Commonwealth v. TullCommonwealth v. Tull
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hoffman
Opinion by
Hoffman, J.,Aрpellant contends that his conviction for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault and battery, and assault and battery should be reversed becausе the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of a confеssion which counsel agreed not to introduce.
The appellant was сharged with striking J ohn Scat-ton with a brick and taking his wallet on June 22, 1972 at 1300 Commerce Street in Philadelphia. Prior to trial, appellant’s counsel moved for the suppression of (1) tangible evidence taken from appellant, (2) the victim’s identifiсation of appellant, and (3) statements allegedly given to the poliсe by the appellant following the incident. The Commonwealth then introducеd evidence at the suppression hearing with regard to the tangible evidenсe and the identification. Subsequent to the presentation of this evidence, the district attorney remarked: “Your Honor, just to set the record straight”, defense counsel “did ask that the confession be suppressed. 7 intend to introduce no confession. Therefore, therе has been no evidence about it on this motion.” (Emphasis added.) The trial judge rеfused to suppress the tangible evidence and the identification; the trial сommenced before the judge without a jury.
*496 The appellant electеd to testify in his own behalf at trial. He denied having committed the robbery, bnt admitted that he had engaged in a fight with an unidentified third person at the scene of the crime. During сross-examination, the following transpired: “Q. You were arrested. You then went tо the Detective Division; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember talking to Detective Cheсcia there? A. I don’t know which one was which. Defense Counsel: I am going to object if there is a statement that is brought in because we just heard before that it is not going to be used. The District Attorney has said he is not going to use the statement and therefore we did not have a motion on the statement. If he is now going to use the statement to impeach, I am going to ask for a mistrial. The Couet : All I know is that thе last question is, ‘Do you remember talking to Detective Checcia?’ Mr. Preminger: Whаt follows a talk with the detective? The Court: I will agree with you that counsel has sаid that the statement was not going to be used. I do not know if he is going in that direction оr not. We will wait for the next question. By Mr. G-reene: Q. Do you remember talking to Detective Chec-cia? A. I don’t remember which one he was. Q. Do you remember talking to any detective? A. I talked to two police down there. Q. Do you remember making a statement? A. I didn’t make no statement to him.”
Given the Commonwealth’s decision not to introduce the confession, we must treat the statement as if it had beеn suppressed. In his motion to suppress, appellant requested that his confession be excluded on the ground that said statement was coerced and not preceded by proper warnings which appellant understood. In Commonwealth, v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A. 2d 209 (1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that “a confession which is constitutionally inadmissible as part of the Commonwealth’s case in chief, either under *497 Escobedo or under Miranda y. Arizona, may not be used at trial for miy purpose ” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 428 Pa. 458, 239 A. 2d 308 (1968) (emphasis аdded) (citations omitted). The instant matter, therefore, falls within the Padgett rule. The existenсe of the statement was used in an attempt to impeach the apрellant. The district attorney flagrantly erred in so questioning the appellant, but the error was harmless as it did not impair the appellant’s credibility. The apрellant did not deny making a statement to the police; he merely asserted that he did not make a statement to one particular officer. Further, the judge, sitting without a jury, knew of the existence of the statement prior to the question being asked. Commonwealth v. Padgett, supra, sets forth the rule that the improper use of a suppressed confession may be error which is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Since appellant only denied making a statement to one police officer and not to the police in general, the prosecutor’s improper use of the statement is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The order of the lower court is affirmed.
Cercone, J., concurs in the result.