Commonwealth v. WingertCommonwealth v. Wingert
Opinion by
Appellant is defendant’s former wife. This appeal is from an order of the court below releasing defendant from further support of their daughter, Mary Kathleen Wingert. While it is the function of this court to review the proceedings, it will not interfere with the order of the lower court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion:
Com. ex rel. Koehler v. Koehler,
Following a separation in 1927, a court order was entered against defendant for the support of his minor children. Appellant and defendant were subsequently divorced, and appellant has remarried. The case was listed for rehearing in 1951, at which time all of the children except Mary Kathleen were of age and self-supporting. An agreement was then reached between appellant and defendant whereby the sum of $2000.00 was paid for support of Mary Kathleen for the period from October 18, 1951, to October 17, 1952. In August 1952, a hearing was held on a petition asking for an increase in the allowance for Mary Kathleen, who had reached the age of seventeen years. She had graduated from a private high school and had applied for admission to the College of New Rochelle. It appears that she had won a scholarship in chemistry and had shown exceptional musical ability. She stood high in her class upon graduation. The testimony of the mother was to *615 the effect that it would cost approximately $3600.00 for tuition and expenses at the college and, in addition, that there should be an allowance of $15.00 a week for twelve weeks vacation. It was also developed that the school gives training, not in any particular field, but in the social cultures generally, including riding, golfing and similar lessons.
There was testimony as to the financial standing of the Wingert Contracting Company, and other capital assets owned by defendant; also as to his standard of living, and education advantages and gifts given to the other children. Evidence for the defendant showed that he had an annual income of $22,500.00 which, after taxes, was approximately $15,000.00 net. Defendant also attempted to establish that, because of his expenses, he was going in debt approximately $500.00 a month. It does not appear, however, that defendant is seriously contending that he is financially unable to send his daughter to college. At the time of the agreement in 1951, he stated that he would send Kathleen to college. Under no circumstances does he want any money to go to his wife or to her present husband.
Appellant’s contention is that a father of the financial means of defendant cannot escape the responsibility of providing for the support of a seventeen-year-old daughter, who is a student of superior abilities, merely because she has completed high school and is attending college. She argues that “In the competitive society existing today, a college education for children of marked abilities is not a luxury, and where a parent has the financial means to provide the same, an arbitrary refusal so to do is unwarranted, harsh and improper”. On the other hand, defendant takes the position that he is under no legal obligation to provide a college education for his children. It should be noted that there is no evidence that the child is not physically or mentally *616 capable of self-support. The lower court made special provision to hear further evidence in this respect, but none was offered.
The purpose of a support order is to secure a reasonable allowance for the support of the child or children, always having in mind the property and earning capacity of the father and the station in life of the parties:
Com. v. Elliott,
The case at bar is similar to Com. ex rel. Binney v. Binney,
In the case at bar it appears to be the intention of the mother and daughter that the latter attend a college somewhat in the nature of a finishing school. We are always mindful of the fact that the trial judge has had the opportunity to see and hear the parties, and his conclusions are entitled to considerable weight: see
Com. ex rel. Suess v. Suess,
We are of the opinion that, under the facts in the present case, the refusal of the lower court to impose a *618 further order upon the defendant was not such an abuse of judicial discretion as to require our interference.
Order affirmed.