COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jeffrey Allen TEETER, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 12, 2008. Filed Nov. 18, 2008.
961 A.2d 890
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion to revoke Ahmad‘s parole and probation and impose the aforementioned sentence.
¶ 23 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
William J. Higgins, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Bedford, for Com., appellee.
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., STEVENS, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, KLEIN, BENDER, BOWES, GANTMAN, and SHOGAN, JJ.
OPINION BY STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 Defendant Jeffrey Teeter appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a jury convicted him of possession with intent to deliver coсaine (PWID), criminal use of a communication facility, possession of a controlled substance, corruption of minors, and possession of drug paraphernalia, charges stemming from his intended sale of drugs at the residential driveway of a 17-year-old buyer. Sentenced to not less than three years or more than six years’ incarceration on PWID,1 Teeter first claims the trial court erred in imposing an additional two year mandatory sentence under
¶ 2 On the evening of June 7, 2004, Teeter made a telephone call to set up a drug sale to S.F., a 17-year-old girl. S.F. asked Teeter to bring the powder to her house; he agreed. Unbeknownst to either of them, S.F.‘s father was listening in on another telephone extension. Suspecting his daughter‘s imminent involvement in drug activity, Father called the police and requested their presence. Father explained to the police dispatcher that his daughter had agreed to purchase drugs from the subject on the other end of the telephone and that this person was on his way to his residence. At the conclusion of his telephone conversation, Father stated that an unfamiliar vehicle was pulling into his driveway, and he beliеved this to be the person coming to sell drugs. Teeter was the driver of that car.
¶ 3 Teeter and a companion parked in Father‘s driveway and S.F. walked out to meet them. S.F. and Teeter spoke, but the drug transaction did not occur. At approximately 9:40 p.m., with Teeter still parked in Father‘s driveway, two state police troopers pulled up and parked their cruisers in the lane leading to the driveway. A few minutes later a police corporal
¶ 4 With Teeter and his companion standing outside of Teeter‘s car, one trooper asked Teeter why he was there. He told the trooper that he was there to collect money he was owed for selling stereo equipment. Another trooper asked the same question of Teeter‘s companion while the corporal talked to Father. All of these events in the driveway occurred within twenty minutes, at which point the officers decided to request consent to search Teeter‘s vehicle. A Waiver of Rights/Consent to Search form was read in its entirety to Teeter, following which he consented and signed the form. When asked, Teeter indicated that he was the owner of the car and all its contents except for a cell phone.
¶ 5 At that point Teeter lunged into the open driver‘s side window, where officers witnessed him reaсh out his hand and brush a clear plastic baggie containing a white powdery substance off of the seat of the vehicle. After claiming that he had nothing to hide, Teeter reached into his front jeans’ pockets and turned them inside out; however, one of the troopers noticed he was concealing a marijuana pipe in his hand. The officers took custody of the pipe and the clear plastic baggie and then gave Teeter his Miranda warnings.3 Teeter signed a waiver in the presence of two officers.
¶ 6 Teeter confessed that he had called and set up the deal to sell cocaine to S.F. He explained that since she could not leave her house, he went to her residence to conduct the drug sale. Since Father was keeping a watchful eye from the garage, Teeter and S.F. had decided to forego the drug deal. Teeter also volunteered to the police that there was a second baggie of cocaine along with a plastic cut-off straw in his car. When the officers could not find it, he also assisted them in locating it in a felt box hidden under the driver‘s side seat cushion.
¶ 7 In the days following Teeter‘s arrest, it was determined that Teeter intended to sell drugs to S.F. ninety-two feet from a location designated by the local public school district as a school bus stop. The Commonwealth therefore notified Teeter after his conviction that it would seek the mandatory three-year minimum sentence under
¶ 8 At sentencing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of, inter alia, a school bus driver for thе Chestnut Ridge School District.4 She testified that the school district has charted the school bus stop in question on her designated route for probably ten years, that the stop was so designated on June 7, 2004, and remained so designated without interruption on the day of her testimony. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/11/05 at 15, 17-18. Moreover, when defense counsel asked her if it was true that school bus stops may change from time to time because of traffic and whatever, the driver replied Yes, I would imagine, [b]ut that stop don‘t change. N.T. at 17-18.
