed single purchase a loan to the Id. operation in the “involved formation of lic resources to assist CHI single hotel the $200,000 Community House: least applied public large.” the San policy Kuzinich, Cir.1982). years. ten per year involving When a case management zoning was forced to the of an emergency took over enactment or- $80,000 dinance, explained why: funnel into House each unsurprisingly— n month, it manifest need rule of [T]he for a abso- determined — transferring management or owner- lute in this illustrated case. ship long-term solution. provide legislators Here are involved in balanc- eventually Its decision lease and sell the ing against social needs constitutional facility organization to an that does not rights, balancing the kind of which often any public preserved receive funds produces opinions, and plurality almost worthy City’s projects. for other coffers always dissenting opinions, the Su- preme legislators These Court. now Second, ongoing policy, had an find themselves sued for the total of latest, helping provide since 1994 at the $2,500,000.00 general damages shelter for and services to Boise’s home- $5,000,000.00 punitive damages by a community. clearly less The MOU states business, plaintiff nearly whose as we City’s cooper- intention to “enter into a record, can from determine has not partnership ative with public/private day. been one shut down primary objective being provide housing Id. comprehensive services for home- community.” City kept less our words, In other it is not the within the looking for keep a solution that would province second-guess of the courts to open. doors of the shelter When it be- policy difficult legislators decisions must came clear that CHI’s financial difficulties simply make because a different decision improving, decided to might have been made weighing after bring in Army the Salvation CHI’s —with disadvantaged immediate needs of a group blessing if a non-profit see different —to of local against possibility citizens group operate facility could with less offending a constitutional or statutory difficulty. Army When Salvation right. City’s ultimate decision in this project weeks, only abandoned the *17 after unmistakably case was not ad hoc. Rath- management the itself took over of er, it City’s was the culmination of the Community House. a And when different repeated to efforts ensure that Boise ad- non-profit organization demonstrated its dressed its homeless crisis and retained a ability desire City’s to take the over homeless shelter. manage efforts to a homeless shelter— CHI casts its fate in large measure with which City’s policy would effectuate the of Kaahumanu, our decision in 315 F.3d at caring saving for the homeless while the case, 1220-24. analyzed In we the City money at the same time—the Maui City Council’s denial aof conditional chose that route. (“CUP”) permit use aрplicant to an who

Finally, the individuals involved in for purposes wished to use commercial her the what decision of to do property with beachfront in an located area weigh important had to social inquiry de zoned for use. residential Our was mands City’s designed ultimately inherent the of policy help to determine whether ing the against significant homeless the by indi denial was Council’s insulated the rights. Legislators vidual involved in such legislative doctrine of from law- balancing generally § are entitled to absolute suits brought pursuant to 1983. Accord- legislative immunity. Kuzinich Santa ingly, we examined whether the denial was Clara County, (9th respect with settled administrative to zon- hand, deny to legislative body, a decision whether it had its policy, on one or ing a laden all hall- policy legisla- of to Barker had the the characteristics isolated CUP decision, the other. Id. implementing tive marks an ad hoc execu- Thus, decision, legislative tive not a one. the concluded that denial Because we is distin- conclude Kaahumanu administrative, we decided the was case, from both this well as guishable were not entitled and its members Council where public from Pedro Hotel the San immunity, we did so for legislative to the aspect tipped funds of the decision two reasons. legislative immunity. scales in favor of First, was on the.cir- the denial “based by enough San Pedro Hotel itself particular case and did cumstances of our decision. support binding create a policy not effectuate discussing long-standing tradition rule of Id. conduct.” legislative immunity, Supreme Court Second, denying single applica- “[i]n legis- has that the frеedom emphasized CUP, change for a the Council did not tion worrying lators make without decisions comprehensive zoning ordinance or Maui’s about personal liability necessary pro- is it, it underlying nor did affect policies just tect the legislators: the citizens—not City’s budgetary priorities or ser- secured, privileges These are thus County provides vices the to residents.” protecting with the intention of by The its Id. at 1223-24. CUP terms against prosecutions members for their parcel applied only to Plaintiff Barker’s benefit, own but support rights rezoning applica- involve or an and did not their people, enabling representa- n. 7. rezoning. for Id. at 1223 tion functions tives to execute the of their in that reasoning To our case articulate prosecutions, without fear of civil office is is to demonstrate that Kaahumanu or criminal. manifestly distinguishable from case 373-74, Here, U.S. at Tenney, of which S.Ct. hand. actions (citation omitted). quotation marks complains specifically super- taken and to how to further policy sede old effectuate new decisions about problem City’s goal approach continuing fighting to a civic laudable homeless- for a searching prime example which reme- ness need to dy. City’s nothing final had city decision allow council members the freedom to administration do with the rote discretionary make important and difficult disputed existing policy. Unlike the deci- being personally without decisions fear of *18 Kaahumanu, discretionary sion the de- doing sued for so. directly important an

