*1 thе basis for the of each of disposition Appellee’s claims. See Williams, 207, 253-55, Commonwealth v. generally (1999) (Castille, J., (em- 1192-93 concurring) of an phasizing importance opinion post-conviction of a issues). covering court all relevant As to claims any requiring dispute, resolution a material factual the court should specific include factual findings express credibility judg- ments.
The order of the court PCRA is vacated and the matter is remanded further consistent proceedings opinion. with this CAPPY, CASTILLE, Chief Justice Justice Justice NEWMAN, Messrs. Justice EAKIN and BAER and Justice join BALDWIN the opinion.
896A.2d 523 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH WILLIAMS, Appellant. James T.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of March
Submitted 2004. April
Decided *10 Silverman, for Esq.,
Daniel StandCounsel. Williams, T. for James Williams. James Allentown, Dantos, Esq., Amy Zapp, for Esq., Maria Lisa Pennsylvania. NEWMAN, CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, BEFORE: and BAER, BALDWIN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, and JJ.
OPINION EAKIN. Justice Williams, a.k.a. appellant,. James T. August
On murder, “Mathematics,”1 of first rob- degree was convicted robbery,2 to commit sentenced bery, and conspiracy to 42 appeal pursuant death. This direct arises Pa.C.S. to 9711(h)(1) (automatic from sentence to appeal § direct death Court). We affirm. by which circle of aliases mentioned are the names friends 1. All using neighborhoods; each testified at trial were known in their cited. aliases id., 2502(a); 3701(a)(1) bodily 2. (inflicting inju- § § Pa.C.S. serious id., (2), 903(a)(1) ry); respectively. § “Pookie,” 29, 1995, White, telephoned Richard a.k.a. May On Peterson, seeking buy large Lamar a friend of to a appellant, his marijuana inventory drug quantity replenish that if had dealing operation. Peterson concluded White sold marijuana, all amount of significant White would have they cash on hand. Peterson rob suggested appellant in a through “stinger;” engage White Peterson would White transaction, drug during appellant suddenly ap- which would pear and rob them both. Peterson and would appellant reconnect later and share the pelf.
Peterson, and Curtis French set out to appellant, find White, but Peterson could not remember the exact location of apartment. White’s The three apart- returned to Peterson’s they “Rah-Rah,” ment where informed a.k.a. Ralph Logan, Avila, “T-Bone,” and Luis a.k.a. plan. The group decided to time, make another attempt find White. This Avila called White and informed him he drop by would soon marijuana. Avila, purchase Logan, appellant set out on *11 however, another robbery attempt; this too was unsuсcessful after the trio went to the wrong apartment. Again, appellant and his cohorts returned to Peterson’s apartment.
Giving “stinger” one try, last Avila called again White location; and ascertained his apartment’s exact appellant, Avila, and Logan again set out to rob him. White was his balcony he when saw the trio approaching; White tucked in pistol street, the rear of his shorts and headed to the where he encountered the group. Appellant demanded White take him to his apartment and hand over his cash. When White refused, pleading with his arms in the air that his children were inside sleeping, appellant pulled out a MAC 10 automatic weapon and fired two bullets into White’s chest and a third into his thigh as he fell to the ground. street, lying
With White in the fled back group apartment. arrival, Peterson’s Upon their appellant informed Peterson that because White uncooperative, was he “wetted ie., lovely,” Trial, him appellant 7/20/01, shot him. N.T. at 1891. The other robbers also testified that appellant bragged about shooting White. summer, and Peterson were arrested appellant
Later an bank robbery. in the FBI for unrelated Baltimore told of appellant’s federal Peterson authorities Facing charges, French, Avila, robbery murder of White. and role in the and and each Peterson’s also arrested corroborated Logan were testified used the same appellant account. three later many Photographs bank robberies. weapon subsequent depicted the time of arrest possession appel- Peterson’s his lant, Peterson, French, Logan; appellant one showed kill 10 used to White. with MAC posing November, 1996, in federal In was convicted court appellant to 687 federal robbery and was sentenced months incarcera- first murder Having already degree charges tion. filed County prosecutors ap- monitored against appellant, Lehigh prosecution portions federal attended pellant’s 2/03/00, Hearing, trial. N.T. at 50. federal Pretrial Colorado; to a ultimately prison transferred federal request extradition. This Lehigh prosecutors sought previously had filed homicide because delayed appellant him in New was also pending against Jersey, which charges was trans- Eventually appellаnt to secure him. attempting Lehigh County. ferred to from the repeated warnings recommendations
Despite represented during himself contrary, appellant court to trial, At standby trial. and with hearings and at pretrial assisting permitted, attempt- when appellant appellant counsel accusers, of his but took the credibility ed to undermine the prosecutors, attack Commonwealth opportunity personally See officers, N.T. Pretrial justice personnel. and criminal 10/12/00, one repeatedly at 4 slurred black Hearing, (appellant * * as as n* *r” and lead con- prosecutor “house prosecutor *12 liar). and spirator of the witnesses were majority
Since Commonwealth’s currently numerous robberies and were co-conspirators crimes, for each about appellant harangued time other serving exchange received in their they the reduced sentences See, Trial, e.g., N.T. cooperation with the Commonwealth. 2205-09, 2213-14; id., 7/24/01, 2407-09; 7/23/01, 2197-98, at at id., 7/27/01, at French Appellant suggested 3307-08. was murder, triggerman White’s and maintained a statewide conspiracy Lehigh County was afoot wherein District Office, Attorney’s police departments, prison numerous staff and employees, appointed standby even defense counsel were acting concert.
Police came into possession weapon murder after Peterson, robbery attempt by French, failed appellant, another individual. As typical strategy, was their the group rob tried to dealer drug but were unsuccessful when dealer weapon; brandished a French the machine dropped gun as the three fled for their lives. Ballistics tests revealed the gun recovered used in White’s was murder. This same weapon was also linked to the bank robbery was appellant of in convicted federal car court. The in the perpetration used of White’s murder also by police; tracked down it had by been rented an associate of had a appellant, and dent in fender consistent the strike of Testimony a bullet. White, appellant revealed when shot one the bullets exited body Id., White’s and ricocheted off the getaway car. 7/24/01, at 2539-40.
In evidence, addition to the physical the Commonwealth expert offered testimony medical consistent with its other n witnesses’version of the particularly killing, the fact that Id., White shot 7/23/01, whilе his arms were raised. 2270, 2293-94. The presented Commonwealth also David Miller, an Prison, inmate at Lehigh County who testified appellant admitted to him he had killed somebody and was Miller’s seeking legal Id., 7/26/01, advice concerning his case. at 3078. assistance,
Besides soliciting Miller’s appellant spoke inmate, another Louis about Washington, having one of Wash- ington’s family members an provide alibi for appellant’s whereabouts on night id., 7/30/01, of White’s murder. See (“So at 3584-87 then [appellant] offered me some money, he my offered some family money my have mother be his ”). alibi.... Coached appellant, woman testify was to appellant was with her during homicide, she because *13 appellant, prior record involvement no criminal
had criminal cohorts. appellant’s story be believed over her would told by appellant, Washington threatened After being result, aAs plans. fabrication appellant’s Commonwealth to appellant “go over” arranged by meeting and at the by state portrayed mother was testimony, Washington’s Stafford; previously had the Commonwealth Trooper Regina During to record the conversations. warrants secured placing time conversation, sequence a appellant orchestrated murder, at the time of Washington’s mother White’s him with say. she exactly expected her was and informed what an trial, called to authenticate Washington appellant At had Washington signed; exonerating appellant which affidavit being after signed only he the affidavit Washington testified 7/30/01, Trial, at- Appellant 3549-62. threatened. N.T. alibi suggested and the fabri- Washington’s credibility tacked cross-examination, fur- the Commonwealth story; cation story. again After appellant the fabrication explored ther he the alibi Washington by alleging invented tried discredit Commonwealth, prosecution curry favor with story rebuttal, verify Washington’s granted permission, plot, testified to the alibi of events. Officer Stafford version for the recording played the conversation was tape charges. convicted on all Appellant was jury. penalty himself again represented during
Appellant to consider his character and hearing, asking jury crime, 9711(e)(8), § surrounding Pa.C.S. circumstances record, id., 9711(e)(1). § criminal allegedly his minor a violent and made person he was not argued victim, i.e., the of the attacks on the character victim repeated armed, drug and a notorious dealer. neglectful parent, circum- jury aggravating offered the two The Commonwealth id, felonies, stances, history of violent namely, appellant’s 9711(d)(9), committed the murder appellant § and that while id, 9711(d)(6). The jury § found felony, in the course of circumstances, proved aggravating both evidence; proposed mitigating appel- rejected appellant’s all to death. lant was sentenced
Reordered, brief, taken from but verbatim these issues are raised by appellant:3
Pretrial:
Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s Motion to Dismiss under former Rule 1100 and the Agree- Interstate *14 ment on Detainers where trial commenced approximately five (5) years appellant charged after days over 180 after final request disposition for of the charges pending against him, custody where in appellant was entire time and where appellant available to agents its Commonwealth had promptly instituted the proper procedures pres- to secure his ence?
Jury Selection:
Was denied due appellant process phase and a fair penalty under both the state and federal constitutions when the trial prosecutor repeatedly every misled venireperson, including those ultimately petit who comprised jury, regarding the “mandatory” nature of the death sentence (contrary 25 years of States Court Supreme precedent) United where the trial court correct compounded did not these errors and in fact them and trial prosecutor repeated them in her penalty phase closing argument?
