*1 Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH WALZACK, Appellant. Michael Nickles Pennsylvania. Supreme. Court Argued April July 6, Decided *3 Lear, Defender, Stroudsburg, Public Michael Robert C. Wetmore, appellant. Tannersville, for J. Atty., Higgins, Marsh, Daniel Asst.
James F. C. Dist. appellee. Atty., Stroudsburg, for Dist. O’BRIEN, JONES, J., EAGEN, C. and ROB-
Before MANDERINO, ERTS, and POMEROY, NIX JJ. OF THE COURT OPINION NIX, Justice. psychiatric evidence is
Today we decide whether must jury accused when an to be evaluated admissible specific required negate the intent it to element offers degree thereby re of murder of the first for a conviction degree. ducing murder of the second 1We the crime to 17, 1969, governed and is crime occurred on June therefore 1. This 24, 872, 701, 1939, 1939, § P.L. Penal Code of Act of June 26, Code, present Act of March P.S. Under the Crimes 18 1974, 4, 213, 46, (Supp. 1975-76), § § No. 2502 P.L. 18 Pa.C.S.
213 authority psy persuaded by weight the vast purpose for this chiatric evidence should admissible and, therefore, the learned court below we hold that excluding proffered testimony from the erred in jury’s consideration.2 specific analyzing it is case, of this
Prior to
facts
clarify
today’s
necesssary
not
what we do
decide
First, appellant
opinion.
not
the defense of
raised
negation
specific
of a
intent
to kill
the crime to
would reduce
degree.
murder
the third
Brawner,
1,
U.S.App.D.C.
969
471 F.2d
United States v.
153
Henderson,
77,
482,
People
Cal.Rptr.
(1972);
386
v.
35
60 Cal.2d
Gorshen,
716,
People
(1963);
492
v.
51 Cal.2d
336 P.2d
P.2d 677
Wells,
330,
(1959);
People
53
following
v.
33
202 P.2d
Cal.2d
(1949) (dissents
grounds);
People,
v.
133 Colo.
on other
Becksted
353,
189,
People,
(1956); Leick
131 Colo.
292 P.2d
194
v.
587,
362,
806,
People,
(1955);
P.2d
Battalino
118 Colo.
281
811
v.
524,
589,
518,
(1948); Ingles
People,
899
v.
92 Colo.
199 P.2d
Gramenz,
(1933);
22
126
Iowa
P.2d
1112
State v.
256
DiPaolo,
(1964);
401
N.W.2d
v.
N.J.
285
State
34
168
denied,
(1961); modi
cert.
368 U.S.
insanity today’s way no the decision in affects vitali- and M’Naghten ty the as the sole in this test standard determining responsibility for criminal Commonwealth alleges Second, the mental illness or where actor defect.3 hereinafter, do for reasons that will be we not discussed position adopted inferentially accept- today the view impulse ing previously the test which have irresistible expressly rejected.4 5Third, we do not here reach applicability principles question of the of the announced specific requiring to other herein crimes a intent than degree. murder of the first Walzack, jury was Appellant, Michael tried before degree murder first in the shoot- and convicted of ing Following penalty death Ole hear- of one Toasen. ing, appellant imprisonment. was to life sentenced judg- for Post-trial motions a new trial and in arrest appeal ment were filed and direct denied this followed.6 killing
During
trial, the
defense admitted
attempted
through
testimony
position
its
to establish
stand,
appellant
a Dr.
to
Willis. When called
proof indicating that
the defense made an offer of
sanity
appellant’s
at the
intend
contest
witness did not
incident,
M’Naghten
standard.
time of the
under
sane;
appellant
that he
defense conceded that
M’Naghten
long
on
relied
test
3. This Commonwealth
act,
liability for one’s
determine
for criminal
mental
Mosler,
repeat
(1846),
have
Commonwealth v.