cision here affected Mayor B. The a City provided service the to disаdvan- Mayor CHI asserts that Bieter is not residents, segment of its and it did taged immunity legislative because entitled budgetary implica- with so considerable city’s a chief mayor “[a] is administrative 55-56, 118 tions. 523 U.S. at S.Ct. Bogan, official,” public a (“The signing the “act of con- [qualifying legisla- for 966 ordinance ministerial,” he “did vote tract is and not responsible the immunity tive for officials argu- on the Ordinance or lease.” This discretionary, policymak- a it] for reflected ignores Supreme ment the Court’s insis- ing implicating budgetary pri- decision the act question tence that the of whether an city city of orities the services the constituents.”). effect, legislative is turns the nature and char- provides to its act, any normally particular is acter not on although the Maui Council 964 at ernment for a

bright-line Bogan, inquire rule. U.S. court to into the Indeed, 966. the Court held of legislators....” 118 S.Ct. motives Id. an Bogan that executive official’sintroduc- importance legislative The of absolute budget signing tion of a local immunity system to our of government legislative ordinance were acts. Id. cannot be overstated: 118 S.Ct. political passion, In times of dishonest or Here, mayor’s office partici are readily vindictive motives attributed legislative re pated process in the entire legislative readily conduct and are garding Community House. Members of place believed. Courts are not the for mayor’s staff attended various CHI Self-discipline such controversies. meetings potential to discuss solu Board the voters must the ultimate reliance The tions to issues. discouraging correcting for such mayor requested February abuses. if it proposal CHI make needed financial (footnote omitted). 378, 71 Id. at S.Ct. 783 Committee, Advisory assistance. decisions, legislative legislators For their member, which Watson was a stated its citizenry are answerable to the to a —not help Mayor just intent to Bieter —not specters impeach- court of law. The City Council members —evaluate the best ment, recall, elections, lost and criminal respect course of action with Communi prosecution bribery and other crimes law, ty contemplated As by House. state enough against legislator’s are checks signed he approved Ordinances and public malfeasance. As a matter of sound passed Resolutions Coun policy, we must and should not add mayor cil. id. intri See Because personal liability financial to that list. cately City’s involved in policy decision provide homeless, shelter for the he is IV legislative immunity along entitled with members, the council even he though is QUALIFIED IMMUNITY an official. nominally executive actions, §In the doctrine mayor That the and council mem immunity qualified protects city officials a religious organ bers knew BRM was personal liability in from their individual only single ization and would allow men to capacities for their official so long conduct stay shelter does not our change as that objectively conduct is reasonable analysis. Courts be extremely must care does not clearly-established violate ful that of a legislator’s considerations mo rights. federal Fitzgerald, Harlow v. tive do not infect the determination of 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. U.S. 73 L.Ed.2d legislative: whether act is (1982) (citations omitted). Qualified claim unworthy purpose of an necessary to “protect[] destroy privilege. Legisla-

does not public timidity from unwarranted on the tors are immune from deterrents part public officials” and avoid *19 discharge uninhibited their legislative “dampen[ing] the ardour of all but duty, private not for indulgence their resolute, most or the most irresponsible.” public but for the not good. One must 399, McKnight, Richardson v. 521 U.S. expect courage legis- uncommon even in 408, 2100, (1997) 117 S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d 540 lators. (citation quotation and internal marks omitted). 377, Tenney, 341 U.S. at 71 “It purposes, S.Ct. 783. True to these “ our gov- qualified [is] not consonant with scheme immunity ‘gives ample standard

965 protect ing plan advising the Council.” judgments’ by and room for mistaken attorney ing plainly incompetent During argument, but oral CHI’s ‘all ” the law.’ knowingly “primary who violate them the movers” who those called 224, 229, Bryant, 502 112 deliberately knowing Hunter v. U.S. and in violation (1991) 534, (quoting 116 L.Ed.2d 589 S.Ct. law CHI’s demise. CHI “orchestrated” 341, 343, Malley Briggs, v. 475 U.S. qualification in this to our respect refers us (1986)). 271 106 89 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. in “[w]here Grossman that a statute au- “Moreover, because is an ‘[t]he entitlement patently thorizes official conduct which is than a immunity suit rather mere violative of fundamental constitutional from have liability,’ repeatedly defense an officer who enforces that principles, resolving im importance stressed the qualified not entitled to immuni- statute is possible at the earliest questions munity ty.” Id. Hunter, litigation.” in 502 U.S.

