179 Pa. Super. 395 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1955
Opinion by
The defendant corporation was convicted and fined for a violation of the Unlawful Collection Agency Practices Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, Sect. 895, 18 P.S. 4895. Section e of the Act provides: “It is unlawful for a collection agency to act for, represent or undertake to render services for any debtor with regard to the proposed settlement or adjustment of the affairs of such debtor . . . .” Defendant admittedly performed services for a debtor, in that it consolidated all the debts of an individual, made arrangements to pay each creditor regularly, and collected a specific amount each week from the debtor to do this. A specified fee was charged for this service. It was determined by the trial judge that defendant was a collection agency, and, having performed a service for a debtor, was guilty as charged. On refusal of a new trial judgment was entered and defendant has appealed on the ground that it was not proven to have been a collection agency.
In order to prove that defendant was a collection agency, the Commonwealth relies on the defendant’s articles of incorporation, which include among other
Defendant contends that the presumption raised by the corporate powers in the charter was rebutted by the testimony of the president of defendant corporation. However, he testified only that defendant did not represent any creditors and that defendant’s “major business is Consolidation of debts and budgeting income so that they can pay their creditors.” He did not deny that defendant was holding itself out as a creditors’ representative or that it was seeking creditors as clients. This testimony cannot be considered as a rebuttal of the presumption arising from the charter.
The evil which the Unlawful Collection Agency Practices Act was designed to eliminate was the practice of representing both debtors and creditors at the same time. Although it was not proven that defendant actually represented creditors at the time it performed
Judgment of sentence affirmed.