Commonwealth v. WalkerCommonwealth v. Walker
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- Before:
- Hester
Shawn Walker appeals from the April 29, 1993 order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his writ of certiorari. On Seрtember 23, 1992, the Philadelphia Municipal Court denied a motion to suppress filed by appellant, found him guilty of carrying a conceаled weapon without a license, and sentenced him to one year of reporting probation plus costs. In his motion to suppress, appellant contended that the concealed weapon which police seized must be suppressed since they unlawfully searched him. He argued that police were not empowered to arrest and search him but only could issue a citаtion for the summary offense he committed for which they initially stopped him. Consequently, he now argues that the trial court erred in denying his writ of certiorari, and we should reverse his conviction. We affirm.
Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress is clear. In Commonwealth v. Haynes, 395 Pa.Super. 322, 333, 577 A.2d 564, 570 (1990), we stated:
Our rеsponsibility is to “determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the court below and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.” Commonwealth v. Hubble, 318 Pa.Super. 76, 78, 464 A.2d 1236, 1237 (1983). Additionally, we must consider the prosecution’s evidence and so much of the defendant’s еvidence as remain uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Mancini, 340 Pa.Super. 592, 490 A.2d 1377 (1985). When ruling on suppression motions, the suppression court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights (Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(i) ).
Bearing this standard in mind, the record reveals the following. On April 24, 1992, Philadelphia Police Officer Anthony McFadden was on duty with a partner in the subway station at 1500 Market Street. He observed appellant leap over the exit turnstyle to gain entrance to the train platform without paying a fare. When appellant realized his act had been noticed by the police officers, he started to leave the platform аnd attempted to evade them. The officers ordered appellant to stop, and he complied. They then frisked the outsidе of his clothing for their own protection. Officer McFadden felt a hard object in appellant’s left trouser leg from which he remоved a handgun. The gun was fully operational and unlicensed.
Appellant moved to suppress the handgun. He does not contend that the instant stop was illegal; instead, he asserts that the search in this case was unlawful since it involved only a summary offense. Consequently, he argues that the gun which police confiscated should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful search. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985), United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) (fruits of unlawful search should be suppressed). In support, he notes that attempted theft of public transit services is graded as a summary offense. Next, he contends that warrаntless arrests are authorized only in connection with certain summary offenses.
Appellant argues that police possess limited authority to arrest and search when summary offenses are involved. Unlike felonies and misdemeanors, arrest is permitted in
Appellant further contends that the Comment to
Finally, appellant argues that
We note that appellant’s construction of
Instead, we agree with the Commonwealth’s interpretation that
The constitutional requiremеnts for effecting a valid arrest are distinct from the constitutional requirements for a valid search and seizure. Commonwealth v. Westerfer, 294 Pa.Super. 459, 440 A.2d 556 (1982). Hence, the requiremеnts for a valid arrest without a warrant are a matter left to state law. See United States v. Carter, 118 F.Supp. 559 (W.D.Pa.1954). Accordingly, there is no constitutional prohibition to the lеgislature providing in
We conclude that
Order affirmed.