stage dispute, Given this heated and because deleted) (citation (em 227, 112 S.Ct. 534 accept we must the facts and reasonable original). Qualified immunity, in phasis light in favorable to inferences most however, only is defense available CHI, in these we hesitate circumstances government officials sued in their individu rule. apply the In- Dittman!Grossman to those al It is available capacities. stead, we examine this issue ac- Eng in only capacities. their official sued cording prong: to Saucier’s second (9th 1n. Cooley, v. 1064 rights allegedly whether the violated were Graham, Cir.2009); v. Kentucky U.S. clearly established at the relevant times. 159, 165-68, 105 L.Ed.2d 114 S.Ct. (1985). note considerable and We here some fog in the CHI’s perplexing record. Sec- recognize public employ We para- in Complaint says ond Amended as Birdsall and Chatterton-— ees—such it pursues 34 and defen- graphs will of carrying express legislative out the and dants Chatterton Birdsall their rely on its ordinarily are entitled to city event, capacities].” In that “official said Dittman Cal lawfulness. As we qualified immunity would principle of (9th Cir.1999), ifornia, 191 F.3d However, utterly inapposite. the district ‍​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‍in reliance on a public “when a official acts parties’ opinion court’s and the briefs and ordinance, enacted statute or duly every arguments give oral indication that qualified immunity.” official entitled being these defendants are sued their Portland, See also Grossman v. complaint’s capacities, as the individual Cir.1994). (9th 1200, 1210 F.3d ' Preliminary suggests: Statement rule, As to the Dittman!Grossman CHI, Plaintiff, monetary 3. The seeks however, hotly parties dispute spe damages, declaratory, injunctive re- played by role in this matter Birdsall cific Boise, City of against the indi- lief unexpectedly, Not and Chatterton. vidually who are named offi- defendants says its “did not vote employees, who employees municipality cials or sale of the or authorize the lease or discriminatory the Defendant’s redress “in building,” unmistakably аcting practices policies, under color of furtherance decisions made law.... state hand, CHI, on the other asserts Council.” added). Furthermore, (emphasis first City’s argument recognize that the “fails City’s attorney at words from the oral Birdsall] role primary [Chatterton *20 this is develop- argument appeal in were that about played wrongful in conduct and which, qualified immunity, repeat we A. may punitive has We lose damages. application no sued their official persons Q. Against the of Boise? capacities. A. Or the individuals.... opinion court’s district Q. you going go punitive Are after lumps together, and, all the defendants in you damages prevail? if all, denying qualified immunity to A. If the evidence shows and the court no makes distinction whatsoever be jury agrees, then a possibil- that’s capacities tween in their official defendants ity. ... capaci and defendants in their individual We simply cannot find in qualified anything ties. Given the rule that immuni ty in record that only suggests par- covers their either the defendants individu capacities, ties or the court only why appreciate al one can wonder district personal difference district court Chatterton’s between and official denied capacity § request Birdsall’s for the same if 1983 lawsuits. When the court asked during argument oral parties capacities and the understood this about the distinction defendants, employees and viewed being these CHI’s counsel could not only in recall what in capacities. complaint. Thus, sued their official it is an appropriate briefs filed both do time to parties republish not acknowl Supreme edge explanation or recognize important this Court’s im- principle. this Indeed, portant during argument, oral distinction. CHI’s coun sel manifested an intention to attempt Proper application of this [immunity] punitive recover damages from the individ principle damages in against actions defendants, ual saying that to leave the public requires officials careful adher- only as the defendant would deprive ence to the personal- distinction between them of that opportunity: and official-capacity suits. Because this court)

(By the apparently distinction continues to con- lawyers courts, fuse and confound lower Q. you looking Are money for judg- it attempt to define more clearly against ments the individual de- through examples of prac- concrete fendants? tical and doctrinal differences between (By plaintiffs) counsel for the personal- and official-capacity actions. Well, A. ... It’s what we are Personal-capacity suits seek to impose for, looking question but the is personal liability upon a government of- apply the court has the law as ficial for he takes actions under color of to qualified immunity. ... state Official-capacity suits, law.... Q. So, you’re looking money for contrast, “generally represent only an- judgments against these individu- way pleading other an against action als? entity an of which an officer is an A. If that’s what the evidence re- agent.” long ... government As as the jury flects and the determines entity receives notice and an opportunity that.... respond, official-capacity is, suit Q. If [the all all disap- respеcts name, individuals] than other to be

peared case, from the against is there treated as a entity.... suit you is not anything get cannot It from the against suit the official per- City of sonally, Boise in terms of compen- party the real interest satory injunctive Thus, entity. relief? while an award of

967 beneficial, mandatory. it is not Courts in but per- an official his damages against in only may their sound discretion can be executed “exercise capacity sonal assets, a personal prongs the official’s of the the against deciding which two seeking recover on a dam- analysis plaintiff immunity should be ad- qualified official-capacity in an suit judgment ages light in of the circumstances dressed first entity it- government look Pearson, must particular in the case at hand.” self. 129 S.Ct. at 818. 165-66,

