COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Michael WEISS, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided March 18, 1992.
Reargument Denied May 5, 1992.
606 A.2d 439
Argued Dec. 3, 1991.
Alan M. Rubenstein, Dist. Atty., Stephen B. Harris, Chief, Appeals Div., Diane E. Gibbons, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
On May 2, 1986, Michael Weiss, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County of Rape, Statutory Rape, Incest, Indecent Assault, Simple Assault, Endangering the Welfare of Children and Corruption of Minors. Subsequent to the filing of post-trial motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, trial counsel withdrew his appearance. Present counsel entered their appearance on behalf of appellant, and filed supplemental post-verdict motions, raising issues concerning after-discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held before the trial court on November 17, November 20, and December 3, 1987. New counsel was then granted permission to litigate supplemental post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. Following argument to the trial court en banc, appellant‘s post-verdict motions were denied in an opinion and order dated January 5, 1989. On February 3, 1989, appellant was sentenced to a period of incarceration of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years. On November 27, 1989, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 397 Pa.Super. 648, 571 A.2d 507. This appeal followed. Appel
The charges brought against appellant arose out of the following circumstances. Appellant, separated from his wife for two years, lived in an apartment with two other men. His daughter, the victim, four years old at the time of the incident, lived with her mother. She frequently visited her father for several days at a time, and did so between November 11-16, 1985. She testified at trial that, one night during that visit, her father [appellant] woke her up, inserted his finger and his penis into her vagina, put Cheerios into her vagina, and cut her vaginal area with a plastic knife. She also testified that when she screamed her father pointed a gun at her. The victim‘s mother, appellant‘s estranged wife, testified that her daughter acted abnormally upon her return from her father‘s home on November 16, 1985, and that on November 19, 1985, while bathing her daughter, she discovered a cut approximately one-inch long on her daughter‘s vaginal area. When unable to reach the family doctor, she took her daughter to Delaware Valley Medical Center emergency room.
The examining physician at the hospital, testified that he observed a one inch cut on the child‘s genital area consistent with having been cut by a plastic knife. Two hospital nurses also testified that the child had a cut on her vagina. One of the nurses, admittedly not an expert in wound dating, testified that the cut was “probably about a day
The defense‘s case consisted principally of the testimony of appellant, who vehemently denied the accusations, appellant‘s two roommates who corroborated appellant‘s testimony, and two children of one of appellant‘s roommates who testified that they had occasionally seen appellant and the victim in bed together. One child testified that on either November 15 or 16, 1985, she and the victim had gone to sleep on the sofa bed, but when she awoke the next morning the victim was in appellant‘s bed. She could not recall whether appellant was at home at the time. Appellant‘s father testified to a recantation by the victim. No character witnesses were called on behalf of appellant. Appellant was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes.
Appellant now, in his appeal before us, contends that trial counsel‘s failure to call character witnesses on his behalf constitutes ineffective assistance. Post-trial testimony reveals that several witnesses would have testified to appellant‘s good character. Many of the same witnesses also would have testified to his wife‘s bad character.
The standard to be applied in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit; for counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985). Once this threshold is met we apply the “reasonable basis” test to determine whether counsel‘s chosen course was designed to effectuate his client‘s interests. If we conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel‘s assistance is deemed
At the hearing on post-verdict motions, appellant offered the testimony of several character witnesses in support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of appellant‘s good character, and failing to present evidence of appellant‘s wife‘s bad character. In addition to appellant‘s employer and co-worker, these witnesses included numerous friends and relatives. Notably, appellant‘s wife‘s parents and brother testified to appellant‘s good character reputation and his wife‘s lack thereof. All of the witnesses testified that they would have been willing to testify at trial on appellant‘s behalf had they been asked by appellant‘s attorney.