Guilt Phase:
Did trial court err in of admitting the testimony Corpo Stafford, ral in Regina jail who to appellant’s was sent during the pre-trial to be a stage pretending civilian out to witness help appellant order to obtain incriminating statements Arizona, from appellant, the absence of 384 Miranda [v. (1966)] U.S. 694 warnings S.Ct. L.Ed.2d or a counsel, waiver of at a time formal had charges already when been brought appellant right had the to be represented by counsel, or appellant because lacked the competency waive counsel, in violation of the Sixth Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and the rule of Massiah It repeating deserves the often-cited maxim: "the number of claims appeal usually proportion raised in ail in inverse to their merit....” Ellis, (1993) Commonwealth v. (citation omitted). [, 12 L.Ed.2d
United States S.Ct. U.S. (1964)]? to due rights his state and federal appellant denied
Was trial court’s the Commonwealth violated process when of crimes” evidence admissibility “other ruling limiting (2) to introduce over- proceeded crimes and relevant two in sev- alleged participation whelming appellant’s evidence to this unrelated completely additional violent felonies eral cautionary case, the trial court failed issue and where limit- (assuming the evidence was admissible instructions ed purpose)? deliberately 'jury mislead prosecutor the trial
Did process rights state and federal due appellant’s violation appellant’s co-conspira- stated that all of she repeatedly when when, under the Common- not murderers” even tors “were and the version theory prosecution co-conspirators’ wealth’s involvement, fully of second- they guilty were of their own *15 in a that occurred having killing murder degree participated necessari- such mischaracterization during robbery, where co-conspirators- that the impression created the erroneous ly as a receiving ben- turned-Commonwealth witnesses were for mur- immunity prosecution from cooperation efit for their they in when truth were? der credibility vouch for prosecutor improperly
Did the trial and in violation of state federal appellant’s of her witnesses incessantly she introduced evidence process rights due when him tell required each witness “to plea agreement that and truth,” imprimatur the official force thereby placing testimony each witness? the state behind weight all it fail to of the benefits Did the Commonwealth disclose in of appel- criminal witnesses violation provided its career and the rule of process rights state and federal due lant’s [, 10 L.Ed.2d Brady Maryland U.S. 83 S.Ct. (1963) its progeny? and] on jury court in to instruct failing Did trial err part of as to first murder where accomplice liability degree appellant’s co-conspirator defense was that Curtis French was the actual shooter? prosecutor
Did the trial commit thereby misconduct and (a) deprive of a appellant fair trial and due she process when its jury disregard exhorted the obligation apply law by erroneously it that instructing “this case is not about the law; him, if find it’s you it’s murder one” when the were facts at least equally consistent this mur- second-degree (b) der; deliberately into jury believing misled her career criminal witnesses did not receive “deals” in state court testimony for their in fact granted when each witness was murder, from on immunity prosecution this of her two wit- granted nesses immunity were from prosecution on some- where 20-60 between other robberies and one witness was granted from immunity prosecution perjury and obstruc- justice tion of charges lying for to the grand this jury (c) matter; and mischaracterized applicable in- law structing jury that the “deals” her -witnesses were received “not relevant” to its decision-making provides when law that such evidence is highly relevant?
Is appellant competent to represent himself on appeal, was appellant incompetent to represent himself at trial and did the trial court err denying appellant funds to retain the expert necessary witnesses to establish his incompetence? Penalty Phase:
Was appellant denied state federal rights due process when the Commonwealth penalty introduced (a) phase evidence of appellant’s alleged participation unre- (b) lated robberies he which never convicted *16 violator, status as a parole where such evidence amounts to inadmissible non-statutory aggravation?
Was appellant denied his state and federal to rights due process the when at jury penalty phase was permitted to consider “other crimes” and “bad acts” evidence previously at the guilt introduced where phase, such evidence to amounts inadmissible aggravation? non-statutory of state protections denied the appellant
Was
process
self-incrimination
due
against
federal privilege
appel-
expressly
commented
prosecutor
clause when
remorse,
of
in
of the rule
to
violation
express
lant’s failure
[,
14 L.Ed.2d
v.
U.S.
S.Ct.
California
Griffin
(3d
(1965)
[,
and Lesko
Lehman
Did the trial court instruct that circumstance aggravating it to consider the order for felony, a perpetration in of killing” “committed appellant killer, the actual appellant it that unаnimously agree must guilty-phase foreclosed its verdict? necessarily an issue not sufficiently of counsel April, Was waiver appellant’s September penalty phase proceed- to the apply valid to (1) determine whether the waiver colloquy ings where sentencing as capital completely valid was deficient (2) earlier rendering unknowing issues the waiver waiver, expired at some assuming point, it was valid six weeks earlier or at some guilt phase conclusion of the point? earlier of make out insufficient as matter law to
Was the evidence felony convictions” “prior circumstance of aggravating 9711(d)(9) exists § 42 Pa.C.S. where there no evidence under prior in the convictions were appellant’s record show fact “felonies”? evidence precluding mitigating
Did the trial court err le- co-conspirators given unprecedented were appellant’s exceedingly their in this murder and nient treatment for role charges outstanding robbery their bank lenient sentences on against in viola- cooperation appellant, for their exchange [, Lockett v. Ohio rule 438 U.S. 98 S.Ct. tion of the (1978) 2954, L.Ed.2d 973 ]? or all of the errors raised
Did the effect of some cumulative a fair trial and due process? herein deprive appellant sufficiency Although challenge does not appellant conviction, degree murder underlying his first evidence
573 cases, in all capital we self-impose such a duty and review evidence supporting the conviction. Commonwealth v. Zettle- 16, moyer, 937, (1982). Pa. 454 A.2d 942 n. 3 This review premised evidence, whether the viewed most light Commonwealth, favorable to the and all reasonable inferences therefrom, arising is sufficient to establish the elements of the beyond offense a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Box- 611, ley, 608, (2003) (citations 575 Pa. omitted). 838 A.2d First degree murder ais criminal homicide committed by an 2502(a). intentional killing. § 18 Pa.C.S. To sustain a first degree conviction, murder the evidence must establish: (1) (2) a human being killed; was unlawfully the defendant did (3) the killing; and the killing willful, committed deliberate, Id,., and premeditated way. 2502(a), (d); § Com monwealth v. Malloy, 425, 767, 579 Pa. (2004); 856 A.2d Cuevas, Commonwealth v. 409, 388, 574 Pa. 832 A.2d 392-93 (2003). “A specific intent to kill bemay proven by circumstan evidence; tial it be may inferred by the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Common v. wealth Spotz, (2000) 563 Pa. 759 A.2d (citing Bond, Commonwealth v. 539 Pa. 652 A.2d (1995)).
The evidence admitted at trial appel established that lant and his cohorts attempted numerous times to locate White in him; order to rob appellant brought along an auto matic weapon to effectuate the robbery and for any contingen cies. When the three White, men found appellant approached him and demanded money and entrance into his apartment. The evidence shows White pled appellant with not to enter apartment his and endanger his sleeping children. For not following demands, his appellant shot White once in the thigh and chest, twice in killing actions, him. These coupled appellant’s boastful admission minutes after killing he “wetted are lovely” [White] sufficient to sustain appellant’s first degree murder conviction. counsel,
As his own and admittedly unversed trial and appellate advocacy, appellant object failed trial to error alleges. Normally, all instances of he now
almost held pro fatal to claims because se defendants are would be as attorneys. Electing standards licensed the same preservation, se not excuse issue see Com- proceed pro does (2004), Bryant, monwealth *18 in are and not raised the lower court waived “[i]ssues Pa.R.A.P. appeal.” be for the first time cannot raised Freeman, 532, 302(a). A.2d In 573 Pa. 827 Commonwealth v. waiver, (2003), 385 abolished relaxed but “deelin[ed] Court or already to the new to cases briefed approach pending apply ” Id., at in briefed.... 403. Since process being the the time Freeman was decid- pending brief appellant’s ed, be each of his issues will applies relaxed waiver addressed. been charges claims all his should have violated Pa.R.Crim.P.
dismissed because Commonwealth 600), rule, (renumbered speedy Pa.R.Crim.P. trial 11004 (IAD).5 Spe- on Detainers Act Agreement the Interstate part: pertinent in a case provided, Rule in "Trial court Former 1100 defendant, complaint against in a filed when which written is case, shall no later than is incarcerated on that commence defendant complaint days filed." from the date on which the is Pa.R.Crim.P. 180 (renumbered 600). Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 Columbia, states, agreement IAD is an between 48 the District 5. The Rico, Virgin procedures for the and the Islands that establishes Puerto jurisdiction temporary prisoners incarcerated in one transfer of lodged against custody jurisdiction which has a detainer of another extradition, request which that the state request Unlike a for is a them. prisoner custody requesting to the in which the is incarcerated transfer state, merely informing jurisdic- detainer a means of the custodial a is outstanding jurisdiction charges pending in there are another tion that prisoner requesting notify request to for the state and a hold the prisoner’s requesting state of the imminent release. provides procedure by prosecutor which the IV of the IAD Article requesting in initiates the transfer: state (a) jurisdiction appropriate in which an untried officer of the indictment, complaint pending be entitled to information or is shall lodged prisoner against and who is whom he has a detainer have serving imprisonment any party made available in a term of in state V(a) upon presentation of written Article hereof accordance with cifically, appellant argues the Commonwealth failed take adequate to secure his steps presence Pennsylvania, and 4, finally after he was it transferred there October took years almost two his trial to commence. The Common- wealth, appellant posits, had only days from arrival IAD, Pennsylvania under the § see Pa.C.S. Article IV(c), days rule, and 180 under speedy trial see Pa. 600(A)(2), R.Crim.P. his trial. begin Appellant correctly however, the pertinent provisions; cites he conspicuously omits from each contention that a trial court has discretion to extend the deadline or days good exclude “for cause Montione, shown.” See Commonwealth v. Pa. (IAD (1998)
A.2d “tolled for as long ‘whenever and as prisoner trial, is unable stand as determined court....’”) § (quoting VI); Pa.C.S. Articles IV and (excludable 600(C) rule). Pa.R.Crim.P. time from speedy trial gap This appellant’s reasoning dispositive. Davis,
In
determine the Commonwealth were occasioning postponement the circumstances Commonwealth, motion the control of beyond trial on be and the case shall be listed for shall denied dismiss certain.”). a date
Here, unavailable while appellant the trial court found was and trial rule custody speedy purposes, for IAD and in federal to him and court specifically procedures attributed delays control, motion beyond appellant’s the Commonwealth’s no The reasoned: had merit. court dismiss 4, 1999 date Thus, February entire from period [the authori- Lehigh County filed IAD notice with appellant there], he not contest transportation ties that would due of the who exercised beyond prosecutor, the control In other [appellant]. to obtain diligence period within [600], words, only days have Rule purposes elapsed toward the Rule [600] rúndate. (citation omitted). 3/26/01, at 14 This Opinion, Trial Court record, at- appellant’s assessment is supported rejected. tempt properly at dismissal was jury pool corrupted during Appellant alleges closing statement again during prosecutor’s voir dire and suggested, permitted the court jury, because circumstances, argue, that certain Commonwealth to following mandatory. Appellant highlights death penalty voir dire: during instructions are is—The in this What we here do law Court: in certain recognizes penalty, the death
cases, imposition. mandates its *20 The and also understand that Okay, you do Court: circumstances, said that in certain Legislature hаs also required? death is penalty Dire, 7/10/01, Additionally, at the prose-
N.T. 451. Voir I told closing argument stated: “As penalty phase cutor in her dire, may be point might you voir this come where you during instance, that in says your faced with the law this Trial, 9/4/01, sentence death.” N.T. at 4312. must be qualification Appellant posits such death directives leave belief are jury they required members with indelible sentence, a reservations impose regardless any death they Appel- the evidence may concerning presented. have lant’s is because the and argument unavailing, prosecutor’s correct, instruc- trial court’s recitation of the law was and each jury’s tion upon findings balancing was conditioned and its Dire, circumstances. N.T. Voir aggravating mitigating 7/10/01, 9/4/01, 4309-4314, 227; N.T. at 4324- Sentencing, that, has ensured statute in Assembly General case, capital must be a of death jury’s “verdict sentence if the least jury unanimously aggravating finds at one circum 9711](d) specified § stance mitigating Pa.C.S. no [42 if circumstance or jury unanimously finds one more circumstances cir aggravating outweigh any mitigating which 9711(c)(3)(iv) added). § cumstances.” (emphasis Pa.C.S. This interpreted mandatory Court has this statute upon as jury, juror and a impose penalty who will not the death when mandated be may removed cause. See Commonwealth v. Morales, (1997) (“as long as there exists one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, here, as is the case the death is re penalty law.”); quired as a matter of Jasper, Commonwealth v. (Pa.) Pa. (juror A.2d is excluded properly juror’s whenever on capital punishment views prevent would or substantially impair performance juror of his duties as oath). accordance instructions and Thus, the trial court was to instruct the required jury the current state of death penalty jurisprudence followed; this ensure that it would be Further, was done. a prosecutor permitted, during voir dire, qualify” to “death a jury uphold to ensure that it will McCree, prescribed 162, 174, See law. Lockhart v. 476 U.S. (1986) (“death 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d qualification” *21 578 Constitution); v. U.S. Commonwealth