Graham, 105 473 U.S. at S.Ct. right omitted). To determine whether (citations and footnotes 3099 established, turns clearly was a court second time on is here for the This case law ex Supreme and Ninth Circuit Court in interlocutory The trial is still basis. act. isting alleged at the time of See Therefore, given future. the distant (9th Kane, 934, v. 936 Osolinski in Hunter Court’s admonishment Supreme Cir.1996). binding prec In the absence of immunity as v. to decide issues Bryant edent, should look to available deci courts 227, U.S. at 112 early possible, see 502 courts sions of other circuits and district 534, this prudent” we “believe it at S.Ct. clearly estab supervisory our ascertain whether law is juncture in an exercise of up apparent to cleai’ this confusion power lished. Id. immunity as qualified and to address

now inquiry and Birdsall— This “must be under it relates Chatterton parties what both ask us to do. specific which is taken context of light in Mattel, Inc., Entertainment, Inc. v. case, general MGA proposition.” not as a broad Cir.2010) (9th 904, (Kozinski, 913 F.3d Saucier, 616 201, 121 533 U.S. S.Ct. 2151. C.J.). ripe The record as it stands established, clearly For the law to be do so. To fail to do so risks adequate to be right must suffi “[t]he contours court, a confusion in the district continuing ciently clear that reasonable official complaint, and a possible new amended that he is doing would understand what in issues not the case. properly trial on right.” Creigh v. violates that Anderson Thus, for CHI his word we take counsel ton, 3034, 107 S.Ct. 97 483 U.S. qualified im- question address (1987). necessary 523 It is not L.Ed.2d munity applies as it to the Establishment previ in “very question action has against and FHA claims Chatter- Clause unlawful,” light “in the ously held but been capaci- their individual and Birdsall ton preexisting law the unlawfulness must ties. relevant, apparent.” disposi “The Id. tive ... is whether it would be inquiry qualified analysis

A clear that his con [official] to a reasonable (1) whether, prongs: “[t]ak of two consists he con duct was unlawful the situation party light en in the most favorable Vance, v. 591 Norwood F.3d facts injury, alleged ... asserting fronted.” Cir.2010) (9th Saucier, (quoting violated a con conduct [official’s] show 2151) (omission 202, 121 (2) 533 U.S. at S.Ct. right”; and whether stitutional cert, original), petition emphasis clearly v. established. Saucier right addition, “[c]ourts filed, April 201, 121 2151, 150 Katz, U.S. S.Ct. of a stat have ... held that existence (2001), Pearson L.Ed.2d modified — authorizing particular U.S. -, 808, ute or an ordinance Callahan, S.Ct. (2009). which militates in favor conduct is a factor Addressing the 172 L.Ed.2d reasonable official conclusion of the test in this order is often prongs two *22 968 that constitutional.” the issue