edly
In evidence, the trial court relied on closely a number of our earlier divided deci- sions. Tomlinson, 446 Pa. 284 A. (1971) 2d (majority opinion by Bell, J.,C. concur- ring opinion by opinion Barbieri, J., dissenting by Rob- erts, J., in JJ., which Pomeroy, joined); Jones and Com- monwealth v. Weinstein, (1971) 274 A.2d (opinion support judgment Bell, of by affirmance of been, 6. While the precise might offer was not as as it have “diminishing reference degree responsibility of of the De fendant for this judge crime” was sufficient to alert the trial area, purpose testimony. intended In this nomencla ture has been a concept source of obfuscation. The has been re partial ferred responsibility, to as responsibility diminished partial Law, insanity. Scott, p. Criminal LaFave & 326. Proba bly, the most capacity” accurate label would be “diminished since the thrust of ability per the doctrine relates to the accused’s specified process. form a cognitive See v. Tom linson, 241, 257, (1971) (Dis n. n. 3 senting Opinion, ROBERTS, J., in which Mr. Chief Justice JONES and Mr. joined): Justice POMEROY “Although ‘partial’ responsibility the terms and ‘diminished’ are the common vehicles used writers and courts to describe theory today, they highly misleading. They discuss connote fully responsible defendant somehow not for his actuality fully responsible, actions. In the defendant is only require but for a crime which does not the elements of premeditation and deliberation.” Padilla, supra, State Supreme New Mexico v. Court of New Mexico advised: “The doctrine contended for the defendant is sometimes referred to This ‘partial responsibility.’ as that of ‘diminished’ actually misnomer, given theory may and the not be However, an allowing proof exact name. means the derangement mental liberate or insanity short of lack evidence of de- premeditated words, design. In other it contem- plates responsibility, partial, full only not but for the crime ac- tually committed.” 66 N.M. at 347 P.2d at 314. result, Eagen O’Brien, JJ., J., concurred in the
C.
opinion
by Roberts,
support
judgment
reversal
J.,
JJ., joined);
in which
Pomeroy,
Jones and
Common
*6
(1969)
wealth
104,
v.
A.2d
Rightnour, 435 Pa.
253
644
Bell,
(opinion
judgment by
support
in
of affirmance of
opinion
by
J.,
support
judgment
C.
in
Rob
reversal
J., dissented);
erts, J.,
Jones, J.,
Cohen,
in which
joined,
Phelan,
265,
Commonwealth
A.2d 540
v.
427 Pa.
234
(1967) (majority opinion by Eagen, J., concurring opin
by
by Roberts, J.,
dissenting opinion
ion
Bell,
J.,C.
Cohen,
dissented);
Ahearn,
Pa.
J.,
Commonwealth v.
421
311,
(majority opinion
J.,
(1966)
Bell,
Appellant charged with and convicted degree. Legislature murder of first defined elements of this crime as: perpetrated by
“All means of murder which shall by lying any poison, wait, in or or other kind of premeditated killing, willful, or deliberate and which perpetration of, attempt- shall be committed or ing perpetrate rape, burglary, any arson, robbery, degree.” kidnapping, shall be murder the first (Emphasis added). 1939, Code, 24, Act Penal of June 872, P.L. 701.7 § “willful, pre-
Under this section the term
deliberate and
meditated” describes the mental state that must accom-
pany
nonfelony
the act before a
murder can be murder
degree.
O’Searo,
of the first
Commonwealth v.
466 Pa.
(filed
224,
January 1976);
279,
(1974);
128,
Alston,
Commonwealth v.
456 Pa.
129,
229,
(1974);
317 A.2d
Mos
Commonwealth v.
ley,
134,
(1971);
444 Pa.
(1974); 222, Commonwealth v. A. Bonomo, 396 Pa. (1959). 2d equally requisite It is the as clear that intent of an offense is the crime. one of the elements of Mullaney Wilbur, supra; supra; In Re Com Winship, Graves, supra; Rose, monwealth v. su Commonwealth v. pra; Bonomo, supra. Consequently, Commonwealth v. trial, upon in the instant it was incumbent the Common prove beyond wealth appel to a reasonable doubt that specific lant support finding had the intent to kill the to of murder of the first decree. Jones, (1947), In Commonwealth v. 355 Pa. stated: “Apart killings in from the made felonious which are murder degree by perpetrated the poison of first statute because means by lying perpetration or in wait or committed the attempt perpetrate statutorily the to one of the enumerated (Act § felonies P.S. June P.L. Sec.
4701),
“the main
from that
distinction
murder in the first
degree”
specific
the second
lies in
life re
the
intent
to take
quired
Iacobino, supra
for the former: Commonwealth v.
[319
65, 67-68,
Robinson,
823];
Pa.
178 A.
305 Pa.
Commonwealth v.
