Commonwealth v. WilliamsCommonwealth v. Williams
Lead Opinion
In this case, we called upon to determine whether robbery or theft occurs when an unconscious, intoxicated victim is rolled over onto his side and his wallet is stolen out of his pants pocket. We conclude that this criminal act consti
The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows. On September 2, 1985, the appellant, Ronald Williams, and the victim were drinking wine with Frank Morrow and an unidentified male on the corner of Ninth and Parade Streets in Erie, Pennsylvania. The victim passed out on his back. Eyewitnesses observed appellant roll the victim onto his side and remove his wallet from his pants pocket. The police were called. When the police arrived, one of the eyewitnesses motioned them to the direction of the appellant, Frank Morrow and the other man who were walking very fast to an apartment building which they attempted to enter. The police, however, surrounded the three men and arrested them.
The appellant and Frank Morrow were charged with criminal conspiracy and robbery. On January 22, 1986, the Commonwealth filed a petition for an extension of time for commencement of trial pursuant to
Post-verdict motions were filed and denied. On July 18, 1986, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of three to seven years imprisonment. Although no timely notice of appeal was filed, appellant later filed a motion for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc which was properly granted by the trial court on September 9, 1986. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to extend time for commencement of trial under
The trial court granted an extension of time in which to bring appellant to trial because the victim was unavailable to testify due to his institutionalization in an alcohol treatment and rehabilitation program in New York and because appellant’s co-defendant failed to appear for pre-trial proceedings and was likewise unavailable for trial. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court decision to grant the extension. Thus, we reject appellant’s first contention.
Appellant’s second contention is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for robbery.
In Commonwealth v. Brown,
The force used in taking the purse from the victim’s arm was a harmful touching of the person, accompanied with sufficient force to compel the victim to part with the conscious control of her property, and supports a robbery conviction under§ 3701 . This conduct substantially differs from the case of the thief who merely takes the property of another with intent permanently to deprive him thereof, using no force or threat of force on the victim — like the pickpocket (Chapter 39 of the Crimes Code). Such conduct is nonviolent, poses no threat to the victim who is unaware of the taking, and is accordingly graded less severely than robbery. A victim who is aware of the taking of property from his person is apt to reflex action to protect himself and his property and thus may be injured by the felon.
For this reason, robbery has always been considered a greater harm against society because violence is caused or threatened. The ordinary citizen has the right to go about his way free from the fear of attack to his person from those who would deprive him of control over his goods. That right is violated even by the slight tug on the arm by the purse thief who must use force to wrench the purse from the arm of the victim without regard to her safety. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish robbery under§ 3701(a)(l)(v) .
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. McNair,
In Commonwealth v. Smith,
[t]he elements of robbery as defined by§ 3701(a)(l)(v) are (1) that the defendant physically take or remove property, (2) from the person of another, (3) by use of force however slight. Here, as appellant concedes, the first two elements were proved. However, with respect to the third element, the only ‘use of force ’ that was proved was that appellant used just so much force as was necessary to ‘physically take or remove’ (first element) the pack of cigarettes ‘from the person of’ Mr. Walker (second element). The conclusion follows that the third element was not proved, and that the evidence was therefore insufficient.
333 Pa.Superior Ct. at 158,
[T]he Crimes Code states that its provisions ‘shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purpose of [the Crimes Code] and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.’18 Pa.C.S. § 105 . One general purpose of the Crimes Code is to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses.18 Pa.C.S. § 103(5) . Construing the phrase ‘force how*545 ever slight’ to exclude a taking by stealth alone is consistent with this purpose because a taking by stealth alone is not as likely to result in injury to the victim as a taking by ‘force’; for ‘however slight’ the force may be, the victim may be prompted by it to resist, and injury may ensue. In recognition of this possibility,§ 3701(a)(l)(v) has as its special purpose that greater punishment should be inflicted on those who use force however slight’ than on those who by resort to stealth void the use of force.
333 Pa.Superior Ct. at 161,
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Windell,
[although the evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that appellant was on the bus and took the victim’s purse and wallet, there was no evidence to connect him or the theft with the pushing which the victim experienced.
865 Pa.Superior Ct. at 397,
Appellate courts in this Commonwealth have not had the opportunity to consider the narrow issue of whether robbery can be committed upon an unconscious victim. However, the cases quoted above indicate that the phrase ‘force however slight’ envisions that the victim must be aware of the force and, because of the force, feel compelled to part with his or her property.
In Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, and Commonwealth v. Windell, supra, convictions of robbery were reversed because the victim was aware of neither the taking nor the “force” utilized to accomplish the taking. Admittedly, the fact scenario in the instant case is distinguishable
Appellant may not at this late date be convicted of theft because appellant was tried on the charges of robbery and criminal conspiracy and not theft. See
Notes
. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight.
. We note that this holding is consistent with the holdings in courts of our sister states that robbery cannot be committed upon an unconscious victim. See Hicks v. State,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
After reviewing the record and applicable authority in this case, it is my conclusion that the appellant was properly convicted of the crime of robbery. For this reason, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which vacates appellant’s robbery conviction and remands for resentencing.
My review of the legal authority in this case, particularly the elements of robbery set out in
The robbery statute does not require among its elements that the victim be aware of the taking or that he part with conscious control of his property. Since the majority opinion concludes otherwise, I dissent from that portion of the opinion.