would find conduct forfeited refuse to consider Grossman, note, however, at 1209. it. We do that 33 F.3d the individu- al including defendants Chatterton and A. Jurisdiction generally Birdsall did raise this issue their in support amended memorandum argues initially juris- we lack their summary motion for judgment. qualified to consider immunity diction They argued that their motion read fairly court Although issue. the district found— them, was all against addressed to claims qualified prong the first immuni- including the FHA claim. ty analysis genuine there were is- —that regarding of material sues fact whether Appellate courts will generally there had been a violation the Establish- not entertain arguments that not Clause, ment ended analysis the court its However, raised in the court. district we II, Cmty. F.Supp.2d there. 654 may exercise our an discretion to consider It go 1166. did not toon determine the appeal issue first if it pure raised on “is a legal purely issue of whether the law was question of law and the record is sufficient clearly so that a established reasonable to review the issue.” United v. States official would have known his conduct vio- 643, Alisal Water 431 4 Corp., F.3d 654 n. lated law—known as the “second (9th Cir.2005). Qualified immunity is such Therefore, prong” of the goes test. CHI’s an issue. v. Pac. Bibeau Nw. Research argument, our review cannot be separated Found., Inc., (9th 1111 n. 5 case, from merits of we have amended, Cir.1999), (9th as 208 F.3d 831 jurisdiction no to consider the issue. Cir.2000) (“Because qualified immunity It is true that when reviewing a presents pure question of law which we qualified immunity, denial of “our appellate novo, review de any by decision the district jurisdiction questions is limited to of law.” deference.”). court would be entitled to no Robinson, However, 566 F.3d at 821. we We have on occasion qualified considered power qualified have immunity consider immunity sponte. sua Graves v. disputed, even where facts long are so D’Alene, Coeur F.3d 339 846 n. 23 we version of “assum[e] the mate (9th Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds facts rial asserted the non-moving party by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Gomez, correct.” 267 F.3d Nev., Jeffers 124 U.S. S.Ct. (9th Cir.2001) curiam). (per We (2004). L.Ed.2d 292 have made such an assumption and thus prejudiced CHI will not be by our jurisdiction have to consider the second consideration of qualified immunity on the prong of It Saucier’s test. would be quite because, FHA noted, claims as we have incongruous public if a right official’s to an favor, assume all disputed facts CHI’s appeal immediate qualified from denial of dispositive and the fully issue—which was evaporate simply were to be addressed during argument oral one—is cause the district court failed or chose not only. law turn now We to the merits. complete the required analysis. Saucier Housing C.The Fair Act B. Forfeiture The individual did specif- defendants The FHA applies only to “dwellings.” ically raise the district court the § defense U.S.C. A dwelling is a struc- qualified immunity with respect as, ture “occupied designed or intended FHA urges claims. CHI as, residence,” thus that we find for occupancy id. dwelling “place not a but a 3602(b), likely or habitation to which § “abode overnight repose safety”). distinguished to return as intends one *23 sojourn or place temporary from the knew, As far and Birdsall as Chatterton Enters., visit,” Resort Lakeside transient likely facili- the BRM was most to use the Palmyra Supervisors Bd. LP v. short-term, home- ty only emergency aas (3d Cir.2006) 154, 157 Township, 455 F.3d proposal The BRM’s initial to less shelter. (citation quotation marks and internal was in 2003— the declined —which omitted). application previous This court’s the transi- proposed retaining longer-term Community House—which FHA to of the However, by tional and SROs. apartments question qualified involve the did not City’s responded the BRM time the the state based not proposal its did process, —was RFI/RFP preliminary in at the time of the record Community would be state that House building con appeal, when junction proposal a manner. The used in such SROs, emergency shelter and tained on the BRM’s “basic” focused instead a stay up to programs. residents would emergency where shelter Chatterton I, half. House how its Cmty. requested clarify and a that the BRM year religious af- men-only policy not determine wheth and services n. We did at 1048 to “emergency shelter services” facility under the fected the the River of Life er BRM. be 6402 offered Ordinances management would also a dwell BRM’s Community and which declared fact, in after our decision Commu ing. sale, property subject to surplus I, Idaho District Court nity House for an explicitly invoked Boise’s need case that separate a determined BRM Although the emergency shelter. issue, facility operated by as very provide under the was authorized lease BRM, dwelling. Intermountain is not services, required the BRM was additional v. Boise Rescue Mis Fair Hous. Council emergency provide only shelter services Ministries, F.Supp.2d 1159 655 sion kitchen. is evidence soup and There amended, (D.Idaho 2009), as 2010 WL that, BRM August as was late (D.Idaho 2010). 1913379 longer-term considering including still point- building. in the But CHI has SROs However, need not decide we suggesting that ed no evidence to the shelter as applies whether FHA with BRM these considerations discussed does, even it currently operated, because if or Birdsall. Chatterton clearly not established application that was not determined whether in 2005. We had clearly if it was established Finally, even met general shelters in the defi homeless Community applied FHA “dwelling,” of a and did House, nition could not have a reasonable official previous appeal. in the decide issue vio- single-men-only policy known that the I, F.3d at n. 2. Cmty. House 1048 It not until lated the statute. issue, courts considered but what Other had that we appeal earlier determined ap no on the FHA’s a fa- types justifications there was consensus could validate Compare discriminatory, shelters. cially men-only policy such plicability —an Foster, split. F.Supp. already subject 1173-74 to a circuit issue Woods ( I, N.D.Ill.1995) (shelter dwelling was a 490 F.3d at 1050. Cmty. House re- the BRM place questioned have no council the homeless other members because that the assured return), garding policy, Dix with Johnson v. to which (D.D.C.1991) (shelter stay City Light at the shelter on, women could F.Supp. (1) be safer to house men the BRM’s activities at the and that it would River facilities, even separate (formerly Mission women Life House) (2) police indoctrination, claims of verified the BRM’s fewer result actions, espe- calls. reasonable These were such indoctrination “attributable to cially considering that this court later de- government.” Id. at 1056. We assume discriminatory policy termined that deciding chapel without the BRM’s safe- legitimate, non-stereotypical based on pre-meal prayers services indoctrinate in fact un- ty pass concerns muster However, guests. the shelter’s we con- *24 der the FHA. Id. clearly it clude that was not established at of such the time the lease that indoctrina- D. The Establishment Clause govern- tion could be to the attributable Clause The Establishment ment. provides “Congress First Amendment The district court determined respecting shall no law an establish make BRM’s indoctrination was attributable to Const, ment of U.S. amend. I. religion.” government First, for two reasons.

