9 Kan. 635 | Kan. | 1872
The opinion of the court was delivered by
In 1867 there was a criminal action for murder in the first degree pending in Riley county. The action was commenced in that county, and the offense was-charged to have been committed there. The action was taken on change of venue from Riley county to Davis county. At the March Term 1867 of the district court of Davis county-said action was tried before a jury composed of residents of Davis county. On the 6th of April 1870 the board of county commissioners of Davis county allowed and paid the bill for the services of said jurors. On the 10th of July, 1871, said.
Conceding, for the purposes of the case, that every question except the one hereinafter mentioned must be decided in favor ■of Davis county, and still we think that the decision of that ..one question will require a decision of this case against Davis • county. That question is, whether this action is barred by a .certain statute of limitations. Or perhaps more properly . speaking the question is, whether the claim itself upon which this action is founded was not barred before any cause of .action ever accrued thereon against Riley county, and in . favor of Davis county. The said statute reads as follows:
“Sec. 47. No account against the county shall be allowed unless presented within two yeafe after the same accrued; Provided, That if any person having a claim against a county be, at the time the same accrues, under any legal disability, .every such person shall be entitled to present the same within •one year after such disability shall be removed.” (Gen. Stat., . 264.)
This statute goes back to the very foundation upon which this action is founded. It does not merely stop with limiting . an action on the claim, but it goes further back and limits the claim itself; or rather, it limits the time within which - the claim must be presented for allowance. It not only bars : an action on the claim after two years have elapsed from the time it accrued, but it bars the claim itself. We suppose it • will be conceded that if Riley county was primarily and originally bound to pay said jurors, that the claim was barred long before it was presented to the commissioners of Riley county