302, 308,
689;
Gibson,
157 A.
Commonwealth v.
supplies
qualities
119 A.
Such
intent
willful
ness,
essential, by
premeditation
deliberation
otherwise
statute,
degree.”
supplied)
(Emphasis
to murder
in the first
525-26,
Any admissibility particular of a type inquiry of evidence must start with a threshold probative to its relevance and value. Commonwealth Jones, 62, 66, (1974); Pa. Common McCusker, 382, 388, wealth approval have rele We cited with the test for propounded leading evidentiary authorities, vance two Wigmore Jones, su and McCormick. Commonwealth v. pra; Lippert, Commonwealth v. 311 A. supra. 2d McCusker, Wigmore axioms, defines relevance in terms of two having probative “None but facts rational are ad value missible,” and, having probative “All facts rational value specific admissible, some rule unless forbids.” 1940). (3rd Wigmore, at Ed. Evidence 9-10 289-95 § suggests determining McCormick rele following for vance, “. . . render evidence offered [d]oes probable desired inference without more than would then, is evi evidence? . . . Relevant evidence thus degree inquiry, dence that some advances probative prima value, facie admissible.” 1972). (2nd McCormick, Ed. 185 at Evidence 437-38 § attempted in case, appellant instant expert testimony concerning mental troduce mur for type specific conviction form the intent a degree testimony obvious requires. der the first This inquiry” as ly “significantly would advanced have *8 element of presence an essential of absence 427, Hickman, Pa. crime. See Commonwealth v. (1973). Thus, the exclusion 564, 433-434, upon lack testimony based a proffered cannot be of the ten Also, finding for relevancy. is no there basis of Al incompetent for other reasons. testimony dered jurisdiction found be though early this can decisions psychiatric tes reliability of express to the that as doubt psy clear that decisions make timony, more recent our recogniz- legitimate chiatry scientific basis. While a ing psychiatry might of that well less exact than some disciplines cogni- the other medical we are nevertheless zant of the “tremendous advancements made in supra McCusker, field.” v. Commonwealth at McCusker, supra, A.2d at 287. aft- noting many er in criminal areas law where accepted psychiatrist’s opinion have a we observed: consistently placed “. . . reliance we have [t]he upon competence psychiatric any of evidence belies sufficiently recognized it is not ac- concern that cepted capable offering quality science of ex- medical pert guidance.” at 292 A.2d at Id. 291.9 long accepted psychiatric on the is We have evidence competent sue of whether an is to stand trial.10 accused Similarly, long permitted psychiatric evidence un we have M’Naghten der an test determine whether accused recently we of the crime.11 More insane at time purpose de have for the allowed evidence pas termining in the heat whether an accused acted that, dissenting opinion, EAGEN concedes 9. In his Mr. Justice materially recent psychiatry “The has advanced science years present information undoubtedly is now able to reliable situations; . Mr. . . to human behavior in certain dissent, however, personal be- Eagen on premises his Justice lief respect bility With all due psychiatry reliable. that in areas is not some accept general relia- appears be inconsistent part recognize of the determi- of a science and fail to dis- judgment that the reliability necessarily nation includes cipline capable recognizing limitations. its Moreover, dis- implicit expression of by the we are disturbed who judgment Commonwealth trust of the of the citizens testimony not does comprise juries. is offered our The fact that example the Hearst acceptance. necessitate its case alluded to An excellent rejected the Eagen jury where the Justice Mr. psychiatrists. testimony of reknowned nation’s most some Novak, Pa. 150 A.2d Commonwealth (1955); Com- Moon, A.2d 96 Pa. Scovern, (1928). 140A. 611 monwealth v. Melton, de cert. (1962); Common nied, L.Ed.2d 87 371 U.S. 83 S.Ct. Woodhouse, 164A.2d 98 wealth v.
220 committing homicide;12 sion when a whether an accused subjectively danger was in of death believed he imminent injury or bodily serious his claim of self- under ;13 capable making defense whether an accused was of confession;14 accept long detailed written we have and, stage penalty of trial.15 ed evidence at
Having psychiatric evidence determined that possesses reliability its for the sufficient for admission purposes whether herein must acertain we announced might ruling any justify it policy there that reasons incompetent. opinions suggest Early of Court have capacity acceptance ed that the doctrine of of diminished acceptance impulse the irresistible tantamount agree. insanity.16 test for do not doctrines We McCusker, 382, (1972). 286 292 A.2d 12. Commonwealth 448 Pa. v. 328, (1974). Light, 288 v. 458 Pa. 326 A.2d Commonwealth Jones, 62, (1974). A.2d 10 14. Commonwealth v. 459 Pa. 327 382, 15, McCusker, 392 n. 292 A.2d v. Pa. Commonwealth 555, 291, 286, Wooding, (1972); 355 Pa. n. v. Commonwealth 421, Hawk, 417, Pa. (1947); Commonwealth v. 238, 231, Stabinsky, Pa. A. supra, Wooding, 169 A. Commonwealth v. stated: is, course, informed jury It is entitled to true that the regarded properly to be of all the circumstances conditions penalty; therefore as relevant to the determination incapacity testimony concerning has of sanity, the mental been that held murder, though in- charged short of even defendant with Sta- purpose: Commonwealth for admissible Hawk, 439; binsky, A. at 329. 