Applied by states to the Fourteenth during period, “the City only lease Amendment, the Establishment Clause charged per year the BRM rent of for $1 all prohibit government does not involve ..., building premises[,] insured the religion. govern ment with It allows the for paid necessary repairs.” Cmty. organiza ment to aid to a provide religious II, Second, 654 F.Supp.2d House at 1162. tion long government as the action has conflicting the record contained evidence purpose secular have the does not option price on whether the of million $2 primary religion. of advancing effect was than less the market value of the I, Cmty. House 490 at F.3d 1055. CHI property.3 Id. We address each in turn. challenge does not this court’s earlier con clusion that the lease and sale Commu 1. Favorable Lease Terms nity House to BRM had a secular recognized As we in Community House purpose provide shelter for the home —to I, lease with CHI’s was more less. Id. at n. 9. 1055 than favorable the BRM’s. 490 F.3d at religious Government aid to a 1057. The BRM obligated pay was to rent organization will fail the effect” “primary year per years, for the five first after $1 (1) if in government test it results indoctri which to a rent would escalate commercial (2) nation; recipients defines the aid rate, аnd the maximum term of the lease (3) by religion; reference to creates only years. lease, was ten The CHI on the government entanglement” “excessive with hand, required only other per rent $1 religion. Id. at 1055. Because the lease year ‍​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‍its fifty-year for lease term. The BRM any sale to the did not define repair had similar and insurance re- body by religion reference and because sponsibilities under both leases. under the no con lease retained that, trol over BRM’s management correctly CHI points out al (at facility, worst) our here inquiry though focuses on indoc the BRM lease Thus, prove trination. lease, a violation of the neutral when compared CHI Clause, not, itself, Establishment show by must this fact sufficient to de Simply adopt previous analysis summary judgment, our on than rather the limited improvident. this issue be We preliminary injunction now record we had in the expanded have appeal. the benefit of an record offered to commercial tenants. That case Clause claim. an Establishment feat (cit I, not whether violate 1057-58 did address it would Cmty. Helms, v. 530 U.S. 838- ing Mitchell Clause if such a lease Establishment (2000) 147 L.Ed.2d 120 S.Ct. on the same terms as those offered (O’Connor, J., But concurring)). neutrali tenants. non-profit received other in the very important factor indoc ty is a oral pressed during argument When inquiry tends to show that a trination issue, plaintiffs’ their case on this best entity’s indoctrination cannot private help this case. It counsel cited does government. See Mitch attributed them. ell, (plu 530 U.S. S.Ct. At court has such a least one decided (“[I]f the rality) government, seeking case. Covenant Church Fairfax legitimate purpose, some secular further (4th Bd., County Sch. 17 F.3d 703 Fairfax terms, on the without re- offers aid same Cir.), denied, 1143, 114 cert. 511 U.S. S.Ct. religion, who adequately to all gard (1994), L.Ed.2d 888 the Fourth it is fair to purpose ... then further *25 policy Circuit a school of considered board religious any going that aid to re- say leasing facilities for an amount of public only furthering has effect of cipient the by entity. rent the of type determined Here, only purpose.”). secular not that primari organizations groups Student City the BRM in the neutral toward

was ly benefitting public the did not have to compared to lease terms when CHI’s its civic, Cultural, pay rent. Id. at 704. lease, actually got BRM the the worse paid educational a “noncom- groups rent at BRM would have been deal. Where the For five churches years mercial” rate. Id. pay to market rent after five required rate, the then paid noncommercial which that—(cid:127) years, guaranteed CHI was to the commercial rate. Id. at escalated fifty-year of throughout entire term charging 705. court held that never its lease—its rent would exceed $1 as churches the same below-market rent year.4 per non-profit groups the other would not vio- to charging If below-market rent a non Clause, late the Establishment but that on religious organization the same profit it charging them commercial rent —which aby worse terms than those received or termed “rent discrimination”—violated previous non-profit secular tenant would Speech Free and Free Clauses. Exercise indoctrination, government that constitute Id. at 706-07. clearly established was of law binding Faced with a dearth cаse Reading Jointly Room Science Christian subject non-profit on the of leases to reli- County City San Maintained (9th gious organizations a Fourth Circuit Francisco, 1015 F.2d Cir. —and (9th “rent amended, holding case that discrimination” 1986), Cir. was 1986), religion based unconstitutional —a leasing public property held that known reasonable official not have religious organization does not violate to Clause, that the as least BRM lease violated the Establish- the Establishment where City ment undertook lease was on the same terms as leases Clause. When rent, $200,000 argues expending over the correct annual rent it was also 4. CHI that comparison Community $1 between the two leases is the annually operations at to fund $125,000 per year paid over, the BRM versus City House. Once the BRM took reported City CHI from the occu- rent money was and use it for able to save ignores pants Community House. projects. other City receiving this fact that when the was Moreover, process, its the BRM was the although might there an RFI/RFP only entity proposed purchase issue as to the of fact market value of the Community property, House. Given that no other it would not have to a been clear non-profit organizations official willing that setting option reasonable keep open, shelter price able doors of the at million would Con- violate the $2 building the decision to lease the to the The appraisal prepared stitution. at the City BRM was reasonable. request accompanied explicit warning was that the million use value was not $3.22 2. The Million Price $2 Sale Knipe market value. City told the respeсt purchase, With option might the figure be used as an opening that, law gen case before 2005 suggested purchase during negotiations, offer but erally, a sale public property a reli required by law to put prop- organization than gious for less market erty auction. up for It could have hardly likely value would violate the Establish set price high- the minimum auction at the See, ment Clause. e.g., Freedom Re from possible est value and expect to receive Found., ligion Marshfield, Inc. v. any bids. The knew only that (7th Cir.2000) (sale F.3d con probable most sale price building stitutional even though city did not solicit $850,000 was somewhere between alternate bids: with complied sale state million. The property failed re- $3.22 law, purchaser value, paid market and the *26 satisfactory ceive a bid at million.5 $2.5 city had no responsi- further maintenance initially The BRM pay only wanted to $1.8 bilities); Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. Negotiating million. option million $2 City York, New 1348-49 of price, which under the in- lease would (2d Cir.1991) (sale constitutional where on, crease as time went seems a reason- value, party paid market land was trans- able solution the somewhat elusive con- private use, ferred for property and did cept of market value. appear not city any connected to in the Having received no viable bids at the way). But no in case the Ninth Circuit or auction, City was required begin the not elsewhere had held that a below-market process the entire the all over Be- again. would sale be unconstitutional where the facility cause the did not sell at auc- the organization important also executed tion, City the Council was specifically em- city policy and city money saved the —the powered by Idaho law to dispose of the situation with which we are confronted property however it believed was “in the City here. The give did not the BRM a [C]ity.” best interest the Idaho Code fact, in gift; it received substantial consid- 50-1403(1). § And it did so. from eration the BRM. In return for man- agement and ownership property, Even if the auction generated had City the was obligation bid, relieved of the and City viable the would not have been of operating shelter, costs while at required accept it. No Es- principle of same time ensuring City as a matter of tablishment Clause jurisprudence requires policy open. stayed shelter government that the choose a secular enti- Although Thus, purchase prop- CHI City. offered to its assets to was Chatterton erty est,” $2.5 "equitable for million of its inter- informing mayor correct in and council equitable CHI had no to bid. interest It CHI possibly pur- members that could not agreed had in 2004 to terminate the lease and property. chase the Operating Agreement and to transfer all of and Mayor it is Bieter Council members simply one because religious ty over Eberle, Jordan, Bisterfeldt, Clegg, Mapp, Having problems had with CHI’s secular. Shealy absolutely are immune from not past, in the management suit, damages injunctive re either work with CHI to continue to obligated lease and lief. The sale itself. opportunity presented another when BRM, as it was preceded House to the consistently providing late in CHI was City’s long partnership with CHI income financial and rental audits requirеd large funding, “re grants amounts allega- City. CHI faced an reports discretionary, deci policymaking flected a embezzlement, the President tion of implicating budgetary priorities sion that CHI had not been able admitted CHI [C]ity [C]ity pro and the services the money. track all of its properly Bogan, its 523 U.S. vides to constituents.” helping given had CHI a chance 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. homeless City ensure the Boise chance that place sleep have a City employees Chatterton and Birdsall —a nearly years. qualified ten Its decision are entitled to with re- lasted BRM did not spect a similar chance to the to CHI’s Establishment Clause and give against First FHA claims them their individu- violate the Amendment. At the capacities. al time of the lease to BRM, a reasonable official would V known that those actions would result have indoctrination or in viola- government CONCLUSION the FHA. tions of City and with the must satisfied and REMANDED. REVERSED the substan- as defendants on the Council KOZINSKI, Judge concurring: Chief case and with raised this