does not contravene
(1997) (“death
203,
Marinelli,
294,
A.2d
216
547 Pa.
690
aof
guarantees
is consistent with the
qualification process
Lambert,
320,
568,
603
trial”);
v.
A.2d
Commonwealth
(1992),
on denial
reconsidera
superseded
opinion
575-76
of
Lambert,
346,
232
568
tion
v.
Pa.
Commonwealth
(2001) (this
to
“repeatedly
challenges
has
struck down”
Court
trial
statements and
juries).
of
court’s
qualification
death
uphold
to
the
jurors’ ability
the
into the
inquiries
prosecutor’s
fails.
appellant’s
claim
penalty
proper,
death
were
permitting
court
by
the trial
erred
Appellant argues
his
recording
to
of
conversa
play
tape
Commonwealth
to
to
testily
her
Trooper
allowing
tion
Stafford and
with
con
Appellant alleges the
appellant’s alibi-making scheme.
given
because he was not
Miranda
versation was unlawful
of
without
benefit
warnings,
episode
place
and the
took
counsel,
counsel;
post-indictment
of
absent a valid waiver
Massiah,
205, 84
are
See
at
interrogations
prohibited.
police
defendant,
of
from
(“Any
interrogation
S.Ct. 1199
secret
indictment,
the protection
of the
without
finding
after
counsel,
contravenes the basic
by
presence
afforded
of criminal causes and
in the conduct
dictates
fairness
crime.”) (citation
charged
rights
persons
fundamental
Franciscus,
376,
omitted);
v.
Pa.
A.2d
551
710
Commonwealth
(1998)
1112,
jailhouse
information via
(“harvesting]”
1119
and without coun
post-indictment,
informant from defendant
Const,
9).
sel,
1, §
Pa.
art.
violates
Although
prosecutions
all criminal
accused
“[i]n
Const,
...,”
1, §
heard
himself
Pa.
art.
right
hath a
be
advocacy
se
pro
has
admonished
repeatedly
Court
cases,
held to
capital
they
defendants that
will be
and warned
those trained
knowledge
level of
and standards as
same
at
(“Appellant may
rely
See
Bryant,
law.
....”)
a new trial
legal expertise
ground
own lack of
as a
n.
California,
Faretta v.
422 U.S.
95 S.Ct.
(citing
Szuchon,
(1975));
Appellant appointed concedes he dismissed counsel and, to following multiple psychological prove examinations his pro to se competency, appellant permitted proceed was 5, 2000, June three months Appel before conversation. maintains, however, lant he not waiver advised his here; counsel would to such scenarios pertain presented as the prо se colloquy merely pretrial warned about preparations advocacy. and trial As he to would be expected recognize and handle Commonwealth evidence-gathering techniques as here, employed appellant his contends initial waiver counsel should not this instance. apply This circumstance under the pitfalls pro advocacy scores se and validates this Court’s to strong opposition such ill-prepared forays legal prac into tice.
The trial court in finding was correct the Common wealth was authorized to investigate appellant’s alibi fabrica tion scheme it separate, because was a independent crime incarcerated; from that for he currently which was appellant witness, attempting tamper § with a 18 Pa.C.S. bribe, id., a 4952(a)(l)-(6), § offer witness a and intimidate a id., 5105(a)(3)-(5). witness, Bomar, § v. See Commonwealth (2003) (Sixth 573 Pa. right Amendment to counsel is “offense-specific and does not attach until initi judicial ”); ation of adversarial proceedings.... Common (1994) wealth v. Mayhue, Pa. A.2d (where informant’s remark did not elicit incrimi deliberately statement, nating appellant’s claim Sixth Amendment must fail). Thus, appellant’s new crimes will not be shielded any claim; deprivation of counsel he waived counsel and was attempting further criminal conduct. 15 dif solicited alleges the Commonwealth
Appellant merely acts evidence to show occasions of bad prior ferent con for criminal conduct. propensity appellant’s references, to numerous relating most of these cedes cohorts, robberies, drug his criminal photos bank proper have been had Common “stings,” would dealer to the connecting appellant into inquiries restricted its wealth of the they merely if natural weapon part or were murder However, appellant posits that of this case. development elaborate on his opportunity used each sully 50-60 armed robberies some participation 404(b). in violation of Pa.R.E. character is, it is “if it is admissible if relevant —that Evidence case, a material fact in the tends logically tends to establish probable more or less or supports a fact issue make presumption material regarding inference reasonable Stallworth, A.2d fact.” Commonwealth *23 omitted). (2001) (internal Such 110, citation evidence 117-18 outweighed by value probative excluded if its is may be Pa.R.E. prejudice. of unfair 403.6 Evidence likelihood acts, to prove not admissible bad prior generally bad while may or criminal be admissible for some propensity, character Pa. Spotz, v. 562 relevant See Commonwealth purpose. other denied, 932, 1139, (2000), U.S. 121 498, A.2d 1152 cert. 532 756 Billa, 1381, (2001); 149 307 Commonwealth v. S. Ct. L.Ed.2d (1989). 168, 835, This has 521 Pa. 555 A.2d 840 Court 404, for which evidence of other Rule recognized exceptions introduced, may including gestae exception be res crimes to be complete story” “the told. See Common which allows 47, (2002). 294, Pa. 800 A.2d Paddy, wealth v. only proba- recently where stated that "evidence is admissible We outweighs prejudicial impact." the evidence its Common- tive value of 26, Treiber, (2005) (quoting Pa. 874 A.2d Com- wealth v. Robinson, (1998)). 554 Pa. 721 A.2d monwealth may predated dealt a trial that Rule 403. Insofar as it Robinson with so, we does not countermand Rule be read to do stress Treiber controlling: may if evidence be its remains relevant excluded which danger probative outweighed by prejudice. value unfair In each by appellant, occurrence cited the testimony connected either to the appellant weapon murder or demon sequence strated the of events leading up to the murder. Additionally, the occasions upon appellant objected where the testimony, and, the trial court addressed concerns appropriate, when administered a cautionary instruction. Further, instruction, gave court one final jury warning the jury any to use criminal prior proof involvement as of his (“This present Trial, 8/1/01, murder charges. N.T. at 4069 evidence must not be considered you any way other than for the I purpose just stated. You regard must not evidence as showing the defendant is a person of bad tendencies, character or criminal from you might which be inclined to infer guilt.”). Appellant’s prior argument bad acts DeJesus, has no merit. See Commonwealth v. (2004) (“jury is presumed have followed instructions....”) (internal
the trial omitted). court’s citation her During closing, the prosecutor directed the jury to remember testimony appellant’s cohorts who were just feet away from appellant as he fired the fatal shots. The prosecutor stated each testified that plan for White’s robbery was to be like all the person others: one would victim, engage appellant would rob the victim and leave the money, with they would meet later up to divide the proceeds. No victim ever to be harmed. The prosecutor further argued that although these co-conspirators had exten sive criminal backgrounds, they were nonetheless “not mur derers”; as the triggerman, it appellant who decided to break the plan and murder White.
