82 Va. 721 | Va. | 1887
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the corporation court of the city of Lynchburg, rendered on the 19th day of October, 1886, upon an issue as to the genuineness of coupons offered in payment of taxes. The Commonwealth, by her attorney, moved that the plaintiffs be required to produce the original bonds from which the coupons were alleged to have been cut. The court overruled this motion, and the Commonwealth excepted. This is the first assignment of error here.
The plaintiffs, in the progress of the case, offered one P. A. Krise as an expert to prove the genuineness of the coupons. The Commonwealth objected to the use of expert testimony in the case upon the trial of 'the issue, but the court overruled the objection, and admitted the alleged expert testimony, and the Commonwealth again excepted, and there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.
We will consider the assignments in their order.
The ruling of the court assigned as error under the first exception is in direct violation and disregard of the act of the
The Constitution of this State vests “the legislative power of this Commonwealth in the General Assembly.” The act of assembly in question was an act to prescribe a rule of evidence in the courts of the State. The first article, § 10, of the United States Constitution provides, among other things, that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; but this provision has no application whatever to rules of evidence or procedure in the State courts. The same provision is found in the fifth article, fourteenth section, of the State Constitution.
The act in question does not in any way affect the obligation of the contract, which is the foundation of the action. The rule prescribed is one-which affects the mode of procedure only, and is in accordance with the principles of the common law. It is a* fundamental principle that the best evidence is required, of which the case is susceptible, and it is one of the most important of the rules of evidence. Every disputed fact must be proved by the best attainable evidence: It is a principle universally recognized by the courts. If the obligation of the State is admitted in the fullest sense as to all the bonds of the State, this admission admits no liability upon her for any but her own bonds; and, when a dispute arises as to the genuineness of any alleged bond of the State, as an original proposition, the genuineness of the bond must be proved by competent testimony; for, if it is not a genuine bond, the State
The Legislature of the State has declared that many spurious coupons are circulated, by which the State has been much embarrassed; and, in the judgment of the law making power, it becoming necessary that the genuine coupons should be distinguished from the spurious coupons, the proceeding in this case was devised. The remedy thus provided should be unobjectionable to the real bondholders. It not only does not impair the obligation of their bonds, but completely and effectually sustains it. The genuine coupons are to be paid, or to
It may be inconvenient to a bondholder to present his bond when he seeks to realize on his coupon, but that argument is of no avail against a rule of evidence, established by the Legislature to regulate the proceedings in the courts of this State. And, moreover, and beyond this, it must be remembered that this is a suit against the State, and the act is the sole authority for the proceeding, and a person availing himself of this remedy must be content to follow the terms of the act. The State can only be sued by her own consent; and, when this consent is availed of, it must be strictly followed. The corporation court of Lynchburg city erred in its ruling, as set forth under the first assignment of error, and the same is true of the ruling excepted to under the second assignment of error.
The act of assembly of January 21, 1886, forbids the use of expert testimony in the trial of an issue arising in such a case, for reasons that are obvious from what has gone before. But, whatever may have been the reason, the subject, like the first, was one coming within the legitimate scope of the legislative functions, and like the act of January 26, 1886, prescribes a rule of evidence for the conduct of trials in the courts of the State, and is binding on all the courts of the State. The Legislature considering the existence of spurious coupons, and their circulation, and the fact that the genuine and the spurious coupons were exactly alike, and indistinguishable therefore when detached, abolished the use of such testimony in th’is State. The object of this provision, and the effect of-it, is to protect the State against fraud, and it impairs the obligation of no genuine bond. The effect of both of these provisions is to provide regulations and rules of procedure in the courts of the Commonwealth, wholesome in themselves, strictly within the province of the Legislature, and violative of no provision of the Constitution.
Judgment reversed.