tive issues official in their Birdsall Chatterton facts, light in the most put The relevant *27 today has no only. Our decision capacities plaintiffs, much sim- favorable to the are As against them. on CHI’s claims effect you’d reading think the pler than after v. Supreme Court held Owen majority’s opinion: wanted to ad- Boise liability “imposing personal Independence, homelessness, it problem so dress have an undue public officials could It Community House. helped establish deci- on the exercise of their chilling effect over, the shelter eventually took closed ... no responsibilities, but sion-making liv- everyone, including tenants and evicted likely consequences pernicious [are] such It then leased ing longer-term housing. recovery possibility from the of a to flow year for a to a Chris- building dollar 622, 653 n. funds.” 445 public from U.S. Mis- organization called Boise Rescue tian (1980) 673 100 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d sion, at a be- option purchase an with immunity from have no (municipalities price. building, which low-market flowing from their constitutional damages had to eventually bought, Mission Rescue violations). a matter only We hold that as a shelter for at least 66 homeless include law, are be- individual defendants be other resi- could also used for men but pur- To purposes. reach of CHI’s claims. The Boise Council yond the dential at oral Two other suggested mayor approved individuals'—as the deal. sue these plan. damages, city helped implement officials by CHI’s counsel'—for argument at least one otherwise, legally Rescue Mission resumed or serves no punitive housing program permitted long-term purpose. cognizable overnight. It hold only stay expose virtually also indoc- otherwise would men ev- religious guests ery municipal funding trinated with activities. judicial decision to review.”). essentially Yet that’s what the facts, agree that the On those I individu- plaintiffs mayor allege city council mayor al are councilmen and entitled to legislation did here: wrongly approve sub- But I legislative immunity. disagree with sidizing the sale of a public lease and way majority comes to that conclu- building to the Rescue Mission rather than sion. It holds that we have to look at sell it Community House. The majority particular whether the lease and sale fit therefore right reaches the result on legis- into a to address plan broаder homeless- immunity, lative not for right but rea- maj. 961 (examining ness. See sons. “larger developing universe” to determine “disputed particular whether acts” were I disagree also the majority’s quali- with not”). “essentially legislative ap That immunity fied analysis, assuming even that by proach is Kaahumanu foreclosed v. plaintiffs sued Birdsall and Chatter- (9th Maui, County F.3d Cir. ton—the remaining individual defen- 2003). case, In that we decided that coun dants —in capacities. their individual See ty councilmen be sued for could their vote Eng Cooley, F.3d 1064 n. 1 deny permit a conditional use ad—an (9th Cir.2009). Addressing the Establish- (a ]”) hoc “disputed decision we distin act[ claims, ment Clause the majority acknowl- guished county’s from zoning broader edges that probably it’s unconstitutional to (the universe”). policy “larger developing public sell a building at a below-market 1218-20, Id. at 1224. The distinction is price an only organization offered using important discrete, almost any because it religious Maj. indoctrination. narrow denying permit— decision—like majority But the suggests also could part otherwise recast as be of some such a sale might unconstitutional if bigger legislative plan by and shielded leg city it would money save the some immunity. Legislative islative require religious group to “execute!] particular disputed act, turns on whether a important city policy.” Id. at 972. The rather than some nebulous “universe” of majority single can’t cite a case or reason policies, essentially related legislative. justifies out carving that exception. precedent. We’re bound our And every no wonder: Almost municipal Legislative immunity apply does to some service costs money, but doesn’t mean *28 actions, very including narrow core bud city give can away its sanitation depart- geting public decisions that affect the Muslims, ment police its department See, large. e.g., Pedro San Hotel Co. v. to the Jews or its schools to the Catholics City 470, 473, Angeles, Los 159 F.3d 476 of in an exclusive deal. sweetheart (9th Cir.1998) (single public loan of mon ey); Scott-Harris, see also v. Birdsall and are Bogan Chatterton entitled to 523 44, 47, 55-56, qualified immunity U.S. 118 S.Ct. from 140 Establishment (1998) (city very L.Ed.2d 79 Clause budgeting). Legis claims for a basic reason inde- lators pendent should not have to answer of every approving for whether the deal decision to appropriate public here clearly resources to was unconstitutional at the project one of instead another. time: They See San didn’t make the decision to Hotel, (“This Pedro 159 F.3d at 476 lease is and sell House to an precisely the type organization of decision for which a on discriminated the ba- legislator given must immunity. sis of religion. complaint To accused

