McGinnis Unemployment Compensation Case
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
184 Pa. Superior Ct. 95 | 132 A. 2d 749
WRIGHT, J., dissenting
DISSENTING OPINION BY WRIGHT, J.:
Thеse employes were willing to continue working on the basis of the existing agreement so as to afford additional time to negotiate a new contract. The employer refused to agree to such extension. It was the duty of the compensation authorities to ascertain the final cause of and responsibility for the work stoppage. This controlling question of fact was determined in favor of the employes, and we are not at liberty to set aside the Board‘s finding in such regard when it is supported by the evidence. I would affirm the decision of the Board upon the authority of McGinnis Unemployment Compensation Case, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 132 A. 2d 749.
Commonwealth v. Taber et al., Appellants.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
November 14, 1958
Argued September 15, 1958. Before RHODES, P. J., HIRT, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, and WATKINS, JJ.
Robert G. Dean, District Attorney, for appellee.
OPINION PER CURIAM, November 14, 1958:
The judgment of sentence of the court below in each case is affirmed on the opinion of Judge BODIE, specially presiding in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Susquehanna County, as reported in 14 Pa. D. & C. 2d 591.
DISSENTING OPINION BY GUNTHER, J.:
Earl Taber, defendant, was convicted for violation of the penal provision of the so-called “blue laws” of this Commonwealth, the
“Whoever does or performs any worldly employment or business whatsoever on the Lord‘s day, com-
monly called Sunday (works of necessity and charity only excepted), or uses or practices any game, hunting, shooting, sport or diversion whatsoever on the same day not authorized by law, shall, upon conviction thereof in a summary proceeding, be sentenced to pay a fine of four dollars ($4), for the use of the Commonwealth, or, in default of the рayment thereof, shall suffer six (6) days’ imprisonment.”
Sometime prior to November 17, 1957, there appeared notices of a “turkey shoot” on the Frigner farm in Jackson Township, Susquehanna County, sponsored by the Lakeview Rod and Gun Club, Kenneth Hoal, Chairman. On November 17, 1957, Frederick Hoal, a brother of Kenneth Hoal, wеnt to the farm about one o‘clock p.m., and talked with Kenneth Hoal and the defendant, Earl Taber, and asked them to stop the turkey shoot as it was against the law. He returned later and observed the defendant and Kenneth Hoal shooting at targets and estimated that approximately sixty peoрle were on the farm. Frederick Hoal thereafter appeared before a justice of the peace and filed information against defendant, alleging violation of the Sunday Laws. From a summary conviction, both defendant and Kenneth Hoal took separate appeals to the court below and both were found guilty as charged.
The act here involved does not come under the hunting or shooting at turkeys; on the contrary, it is conceded by all that the “turkey shoot” here engaged in is a contest where the participants shoot at targets and the winners, for their skills, are rewardеd with a turkey as a prize. If, therefore, the defendant was guilty of anything, he was guilty of shooting at a target out in the open countryside in competition with others similarly interested in the harmless sport or relaxation of target shooting.
The title to the
Originally, the statute was sustained by our courts on constitutional grounds by assertions that Christianity is part of the common law of this State. The difficulty with this argument is that no definition of Christianity could be promulgated which would have satisfied all those who profess that faith. See Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102; Cоmmonwealth v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497. This argument overlooked the Seventh Day Christian Churches, for example, and raised serious doubts concerning those not adhering to the Christian faith. See Article I, section 3 and 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This reasoning gave way to the theory that the statutе was a purely civil regulation and a proper exercise of the police power. See Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312; Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Railroad Company, 54 Pa. 401; Commonwealth v. Grochowiak, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 522, 136 A. 2d 145. This police power is primarily based on the proposition that the designation of Sunday as a day of rest is aimed to enforce a cessation from labor on one day in seven and to protect citizens in the enjoyment of repose, rest and relaxation and, therefore, to promote the health, peace, good order and morality of society. Specht v. Commonwealth, supra; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 710, 28 L. Ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730.
The basic problem involved under the Act in question is whether it should receive a strict or liberal construction. This consideration and its application produce results as far apart as the north and south poles. If the statute is viewed under the literal and strict construction theory, being penal in nature, such construction should apply with equal force on all phases of our activity, all segments of our society and to every person, natural or artificial. Consequently, law enforcement agencies of our Commonwealth should vigorously prosecute all violations. Open disdain for the law through lack of enforcement should not be tolerated, and no law enforcement officer can be permitted to select violations which will be prosecuted and those which will be sanctioned. Farmers should be prosecuted for selling their wares on Sunday in markets or on the roadsides of this Commonwealth. All industrial establishments, including the labor force utilized by them, should be prosecuted for employment and operation on Sunday, excepting only that portion which is required for strict maintenance. Businessmen and commercial houses of all description are not outside the pale of the law, and the huge transportation industry should not be permitted to operate except those which are specifically exempt from the law. Innumerable sporting and recreational activities, picnics, expositions, fairs and amusement parks should be closed as being in violation of the law. However, baseball, football, tennis, motion pictures, polo, fishing, the removal of raccoons and fur-bearing animals caught in hunting traps or deadfalls, the registration of voters and the consumption of liquor in private clubs should be permitted because the legislature has exempted these activities from the operation of the so-
It is readily apparent that such strict and literal construction of the Act in question would produce chaos in present day society. I do not concede that such literal and strict construction of the statute is necessary or even contemplated by the framers of the Act. As stated by Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 Supreme Ct. 114: “Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive .... And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their oрeration.” The reverse of this proposition is equally true.
The
Whatever reasons may have been attributed to upholding the Aсt on the basis of employment on Sunday cannot be considered as valid when sports, relaxation and diversions from employment of the type here involved is considered. It is difficult to see why certain sports and amusements may be barred while others are sanctioned. From a physical point of view, it seems more desirable and beneficial to engage in some innocent recreation on Sunday than to spend the day in enforced idleness or only in those activities specifically permitted as exceptions to the general prohibition. A reasonable interpretation of the original enactment, however, does not lead to such incongruous conclusion. The act forbids the practice of any unlawful (not authorized by law) game, hunting, shooting, sport or diversion whatsoever on Sunday. The proper construction of this clause, when considered with the rest of the original Act, leads to the conclusion that the word “unlawful” modifies or qualifies every subject mentioned in it. If a statute speaks of “any unlawful act, practice, scheme or device“, the word “unlawful” applies to all of the nouns. The adjective applies to all the subjects following it, and it penalizes only such games, hunting, shooting, sports or diversions whatsoever as are unlawful. Section V of the
It could be further reasoned that the persons who arranged the “turkey shoot” were engaged in worldly employment which is prohibited. Any attempt to enforce the law on such arbitrary classification would only invite further legal concern, for then we would not be concerned with the vexing problem of discriminаtory classification in the enactment of the statute but, rather, in the discriminatory enforcement or the equality of operation of said enactment. The equality of enforcement under a statute may be just as objec-
The action of the mаjority of this court, without opinion, is based upon a mere conclusion of the court below which I consider unsound, archaic and as making an act illegal on a particular day of the week which is perfectly proper on any other day. I therefore dissent and would reverse the court below.
WATKINS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
