This is a direct appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County which sentenced Alex J. Vergotz, Jr., Appellant, to a $5,000.00 fine and one to two years imprisonment for his conviction of Deceptive Business Practices, and imposed a fine of $100.00 for each of the thirty-three counts of Violations of Use of Certificate of Inspection for which he was also convicted. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The pertinent facts are as follows: In December 1989, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper James E. Ruff obtained information from several informants concerning the sale of illegal inspection stickers from Fred Palmieri, who operated an auto inspection station, to Appellant, who operated a used car lot. Palmieri informed Trooper Ruff on Dеcember 8, 1989 that he sold the stickers to Appellant through Appellant’s mechanic, Norman Carder, at the rate of fifteen for two *444 hundred dollars. On December 12, 1989, Robin Herman, an employee of Appellant, informed Trooper Ruff that she had observed the inspeсtion stickers in Appellant’s possession and saw them being issued to Carder. On December 13, 1989, Carder informed Trooper Ruff that Appellant had approached him on several occasions, since the commencement of his employment with Appellant in August 1989, and asked him to obtain inspection stickers. Carder would comply, and then would attach the stickers on vehicles designated by Appellant. On December 14,1989, Trooper Ruff secured a search warrant for Appellant’s place of business, and on December 15, 1989, the warrаnt was executed. As a result of the search, thirty-three Pennsylvania Certificates of Inspection were removed from vehicles which were listed for sale. Trooper Ruff then conducted a thorough and extensive investigation of each of the confiscated stiсkers, cataloguing them and comparing them with the records from the inspection station. Trooper Ruff waited until the completion of the investigation on or about January 20, 1990 before initiating a criminal complaint on January 31, 1990. The complaint was issued on February 2, 1990, chаrging Appellant with one misdemeanor count of Deceptive Business Practices (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(a)(4)), and thirty-three summary counts of Violations of Use of Certificate of Inspection (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2)). Appellant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, moving to quash the complaint, which the trial court denied. Appellant then filed an Amended Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, moving to suppress any and all evidence seized during the search of Appellant’s place of business. The trial court denied this motion as well. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury found Appellant guilty of Dеceptive Business Practices. The trial court found him guilty of thirty-three summary Violations of Use of Certificate of Inspection, and imposed sentence. Following the denial of his Motion to Reconsider and Modify Sentence, Appellant brought this appeal.
Appellant raises four issues for our consideration:
1) Whether thе trial court erred in refusing to suppress the physical evidence seized during the search of Appellant’s *445 business premises when the affidavit of probable cause accompanying the search warrant did not establish a sufficient time frame as to when the inspeсtion stickers were sold to Appellant, and was therefore legally insufficient?
2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to quash the criminal complaint and information when they were not commenced within thirty days after the commission of the alleged offense or the discovеry of the offender, whichever is later, as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5553(a)?
3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to quash the criminal complaint and information when Appellant was charged with violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(a)(4), a general provision of the penal code, and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2), a special provision of the motor vehicle code, when the law does not permit prosecution under a general provision if an applicable special provision exists which prohibits the same type of conduct?
4) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to quash thе criminal complaint and information when 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(a)(4) and the definitions contained therein are unconstitutionally vague?
Appellant’s first contention is that the affidavit accompanying the search warrant for his business premises did not adequately set forth a time frame which established continuing criminal activity. Therefore, Appellant argues, because the affidavit of probable cause was legally insufficient, the inspection stickers which were seized as a result of the search should have been suppressed.
In reviewing the rulings of the suрpression court, our initial task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record.
Commonwealth v. Bell,
The affidavit in the instant сase, when read in the light of common sense and the totality of the circumstances, supports the finding that probable cause existed for Trooper Ruff to search Appellant’s place of business. The nature of Appellant’s business was not a single, isolated occurrence to be pinpointed in time; rather, Appellant was engaged in a continuing course of conduct. For the purpose of determining whether information supporting issuance of a warrant has grown stale, the continuity of an illegal scheme may be еstablished by the inherent nature of the criminal activity itself or evidence that the activity has extended over a period of time.
Commonwealth v. Alewine,
We will next address Appellant’s third contention, as the disposition of this issue controls whether the Commonwealth may bring charges under both code sections, and then be permitted to pursue the prosecution under the general code section when the charges under the special code section have been quashed as not timely filed. Appellant asserts that because the two statutes under which he is charged both apply to the same conduct, the Commonwealth is barred from prosecuting him under the general provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(a)(4) and instead may only bring charges against him under the special provisions of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2). However, even if a general statute and a special statute have identical elements in the sense that the special wholly encompasses the general, both charges may still be pursued in one trial, as long as the general has elements outside the special.
Commonwealth v. Warner,
Having еstablished that the Commonwealth is permitted to charge Appellant under both the general and special code provisions in the instant case, our next inquiry is whether the summary offenses Appellant was charged with under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2) should be quashed because they were nоt brought within thirty days after the discovery of the offense or the identity of the offender, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5553(a). 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5553(a) provides that:
... proceedings for summary offenses under Title 75 (relating to vehicles) must be commenced within thirty (30) days after the commission of the alleged offense or within thirty (30) days after the discovery of the commission of the offense or the identity of the Defendant, whichever is later, not thereafter.
In the instant case, the offense was committed prior to Trooper Ruffs discovery of the offense and of the identity of Appellant. Therеfore, the time period for commencing charges against Appellant would have begun to run when it was discovered that an offense had been committed or that Appellant was the person who committed the offense. The Commonwealth argues that the identity of the offender was not discovered until Trooper Ruff had completed his investigation on or about January 20, 1990, and that therefore, the criminal complaint and information were timely filed. The trial court accepted this argument; however, we are not in agreemеnt with the decision of the trial court. Trooper Ruff was aware of Appellant’s alleged criminal activity prior to the execution of the search warrant on December 15, 1989. He had been advised by three informants regarding the nature of the criminal activity and the idеntity of the offender. Upon searching the premises, thirty-three inspection stickers were seized by the trooper, and thus he obtained the necessary evidence to support the informants’ allegations that an offense had been committed by Appellant. Therеfore, once the stick
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ers which were in Appellant’s possession had been confiscated, sufficient evidence existed to support, with reasonable certainty, that Appellant had committed the summary offense of Violations of Use of Certificate of Inspection, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2). Because this violation is a summary offense, the thirty day time period set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5553(a) is applicable.
See Commonwealth v. Matthews,
The final argument Appellant asserts in this appeal is that because 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(a)(4) and its definitions are unconstitutionally vague, the criminal complaint and information brought against him under that statute should have been quashed. A penal statute and its terms, in order to be constitutional, must be “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it, what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.”
Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh,
Convictions for summary offenses vacated; in all other aspects, the judgment of sentence is affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.