975 depart But I no policies nity. of see reason from only “implementing of them doing precedent our so. Boise,” and we shouldn’t con- City of allegations sider additional Dream

“newly appeal. minted” on See Onsite, Ariz., Inc. v. PC

Games of (9th Cir.2009); 983, 995-96

F.3d Crawford (9th n. F.3d Lungren,

v.

Cir.1996). do, if sim- Even we Chatterton Karey LUCHTEL, R. Plaintiff- processes, auction ran the RFP and ply Appellant, helped prepare the meetings attended and approval. ap- Birdsall lease for Council v. played negotiating no role in

parently HAGEMANN, Officer Clark a Seattle and sale. Their conduct isn’t what lease Officer, Police in his individual and alleged Establishment triggered сapacity; official Officer Thomas Garcetti, v. problem. See Whitaker Clause Hanley, Officer, a Seattle Police in his Cir.2007) (“[A]n (9th 486 F.3d capacity; individual and official SPD quali- of stripped individual defendant is Officers J. # 1 and # Doe J. Doe immunity only if he violat- personally fied identity presently unknown, whose rights.”). plaintiffs ed a constitutional capaci in their individual and official ties; Kerlikowske, Police, Gil Chief of qualified have Birdsall Chatterton capacity; in his individual and official Housing from the Fair Act 3-7, Supervisory # John and Jane Doe They reasons. didn’t claims similar Seattle, Police Officers of the men-only policy authorized approve the identity and number whom are by the Res city implemented council and unknown, presently in their individual California, cue Mission. See Dittman v. capacities; Richard official (9th Cir.1999) 1020, 1027 191 F.3d Doe, municipal policymakers Jane 1-5 (“[W]hen public official acts in reliance city Seattle, identity ordinance, duly on a enacted statute or presently number of whom are un ordinarily quali is entitled to that official known, in individual and their official immunity.”); fied Grossman Seattle, capacities; City of a Munici (9th Portland, 1200, 1209 33 F.3d Cir. pal Corporation, Defendants-Appel 1994). they reasonably And could have lees. justified by policy believed No. 09-35446. Cmty. legitimate safety concerns. See House, Boise, Inc. v. Appeals, States United Court (9th Cir.2007). 1050-51 We need cast Ninth Circuit. does, doubt, majority published as the *29 argument Submitted without that had “little opinion by previous panel 11, 2009. Dec. concluding apply that the Act did

trouble” withdrawn Feb. 2010. Submission operat parts building to at least by the Rescue ‍​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‍Mission before the sale. ed May Argued and Submitted 2; maj. n. see at 969. Id. at 1047-48 & 7, 2010. Filed Oct. majority, I would hold that the Like to immu-

individual defendants are entitled

Case Details

Case Name: Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 6, 2010
Citation: 623 F.3d 945
Docket Number: 09-35780
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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