COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Edward Stanslaus ZAKRZEWSKI, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
March 18, 1975.
333 A.2d 898 | 460 Pa. 528
Argued April 26, 1974.
Judgment of sentence of the court below is affirmed.
JONES, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Milton O. Moss, Dist. Atty., William T. Nicholas, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., Stewart J. Greenleaf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appellate Div., Norristown, for appellee.
Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POMEROY, Justice.
On July 16, 1972, appellant, Edward Zakrzewski, was charged with the murder of one John Higgins. Upon the return of an indictment for the crime, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and moved for the suppression of a confession which he had given the police subsequent to his arrest. Concluding that the confession had been voluntarily made, the suppression court denied the motion. Appellant then, upon the advice of counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to murder generally. This plea was conditioned upon his right to withdraw it and proceed to trial should the court determine that the killing rose to murder in the first degree. A degree of guilt hearing was then conducted, at the conclusion of which the court found appellant guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced him to not less than ten and not more than twenty years imprisonment. This appeal followed.1
In the case at bar appellant has made no claim, much less demonstrated, that his trial counsel was ineffective.3 Indeed, a careful review of the record reveals that defense counsel‘s conclusion that it was in appellant‘s best interests to plead guilty was reasonable under the circumstances. We, therefore, reject appellant‘s
Zakrzewski has filed with this Court a document in the nature of a brief or petition, prepared by himself, asserting that his plea was the result of assurances made to him by his lawyer that the District Attorney and the trial court had agreed to the imposition of a sentence not to exceed seven to fifteen years in exchange for his plea of guilty to murder generally.
It is settled that where a plea bargain has been entered into and is violated by the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled, at the least, to the benefit of the bargain. Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971). See Commonwealth v. Hosack, 459 Pa. 27, 326 A.2d 352 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hauser, 450 Pa. 388, 299 A.2d 218 (1973); Commonwealth v. Barrett, 223 Pa. Super. 163, 299 A.2d 30 (1972). See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). But see Commonwealth v. Wilkens, 442 Pa. 524, 277 A.2d 341 (1971). It is equally settled that a trial court may not, consistently with the requirements of due process participate in a plea bargain, Commonwealth v. Sanutti, 454 Pa. 344, 312 A.2d 42 (1973); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969); and that a defendant‘s undispelled misapprehension that the court is bound by such an agreement is fatal to the validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 449 Pa. 76, 295 A.2d 272 (1972). Appellant‘s allegation is a serious one, therefore, and if there were any possibility that it were true, we would remand for
The record before us, however, contains an extensive colloquy among the trial judge, Zakrzewski and the latter‘s lawyer as to the existence or non-existence of a plea bargain. The trial court, in compliance with the directive contained in Commonwealth v. Alvarado, supra, 442 Pa. at 519-520, 276 A.2d at 528, inquired of both the appellant and his counsel whether any agreement had been entered into concerning the length of sentence to be imposed. Both answered explicitly in the negative. At three different times the court inquired of appellant whether he understood that it was within the court‘s power to impose the maximum sentence upon him; in each instance, appellant himself responded affirmatively. There is not the slightest intimation that there was any plea bargain. In the absence of any suggestion by appellant that he was not truthful because he was threatened or “coached“, or because of some other reason that would necessarily be outside the record before us the exhaustive colloquy conducted below provides us with a sufficient factual basis for assessing appellant‘s claim and for concluding, as we do, that it is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
ROBERTS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NIX, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MANDERINO, J., joins.
ROBERTS, Justice (concurring).
I remain of the view that “if appellant can establish that his confession was in fact unconstitutionally ob-
However, I conclude after reviewing the record that the suppression court‘s finding that appellant‘s confession was, in the totality of the circumstances, a voluntary one is supported by the record. Because appellant has thus failed to establish that his guilty plea was induced by an unconstitutionally obtained confession, I concur in the result.
While concurring in the result, I agree with the observations of Mr. Justice Nix on the impropriety of considering in this proceeding the effectiveness of appellant‘s counsel in the trial court.
NIX, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. My views, as expressed in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 355, 296 A.2d 823, 828 (1972), that appellant need not demonstrate that his plea was entered as a result of incompetent advice of counsel, remains unaltered. The facts of this case only highlight the absurdity of the third requirement under the Marsh test. Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A.2d 481 (1970). Here appellant is represented by the same counsel who represented him at the time of the entry of the plea. The issue which the majority now demands this appellant to pursue if he is to be allowed to attack the constitutionality of the circumstances under which the confession was obtained is the effectiveness of his present counsel in advising appellant to enter the plea.
The majority contends that the record is sufficient for us to make this determination without any recognition of the fact that appellant is severely compromised in this appeal because he lacks objective guidance on this issue. In Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974), we refused to find a waiver of the effectiveness of counsel claim under the Post Conviction Hearing Act1 although it had not been raised on direct appeal, because appellant had been represented in that appeal by a member of the same office that represented him at trial. There we said “the law will not assume that counsel had advised his client of his inadequacies or those of his associates.” Id. at 377, 316 A.2d at 898. Cf. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).
The clear rationale expressed by this Court in Via, supra, is that a party who is called upon to meet the issue of his counsel‘s incompetence is in fact uncounselled. The majority while recognizing this principle2 suggests that although the issue of counsel‘s stewardship at the time of the entry of the plea remains open for collateral attack, nevertheless, ignores the principle when it attempts to apply the Marsh formulation in this instance. The absurdity of such reasoning in my judgment is obvious.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissent.