COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. MARCUS WOMACK, Appellant
No. 110 MAP 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
May 31, 2024
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: May 31, 2024
I. Introduction
In this discretionary appeal, we consider the computation of time for the purposes of
II. Background
On October 6, 2017, law enforcement officers, including Pennsylvania State Trooper Andrew Corl, executed a search warrant at the home of Tyler and Bobbi Martin in Huntingdon County. The search followed a year-long investigation, which revealed that Appellant, Marcus Womack, had been selling drugs from that location. During the search, law enforcement officers recovered from Appellant‘s person a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. They also found an additional stolen firearm elsewhere in the residence. Appellant was placed under arrest. That same day, Trooper Corl filed a criminal complaint (“first complaint“), charging Appellant with nine offenses, including possession with intent to deliver (“PWID“), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The trial court set Appellant‘s bail at $250,000.00. Unable to post bail, Appellant remained in custody.
Following the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Corl learned from the Martins and other arrestees more information about the scope of Appellant‘s drug enterprise, which extended to both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Law enforcement officers executed additional search warrants. Trooper Corl also reviewed data from Appellant‘s cell phone, which had been seized during the search that took place on October 6, 2017. His preliminary review of this information revealed the possibility of a more sophisticated operation than originally anticipated. Based on the foregoing, the Huntingdon County District Attorney‘s Office sought the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG“) in pursuing additional charges.
The OAG accepted jurisdiction and submitted the case to a statewide investigating grand jury. During this time, at the request of the OAG, the Huntingdon County District Attorney‘s Office placed the first complaint on hold. The grand jury investigation commenced in late 2017 and ended on October 23, 2018.1 On October 31, 2018, the Commonwealth filed another criminal complaint (“second complaint“), charging Appellant with a total of twenty-eight offenses including four counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, and two counts of corrupt organizations. The charges alleged in the second complaint were not identical to the first complaint but were based upon evidence gathered
by law enforcement before, during, and shortly after Appellant‘s arrest and the filing of charges in the first complaint. The OAG‘s grand jury investigation also led to the arrest of over thirty other individuals for drug-related criminal activity.
On February 13, 2019, Appellant moved to dismiss the second complaint pursuant to
On September 6, 2019, at a pre-trial conference, Appellant rejected the Commonwealth‘s plea offer of 11½ to 23 years’ imprisonment, asserting the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the second complaint under Rule 600. In light of this, Appellant asked the trial court to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal nunc pro tunc. Though the trial court granted this request, Appellant failed to file such appeal and instead filed another Rule 600 motion alleging the Commonwealth attempted to
circumvent Rule 600 by filing two criminal complaints based on the same criminal conduct. The trial court similarly denied this motion on August 11, 2020.3
On October 8, 2020, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on the second complaint. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the following offenses: three counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity, corrupt organizations, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and criminal use of a communication facility. He was acquitted of the remaining charges. On November 12, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years’ imprisonment. He received 224 days of credit for time served from October 6, 2017 to April 10, 2018. This spanned the period of time between Appellant‘s arrest on the first complaint and the date the state parole detainer was lodged. He timely appealed to the Superior Court, maintaining the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the second complaint and asserting that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint.
The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous, unpublished memorandum decision. See Commonwealth v. Womack, 445 EDA 2021; 2022 WL 1284618 (Pa. Super. filed April 29, 2022). The court recognized that “Rule 600 does not specify which start date to use when two complaints are filed against one defendant,” but explained that “the second complaint generally provides the starting point for the calculation” where “the first complaint was properly dismissed.” Id. at *6 (citing Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 A.2d 367, 370 (Pa. 1981)). It noted, however, that if the Commonwealth attempts to circumvent Rule 600, then the first complaint becomes the starting point for calculation purposes. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court also noted that the Commonwealth “does not get the benefit of the filing date of an identical second complaint” where it fails to exercise due diligence in “prosecuting its first complaint.” Id. (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808).
The court then discussed two cases it found particularly instructive. It first recounted this Court‘s decision in Commonwealth v. Earp, 382 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1978). Id. Earp was charged with murder, conspiracy, and other offenses. Both the murder and conspiracy charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing, while the remaining offenses were held for court. The Commonwealth subsequently arrested Earp for the same murder and conspiracy, which kept him confined between his first arrest and trial. Id. (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1216). A plurality of this Court determined that the speedy trial period “begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction.” Id. (quoting Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217). It also found instructive Commonwealth v. Simms, 500 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1985), which involved a two-complaint scenario with different charges.4 Id. There, the Commonwealth initially filed a complaint charging Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim‘s death, filed a second complaint charging Simms with criminal homicide. Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802). In finding that the date of the second complaint controlled, this Court held that “[i]n cases where an aggravated assault charge is filed, the victim later dies, and, thereafter, a homicide complaint is filed, the [speedy trial] period for trial on the homicide charge should
be deemed to commence with the filing of the latter complaint.5 Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 804).
Based on the foregoing, the court discerned no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court‘s decision denying Appellant‘s motion to dismiss the second complaint. In its view, based on Simms, “[t]he difference between the offenses charged in the complaints demonstrates that the Commonwealth did not try to circumvent Rule 600.” Id. at *7 (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 803-04). As the second complaint was filed on October 31, 2018, the court used this as the starting point for its Rule 600 calculations. It explained that approximately 230 days of pre-trial delay were caused by Appellant. The court also recognized that Rule 600 was suspended from March 16, 2020 through October 8, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus time excludable. Even so, the court highlighted its skepticism concerning “the Commonwealth‘s tactics in leaving [the first complaint] open despite not intending to prosecute it.” Id. at *8. It nevertheless concluded that the Commonwealth‘s lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint was “irrelevant [to] the Rule 600 calculation of [the second complaint].” Id. The court therefore affirmed Appellant‘s judgment of sentence.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted to consider the following question:
Does Rule 600 run from the first or second criminal complaint when the first complaint is still pending against a defendant who is in pretrial detention andthe second complaint is premised on grand jury proceedings that subsumed the case underlying the first complaint?
Commonwealth v. Womack, 288 A.3d 865 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam).
III. Parties’ Arguments
Appellant asks this Court to find that “Rule 600 runs from the filing date of a first complaint unless the Commonwealth demonstrates that it exercised due diligence throughout the prosecution of the two complaints, which also focuses on the period of delay between the filing of the two complaints.” Appellant‘s Brief at 29. Turning to the plain language of Rule 600, Appellant argues the rule clearly establishes that due diligence is required to obtain the benefit of prosecution. He then notes that the Comment to Rule 600 states:
In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when . . . the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence . . . .
Id. at 31 (quoting
With regard to investigating grand juries, Appellant notes the Commonwealth is not required to submit its case to one in order to prosecute. Nor does any law prevent the prosecutor from withdrawing from one where it is apparent investigation is no longer necessary. He therefore concludes that requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate the reasonable necessity of an investigating grand jury would not disturb the prosecutor‘s authority and would advance the dual purposes of Rule 600, those being “more effectively protect[ing] the right of criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and the efficient
administration of justice.” Id. at 32-33 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2021) (additional quotations omitted)). Appellant asserts that due diligence here would require the Commonwealth to present some evidence to justify his continued detention and the lack of action on his first complaint. Id. at 33.
To the extent the Commonwealth asserts due diligence only applies to the second complaint in this case, Appellant maintains we have declined to adopt such a construction. Id. at 34 (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808-810 (Eakin, J., dissenting)). He argues this approach would allow the Commonwealth to “hide behind the sluggish [investigating grand jury] process – a product of [its own] operation – when the process may not be reasonably necessary to prosecute a particular defendant.” Id. at 34.
Applying this test, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence. He maintains the first complaint served no purpose other than keeping him “on ice,” knowing the initial complaint would never be pursued while continuing on with the investigating grand jury. He avers the Commonwealth has failed to present any evidence that the grand jury was necessary to shroud its investigation in secrecy or as a prosecutorial tool to
more than 365 days after the first complaint was filed and the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate due diligence, dismissal was warranted.
Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains the lower courts applied longstanding speedy trial precedent concerning two complaint cases and reached the correct conclusion that the clock began when it filed the second complaint. It similarly points out that the Comment to Rule 600, which relies on Meadius, provides that the speedy trial period begins with the second complaint where the Commonwealth‘s new filing is “necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600.” Commonwealth‘s Brief at 22 (quoting
The Commonwealth then discusses Simms, which it purports involved a two-complaint scenario similar to this case. As noted above, the Commonwealth charged Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim‘s death, filed a second complaint charging Simms with homicide. This Court concluded that the speedy trial period began to run with the second complaint, considering “events beyond the control of the prosecution [ ] operated to change the nature of the offense for which [the] defendant [was] to be tried.” Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802-04). The Commonwealth avers that the difference in charges between the first and second complaint in Simms negated any inference that the Commonwealth attempted to circumvent then-Rule 1100, now Rule 600. Id. at 22-23. In its view, the critical question instantly is “whether the Commonwealth could have charged the crimes brought in the second complaint at the time of the filing of the first complaint, but instead chose to delay the charges in order to circumvent Rule 600.” Id. at 23. The Commonwealth asserts that cannot be the case where the second
complaint involves new charges that could not have been filed at the time of the first complaint. Id.