¶ 9 The sentencing court viewed the evidence in light of the language of Section 6314(b)(4) and rejected Teeter‘s argument
¶ 10 On appeal, Teeter first argues he cannot be subject to the mandatory minimum penalty under
¶ 11 A defendant does have a substantive due process right to be free from vague and overbroad sentencing statutes. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563 (2002); Commonwealth v. Bell, 537 Pa. 558, 645 A.2d 211 (1994); Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 669 A.2d 883 (1995). This due process right is connected to the right to be free from аrbitrary or discriminatory sentencing. Bell at 567 n. 9, 645 A.2d at 216 n. 9. When faced with such a challenge, courts must define the allegedly-vague word or phrase to determine its meaning, in keeping with the apparent intent of the General Assembly (as discussed infra) Burnsworth. However, since the sentencing enhancement does not apply until sentencing, notice of its application is not required until after the defendant is tried and convicted of the underlying crime. See Commonwealth v. Grundy, 385 Pa.Super. 384, 561 A.2d 39, 40 (1989) (citing Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334, 516 A.2d 1172 (1986)).
¶ 12 The legislature has the authority to enact sentencing schemes that reflect various penal philosophies, including other recognized goals of sentencing beyond individual deterrence and rehabilitation, such as retribution and vindication. Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 562 Pa. 120, 127-128, 753 A.2d 807, 811 (2000) (Cappy, Justice, concurring). The legislative policy behind Chapter 63 аnd its enhancement penalties is to punish more severely those who seek to involve children with drugs. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 775 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 757, 790 A.2d 1014 (2001) (interpreting Section 6317 of the Crimes Code, Drug-Free School Zones, as intended to protect young children from illegal activity attendant with the drug trade, whether or not children were present or had access to the drugs).
¶ 13 As discussed infra, we conclude the phrase school bus stop is unambiguous under the facts presented at sentencing in the case sub judice. A plain reading of
¶ 14 Teeter argues that the phrase school bus stop is impermissibly vague under the facts. Without a permanent landmark signifying its use, Teeter claims, the location in question is a school bus stop only when children are gathered there either before boarding or after exiting a school bus. As school was out of session for summer break when he committed the underlying offense, Teeter concludes there was no school bus stop nearby to bring him under the statute.6
¶ 15 A lawfully enacted statute commands a presumption of constitutionality and should be uphеld unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution. Bell, 537 Pa. at 569, 645 A.2d at 217. One has a constitutional right to be free from vague and overbroad sentencing statutes. Johnson, supra. The due process right is connected to the right to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing. Bell at 567 n. 9, 645 A.2d at 216 n. 9. Where a facial attack on the alleged vagueness of a statute does not implicate First Amendment freedoms, we measure the specificity of a statute against the actual conduct in which the appellant engaged. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 368 Pa.Super. 255, 533 A.2d 1051, 1052 (1987).
¶ 16 In construing the enactments of the legislature, appellate courts must refer to the provisions of the Statutory Construction Act. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2000). In so doing, we are obliged to consider the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intention. Id. The Generаl Assembly has clarified the approach we are to use to determine legislative intent as follows:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
***
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
¶ 17 We are to give words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, and construe them according to their common and accepted usage. Campbell, supra;
¶ 18 Moreover:
[A] penal statute is a statute that defines criminal offenses and specifies corresponding fines and punishment. Penal statutes must be strictly construed. Strict construction does not require that the words of a criminal statute be given their narrowest meaning or that the Legislature‘s evident intent be disregarded. Languagе which is capable of more than one meaning can be clear and unmistakable in the context of its usage by the selection of the meaning which is neither forced nor strained.
Id. at 1236-37.
¶ 19 We must, therefore, determine the meaning of school bus stop in keeping with the apparent intent of the General Assembly.