196 A. 355 Pa. at Ahearn, (1966), A.2d 561 16. In Court, concept Bell, equated the writing Mr. Justice for the Chief impulse: capacity irresistible diminished with witnesses, any of psychiatrists nor Neither defendant’s under repeat, was insane we M’Naghten defendant testified that experts, be- if testimony defendant’s Rule. The impulse lieved, violence in establish an irresistible would vary Psychiatric definitions names or certain sexual situations. conventions”; and the “bridge change rapidly as or almost re- impulse,” or “diminished “irresistible use sponsibility”, terms such as oneself”, “temporary or “inability to control not suffi- psychopaths, are partial insanity”, kinds or various impulse en- and irresistible involve diminished *10 impulse tirely distinct considerations. Irresistible is a insanity M’Naghten test for which is broader than the may impulse person the test. test a Under irresistible capable responsibility though criminal he is avoid even fully distinguishing right wrong, between provided he quality the aware of nature and his act acting. establishes that he was unable to refrain from theory offering of dimin- evidence the An accused under liability. The general capacity criminal concedes ished challenge is to thrust of this doctrine possess particular required state of mind to a actor degree of legislature certain for the commission a charged. the crime today, adopting position we are we announce
In jurisdictions in the many the fact buttressed jurisdictions, accept country these this view.17 Of M’Naghten we do.18 rule as of them embrace the number doctrine, the Su- recognizing validity of this preme reasoned: Court Colorado degree has murder case
“A
in a first
defendant
estab-
plea
insanity, to
right,
without reference to a
capacity to
bearing upon
deficiency
lish mental
what, in
change
psychiatrists used to call
cient
to
what
has
called,
impulse.
always
legal language,
an irresistible
been
##**** v #**
impulse’
in the modern
‘irresistible
“The doctrine of
self’, wheth-
‘inability
control one’s
vernacular
escape
insanity,
a device
legal
or as
er
criminal
to denote
used
crime
reduce
responsibility
one’s acts or to
for
always
Pennsylvania.”
degree,
rejected
been
or its
principally on Commonwealth
relied
See also those cases which
Tomlinson, supra;
Ahearn,
example,
supra,
v.
for
Commonwealth
v.
Weinstein,
Rightnour,
supra;
v.
Commonwealth
v.
Phelan, supra.
supra;
v.
supra.
(2),
cited in Footnote
See authorities
Gorshen,
Henderson,
supra;
supra; People
Beck
People
v.
supra;
People,
People,
People, supra;
Battalino v.
Leick v.
sted v.
Moran,
Gramenz,
supra; People
supra; People v.
supra; State v.
Colavecchio, supra.
specific
degree
form the
intent essential to first
mur-
der.”
People,
Beeksted v.
Colo.
See, also,
People,
Battalino
118 Colo.
P.2d 897
People,
Leick v.
We that failure to there can be an nega- unsoundness of mind of such a character toas specific crime, particular tive intent to commit a ignore great advancements which have been psychiatry. made the field of The results which growing reliability. have been achieved confirm its *11 contradictory do not position We consider this to our right insanity. wrong adherence to the test of and We pretend except do not there are no mental disorders those qualify which under this rather limit test, but the types defense insanity to the of mental in illness comprehend which the defendant cannot the or nature consequences of his Mental act. Weihofen his text Disorder as a if we rec- Criminal Defense states that ognize principle the person basic that a should not be punished requi- for a crime if he did not entertain the mind, escape site state logical “there from the no proposition person guilty that a cannot held of a de- premeditated killing liberate and he did not when delib- premeditate, incapable erate and of de- and indeed was liberating premeditating. If, however, and he was able to the he com- understand nature of act mitting act, if he he intended to do that should be guilty degree held or man- murder in the second slaughter. logic nothing’ There in the or as- is no ‘all sumption opinions underlying many so court on the subject wholly person either re- ‘sane’ and —that sponsible wholly acts, for all his or ‘insane’ and Gramenz, 134, Iowa irresponsible.” State N.W.2d proffered evi it is that
Once determined process competent, re due dence was both relevant Penn quires I, 9 of the its admission. Article Section rights sylvania accused of an sets forth Constitution prosecutions. in criminal interpretation myopic this clause the most
