139 A. 493 | Pa. | 1927
Argued September 26, 1927. A recital of the revolting details of this crime is quite unnecessary. Defendant was found guilty of murder of the first degree and the penalty was fixed as death. In compliance with the mandate of the Act of February 15, 1870, P. L. 15, section 2, we have read the entire record and have found to be present all of the ingredients necessary to sustain the jury's finding.
The only criticism of the trial made by appellant's counsel is that the charge of the court took away from the jury its right or privilege to bring in a verdict of second degree murder. Three parts of the charge are pointed to as sustaining this position; they will be found bracketed in the portion of the charge printed in the reporter's notes. The gravamen of appellant's complaint is that the trial judge stated the defendant would be guilty of murder in the first degree if the jury found certain facts, the contention apparently being that the statement by the court that a specified state of facts *45
constitutes murder of the first degree is equivalent to a direction to bring in a verdict of first degree if those facts are actually found. It is, of course, the function of the jury, under the plain words of the 74th section of the Act of 1860 to fix the degree of guilt (Com. v. Frucci,
The judgment is affirmed and the record is remitted to the court below for the purpose of execution. *46