In a case such as this, where there are only two direct witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and character evidence is critical to the jury‘s determination of credibility. Evidence of good character is substantive, not mere makeweight evidence, and may, in and of itself, create a reasonable doubt of guilt and, thus, require a verdict of not guilty. Commonwealth v. Neely, 522 Pa. 236, 561 A.2d 1 (1989). Appellant‘s claim, therefore, is not without merit.
We must now determine whether appellant‘s counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to present character witnesses at appellant‘s trial. Trial counsel testified at the post-trial hearing, that his theory of the case contemplated the use of character testimony, but that after contacting the witnesses given him by appellant, he concluded that he could not use character witnesses. (N.T. 11/17/87, p. 27).
Trial counsel‘s failure to use appellant‘s numerous relatives as character witnesses was based upon his perception of familial character evidence. He testified that, “[a]s a policy matter, I don‘t ever recall ever putting on character evidence of family members. I think the jury just thinks it‘s garbage.” Counsel admits that he never discussed with appellant the possibility of presenting character evidence from appellant‘s family. (N.T. 11/17/87, p. 28). Counsel‘s preconceived notions about familial character evidence led to his failure to even interview appellant‘s relatives, and precluded him from assessing their credibility. Although familial character witnesses generally lack the credibility of unbiased non-familial witnesses, an attitude that they are per se worthless, is sufficient evidence of counsel‘s incompetency.
In light of the overwhelming need for character evidence in a case such as this, counsel‘s limited investigation into the quantity and/or quality of potential character witnesses on behalf of appellant, and counsel‘s prejudice toward familial witnesses, we find no reasonable basis to support trial counsel‘s decision not to call any character witnesses.
Finally, we must determine whether appellant was prejudiced by counsel‘s deficient performance. See, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). Appellant must demonstrate that the alternative not selected by counsel offered a substantially greater chance of success than the tactic chosen. Commonwealth v. Saxton, 516 Pa. 196, 532 A.2d 352 (1987). To properly determine whether prejudice resulted from the quality of counsel‘s representation, we must focus
Counsel‘s stated strategy was not to contest the physical findings of sexual abuse, but to focus on the fact that it may have been appellant‘s wife, not appellant who “set the whole thing up.” (N.T. 11/17/87, p. 34). It would have been entirely consistent as well as highly beneficial, in light of this strategy, to present character witnesses, who not only would vouch for appellant‘s good character, but would have impeached his wife‘s character at the same time.
Whereas the defense did not attempt to refute the physical findings, the evidence regarding the perpetrator boiled down to appellant‘s word against the word of his wife and daughter. The only issue then, was whether appellant or someone else was responsible for what happened.6 Considering there was no overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case, credibility of the witnesses was of paramount importance, and counsel‘s error not to employ character witnesses, familial or otherwise, undermined appellant‘s chances of instilling reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury and resulted in prejudice to appellant.
We find, therefore, that even with the presumption of adequate performance, trial counsel‘s defense was the result of unreasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable probability that, absent trial counsel‘s error, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting appellant‘s guilt. Hence, the fundamental fairness of the proceeding has been undermined by the ineffective assistance of appellant‘s trial counsel.
The judgment of sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
ZAPPALA, J., joins the majority opinion and files a concurring opinion.
NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J., concur in the result.
McDERMOTT, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result based on the specific facts of this case. I also wish to state that the decision in this case should not be blindly applied to all those cases where an attorney made a tactical decision to eschew the calling of character witnesses.
ZAPPALA, Justice, concurring.
I join the majority opinion except as it suggests that counsel could have introduced witnesses to testify to the appellant‘s wife‘s “bad character“. I generally agree that it would have been permissible to impeach her credibility as a witness with evidence of her conviction for unauthorized use of a credit card, at 442, n. 5, although I believe the proper means of doing so would have been in the course of cross-examining her, and not through questioning of her parents. Moreover, her parents and perhaps others might have been questioned as to her reputation for truth and veracity generally, but not as to specific acts. Beyond that, however, I fail to understand on what basis testimony as to her “bad character” would have been admissible.