266 Pa. 236 | Pa. | 1920
Opinion by
In May and June, 1918, Frank I. Wilson, a pawnbroker in the city of Williamsport, made loans to Genevieve M. Begbie, taking from her several pieces of jewelry as security for the repayment of the sums borrowed. He issued pawn tickets to her, a printed condition in each being that the pledged property should be redeemed within one month from the date of the loan, and. that, upon failure to so redeem, the pledgee might regard it as forfeited, with a right in him to sell it; but he admitted on the trial in the court below that he had agreed, at the request of the pledgor at the time the loans were made, that the period for redeeming should not expire until the following September, while she testified that he had agreed to give her six months within which to redeem. In November — within six months from the time the first loan was made — she called upon the appellant, prepared to pay what she owed, and after tendering him the amounts due, demanded return of her jewelry. This demand was refused by the appellant on the ground that he had sold the pledged articles, and thereupon Mrs.
“6. The court erred in charging the jury as follows: Upon the question of time, which, by the way, as the court views this matter, is the important fact for you to determine, the parties do not agree. The prosecutrix testifies that at the time she secured the loan and made the pledges of the necklace and brooch the defendant agreed to give her six months in which to redeem the property pawned. The defendant testifies that the prosecutrix only asked that the goods be held until September 1st, or rather, that she only asked for a loan until September 1st.”
“9. The court erred in charging the jury as follows : This defendant is presumed to be innocent, and it is incumbent upon the Commonwealth to prove to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. This doubt, however, must be such a doubt as arises out of the evidence. If, in your own business transactions, you would be convinced beyond any doubt of the truthfulness of the statement of the defendant, then that would be such a doubt as should cause you to hesitate to convict, and you must give the defendant the benefit of that donbt and acquit him. If, however, you have no doubt of the defendant’s guilt, then not only under your oaths, but your manhood as well, you would be compelled to bring in a verdict of guilty.”
The question of the time agreed upon by the parties to the loans for the redemption of the property pledged for
Appellant’s second ground of complaint also calls for an order awarding a new trial. The jury were correctly instructed that they could not find him guilty unless the Commonwealth had satisfied them beyond a reasonable doubt that he was justly accused; but this was immediately followed by the instruction complained of by the ninth assignment. The appellant was not required to convince the jury “beyond any doubt of the truthful
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, as is that of the court below, and a venire facias de novo awarded.