Appellant alleges the prosecution’s characterization of his cohorts misled the as to their jury true culpability they were — *24 Each, contends, murderers. appellant culpable of at least murder, degree 2502(b), second § 18 Pa.C.S. as a co-conspira- tor or accomplice, by virtue of in participation the attempted id., robbery of White death. See which resulted in his § 306 id., (criminal (accomplice § liability); conspiracy liability); Lambert, Commonwealth v. (Pa.Su- 795 A.2d (even per.2002) if not principal, there is evidence of “[o]nce liable for acts of co- conspirators of a are conspiracy, presence conspiracy.”) in of the committed furtherance conspirators omitted). (internal Appellant portrayal citations contends appellant’s more credibility jury assigning into duped This is belied than was assertion cohorts warranted. record. his involvement in testifying co-conspirator admitted
Each murder, sen- serving lengthy he was and revealed White’s and Peterson French Although for unrelated robberies. tence murder, crimes to White’s charged any relating were Trial, N.T. on direct examination. testified this fact each 7/23/01, 7/20/01, 1871; id., at 2297. and Avila Logan at were murder, related and with crimes to White’s charged both they prosecution to the had with plea agreements testified Id., trial. cooperation appellant’s their participation for addition, id., 7/26/01, 7/25/01, 2624-25; appel- at 2903. In at plea during each cross- explored agreement witness’s lant Rickabaugh, examination. See Commonwealth (“At outset, note that (Pa.Super.1997) Appel- we poten- to their extensively each as lant cross-examined witness testifying plea him. against tial bias and motive jury fully fairly disclosed and agreements were been at- may to consider facts the witnesses have able Therefore, curry prosecution.”). tempting favor with claim fails. appellant’s
Next, argues prosecutor improperly appellant credibility by each cohort’s testifying stating, vouched agreements, they to their were “re according plea federal 7/20/01, Trial, N.T. at to tell truth.” See 1870-71 quired id., id., 7/25/01, (Peterson); 7/23/01, (French); at 2297 id., (Avila). 7/26/01, at 2903 claims nu (Logan); and this Common merous Third Circuit decisions Court Tann, (1983), Pa. A.2d 322 have wealth v. For improp trials such statements. upon new based awarded (1) occur, assure the prosecutor jury must bolstering er (2) credible, testimony of the witness is government the prosecutor’s per this assurance must be based either information not contained in the knowledge other sonal
588 Walker, (3d United v. record. States 155 F.3d 187 Cir.1998). While both jurisdictions the Third Circuit this found, Court have limited circumstances upon and based factors, additional that such comments can invade the province of jury the impermissibly bolster credibility a witness, testifying appellant’s facts not embody do such an occasion. DiLoreto, (3d
In States v. Cir.1989), United F.2d per Zehrbach, se rule by overruled United v. States 47 F.3d (3d Cir.1995), Circuit, the Third applying consti- federal law, tutional overturned convictions a of defen- group dants because the prosecutor put the feder- imprimatur al on the government testimony of In cooperating witnesses. defense, response repeated credibility attacks stated in prosecutor closing: his you they
And also heard [governmental that have witnesses] plea bargain, and you happened heard that what when bargain lie, is not plea fulfilled. If that they bargain is off. it, no bargain. That’s We don’t take liars. put We don’t liars on stand. don’t We do that.
DiLoreto, at 998 (emphasis original). court reasoned of argument implied prosecution mode had to, facts may additional not jury be “which privy convinced the prosecutor that his witnesses were liars.” This Id. perceived personal jeopardized reinforcement “clearly the de- right fendants’ to be solely tried on the basis of the evidence Id., presented at trial.” at 1000. Tann,
In this Court awarded a defendant a trial new prosecutor because the call permitted to the stand co- counsel, conspirator’s who testified his client waiving his Fifth Amendment right remain silent so that client testify Tann, could “truthfully.” at 327. Counsel further agreement detailed how the plea if
would be nullified his client testify did not truthfully. This Court determined counsel’s testimony regarding plea agreement, which highlighted the fact that the witness was waiving right silent, to remain coupled with counsel’s truth,” improperly client “tell the that his would
statement Id., at credibility. 327-28. co-conspirator’s vouched during bolstering place took secondary personal No such witness, as under testifying required trial. Each appellant’s 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d Maryland, U.S. S.Ct. Brady *26 his the (1963), agreement the terms of plea recited truth”; all it him to “tell the required and stated government and swear to such an oath obligation have the same witnesses The mere reiteration any prior arrangements. of regardless required testimony truthful did plea bargains that the federal the on each government the improperly put imprimatur testimony. witness’s
Further, lambasted each witness on terms appellant jury for the to consider each agreement, and called plea his against him. testifying motivations for witness’s cross-examination, during going so testimony introduced this and summa- highlight an overhead projector far as to use testimony. attempt impeach Logan’s rize statements to Trial, 7/25/01, appellant at 2656-60. Since introduced N.T. evidence, imper- he cannot now claim Commonwealth his Logan’s credibility by rebutting line missibly bolstered Duffey, v. 519 Pa. generally Commonwealth questioning. See (1988) (where 1178, 348, “opened 548 A.2d 1188 defendant fair permitted rebut- jury’s inquiry, Commonwealth door” Walker, tal); see also sentencing reference to prosecutor’s Logan’s
The more closing argument plausibly her could transcript during stated, “And vouching. prosecutor as The improper be viewed I for that. Judge you [Logan] commend say? does what told the truth even after came here and [Logan] You still Judge in the beaten. That’s Federal you [Logan] were Trial, 7/31/01,at 4007. trial.” N.T. has that once Third Circuit indicated defense of a concerning credibility is rebutted argument
counsel’s witness, references to the prosecutor’s wit government Walker, prosecutor end. at 187. If a credibility ness’s should in the affirmative that the arguing further and starts proceeds
585 credible, and witness is does so based either information not in knowledge, prosecutor the record then the own engaged improper bolstering. has Id.
It is well settled that statements made prosecutor jury closing to the not form during argument will the basis for trial “unless unаvoidable granting new effect of such comments be prejudice jury, would forming their minds fixed bias and toward the hostility they defendant objectively so could not evidence weigh Fletcher, render a true v. 580 Pa. verdict.” Commonwealth 898, (2004) 403, 861 (quoting A.2d v. Commonwealth Stokes, 299, 226, (2003)). 576 Pa. A.2d Like the defense, the latitude prosecution accorded reasonable may employ oratorical flair in its of the arguing version case Williams, to the jury. Commonwealth v. 541 Pa. (1995), denied, cert. 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. (1996) Marshall, (citing L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)). A.2d Prosecutorial mis
conduct be will not found where comments based on were *27 the evidence or derived from Common proper inferences. Chester, (1991), wealth v. 526 Pa. A.2d cert. 1377 denied, (1991) U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (quoting v. Zettlemoyer, (1982)). We do not as strictly prosecu- read Walker so to a prevent tor from ever mentioning credibility the of a government witness in a closing argument rebutting argument after that the evidentiary portion a trial. To that way read Walker would eliminate an inquiry requirement, into second Walker’s that vouching the be based on either not in information the record or part of his own knowledge. Finally, reading Walker strictly would conflict with settled state that precedent prosecutor has reasonable a closing latitude presenting argument may make and comments based on evidence or the Williams, derived from See proper supra; inferences. Ches- ter, supra. prosecutor’s The statement here be seen as could jurors an effort to the entreat to believe Logan’s testimony based on the federal judge’s credibility, assessment of his However, the bolstering. constituting improper
arguably assuring jury Logan’s the that personally not prosecutor was credible; the federal only she referenced testimony was Further, the appellant introduced comments. since judge’s evidence, not into agreements prosecutor plea federal on information not Logan’s credibility based bolstering brief mention of the federal The prosecutor’s evidence. not rise based on evidence did judge’s comments was credibility advocacy Logan’s of affirmative the level However, say this is appellant. not prejudice constitute to a witness’s government that references prosecutorial all are after closing appropriate credibility during argument rebuttеd defense claims that witness was prosecution occurred; instance, no specific prejudice In this credible. therefore, no relief. this claim warrants committed misconduct
Appellant posits prosecutor “This isn’t case about by saying: really her during closing him, if law, find it’s you ladies and because gentlemen, this, Trial, 7/31/01, it’s one.” N.T. he did murder jury a new trial is warranted because Appellant contends rea for requisite he did not mens could have found have him murder, it of second first could have convicted degree alleges misrepre degree prosecutor murder. jury to channel the into believ attempting the law by sented only degree first murder was available. ing that
Here, during presented evidence prosecutor three intentionally shot White robbery attempt, appellant The to his demands. times for failure to adhere White’s facts, accepted appel if these argued the'jury prosecutor closing statement degree lant of first murder. guilty as it jury, did not mislead degree first murder requesting *28 context, did not Taken in it upon was based the evidence. However, a true we jury rendering from verdict. preclude “not a case is about disapprove advocating strongly circumstances, may, in this vein some Advocacy law.” un process potentially and adversely adjudicatory affect the in a verdict. dermine confidence process maintains due Brady rights and the prosecutor were violated failed to inform the or jury, when co-conspirator, elicit from each testifying that each was im charges mune from for prosecution any related White’s murder; robbery prosecutor’s lies here violate her “[t]he duty to refrain from presenting testimony or information she knows to be false or misleading that is harmful to the Brief, defendant.” at 67. Appellant’s Appellant contends that although agreement no plea writing, was memorialized cooperation these deals” meant “unspoken would result in no charges being against testifying filed co-conspirator. Decla rations of co-conspirators’ each counsel appellant’s attached to brief attest that no subsequent charges in fact were filed.
The record shows of the co-conspirators that two four they charges relating and, testified faced to White’s murder although the not to prosecution decided or pursue additional original charges against offenders, the other two the district the sole attorney was arbiter of this decision. See Common (1995) (“It wealth Stipetich, is well established that attorneys, district in their investigative roles, prosecutorial broad have discretion over whether charges case.”). be brought any given should Appellant’s suggestion the prosecution had illicit lied is dealings unsubstantiated; there Brady was no violation because the terms of each plea agreement fully were Addition disclosed. ally, newly created declarations attached to appellate an brief have not been tested via the system, adversarial and are therefore not accepted said, their truth. That nothing in these support documents appellant’s argument prosecutori al misconduct or unlawful dealings.