The Commonwealth rejects Appellant‘s assertion “that the Commonwealth knew enough at the time of the first complaint to charge him with all the crimes brought in the second complaint” as factually incorrect, as determined by the trial court, and also irrelevant. Id. at 23-24. The Commonwealth explains that any issue concerning delay in bringing the first trial is a moot point because that case was dismissed under Rule 600, and any delay in bringing the second case is a non-issue because Rule 600 does not begin until charges are brought. It goes on to explain that much of what was charged in the second complaint was not known when the first complaint was filed. Id. at 25-30 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/21, at 32-34).
The Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant‘s claim that it “nefariously used the
IV. Analysis
Our standard of review in evaluating speedy trial issues is “whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court‘s findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883, 899 (Pa. 2010) (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 805). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted)).
This Court has previously explained that Rule 600 was adopted in order “to protect defendants’ constitutional rights to a speedy trial under the
Turning to its text, Rule 600 requires that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has
failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
. . .
(D) Remedies (1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant‘s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
Rule 600 does not explicitly address the way in which two-complaint scenarios should be handled, and this Court has had minimal opportunity to examine the rule in that context. The most recent case addressing such a scenario is Meadius. There, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint charging Meadius with several offenses, including forgery and insurance fraud on January 16, 2001. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 803. The Commonwealth was unable to proceed with the preliminary hearing on three occasions for various reasons and ultimately withdrew the complaint. Id. On March 27, 2001, after receiving assurances from various witnesses concerning their ability to testify at a future preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth filed a second complaint alleging the identical offenses. Id. Meadius was scheduled to proceed to trial on February 4, 2002, which would have been more than one year after the first complaint, but not the second complaint, was filed. Id. Meadius moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice under Rule 600, asserting the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within the period of time required by law. Id. at 803-04.
The trial court granted Meadius’ motion to dismiss, reasoning the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 600. Because the Commonwealth failed to bring Meadius to
trial within one year of filing the first complaint, it was not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the second identical complaint. Id. at 804. In doing so, the trial court rejected the Commonwealth‘s argument that the case was controlled by Commonwealth v. Whiting, 500 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985). In Whiting, the Commonwealth sought dismissal of its case at the preliminary hearing and filed an identical second complaint almost one year later. This Court calculated the speedy trial period from the filing date of the second complaint, finding the record did not demonstrate any effort by the Commonwealth to evade or manipulate the speedy trial period. Id. (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d at 806-808). The trial court in Meadius distinguished Whiting on the basis that Whiting involved “dismissal by an impartial magistrate, not withdrawal of charges by executive action.” Id. at 804. It instead found applicable the two-part test set forth in Commonwealth v. Sires, 424 A.2d 1386 (Pa. 1981). There, this Court found that the speedy trial period begins with the second complaint where: “(1) the first complaint was properly dismissed by a competent judicial authority; and (2) the record does not reveal any prosecutorial attempt to circumvent or evade the rule‘s mandate.” Id. at 804 (citing Sires, 424 A.2d at 1387). Finding neither prong met, the trial court granted Meadius’ motion to dismiss. The Superior Court reversed, applying Whiting. It viewed Whiting more broadly than the trial court, emphasizing the fact that “the initial complaint in Whiting was dismissed on the Commonwealth‘s motion without independent review by the district magistrate, thus prompting this Court to deem it ‘a voluntary withdrawal of the prosecution by the Commonwealth.‘” Id. at 804 (citation omitted). The Superior Court also found the Commonwealth had not attempted to circumvent or manipulate Rule 600. Id. at 804-05.
the postponement were beyond its control.” Id. at 805. We acknowledged that previous case law, particularly Whiting, provided some support for the position that such Rule 600 matters should be disposed of based solely on whether the Commonwealth attempted to evade or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. Id. at 806 (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d at 808). We explained, however, that Whiting “did not consider a scenario where the Commonwealth‘s failure to act diligently precipitates a withdrawal of the complaint followed by a re-filing of identical charges.” Id. at 807. In addition to considering the Commonwealth‘s intent to evade or manipulate Rule 600, the Meadius Court believed the appropriate test should also consider the Commonwealth‘s exercise of due diligence, explaining:
The rule‘s focus upon allowing the prosecution time extensions only where it has acted diligently and where the delays in question were caused by factors beyond its control supports an interpretation whereby it must forego the benefit of a second filing date when these conditions are not met. Indeed, a contrary result would undermine the rule‘s own facial requirements directed to prosecutorial diligence, as well its objectives, which include advancing society‘s interest in seeing those accused of crime prosecuted in a timely manner, as well as ensuring the efficient management of criminal cases as a means of avoiding substantial backlogs[.]
Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this standard, in light of the trial court‘s findings, the Meadius Court found the Commonwealth failed to proceed with due diligence in bringing Meadius to trial in the required time period. It therefore reversed the Superior Court‘s decision and reinstated that of the trial court. Id.
Though the specific provision of Rule 600 at issue in Meadius is no longer present in the current version of the rule, Rule 600(C)(1) imposes a due diligence requirement on the Commonwealth. Additionally, the test developed in Meadius appears in the Comments of the current version of Rule 600 and continues to be applied to cases involving two-complaint scenarios. That Comment states:
In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Meadius, 582 Pa. 174, 870 A.2d 802 (2005).
See
We find the Meadius test applicable herein, as it seeks to reach a balance between the twin aims of Rule 600. We first address due diligence. This Court has explained that it is the Commonwealth‘s burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). Perhaps most importantly, this Court has recognized that “[d]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has
Here, the Commonwealth‘s filing of the second complaint cannot be attributed to a lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint, but is directly tied to its need for further investigation after discovering that Appellant‘s drug enterprise extended beyond the jurisdiction of Huntingdon County. The relevant period of time for due diligence purposes under the unique facts of this case therefore becomes the period of time
between the filing of the first and second complaint. Here, the Commonwealth‘s undertaking of grand jury proceedings can only be understood as an exercise of due diligence. As mentioned previously, the OAG‘s grand jury investigation was necessitated by the revelation the Appellant‘s criminal conduct extended beyond Huntington County and throughout the Commonwealth. The OAG‘s investigation began almost immediately after learning additional information that grand jury proceedings would be necessary, and the second complaint was filed promptly after the conclusion of those proceedings. Although the Commonwealth concedes it could have withdrawn the first complaint while the investigation occurred, Appellant‘s Rule 600 challenge to the first complaint resulted in dismissal of that complaint. Dismissal of the second complaint, however, is clearly not the proper remedy. Appellant‘s retrospective focus on the result of the grand jury proceedings also misconstrues the due diligence inquiry, as due diligence is not outcome based but rather an assessment of the Commonwealth‘s affirmative actions. See Selenski, 994 A.2d at 1089. Nevertheless, it is clear the Commonwealth‘s grand jury investigation bore fruit in the form of additional charges against Appellant that were not, and could not have been, included in the Commonwealth‘s initial complaint. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/21, at 32-35. We reject Appellant‘s argument to the contrary as unsupported by the record. See Wholaver, 989 A.2d at 809; Bradford, 46 A.3d at 700.8
We must now address the remaining Meadius factors, specifically, whether the Commonwealth‘s filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control and whether its actions were an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the timing requirements of Rule 600. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808. As to the former, the Commonwealth‘s filing of the second complaint was the result of becoming aware of additional information after the
With respect to the final factor, the Commonwealth‘s filing of the second complaint was not an attempt to manipulate the speedy trial requirements. As noted above, many two-complaint cases involve the re-filing of a second complaint with charges identical to the first complaint. In these cases, the goal is to extend the speedy trial clock where factors came in the way of a speedy prosecution the first time around. In contrast, the second complaint in this case involved some of the same charges from the first complaint but also included additional charges based on information discovered during the grand jury process. The filing of additional charges based on additional information is hardly an attempt to evade the speedy trial requirements, but rather an effort to hold Appellant accountable to the full extent of his criminal activity. We therefore conclude the Commonwealth‘s filing of the second complaint was not an attempt to manipulate the
speedy trial requirements. As the Commonwealth has met each of the Meadius factors, the Superior Court properly denied Appellant‘s motion to dismiss.9
V. Conclusion
Where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a defendant, the Commonwealth receives the benefit of the filing date of the second complaint for Rule 600 purposes where it demonstrates that it acted with due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed. The Commonwealth must also establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control and that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. Under the specific facts of this case, the Commonwealth has met these requirements.10 We therefore affirm the order of
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the opinion.
Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.
Notes
Rule 600(D)(1) provides:
When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant‘s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.