Commonwealth v. WilliamsCommonwealth v. Williams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Flaherty
OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
This appeal presents the issue whether, in imposing sentence for a second drug trafficking offense, the enhancement
The history of the drug trafficking offenses of appellant, Tyrone Williams, as to commission of the crimes, conviction, and sentencing, is as follows. The first offense was committed on November 2, 1988. He committed the second offense on May 21, 1991. He was convicted (by guilty plea) of both offenses on October 11, 1991. He was sentenced for both offenses on November 26,1991. .As to the second offense, the Commonwealth sought application of the provision of
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Superior Court en banc reversed and remanded for reimposition of sentence, mandating application of the enhancement provision of
Appellant argues primarily that the purposes, policy, and philosophy underlying the recidivist sentence enhancement statutes cannot be applied unless the second offense is committed after conviction for the first, citing
Commonwealth v. Dickerson,
533 Pa. 294, 621 A.2d 990 (1993);
Commonwealth v. Vogel,
440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970);
Commonwealth ex rel. Turpack v. Ashe,
339 Pa. 403, 15 A.2d 359 (1940);
Commonwealth v. McDermott,
224 Pa. 363, 73 A. 427 (1909);
It was not intended that the heavier penalty prescribed for the commission of a second offense should descend upon anyone, except the incorrigible one, who after being reproved, ‘still hardeneth his neck.’ If the heavier penalty prescribed for the second violation ... is visited upon the one who has not had the benefit of the reproof of a first conviction, then the purpose of the statute is lost.
Id. This view, often referred to as the “recidivist philosophy,” is a valid policy. It was applied in Dickerson, supra at 533 Pa. 299, 621 A.2d 992, a case interpreting a different recidivist sentencing statute, to aid in resolving an ambiguity in the statute. All of the cases cited by appellant utilized the “recidivist philosophy” to construe recidivist sentence enhancement statutes which were ambiguous as to whether a prior conviction must have preceded commission of the second offense or whether the prior conviction merely must have preceded sentencing for the later offense. In other words, the philosophy is a valid tool in interpreting ambiguous statutory language.
The “recidivist philosophy,” however, is not a constitutional principle or mandate, and the legislature is therefore free to reject or replace it when enacting recidivist sentencing legislation. If the legislature enacts a statute which clearly expresses a different application, the “recidivist philosophy” possesses no authority which would override clearly contrary statutory language.
The legislation in question contains no ambiguity at all. It says that “if at the time of sentencing the defendant has been
Appellant raises two additional issues, neither of which has any merit. The first is based on the anomaly that on December 19,1990, the sentencing statute was amended. The effective date of the amendment fell between appellant’s two offenses. At the time of appellant’s first offense, the statute provided at
The gist of appellant’s argument is not entirely clear, though it appears to be based on the fact that if he had altered the order of pleading’ guilty to the two offenses and been sentenced for the second offense first, there would have been no enhancement of the sentence for the second offense, there being no prior conviction; then he could have pleaded guilty to the first offense and would not have received an enhanced sentence because the conviction for the second offense would not have occurred prior to the commission of the first offense. He argues that an enhanced sentence for the second offense, as the Superior Court has ordered, based on the amended version of the statute, constitutes an ex post facto application of the amended statute. Whatever the merits of this argument, we need not address it, for the hypothetical chronology of events posited by appellant did not take place and we are limited to the application of the statute to the facts of this case.
Finally, appellant argues that the Superior Court’s interpretation and application of the amended sentence enhancement statute penalizes him for pleading guilty pursuant to
Accordingly, we hold that the sentence enhancing statute,
Order of the Superior Court affirmed and case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation.
Notes
. There are other purposes of sentencing in addition to individual deterrence and rehabilitation. See generally W. Gaylin, Partial Justice: A Study of Bias in Sentencing (1974). Chapter II, “The Sentencing Process,” at 15-27, outlines five broad purposes of the penal system: protection of society, general deterrence (example to others), individual deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution (punishment, vengeance, desserts).
The “recidivist philosophy” urged by appellant is particularly relevant to the concepts of individual deterrence and rehabilitation. The “recidivist philosophy,” however, is totally meaningless insofar as other valid purposes of sentencing are concerned, such as protection of society and general deterrence. The legislature is perfectly free to enact a sentencing scheme which rejects the “recidivist philosophy” and focuses on other goals of the penal system.