¶ 20 Teeter asserts that an officially designated school bus stop is not a school bus stop as provided in
¶ 21 Applying a plain meaning analysis to
¶ 22 Thus, the phrase school bus stop is clear and is consistent with the apparent intent of the General Assembly to punish more severely those who seek tо involve children with drugs. The legislature has made the policy decision to keep safe and drug-free, to the greatest extent possible, neighborhoods immediately surrounding our schools, playgrounds, and school bus stops on a year-round basis, even at times
¶ 23 The intended purpose of the statutory scheme, therefore, is the continuous protection of places where we direct our children to gather regularly at certain times of the year. For thе courts to relax or suspend altogether our application of sentencing enhancements during times at which such places are not in use makes it more likely for the drug trade and its attendant vices to gain a foothold near those places in which the legislature created safe havens. For this Court to encourage the decline of neighborhoods enveloping school bus stops so as to compromise the safety of children gathering there during the school year would certainly frustrate the clear and compelling legislative intent underlying the entire statutory scheme.
¶ 24 Our decision here is consistent with the manner in which we applied a strict interpretation of Section 6317, Drug free school zones. In a series of decisions, we held that mandatory minimum sentence provisions applied when defendants were convicted for selling drugs near schools and playgrounds even when: (1) no children were involved in the transaction; (2) the playground was on private property; (3) the transaction took place in a residence not accessible to the public; and/or (4) when school was not in session. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 955 A.2d 386, 2008 Pa. Super Lexis 2042 (Pa.Super.2008); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 775 A.2d 859 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc); and Campbell, supra. Acknowledged in these decisions was the legitimate and paramount legislative intent to fortify the barrier that segregates the places where our children frequent from the illegal drug scene. Campbell at 1236-1237; Hinds at 862 (quoting Campbell, supra); Drummond at 856 (quoting Campbell, supra). It follows that to keep such places free from the ravages of drugs, the legislature intended extensive and continuous application of the sеntencing enhancement statute.7 For the same reasons, therefore, we would hold that within the plain meaning of a school bus stop is the fact that it exists regardless of whether school is in session.
¶ 25 Here it is undisputed that Teeter chose to deliver cocaine to a school-age minor 92 feet from a location officially designated a school bus stop for the past ten years. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the stop had lost its status as a school bus stop. As such, there is no merit to Teeter‘s claim that
¶ 26 Next, Teeter contends that from the time the рolice arrived at Father‘s residence he was the subject of an illegal arrest and, as such, all evidence discovered by the police should have been suppressed before trial. It was unreasonable, he contends, to believe he was free to leave when officers were on each side of
¶ 27 An encounter between police and a suspect may be characterized as a mere encounter, an investigative detention, a custodial detention, or a formal arrest. Commonwealth v. Douglass, 372 Pa.Super. 227, 539 A.2d 412, 417 (1988). Since a mere encounter carries no official compulsion to stop or respond, it need not be supported by any level of suspicion. Meanwhile, an investigativе detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion since it subjects the suspect to a stop and a period of detention. However, unlike a custodial detention or a formal arrest, an investigative detention does not require probable cause because it lacks the same magnitude of coercive conditions. Id. at 418. The court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if an encounter is investigatory or custodial, but the following factors are specifically considered: the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions. Id. at 421.
¶ 28 In the present case, the officers responded to a call that someone unknown to Father was coming to his residence to sell drugs to his minor daughter. Shortly thereafter, when an unfamiliar car pulled into Father‘s driveway and parked, police officers suspected the driver of that vehicle was the unknown person. These facts created at least reasonable suspicion that Teeter was the one intending to engage in criminal activity at Father‘s residence. Once the police arrived on the scene, they talked to Teeter for 20 minutes. Teeter was never prevented from leaving the residence, nor was he told by the officers that he was not free to leave. Thе officers did not use any restraints or any threat of force on Teeter, but, rather, the officers simply asked Teeter questions and requested information. We agree with the trial court that up to the point that the police administered Miranda warnings to Teeter, the police encounter with Teeter amounted to no more than an investigative detention. He was never detained or arrested and, thus, the trial judge was correct to deny Teeter‘s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reject Teeter‘s challenge to the order denying his motion to suppress.
¶ 29 Judgment of sentence is affirmed.