Appellant’s primary strategy point trial was to finger French, at Curtis that since arguing previ French had ously handled the weapon murder and was at the scene of murder, White’s he could have been the triggerman. With this as a premise, appellant claims the jury have been should instructed on accomplice liability; this would have better apprised jury as to French’s true culpability, and it could *29 merely accomplice. argu- an This was appellant
have found French not on trial here— because was ment is misdirected was, aware of French’s jury fully and the was appellant free to who jury was decide conduct in murder. White’s Miller, Pa. shooter was. See Commonwealth actual (1999). because Simply appellant A.2d oblige the court to inquiry did not sought jury’s to shift efforts. entertain his his competent during he was not claims
trial, appeal. he now on competent nor should be deemed himself, to appellant defend appellant the time decided Since been standby waging counsel have court-appointed and his defense; appel counsel claimed stewardship over his war for defense, and de to maintain his own incompetent lant was to hearing. allowing appellant Before competency manded to se, be appellant the trial court ordered evaluat proceed pro appellant both testified by experts; ed psychological two to that sentenced death only being It was after competent. standby of heart coun permitted had a appellant change determination. competency sel to seek a new to retain a ex- request psychological for funds Appellant’s trial hearing denied competency and a new were pert appellant’s The court found belated January court 2003. result-driven, commenting: request was no proffers apparent [appellant] is nevertheless [I]t compel or evidence to the Court convincing argument [appellant] competent determination revisit its at this hour he would right Although counsel. waive reports relied impugn independent expert attempt nothing in its ... the trial court determination upon by in the which the Court any deficiency information suggests took account. into Order, this this Following reasoning,
Trial Court 1/31/03. 29, no April this see request denied same We Court basis to reverse determination. around cluster of claims revolves next
Appellant’s Initial- transpired penalty phase hearing. at his events which ly, contends the appellant Commonwealth violated federal and state due process rights by incorporating “other crimes” evidence from the guilt phase of his trial to the penalty phase. Trial, 9/4/01, N.T. See at 4190. Specifically, appellant points to testimony from his co-conspirators police detectives wherein each described numerous robberies and parole viola- *30 committed; appellant tions appellant not charged was crimes, these and he the jury permitted believes was to infer his propensity to commit criminal acts in deciding whether he significant had a history of felony convictions. Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(9). §
As discussed previously, appellant’s “other crimes” during evidence admitted the guilt phase of his trial was properly admitted under the res gestae exception Pa.R.E. 404, or brought in by appellant opening door to such evidence via inquiries his during cross-examination. The Commonwealth did not err by incorporating this evidence into the penalty phase because the jurors same had already heard testimony previously; “[a]ppellant’s guilt had already determined, been and the incorporation of this evidence into the penalty stage purely procedural matter сarried out pursuant § to 42 Wharton, Pa.C.S. 9711.” Commonwealth v. 127, (1992) 607 A.2d (quoting Commonwealth Albrecht, (1986)). v. Pa. In addition, appellant had other properly admitted felony convic tions for the jury to consider which satisfied 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(9). § Supplemental See 8/27/03, Trial Court Opinion, (Commonwealth at 15 presented “three uncontested qualifying involving felonies armed robberies —of themselves more than sufficient to establish a significant history under the stat ”). ute .... Appellant’s claim that this “other crimes” evidence a proper tainted consideration of his documented criminal history is baseless.
Appellant claims rights his against self-incrimination and due process were violated when the prosecutor stated in her penalty phase closing statement: “Mr. Williams has ex pressed no remorse. You know who he is. You him know 9/4/01, Trial, him to murderer.” N.T. cold. know be a
be You his failure argues this comment referenced at 4313. 609, 85 California, 380 U.S. testify, violation Griffin Lehman, (1965), 925 F.2d Lesko v. 14 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (3d Cir.1991), and the Fifth Amendment of the United Constitution. States States Court admonished Griffin, Supreme
In
the United
he
closing:
things
“These
stating during
prosecutor
And
deny
explain.
fit
take the stand and
has not seen
world,
know, this
if
defendant would
anybody
the whole
would
dead,
story.
her
of the
you
she can’t tell
side
know.
[Victim]
(internal
Griffin, at
Relying made an hearing prosecutor because the penalty new death during phase to “appeal vengeance” penalty impermissible to testimo- closing, response mitigation and in the defendant’s defendant failed to show remorse. Court ny, argued the cumula- held “that remarks were Considered improper. both penalty argument in the tively, prosecutor’s phase errors Lesko, or at 1541. Unlike not harmless....” were Griffin Lesko, however, in appel- isolated reference prosecutor’s continual closing companioned lant’s not or penalty phase error, appellant’s not directed at additional silence, Riv- v. but his lack of remorse. See Commonwealth (“[t]he (2001) erа, 289, 131, 565 A.2d 141 Common- Pa. 773 a defendant may argue penalty phase also at the wealth remorse, it not an long no so as sympathy showed tirade.”). This mention did not commen- extensive constitute Fifth to right on Amendment silence. tary appellant’s
591
trial,
of
penalty phase
At
where the presump
is no longer
tion
innocence
applicable,
Commonwealth is
permitted
employ
to
and impassioned argument
oratorical flair
Baker,
for the death
sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Pa.
541,
663,
(1992).
671-72
Although
A.2d
a defendant’s
Smith,
Fifth
privilege
applies,
Amendment
still
Estelle
v.
454, 462-63,
1866,
(1981),
U.S.
S.Ct.
A.2d
(single reference to
defendant’s
capital
lack of
is “a
consider.”),
remorse
factor
the jury
which
should
Owens,
(3d
grounds
reversed on
v.
by
other
Lesko
Appellant argues the trial court failing erred in charge the it jury could find circum aggravating 9711(d)(6) § stance 42 (killing Pa.C.S. perpetra committed in tion of unless it felony), found appellant was the actual shoot events, er. Since this was his version appellant contends the jury could have believed merely accomplice, he was an *32 aggravator this not to would him. apply See Commonwealth Lassiter, (1998) v. Pa. 722 A.2d (accomplice murder, 9711(d)(6)). does not “commit” § cannot be of guilty All three co-conspirators appellant testified the trigger- was man, and the Commonwealth’s entire case was built this fact; appellant confessed to Peterson that fact he in shot jury charge presented jury with guilt phase
White. of was appellant guilty option the verdict only allowed— the jury After found as principal. first murder degree shooter, the murder as the degree first guilty of appellant 9711(d)(6) § sought aggravator. properly Commonwealth to rely relaxed addition, upon can waiver although appellant In issue, Freeman, hard would be we avoid waiver a instruc- failing give jury fault trial court for to to pressed was not consis- either which requested by party, tion not at trial. Commonwealth presented See any tent evidence with (trial (2003) Cuevas, judge trial). only established at jury has to instruct on evidence duty no relief. This warrants issue to prior his initial waiver of counsel claims
Appellant penalty phase. to over to the carry trial insufficient initial did apprise contention is that his waiver Appellant’s should penalty phase, him of the court gravity of the appel to colloquy held another waiver ensure sponte have sua is This self-representation. position lant to continue intended he to contin Appellant was asked whether wanted meritless. to standby or if he counsel ue wished self-representation He of the penalty phase. take to commencement prior over later hearing, conduct the but stated counsel would initially to N.T. reneged permit counsel advocate. See refused Further, Trial, 9/4/01, appellant repeatedly at 4175. evidence was standby the court and counsel what advised ignore the fact that he chose to penalty phase; germane not entitle him to relief. such does guidance failed to maintains Appellant doubt, a significant that he had beyond reasonable prove, felony involving the use or threat convictions history 9711(d)(9). that al posits § violence. Pa.C.S. three introduced into evidence his though the Commonwealth convictions, these prove it failed to convictions robbery armed It is the Commonwealth’s burden were in “felonies.” fact convictions; a defendant’s prior felony admit into evidence jury consider those charged allowing only court *33 9711(d)(9). § convictions that satisfy A trial court is not required jury instruct the that each element of an aggrava- ting circumstance be proven beyond reasonable doubt.7 Busanet, 1060, Commonwealth v. 572 Pa. 817 A.2d (2002). juryA instruction stating the Commonwealth must prove aggravating beyond circumstances a reasonable dоubt is id., appropriate. Here, See at 1075-76. the trial court ad- the jury vised the Commonwealth must prove aggravating circumstances beyond Trial, a reasonable doubt. See N.T. 9/4/01, Thus, at 4325. the trial court’s jury instruction was This appropriate. claim warrants no relief.
Appellant alleges he
permitted
should have been
argue,
evidence,
as mitigating
unfairness
him
subjecting
to the death penalty when his equally-culpable co-conspirators
Ohio,
received lenient treatment.
on Lockett
Relying
v.
U.S.
(1978),
S.Ct.
Capital phase mitigating evidence is limited to those criteri- 9711(e); enumerated in 42 § Pa.C.S. a cohort’s ultimate criminal punishment is not among those established General Assembly. phrase “the circumstances of the particular offense” refers to mental states and surrounding Notably, many aggravating expressed single circumstances are in a terms, phrase fairly straightforward 9711(d), and in § see 42 Pa.C.S. and, accordingly, readily are not component considered in terms of elements. to the criminal act—not what leading up punishment
events
routinely rejected
be
later. This Court
will
has
imposed
cohorts
disposition
the criminal
of a defendant’s
argument punish-
to a defendant’s
any
mitigation
has
relevance
own
Haag,
ment.
See
(1989) (“the
of the
disposition
against [appellant’s
cases
*34
sentence.”);
appellant’s
no
Com-
bearing upon
has
cohorts]
(1989) (life
Frey,
Pa.
monwealth v.
miti-
shot
not
co-conspirator
of
who fired fatal
was
sentence
crime).
gating circumstance to defendant’s role
In
There “catch-all” type even the comparison appellant suggests; of 9711(e)(8)] not § mitigation circumstance Pa.C.S. would [42 co-conspirators’ sentences because evidence of encompass has to do “the character and nothing such evidence his of- or “the circumstances of record of defendant” fense.”
Id., (citation omitted). at 471 of is that the cumulative effect
Appellant’s last issue However, him as this errors entitles to relief. alleged all held, may “no of repeatedly Court number failed claims has individually.” so they attain merit if could not do collectively Williams, A.2d Id. (quoting Commonwealth (1992)). 716, 722 to relief having appellant concluded entitled
Finally, raises, any claims that he must also conduct of the we 9711(h)(3), § requires 42 Pa.C.S. which review mandated affirm unless deter- Court to the sentence of death we mine:
(i) of passion, preju- of product the sentence death factor; arbitrary dice or other or any (ii) support finding evidence of one fails at least (d). aggravating specified circumstance in subsection 9711(h)(8). § 42 Pa.C.S.
