On Mаy 13, 1977, at or about 5:00 o’clock, A.M., Sgt. James F. McCullough and Officer James H. Fitch, both employed as policemen by the University of Pittsburgh, stopped for coffee at a White Tower Restaurant on North Craig Street in the City of Pittsburgh. The restaurant, a private commercial enterprise, was located directly across the street from the University of Pittsburgh’s Urban Research Building. While the campus policemen were drinking coffee, Donald R. Thinnes, the appellee, entered. He was intoxicated, became loud, and verbally abused a waitress. When McCullough told him to leave оr be arrested, appellee directed his verbal abuse at McCullough. An effort by McCullough to evict Thinnes resulted in a scuffle. Fitch came tо McCullough’s assistance, however, and Thinnes was subdued. He was then arrested and charged with aggravated assault on a police officеr, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct.
A hearing was held before a magistrate in Allegheny County, and Thinnes was found guilty of disorderly conduct, a summary offense. The assault and resisting arrest charges, however, were dismissed. Thinnes appealed his summary conviction to the Court of Common Pleas of Allеgheny County, where he received a hearing de novo. At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, defendant offered a demurrer tо the evidence. The basis for the demurrer was the alleged lack of authority of campus policemen to make an off-camрus arrest. The trial judge said: “I am going to sustain the demurrer in this case. I find that this governs the case, that is 71 Purdon’s 646 takes precedence over title *82 22, and I will decide it on that ground.” 1 The order which the court entered, however, adjudged the defendant “Not Guilty of the Offense of Disorderly Conduct.”
Appellee contends that thе Commonwealth cannot appeal from a not guilty verdict. We agree and will dismiss the appeal.
It is well settled that the Commonwealth may not appeal from a verdict of “Not Guilty” entered by the trial, court in a criminal prosecution, and this is so whether the prosecution be by indictment or by summary proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Ray,
In
Commonwealth v. Kerr,
In Commonwealth v. Ray, supra, the defendant-appellee had been charged, inter аlia, with possessing an unlicensed weapon in violation of an ordinance of the City of Philadelphia. The following colloquy occurred between the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge:
“ ‘The Court: Do you want a ruling on that one?
‘Mr. Cox: Yes, sir.
‘The Court: I rule that the City ordinance is unconstitutional.
The ordinance is a violation оf the Federal Constitution: “The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed.”
I don’t like guns any more than you do.
Is there anything further on this particular bill of indictment?
‘Mr. Cox: Beyond thе offer of proof on the statement, no Your Honor, no.
‘The Court: The verdict is not guilty.’ ”
*84
The Supreme Court quashed a Commonwealth appeal. The Court at the оutset recognized the Commonwealth’s right of appeal in certain instances where a trial court’s order involves a pure question оf law which in effect terminates the action. Having recognized this limited right of appeal, the Court concluded
A careful analysis of this Court’s opinion in
Commonwealth v. Davis,
It may be in the instant case that the trial judge’s decision turned on an issue of law. It may also be that he intended to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the criminal complaint. In fact, however, he adjudicated the defendant not guilty. It is this adjudication whiсh one finds when he examines the record. From such an adjudication the Commonwealth has no right of appeal.
Because the Commоnwealth’s appeal must be dismissed, we do not consider and do not decide the authority of *85 private policemen employed by thе University of Pittsburgh to make off-campus arrests. Neither do we consider or decide whether the unlawfulness of appellee’s arrest, if such wаs the case, precluded a conviction on a summary criminal charge of disorderly conduct.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes
. The trial court’s reference to 71 Purdоn’s 646 was to the Act of September 28, 1965, P.L. 553, § 4, as amended,* 71 P.S. § 646, which identifies the powers and duties of “Capitol Police, Commonwealth Property Poliсe and the Security or Campus Police of all State colleges and universities and State aided or related colleges and universities.” This section provides, inter alia, that “Security and Campus Police shall exercise their powers and perform their duties only on the prеmises of the State colleges and universities and State aided or related colleges and universities by or for which they are employed . . . ”
When the court referred to Tile 22, it contemplated the Nonprofit Corporation Law of May 5, 1933, P.L. 289, § 310, 15 P.S. § 7310, as re-enacted by the Act of November 15, 1972, P.L. 1063, No. 271, § 501, 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 501. This section provides: “Any nonprofit corporation . . . maintaining . . . any buildings or grounds open to the public . . . may apply to the cоurt of common pleas . .for the appointment of such persons as the corporation may designate to act as policemen for the corporation.” It was under the authority contained in the Nonprofit Corporation Law that the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County had approved the appointment of McCullough (1971) and Fitch (1975) as policemen for the University of Pittsburgh. Their statutory powers included “all the powers of a police officer in this Commonwealth, in and upon, and in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of, the property of the corporation. . . . ”