Commonwealth v. WableCommonwealth v. Wable
Opinion by
Defendant, John Wesley Wable, 25 years of age, although of a well respected family in the community and a high school graduate, was court-martialed while in Army service and received a dishonorable discharge; thereafter he worked for some time in Cleveland but became unemployed a short time prior to the occurrences which have now resulted in his conviction of the crime of murder.
On July 25, 1953, one Lester B. Woodward, a truck driver, was murdered while asleep in the cab of his truck on the Pennsylvania Turnpike at a point in Westmoreland County. Three days later, on July 28, 1953, one Harry Franklin Pitts, likewise a truck driver, was similarly murdered while asleep in the cab of his truck at a point on the Pennsylvania Turnpike also in Westmoreland County. Three days later, on July 31, 1953, one John TC Shepard, another truck driver, was shot while asleep in the cab of his truck on a highway in Ohio at a point approximately 15 miles from the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Defendant was indicted and tried for the murder of Pitts. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict and the sentence imposed thereon by the court.
Of the several reasons advanced by defendant in support of his appeal the principal one is that the court erroneously admitted evidence relating to the murder of Woodward and the shooting of Shepard. Apart from the fact, however, that the crimes all occurred at three day intervals and two of them in the same neighborhood, there was a striking similarity in the manner in which they were committed. Woodward and Pitts were each found lying on the seat of his
It is true, of course, that a distinct crime, except under certain special circumstances, cannot be given in evidence against a defendant who is being tried for another crime, because the fact of the commission of one offense is not proof of the commission of another. Indeed, this was said, in
Commonwealth v. Burdell,
Defendant complains that his ballistic expert was not afforded a sufficient opportunity to examine the gun and bullets allegedly employed in the shootings, although his counsel, after the impaneling of the jury
The Commonwealth had engaged two psychiatrists to examine defendant in order to ascertain whether he was sane and capable of standing trial. Counsel for defendant also had defendant examined by psychiatrists but complains that he was refused information as to what the report of the Commonwealth’s experts disclosed. He presented a petition for that purpose during the progess of the trial but before the District Attorney’s office had received a written report from its experts as to the result of their examination. No question of defendant’s sanity was raised at the trial, so that, at best, the matter complained of was of no real importance. Moreover, there is, to say the least, grave doubt as to whether a District Attorney is obliged to allow a defendant or his counsel the right to inspect reports from investigators or experts in the possession of the District Attorney, or to obtain information in regard to the latter’s intervieAVS with prospective witnesses, prior to disclosure thereof at the trial. “The general rule is that the accused has no right to the inspection or disclosure before trial of evidence in the possession of the prosecution”: 2
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence,
1311, 1312, 1354 (citing cases from many jurisdictions). See also
Common
One of defendant’s witnesses, Eugene Weber, called to establish an alibi, testified that “It is very possible I did see him [the defendant] the last week of July”, but he admitted that he could not state the exact date. The Commonwealth objected to this testimony on the ground that it did not specifically refer to July 28th, the day when the Pitts murder was committed. However, after the noon recess of the court, Weber testified definitely that he saw defendant on the morning of July 28th, claiming that he how fixed the date by a newspaper article concerning the murder which he remembered reading. The District Attorney, in his closing address to the jury, called their attention to the fact that Weber, unable to fix the date before the recess, had overcome that difficulty during the recess. The defense claims that this was a prejudicial remark since it implied that the witness had been coached. The District Attorney however, merely stated what was a fact, nor did it carry any such necessary implication. Moreover, no objection was made at the time, nor was the remark noted upon the record.
A careful reading of the testimony leads to the conclusion that the jury was well justified in finding that defendant was the person who committed these outrageous, deliberate and brutal crimes. The trial was fair, impartial, and conducted by the court with painstaking and meticulous regard for all of defendant’s legal rights.
Judgment and sentence affirmed.
Notes
Defendant makes some complaint of the fact that the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of the District Attorney of Albuquerque that defendant was arrested in New Mexico for grand larceny and that a criminal complaint was filed against him for robbing a cash register there. This testimony was merely to explain how defendant came to be identified and apprehended and was admissible for that purpose:
Commonwealth v. Robinson,
For example:
Commonwealth v. Coles,