Our of record establishes the review sentence imposed not the product passion, prejudice, any arbitrary other Additionally, factor. conclude the evidence we presented was support jury’s sufficient two finding (1) aggravating history circumstances: had appellant felonies, id., (2) 9711(d)(9), § violent appellant committed id., felony (robbery), murder while the course of a 9711(d)(6). § Accordingly, we affirm verdict sentence of death.
Appellant’s judgment of sentence is affirmed.8 CASTILLE, NEWMAN, Justice Justice Justice SAYLOR and Justice join opinion. BALDWIN
Chief Justice CAPPY files a concurring opinion.
Justice BAER dissenting files a opinion. *35 CAPPY,
Chief Justice concurring. join I majority the its of opinion, except analysis for the claim that Appellant brought under the Interstate Agreement (“IADA” “Act”), Detainers Act or § 42 Pa.C.S. 9101. I write separately to set forth for my reasoning affirming the trial decision deny court’s to Appellant relief under IADA. the More I specifically, that believe court deter- correctly trial mined that because Appellant did not demonstrate that he complied strictly with the IADA’s procedural requirements, its time limit 180-day bringing commence, for him to trial did not violated.1,2 and the Act was not Prothonotary
8. complete The is directed transmit the of record this Governor, l(i). pursuant case § to the to 42 Pa.C.S. 971 regard, disagree 1. In I majority with the and Mr. Baer in Justice dissenting opinion his that the trial court addressed and resolved the view, Appellant's my substance of IADA claim. In the trial court's Appellant brought timely decision that in a to trial fashion was only Pennsylvania’s under prompt provision rendered trial at Pa. 1100). (formerly R.Crim.P. 600 Pa.R.Crim.P. a congressionally the IADA is background, of By way compact Compact within the Clause sanctioned interstate I, 10, 3, Constitution, § cl. Const. Art. U.S. States United therefore, law, construction. subject is federal and a federal 433, 438-442, Adams, 101 S.Ct. Cuyler v. 449 U.S. construction, (1981). of federal principles Under L.Ed.2d 641 the Act’s courts consult determine that the sources legisla- well as its are its and structure as meaning language on the reflected in the comments made history, which is tive at its the Council of State Governments by draft Agreement Act in adopted it by Congress and when 1956 conference Nash, See, 473 U.S. 105 S.Ct. e.g., 1970. v. Carchman (1985). Further, courts keep L.Ed.2d 516 in mind adoption the reasons for its Act and purposes See, e.g., its United States construing provisions. when 361-62, Mauro, 56 L.Ed.2d 436 U.S. S.Ct. (1978).3 (the by one state procedures Act which establishes state”) from custody another temporary obtains
“Receiving
state”)
(the
a
“Sending
against whom
prisoner
of a
state
him to trial on a
bring
pending
in order to
lodged
detainer was
information,
II;
indictment,
Art.
complaint.
Cuyler,
Act,
are
there
& n.
3. The analysis light of as of his IADA claim. In Pa.R.C.P. 600 suffices under disagree. principles, I these by a procedure in Article IV and is initiated is found The other though Appel- it Receiving Even prosecuting officer in the state. III, majority purported invoke the Act under Article who to lant IV impression that this is an Article appears to be under the mistaken case. 111(a) In regard, Article sets forth certain for a actions prisoner complete in protection. order invoke Act’s 111(a) Article provides: a person
Whenever has entered a term of upon imprison- state, ment in a or penal correctional institution of a party during whenever the continuance of the term impris- of onment there is pending any other state party any indictment, untried complaint information or on the basis of a detainer lodged against which has been he prisoner, brought shall be to trial within 180 he have days shall after caused to be prosecuting delivered to the and the officer appropriate comí the prosecuting jurisdiction of officer’s written notice place and his imprisonment of of indictment, a request disposition be made final of or ... complaint: request The the prisoner information of shall be accompanied by the appropriate certificate of having custody prisoner, stating term official of of held, commitment under prisoner which the being served, time already remaining the time to be served on the sentence, earned, good amount time the time of parole eligibility prisoner, any decisions parole state agency relating prisoner. 111(a) added). addition, (emphasis III,
Art. In under Article indictment, trial is not any information, had on “[i'Jf or com- plaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner original place indictment, to the of imprisonment, such infor- mation, complaint shall not any have further force or effect and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 111(d). prejudice.” Art. courts, federal, both state and lower have addressed steps prisoner
what
take
must
in order to
Article
trigger
Ill’s
time
180-day
period. Many of these courts have held
the period is not
unless a
triggered
prisoner strictly
complies with Article
procedural requirements
Ill’s
and has
caused to be
prosecutor
delivered to the
and the appropriate
court the materials and information that it sets forth. See
Further,
3.5
supra, p.
it is the prisoner’s
prove
burden to
such
Dent,
(3d Cir.1998)
e.g.,
5. See.
United
(сoncluding
States v.
compliance. Henson, v. (9th Cir.1987); United States 945 F.2d (1st Cir.1991). considering compliance approach, merits of the strict
In
the
in the
Supreme
decisions of the
States
Court
I find
United
Michigan,
v.
Fex
example,
instructive. For
U.S.
area
1085, 122
(1993),
Court
43, 113
High
L.Ed.2d
was
S.Ct.
in Article
meaning
phrase
of the
upon
called
construe
days
prisoner]
after
shall have caused
[the
III “within
180-day
time
order to determine
be delivered”
when
phrase
Declining
commences to run.
to construe
period
IADA
liberally than the literal words of the
would have
more
allowed,
to the
phrase
that the
refers
time
rejected
the Court
imprison
notice of
prisoner
at
transmits
written
which
disposition
final
to the correctional
request
ment and
for
Id. at
in the
he is
state
incarcerated.
authorities
where
Rather,
the Court focused on
literal
113 S.Ct.
Act,
that
time
180-day
period
of the
and held
“the
language
111(a)
until the
of the
does not commence
Article
[IADA]
of
for final
request
disposition
prisoner’s [notice and]
actually
him
court
against
been delivered
charges
ha[ve]
lodged
against
that
him.”
officer
detainer
prosecuting
so,
In doing
Id.
at
tolling provision in Article as has Mr. Baer in Justice his dissent. not show Appellant reveals that did of the record My review to the when, ever, prosecuting to be delivered if he caused Lehigh County Pleas of and the Court Common officer for a request of his place imprisonment, of the written notice him, against or charges brought of the disposition final Therefore, I conclude requires. Article III certificate that of proving compliance to meet his burden failed that Article Ill’s requirements; Ill’s procedural with Article the Act triggered; time limit 180-day case.7 present in the not violated BAER, dissenting. Justice to' room for courts
Although provides the law often affirmatively cases it procedural missteps, some forgive Agreement on Detain- such The Interstate denies discretion. (IADA Act),1 preju- dismissal with requires Act which ers tried, into latter catego- falls any charges untimely dice view, its of the Act with the my by conflating analysis ry. In “Prompt distinct Trial” Pennsylvania’s similar but analysis rule,2 demanding requirements the IADA’s more lacks *39 which sanction, in declining the trial court erred mandatory and its prejudice charges against Appellant, to dismiss with affirming T. The on similar Majority, James Williams. basis, by enshrining it as compounds the trial court’s error fear, I ruling, This disserves of this Commonwealth. law long-lived and well-settled legislative underlying intent July Appellant in in filed the trial court 7. There is memorandum n "Exigent to Court’s Appeal” entitled and directed this attention. interlocutory appeal to be an The trial court viewed the memorandum improperly to it and forwarded the document to that was submitted present appeal. Attached to the memoran- purposes for of the Court copies appear be IADA forms. Because of documents that dum are appeal, I for the first time Appellant submitted these documents Court consider them. See not them nor should this have considered Pa.R.A.P.1921; Young, A.2d Commonwealth 264(1974). § 1. Pa.C.S. 9101. 1100; (formerly ef- Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Pa.R.Crim.P. renumbered See 1, 2001). solely following opinion, Rule April In the I refer fective Rules, event, any do in not differ applies which to this case. way following analysis. any to the in material scheme;
statutory creates considerable tension Penn- between and sylvania binding law federal on the question; law same materially overrules or abrogates prior decisions of this Court sub silentio. The only remedy called for under the IADA is dismissal. Such statutes are as only effective as willingness courts’ to apply them in even the mоst resolutely circumstances, unappealing of it is not for the courts to tailor the import Thus, of the law to suit its result. I respectfully dissent.
Before addressing legal dissent, concerns animating my however, it is necessary procedural visit of this history 18, 1996, case. On October filed a written complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County charging Appellant homicide, criminal with crim- robbery, and inal conspiracy. 1996, however, As of October Appellant inwas custody federal pending authorities disposition federal charges associated a bank robbery unrelated to the Pennsylvania charges. Upon court, in conviction federal Appellant was transferred to a federal correctional facility Schuylkill, Pennsylvania. Following various mat- preliminary ters, Appellant appeared, by of a leave United States Attor- ney, his preliminary hearing on the charges pending There, Pennsylvania. he waived arraignment pleaded guilty to all charges.
