In a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted on two counts of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a), and two counts of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(1) (Supp.1982- *91 1983) involving two victims. After denial of post-verdict motions, the trial judge imposed sentences of five years psychiatric probation for each count of corruption of minors, and two years psychiatric probation for each count of indecent assault, all sentences to run concurrently. In this appeal from that judgment of sentence, defendant raises three issues.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s petition for an extension under Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100(c), and in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 1100(f). We find that the trial judge’s opinion adequately discusses and disposes of this issue, to which we have nothing to add.
Defendant contends that his speedy trial motion should have been granted under Rule of Criminal Procedure 6013, which provides a 120-day rule for commencement of trial in Philadelphia Municipal Court, in contradistinction to the 180-day rule applicable in common pleas court under Rule 1100. Defendant argues that Rule 6013 was applicable to these proceedings, even though they occurred in common pleas court, because he had a right to a Municipal Court trial, which had not been properly waived. Defendant did not raise the specific issue of the applicability of Rule 6013 in either his original or amended post-verdict motions, and hence this issue is waived.
Commonwealth v. Davenport,
Defendant’s last contention is that the indecent assault convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes with the convictions for corruption of minors, because the convictions were based on the same acts. Although this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it is not waived.
Commonwealth v. Smith,
Defendant could only be sentenced for the most serious offense, the one with the greater possible maximum penalty.
Commonwealth v. Boerner,
The two-year probationary sentences for indecent assault equal the statutory maximum, while the five-year probationary sentences for corruption of minors exceed the statutory maximum. When the illegal sentences for corruption of minors are reduced, as they must be, to the statutory maximum of two years, they equal the sentences for indecent assault. Had the trial judge known she could properly impose only a total of two sentences with a two-year maximum for each, she might have made these two sentences consecutive rather. than concurrent. Since we cannot determine whether the sentences for corruption and indecent assault influenced each other, we shall vacate all judgments of sentence, and remand for resentencing only on either corruption or indecent assault for each of the two criminal acts.
Judgments of sentence vacated, and case remanded for resentencing.
