1 A.2d 812 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1938
Argued April 11, 1938. Defendant, Wendell Williams, was convicted in the court below of the involuntary manslaughter of one James Vincent, and he has appealed. The death occurred when an automobile operated by appellant collided with a telephone pole. Appellant had been a duly licensed operator for several years prior to 1936, but had failed to renew his operator's license in 1936, and had no such license at the time of the accident on December *106 25th of that year. The verdict of the jury was as follows: "And now, to-wit: February 12, 1937, we the Jurors empanelled in the above case, find the defendant not guilty on any ground other than his not having an operator's license or permit, but having found that he did not have such a license or permit our verdict is subject to the opinion of the Court upon the question of law whether or not his driving without one was sufficient in and of itself to render him guilty, which question was reserved in the charge for argument before all the judges. If the court should be of opinion that such driving was in itself such an unlawful act as to render defendant criminally responsible for the death of James Vincent then we find defendant guilty; but if the court should be of the contrary opinion upon this question of law, then we find defendant not guilty."
After argument upon the question of law so reserved to the court, the court below was of the opinion that such unlicensed driving was an unlawful act sufficient to render appellant guilty of involuntary manslaughter as a matter of law, and accordingly found appellant guilty of that crime, and sentence was imposed.
It will be observed that appellant has been absolved by the verdict of any negligence or recklessness in the operation of the motor vehicle, and the conviction must be sustained, if at all, upon the ground that the death occurred while appellant was operating the motor vehicle in violation of section 601, art. 6, of The Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, as amended by the Act of June 22, 1931, P.L. 751, section 2, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 161, reading as follows: "No person, except those expressly exempted under this act, shall operate any motor vehicle upon a highway in this Commonwealth, unless such person has been licensed as an operator or a learner by the department under the provisions of this act," and providing a penalty therefor. *107
In Pennsylvania there is no statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter, but in Com. v. Mayberry,
The unlawful act proven in the instant case was neither a felony nor did it naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm. By the Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Smith's Laws, p. 186, "manslaughter" was divided into two classes, "voluntary manslaughter" (section 7), and "involuntary manslaughter, happening in consequence of an unlawful act" (section 8), and this was substantially re-enacted in section 79 of the Criminal Code (Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 382, as amended by Act of April 11, 1929, P.L. 513, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2226). Com. v. Gill,
A motor vehicle is not an outlawed instrumentality, but its use is lawful only under certain conditions. The failure of one to procure an operator's license, without more, is not an offense under The Vehicle Code. It is only when the omission to secure an operator's license is coupled with the operation of a motor vehicle that it becomes cognizable by the law. In other words, under section 601 of The Vehicle Code, supra, any person, except those exempt, who operates a motor vehicle commits an unlawful act, but it becomes lawful when the operator possesses a license.
We think that there is merit in appellant's contention that in order to sustain the conviction the Commonwealth *108
is obliged to show that the death was the result of, or happened in consequence of, the unlawful act as we have defined it, and that the Commonwealth failed to do so in the instant case. InCom. v. Ushka,
In our opinion, the language of the above cited statutes and cases implies more than that the unlawful act should be a remote unit in a sequence of events culminating in a fatality, and requires such act to be something more than a factor which might be denominated more properly as an attendant condition than a cause of the death.
We find no decisions of our appellate courts which we consider determinative. The Commonwealth and the court below rely uponCom. v. Ernesto et al.,
But the question has been considered in other jurisdictions,1 and answered favorably to the position taken by appellant in this case.
In Potter v. State,
In Votre v. State,
In the instant case the proper conclusion would seem to be that the unlawful act must be something more than an attendant condition without which the death could not have occurred; that the death must be the natural result or probable consequence of the unlawful act.
In State v. Budge,
In Holder v. State,
As stated in State v. Nichols,
In the instant case, it is true that the death would not have occurred if appellant's automobile had not been on the highway. Its presence was unquestionably a condition without which Vincent's death could not have taken place. But appellant's violation of The Vehicle Code had no direct relationship to the death.
A criminal statute must be strictly construed. If appellant's conviction is sustained, it would logically follow that, if deceased had intentionally thrown himself in front of appellant's automobile and had been killed, appellant would have been equally guilty of involuntary manslaughter. A construction that must lead to such a conclusion would be neither reasonable nor humane.2
In the opinion of the court below, incorporated as part of the agreed statement of facts, it is said: "The testimony was to the effect that while the defendant was driving along a street he saw a car, coming in the opposite direction, swerve from its path and start to *112 move in his direction, and when, with a view to avoiding a collision, he drove farther over upon his side of the street, his wheels encountered some ice or frost, with the result that his car skidded in such a way as to strike a telephone pole and cause the death of Vincent who was a passenger in the car."
It is obvious that the testimony was insufficient to show any relationship between the death and the unlawful act of appellant, or to establish that the death was the natural result or probable consequence of appellant's unlawful act. Appellant was not negligent; he was blameless except for the violation of section 601 of The Vehicle Code, supra. It cannot be logically concluded that the death "happened in consequence of" such violation. Until the swerve of the approaching automobile, appellant and deceased were riding in safety. Remove that factor, and it is perceived, without difficulty, that deceased would still be living, despite the fact that appellant operated his automobile without an operator's license.
Judgment of the court below is reversed, and defendant is discharged.