In January was sentenced the federal court to approximately fifty-seven years prison. He then remitted the federal prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylva- nia. The meanwhile, court of common pleas, listed a hearing and a pre-trial conference concerning Appellant’s Pennsylva- nia charges, and set a trial date of September 1997. In 1997, however, March of the federal Bureau of Prisons deter- *40 mined that Appellant should serve his federal sentence at its (USP in facility Florence); Florence Colorado Appellant ar- rived at USP 6, 1997, Florence on March 1997. On June Lehigh County lodged a detainer against Appellant, signaling Pennsylvania’s intent to try Appellant on his outstanding charges. however, charges also faced unrelated homicide
Appellant, the Pennsylvania in took over Jersey, precedence New which to New charges. transported Appellant Federal authorities 15, 1997. trial in New Jersey July Following for trial on custody, arriving returned to federal at USP Jersey, Appellant February 4,1999. Florence on Florence, immediately Appellant his return to upon
Almost seeking Article III of the IADA petition a under prepared in that Pennsylvania of the were disposition charges The subject Lehigh County of the detainer.3 Article III later than petition IADA no Appellant’s received date, County a law Lehigh 1999. February On testified, he an IADA enforcement officer consulted with to address Appellant’s request. coordinator followed, the In efforts the months Commonwealth’s only for trial met confusion presence secure Appellant’s disputes have revolved principal appear resistance. whether, death around prosecution seeking where trans- provides IADA mechanism for penalty, proper jurisdictions. Questions proper fer over whether between variety agree- writ” or procedure required some “executive ment, simple ad or a corpus prosequendum, of habeas writ had the IADA crowded out that request under ticking.4 IADA that a clock 180-day invoked the part: in provides, 3. Article III of the IADA relevant (a) person imprisonment upon has entered a term of Whenever state, party whenever penal in a or correctional institution of a imprisonment pending during continuance of the term there is indictment, party any or any other state untried information lodged against complaint which a detainer has been basis of brought days he within 180 after he prisoner, shall be trial prosecuting caused to to the officer and the shall have be delivered jurisdiction prosecuting written appropriate court of the officer's request place imprisonment and his for a final notice of the of his indictment, disposition complaint. to be made of the information or court, Provided, good open prisoner That cause shown being present, having jurisdiction matter the court of the counsel may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. § Pa.C.S. fully improbable encountered explicates 4. The court difficulties trial Pennsylvania Slip seeking Appellant’s for trial. Tr. Ct. transfer *41 13, 1999, August Lehigh On while to County continued pursue trial, transfer federal Appellant’s from the custody court pleas of common entered an order trial for scheduling 27, 2, 1999, September On filed a September Appellant 15, 1999, motion continue trial. seeking September the On dismiss, a Appellant filed motion to of gravamen which was his assertion that the Commonwealth had violated right 1999, to a trial. In speedy re- September mained in federal in custody. He did not Lehigh arrive 4,1999. County until October 14, 1999,
On October the trial court a hearing convened regarding Appellant’s pre-trial motions. hearing This 1999, in by followed additional hearings November and in 2000, In February 2000. February Appellant notified the court that he right wished waive his to counsel proceed 5, 2000, pro se. On June an following April 2000 hearing, date, Appellant’s request granted. On the same trial granted court also Appellant’s request for hearing further his motion to dismiss. were Hearings scheduled and resched- uled, separate and on hearings two occasions October were convened for Appellant to witness present testimony sup- port 29, of 2000, his motion. On Appellant’s November while motion to dismiss was still pending, Appellant, in response to order, court filed a letter arguing brief that IADA re- 1, quired On dismissal. December the trial court con- hearing. ducted a final On March Appellant’s arguments Trial”) under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 (“Prompt and the it, IADA before trial Appellant’s court denied motion. Although dispositive order referred only Rule trial court ultimately addressed and rejected Appellant’s IADA It is arguments. the trial court’s erroneous treatment of these arguments, Majority’s and the quiet ratification of the trial reasoning, court’s me compels to write.
The IADA is States,
a compact States, entered into the United the District of Columbia to procedures establish for resolu- 3/26/01, Op., presume good part at 8-14. While I faith on all parties, legal involved impact delay. does not alter a charges outstanding against prisoner
tion of one State’s interstate As a sanctioned congressionally another State. of the United States Compact Clause within compact Constitution, I, § federal law Art. cl. [IADA] subject to federal construction. charges prisoner bring against
A seeking State a de- process by filing custody begins another State’s *42 justice the criminal tainer, request by a State’s which is housed prisoner in which the is that the institution agency agency or when agency notify for prisoner hold the lodged a detainer has been is imminent. After release final him, file a a may “request for against prisoner a information, indictment, or disposition to be made of 111(a). such Upon request, prisoner Art. a complaint.” days,” to trial one hundred brought eighty “shall be within court, good open that for cause shown provided having the court being present, or counsel prisoner his neсessary or may grant any of the matter jurisdiction * * * If is not a defendant continuance. reasonable statutory the applicable period, trial within brought indictment be dismissed with requires that [IADA] V(c). prejudice. Art. 110, 659, 145 Hill, 111-12, 120 v. 528 U.S. S.Ct.
New York
(some
(2000)
internal quotation
560
citations and
L.Ed.2d
Fisher,
102,
omitted);
v.
Pa.
marks
see
Adams,
433,
v.
(1973);
Cuyler
[A] custody He is in disadvantaged by such action. seriously to seek witnesses or to position preserve and therefore in no in close and is kept custody He must often be defense. more, assignments. What is desirable work ineligible when detainers are against filed he prisoner sometimes loses interest in opportunities institutional he because must serve his sentence without knowing what additional sen- may him, when, ever, tences lie before if he will be position employ education and skills he may be developing.
Id. at (quoting 91-1018, S.Ct. 703 H.R.Rep. No. 3p. (1970); 91-1356, S.Rep. (1970); No. p. 3 U.S.Code Cong. & 4866); Admin. p. News see also United ex States rel. Groomes, Esola (3d Cir.1975) (“The 520 F.2d 836-37 of the purpose provision ... is to minimize the impact adverse of a foreign prosecution on programs rehabilitative of the * * * * jurisdiction. confining psychological strain re- [T]he sulting from uncertainty about any future sentence decreases an inmate’s desire to advantage take of institutional opportuni- ties.”). This Court has noted the same concern for “prisoners’ uncertainty resulting from unresolved charges pending in jurisdiction.” another Montione, Commonwealth v. (1998) Scheer, (citing United States v. (2d Cir.1984));
Article III of the IADA permits a prisoner
to seek a
temporary transfer to
jurisdiction
that has filed a detainer
for final disposition of outstanding
in the
charges
transferee
jurisdiction. A prisoner utilizing Article III must transmit his
request
the prosecutor and the court in the detaining
jurisdiction.
111(a).
See IADA Art.
Receipt of these materi-
als triggers the running of a 180-day clоck that counts down
the period during which the prosecution must commence its
Fisher,
102,
case. See
451 Pa.
606 a to toll the court clock explicitly permits IADA disposal the courts’ parties’ the means at the
specifies
trial
a
remedy.
envisages
seek
a
the statute
Specifically,
such
open
“for
cause
in
good
of a continuance
shown
grant
court’s
court,
IADA Art.
being present.”
or his counsel
prisoner
111(a).
been
federal courts —and
language
by
This
has
held
Fisher,
exactly
in
mean
by this Court
discussed infra —to
that a
requirement
no
from the
says, granting
quai’ter
what it
sought
during
court
affirmatively
open
be
continuance
Skeen,
time limitations. See Birdwell v.
prescribed
IADA’s
(5th
Anderson,
Cir.1993);
F.2d
983
1332
Stroble v.
587
F.2d
(6th
Stroble,
Cir.1978), cert. denied sub nom Anderson v.
830
(1979); Fisher,
1289,
451
940, 99
59
499
440
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
notwithstanding
(dismissing
charges
Pa.
A.2d 605
181). Thus,
day
sought
continuance
prosecution
post
cause
cannot occur
“good
this determination
shown”
prosecution
hoc.
fails to seek
continuance
When
180-day
Article III
time
compliance
IADA
"with
within
for final
disposition,
period triggered
prisoner’s request
apply the statu
qualification
without
that we
requires
law
Fisher,
Indeed,
Pa.
Even if federal law were
our
analysis
any
upholds
demonstrates the flaw
caselaw
In
in the instant case.
conviction and sentence
Appellant’s
(1973),
Fisher,
Pa.
On
appeal,
rejected
Court
explicitly
Common-
argument
wealth’s
that scheduling
precluded
conflicts
its
bringing defendant to trial within the
time limit.
prescribed
Further,
rejected
Id. at 607.
we
reliance on
prosecution’s
Jersey
a New
case that permitted
grant
necessary
“the
of any
or reasonable continuance at any time
to an
prior
entry
actual
of an order
Id.
dismissing
indictment.”
(citing State
Lippolis,
(1970)).
55 N.J.
A.2d 241 (emphasis Regarding Common- arguments wealth’s that the necessity securing particular witness companion burden of preparing against case trial, defendant precluded timely id. at 607 n. we observed that, “[wjhile the Commonwealth might arguably have had good continuance, have, cause to obtain a it did it does nor offer, attempt an excuse for its in seeking dilatoriness *45 608 Id. at fact, to coupled We held that
continuance.”
607.
IADA,
compelled
nature of the
dismissal
mandatory
charges.
prejudice
outstanding
of
Fisher, moreover,
decisions
followed earlier
Our decision
In
IADA’s predecessor
of this
under
statute.
Court
Bell,
(1971),
v.
566,
Pa.
A.2d 834
we
Commonwealth
276
bring
to
only
prosecution’s
not
did the
failure
ruled that
dismissal, but that
days
trial within 180
mandate
defendant
to
statute,
dismissal,
of the then
applicable
under
terms
jurisdiction.
the court of
self-executing
entirely
divested
Id. at 837-38.
all motion
that follоwed
Accordingly,
practice
or
initiated
defense
prosecution,
whether
expiration,
Id. at 838. “The clear
of
language
consequence.5
was without
v.
[Commonwealth
opinion
and our
both statute
unanimous
Klimek,
(1965)]
dis
compelled]”
that he complied strictly
requirements
with the
of the
limit,
Dent,
IAD to
day
invoke the 180
time
see
U.S.
(3d Cir.1998);
F.3d 180
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 370 Pa.Su-
*46
(1988),
per.
Tr. Ct. Op., cases, at 6 n. 5. These are however Dent, distinguishable. for example, decided under the Furthermore, IADA. the in defendant Dent had delayed his trial through affirmative conduct (flight) entirely аbsent from the instant In case. Lloyd, defendant filed his IADA before request incarcerated, he was actually a predicate condi- Here, tion for the Act’s application. again, this circumstance in no informs way the instant case.
Neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth asserts that
notice failed in any way relevant to its purpose of
notifying
Commonwealth of Appellant’s desire to
Pennsylvania
return to
to defend his outstanding
Indeed,
criminal charges.
the Com-
monwealth testified that upon receiving Appellant’s Article III
notice a Lehigh County law enforcement officer called an
IADA administrator to address the situation.6 Finally, prior
Cappy,
6. Mr.
Concurring
Chief Justice
in
Opinion,
upon
relies
Appeals
Dent,
United States Court of
for the Third Circuit’s decision in
Supreme
the United States
Michigan,
Court’s decision in Fex v.
507
(1993),
U.S.