¶ 30 Judge KLEIN files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in which Judge BENDER and Judge BOWES join.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that the trial court properly determined that Teeter was not subjected to an illegal arrest, and, therefore, properly denied his motion to suppress. However, under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that it is permissible to impose the tripling of the minimum of Teeter‘s sentence by applying the school bus stop enhancement. Therefore, I join in part and dissent in part.
¶ 2 Defendant Jeffrey Teeter received a mandatory sentence for the attempted sale of drugs; his sentence was increased three times more than it would have been otherwise because the court found that his conduct fell within the provisions of
¶ 3 It certainly makes sense to provide an additional penalty if a defendant sells drugs on a school bus or in the vicinity of a
- no one could realize this was a bus stop because there was no sign indicating such;
- it was 9:30 at night; and
- school had ended for the year.
All of these circumstances demonstrate that
¶ 4 The majority accurately states the law, which raises the issue of substantive due process, but then does not follow this law. I fully agree with the follоwing statement found on page 6 of the majority opinion:
A defendant does have a substantive due process right to be free from vague and overbroad sentencing statutes. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563 (2002); Commonwealth v. Bell, 537 Pa. 558, 645 A.2d 211 (1994); Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 669 A.2d 883 (1995). This due process right is connected to the right to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing. Bell at 567 n. 9, 645 A.2d at 216 n. 9. When faced with such a challenge, courts must define the allegedly-vague word or phrase to determine its meaning, in keeping with the apparent intent of the General Assembly (as discussed infra) Burnsworth.
¶ 5 However, I strongly disagree with the majority when it states in the same opinion:
As discussed infra, we conclude the phrase school bus stop is unambiguous under the facts presented at sentencing in the case sub judice. A plain reading of
Section 6314(b)(4) yields no ambiguity within the statute and reveals a legislative intent to regulate sentences for drug offenses committed near places used as school bus stops.
¶ 6 There is an adage used when instructing young lawyers that when a lawyer says something is clear, it is usually unclear or clear the other way. That adage applies when saying that the location at the end of a driveway where this drug sale was intended to take place is near what must unambiguously be considered a school bus stop.
¶ 7 The context of the phrase school bus stop in
¶ 9 I also disagree with the Commonwealth that the cases dealing with the school zone sentencing enhancement control this situation. The cases interpreting
- In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2000), this Court held that the term playground encompassed play areas in semiprivate housing complexes and apartment building complexes. In reaching this conclusion, we rejected the argument of the defendant, as well as the trial court, that the term playground only referred to a school-related playground. Id. at 1235.3
- In Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 756, 790 A.2d 1013 (2001), this Court rejеcted the argument that the legislature, in establishing a 1000-foot drug free zone around schools, had intended to include only public areas accessible by school-aged children. Therefore, we held that the drug free school zone included a private apartment within 1,000 feet of a school. Id. at 857.
¶ 11 In the present case, the phrase school bus stop is susceptible to several reasonable interpretations. The evidence at trial clearly showed that there was no marking showing that this was a school bus stop at this location. Further, the testimony of a witness for the Commonwealth, a school bus driver for the Chestnut Ridge School District, oрined that, because school had recessed for the summer, no school bus stop existed within 500 feet of the place of appellant‘s intended delivery of the controlled substances to a mi-
¶ 12 Since the phrase school bus stop is ambiguous in the context of the record before this Court, I believe that the ambiguity raised must be resolved in favor of Teeter. The so-called rule of lenity is a rule that ensures fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as tо what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be. See Commonwealth v. Reaser, 851 A.2d 144, 149 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to the principle of fair notice, the rule of lenity further provides that ambiguity concerning the ambit of a penal statute must be resolved in favor of lenity. Id. (Internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 583 Pa. 478, 879 A.2d 185, 195-96 (2005). Here, the ambiguity presented in the text of
¶ 13 I believe the phrase school bus stop, as applied in this instance, is ambiguous, and, based upon the principles and canons prohibiting the imposition of criminal punishment upon defendants due to unreasonably vague penal statutes, the application of the mandatory minimum prescribed by
¶ 14 In summary, while I agree with the majority that the motion to suppress was properly denied, I disagree that the tripling of the minimum sentence because of the school bus stop enhancement applies in this case and accordingly dissent from that part of the Opinion.