217 Pa. Super. 285 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1970
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion By
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant, Martan Williams, appeals from his March 1969 conviction of aggravated robbery, by a judge sitting without a jury, in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia.
Appellant alleges that his waiver of a jury trial was invalid, and that the trial court erred in continuing to sit after it had ruled against acceptance of ap-. pellant’s guilty plea.
Secondly, the trial judge continued to sit after discussing appellant’s offer of a guilty plea with him, and refusing the plea because it appeared appellant might have a defense. Appellant argues that it was error for the same judge to hear the merits of the case after having considered a plea of guilty. I agree. The awareness that the defendant had been willing to admit guilt could interfere with the court’s ability to hear the evidence impartially on the presumption that he was innocent. In Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 56-7, 252 A. 2d 689, 691 (1969), the Court stated in a note: “Moreover, if a judge refuses to accept a plea bargain agreed to by the defense and the Commonwealth, or
I would reverse the order of the court below and grant a new trial.
“Rule 1101. Waiver of Jury Trial. In all cases, except those in which a capital crime is charged, the defendant may waive a jury trial with the consent of his attorney, if any, the attorney for the Commonwealth, and approval by a judge of the court in which the case is pending, and elect to be tried by a judge without a jury. The judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver and such colloquy shaU appear on the record. The waiver shaU be in writing, made a part of the record and shall be in the following form: . . .”
Lead Opinion
Opinion
Judgment of sentence affirmed.