251 Mass. 355 | Mass. | 1925
The defendant was tried and convicted upon an indictment which charged him with operating a motor vehicle so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered. He was also tried at the same time upon two other indictments, predicated upon the same state of facts,
There was evidence tending to show that on February 29, 1924, the defendant operated an automobile truck on the northerly side of Essex Street in Lawrence, at a speed of twenty miles an hour; that one Elizabeth Poirier, while crossing from the south side of that street, was struck by the truck and killed, and that her body was thereafter dragged by the truck a distance of thirty-two feet. There was also evidence that the defendant said to a police officer that “he was in a hurry delivering some fruit or something and he took a chance and tried to get by her”; this was denied by the defendant. Other evidence was offered by both sides. The jury took a view of the place where the accident occurred. At the close of the evidence the defendant requested the trial judge to give the following instructions:
“1. The fact that an accident happened and the deceased was killed by the defendant’s truck is not enough to convict the defendant of operating so that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered. The jury must find some improper act of the defendant’s which might endanger the lives and safety of the public. If the defendant was operating his truck properly and the accident happened through no fault of his, then the jury should find for the defendant.
“2. If the jury find that the accident was caused by the defendant’s truck, they should find him not guilty if they find no improper operation by the defendant caused the accident and that he was not in any other way operating the truck so that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered.”
“4. You are instructed that the law does not hold a person who is faced with a sudden emergency to the same degree of judgment and presence of mind as would otherwise be required of him under circumstances not indicating sudden peril.”
The first sentence of request “1” was not an accurate statement of the law; he was guilty if he so operated a motor vehicle that either the lives or safety of the public might be endangered. The further assertion in the next sentence,
The second request is similar in terms to the first and for reasons already stated was rightly denied.
The fourth request might be pertinent where negligence was involved, but as it has no relevancy to the case at bar it was rightly refused.
Exceptions overruled.