“Even right necessarily offer relevant to would concede challenge to issue Com- evidence a material of fact.” Graves, supra, 665, n. 7.20 monwealth v. at 334 A.2d at principles Ameri- It is inconsistent with fundamental offering jurisprudence preclude can an accused from charge competent dispute evidence relevant and against This, course, of the ele- any him. includes comprise charge. that ments that Judgment trial of sentence new award- reversed ed. Legal virtually unanimous textwriters and authorities is, today. approval position adopt foremost their perhaps, Code. American Institute’s Model Penal Law provides: proposed Section 4.02 official draft the institute disease “Evidence defect is admissible defendant did or did from a mental that defendant suffered prove is relevant to whenever it an ele- which is a state of mind not have of the offense.” ment See, cit- g., single too authorities Others are out. e. numerous *12 (2) supra. ed in Footnote refer- In makes a footnote in Mr. Justice EAGEN dissent enactment, (1975 ses- statutory ence to a House Bill 826 recent 7, 1976, Code, sion), April December amending eff. Act of Crimes Although § § P.L. No. 18 Pa.C.S. 308. suggested legislation response decision to this Court’s this was in Graves, (1975), ac- in curacy A.2d specifically provision dictates that we here note that this legislature recent position in the reversed the the taken Code, supra, prior years our decision Crimes enacted three to Graves, Further, supra. the rationale while with provision may interpreted be this new view this Court to at variance Graves, supra, it expressed in Commonwealth v. articulated 759 odds of this also at with the earlier view Court Tarver, (1971) in Commonwealth v. Pa. (Eagen, J.). dissenting opinion in which
EAGEN, J., a filed O’BRIEN, J., joins. (dissenting).
EAGEN, Justice McCusker, majority multi- (1972), a of this overruled a Court prior psychiatric testimo- tude held decisions and that ny is to in determin- at trial the fact finder admissible aid passion. ing did so in the heat of if one who another kills leap into Today majority a further a takes Court psychiatry to science of unknown and attributes certainty ability say degree of to with reasonable admittedly act- killer, sane and that the instant who was know capacity to ed had the mental with malice and going doing what was he was know what he to specific in- wrong, lacked the mental to form McCusker, I here I and dissent tent to kill.1 dissented in again. materially psychiatry
The science of advanced present reli- years undoubtedly recent is now able in certain situa- able information as to human behavior involved, ; psychiatric testimony, tions here however, the reliability it patently is so should not receive devoid judicial sanction. dig up psychiatrists will excuses for continue
Some trial) (as witness, the recent Hearst criminal behavior though may ri- “excuses” on the such border even some reliability. totally lacking in scientific and be diculous join judiciary will Unfortunately, some members of accepting these excuses. them in majority views As to the assertion reliability psychiatric testi- present this on the writer position represents mony personal, my submit that I Graves, Compare opinion in Commonwealth v. with that (1975), gave public rise furor which Pennsylvania ago. credit months To the eternal several legislation. Legislature, through recent was nullified Graves *13 long testimony and well established is view that such purposes not majority admissible for the which the now it nothing holds Moreover, admissible. in the record be- testimony anymore fore this Court shows this reliable today yesterday. than Because the trial court had no power prior rulings, to overturn our not did hear evi- dence to reliability testimony. establish the of this Yet majority prior rulings reverses our based not on a showing reliability personal in the their record but on knowledge and psychiatry. majority beliefs about If the facts, they concerned with would at least remand the hearing case for reliability. Thus, on while I defer to majority expresses the well rule, only established not personal beliefs, they their subject the entire Common- wealth to those they beliefs so in the face do divi- testimony sion as to the reliability of such even within See, “Mercenary Psychiatry”, field. New Republic March majority my position represents also states an ex-
pression judgment of distrust of the citizens contrary, my this Commonwealth. To the in citi- trust serving jurors zens waning. has never and is not now My submitting concern is with unreliable evidence to jurors thereby complicating those their delibera- jurors I tions. do not evi- think should have to evaluate dence which has not been shown to be reliable. majority legisla-
Further, correctly notes that response Graves, supra, also re- tive pudiated previous legislative determination. What majority legislative provision fails to note is that the Graves, supra, little known and that public response Finally, legislative caused the furor. contrary expressed is indeed to the me in Com- views (1971) Tarver, monwealth v. merely but Tarver well reiterated the established law Pennsylvania, Eyler, see Commonwealth v. change A. not the law of Tarver did *14 today’s Graves, supra, as does
Pennsylvania as did major- personal of a merely views because decision reliability testi- ity as to the Court mony. joins
O’BRIEN, in this dissent. J., al., Appellants PAYNE et Marion Woodward , Secretary of the Individually KASSAB, and as Jacob G. Transportation, Department Pennsylvania al., Appellees. et Phelps Appeal et al. of Frances WALLER Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued 30, 1975. June July Decided