113 S.Ct.
precedents
L.Ed.2d 406
and other
require Appellant’s
compliance”
to
activating
“strict
with the
condi-
assign
tions of IADAArticle III and
him
demonstrating
the burden of
597-98,
compliance. Op.
such
at
reading
did not seek
Act’s
officials,”
undermining
systematic meth-
prosecuting
thus
“Article Ill’s
against
rapidly adjudicating charges
prisoners held in another
od of
omitted).
(internal quotation
Critical-
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1293
marks
adequacy
itself
ly,
Supreme Court
has noted
of
the United States
prosecution
prison-
a
compliance
on notice of
where
substantial
Mauro,
436 U.S.
of the Act. See United States v.
er’s invocation
364-65,
(1978) (holding
prisoner's
98 S.Ct.
56 L.Ed.2d
trial, notwithstanding
specifically
requests
speedy
his failure
for
put the
requests,
IADAin
were "sufficiеnt to
Govern-
invoke the
those
claim”);
of his
ment and the District Court on notice
the substance
49-50,
Fex,
(triggering
S.Ct.
the IADA
see also
U.S.
prosecution’s receipt
prisoner’s request
rather
upon
than
clock
transmittal,
prisoner’s
part
receiving
"that the
upon the
ensure
they
losing
prosecutors
in no risk of
their case until
have
State’s
are
trial”).
Supreme
request
Court's
been
of the
Given
informed
IADA,
reading
interpreting
any more
cannot
primacy in
strict
stand.
against
imposition
Even if Mauro
conclusive
strict
were not
case
compliance against Appellant,
presented
w e are not
with a
like
case,
against
prisoner
part
In that
the court ruled
because
Dent.
prosecutors
expressly
failed
to invoke the IADA.
his communications to
*47
case, however,
recognized
undisputed
prosecutor
In this
it is
that the
Indeed,
request in
gravamen
Appellant's
of
the first instance.
as
the
infra,
undisputed
greater length
days
receipt
within
at
of its
discussed
III,
request
Appellant's
disposition under the IADA Article
the
of
coordinator,
Pennsylvania’s
act as
prosecution
IADA
an
un-
contacted
consequence.
equivocal in its
the IADA in
To
connotation as
its
uniformly
binding
require
compliance is
inter-
strict
inconsistent
manifestly
pretations of the Act and
contradicts the Act’s Article IX
liberally
that
"to effectuate its
admonition
we must construe
Act
purposes,"
Supreme
identified as the
one of which the
Court has
prisoners against
outstanding."
"protection] of
whom
are
detainers
here,
448-49,
Where,
Cuyler,
611
Similarly, the Commonwealth argues
Appellant
that
was not
in fact transferred to the Commonwealth under the IADA.
that in
The Commonwealth notes
finally arranging
transfer
to Pennsylvania
the mechanism
Appellant
custody,
adopted
of the
involved
withdrawal
detainer and
issuance of an
writ,
executive
of habeas
ad
corpus
prosequendum.
writ
argument
invocation,
This
also is unavailing. Upon
the IADA
all
governs
subsequent proceedings pertaining to the underly-
Mauro,
indictments or informations.
436
ing
See
U.S. at
(“Once
1834
98
the Federal
lodges
S.Ct.
Government
a detain-
officials,
against a prisoner
prison
er
with state
the Agreement
express
its
terms becomes
and the
applicable
United States
comply
must
with its provisions.”); see also United Slates v.
(10th
Schrum,
Cir.1981) (form
ing
protections, Appellant
put
prosecution
Act’s
and the trial
court on notice that
offing.
the Act's severe sanctions
in the
were
Especially
applies
insofar as the "relaxed waiver” doctrine
to this
case,
capital
acknowledged by
Maj.
a fact
*48
Majority,
Op.
the
see
at 574-
75,
(noting
Considering conviction case, trial in this erly applicable invoked nor otherwise time that it spent a deal of great arguing court nevertheless if it The trial court applies. dismissal even require does encountered, morass rely to on intractable appears largely during Pennsylvania summer of when spring his Appellant’s presence try attempted officials secure trial 1999 demand. The charges per February his outstanding many recital of the communications court’s detailed amply and federal authorities passed between Commonwealth It process. that infected the does demonstrates confusion not, however, explain permits diligent the IADA how even clearly deny Appellant’s faith to prosecutors acting good trial timely because officials various right invoked or abide the law jurisdictions governing fail understand Mauro, 1834. See U.S. 98 S.Ct. use detainers. dates that not- require The trial court sets forth dismissal and federal any degree prosecutorial diligence withstanding recognizes Appellant’s avail- obstruction. trial court to USP ability upon under the IADA commenced return August In Jersey February Florence' from New *49 1999, trial was scheduled for mid-September. September On 2, 1999, Appellant sought continuance to prepare defense. 4, 1999, days separate Two hundred and ten from February 2, If September identify 1999. we as the start February date 1999, (and 18, when the acknowledged corrob- conduct) notice, orated its by receipt of IADA Appellant’s span days; relevant shrinks to 196 the one eightieth hundred 18, 1999, after day February 16, fell on August 1999.8 The court, however, trial period ruled February between 2, 1999, September constituted excludable time due to the Commonwealth’s diligence pursuing Appellant’s presence Thereafter, Pennsylvania. ruled, it Appellant’s various mo- tions caused all thus the delays, delays constituted excludable time. In support of this ruling, the trial court relied an analogy to Pa.R.Crim.P. Pennsylvania’s “Prompt Trial” which, provision, in the absence of the IADA’s mandatory language sanction, requiring specific affords courts some latitude to forgive delays after the running the relevant time limit.
The Majority, summarily acknowledging gravamen Appellant’s argument, impugns his failure to recognize that “a trial court has the discretion to extend the deadline or exclude ” ‘for days good cause Maj. shown.’ at 586 Op. Pa.
A.2d at 536
Montione,
(citing
Commonwealth v.
554 Pa.
(1998)).
720 A.2d
however,
The Majority,
fails to
acknowledge that “good cause shown” under the IADA refers
specifically to a
showing
open court, the defense being
present, of the
necessity
of a duly
reasonableness
sought
prior
continuance
to the expiration of
applicable
IADA
Fisher,
time limit.
See
605;
see also
Birdwell,
1332; Stroble,
983 F.2d
The Majority’s
however,
citation to
is unavailing.
In
parenthetical,
its
the Majority summarizes Montione as
“IAD
follows:
‘tolled whenever and for as long
prisoner
as the
trial,
is
unable
stand
as determined by
Maj.
the court....’”
Op.
VI(a)
at 586 Pa.
Montione, only
that,
standing
proposition
filing
motions, a
prisoner
delay
accedes
resolution
these
filings incurs, simply does not reach
case
at bar. During
18, 1999,
the relevant
time period February
August
—
nothing
did
to contribute to
delay
1999—
trial, nor does the trial
Majority
court
other-
suggest
wise. Appellant did not even arrive in Lehigh County until
4, 1999,
October
nearly
months
the 180-day period
two
after
under IADA Article III
To read Montione as
expired.
had
pause
I
Majority mistakenly
to note that
IADA
characterizes
Article IV
рrovision
Maj.
as the relevant
Op.
rather than Article III.
however,
exonerating that a plain-language requirement thus and to obviate cause in granted only upon good open be shown continuance III, Article to days provided by IADA court within of resolution ensuring prompt flout the statute’s purpose to statute “freight” with pending prosecutions of determined Fisher precisely subjective assessment we Fisher, A.2d inquiry. no in an IADA See at 607. part had especially broadly, light not read Montione so I would Article IX to construe the statute clear mandate under our Cuyler, See consistently prophylactic purpose. with its 448-49, 101 at S.Ct. U.S. ruling Majority’s and the en
Underlying
trial court’s
pеrmissive
of it is the evident desire to borrow
dorsement
provision
Trial”
miti
“Prompt
rulings
Pennsylvania’s
under
the IADA
sanction demanded
where
severe
gate
not to
prisoner appears
to transfer a
be
timely
failure
however,
Court,
rejected the
faith. This
has
product of bad
under Rule 1100 are coextensive
proposition
analyses
IADA, notwithstanding
they
those under
areas where
Montione,
related
See
overlap
purposes.
due
their
Hill,
at
n.
744;
In this
does
notice,
18, 1999,
no
than
February
on clear
effective
later
to
to
Pennsylvania
desire to be returned
stand
Appellant’s
Indeed,
charges.
trial on
criminal
record
outstanding
reflects that a
enforcement
Appellant’s
law
officer on
case
18, 1999,
sought
February
advice
from the Harrisburg
administrator,
IADA
an
sign
obvious
that the relevant authori-
ties understood the
import Appellant’s request. Based on a
18, 1999,
notice date of February
the Commonwealth was
obligated
the IADA
bring Appellant
to
to trial by August
16, 1999, or alternatively
satisfy
to
one of the recognized
to
exceptions
the IADA’s time
The prosecution’s
limits.11
only
recourse, upon realizing that
prevent-
administrative obstacles
Appellant’s
IADA,
ed
timely transfer under the
to seek
a
continuance in open court. This it
not do.
did
prosecution
makes out a persuasive case that it worked
diligently
bring
Pennsylvania
prosecuted
to be
on the outstanding charges, and that it
every
was foiled at
turn.
I find it difficult to believe that
trial
in
any
court
Commonwealth, faced
showing
with such a
good cause
court,
open
would deny the
a
Commonwealth continuance duly
Indeed,
requested under the IADA.
good-cause
exception
was fashioned for precisely this sort of situation. That a
continuance almost certainly
been granted
would have
upon
motion, however,
timely
cannot
prosecution’s
vitiate the
failure
Fisher,
(“While
to seek one. See
In
predecessors
case our
on this Court
wrote
misconstrue,
language difficult to
this Court held that
continuance,
Appellant's September
request
for a
which
run,
occurred alter
simply
the IADA clock had
does not affect this
Bell,
calculus. See
tive in General District # Reeves, Appeal Esquire. of Edward V. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of April 2006. Submitted April Decided notes feature the distinguishing prejudice as IADA, implicitly satisfy dismissal for failure any arising scheme of the IADA is more the remedial acknowledging any in its sanctions than Rule 1100 repudiating absolute to Rule 1100. derogation by appeal of IADA sanctions