77 Pa. Super. 410 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1921
Opinion by
. This appellant was duly appointed, qualified and served as one of the clerks in the fifth election district of the thirteenth ward of the City of Wilkes-Barre, at the election held on November 4, 1919. He was subsequently charged, jointly with the judge, inspectors and the other clerk, who served at said election, in an indictment which contained two counts, the first charging that the defendants did willfully and fraudulently make a false and corrupt count and computation of the votes cast at said election in said district for candidates for the office of city treasurer, of the City of Wilkes-Barre, and the second count charging that they did willfully and fraudulently make a false return of the votes cast at said election. The defendants were jointly tried and all found guilty and sentenced, from which conviction ■Joseph Sylvanus appeals.
This appellant moved to quash the indictment, upon the alleged ground that the judge, inspectors and clerks at an election cannot be jointly indicted for the offenses charged in this indictment. He subsequently moved in arrest of judgment upon the same ground. We thus have presented the first question which the learned counsel for the appellant alleged to be involved in this case, viz: “Can the judge, inspectors and clerks of election be joined in one indictment charging willful fraud in making a false and corrupt count and computation of votes cast, and in making a false return of the votes cast?” The Act of July 2, 1839, P. L. 541, is the foundation upon which has been erected our legislation regulating elections. That statute provided for the election of a judge and two inspectors of election, in each election district, and in its 14th section enacted that elections should be held and conducted by the inspectors and judges elected under its provisions, “and by clerks appointed as
The present Constitution of the Commonwealth, article VIII, section 14, requires that: “District election
The Act of January 30,1874, P. L. 31, which wrought the changes in the preexisting election laws necessary to carry into effect the requirements of the new constitution, changed many of the details of procedure. The manner in which the return shall be made by the officers of election and what shall be done with the return after it is so made is regulated by the 13th section of that
The manner of making the count is now regulated by the Act of June 10, 1893, P. L. 419, as amended by the Act of April 29, 1903, P. L. 338, section 28: “After the polls are closed, the election officers only shall remain in the voting room within the guard rail, and shall there at once proceed to count the votes. Such counting shall not be adjourned or postponed until it shall have been fully completed. A record shall first.be made of the number
The second question involved, viz: “Was the charge of the court inadequate, intemperate and unfair,” is raised by specifications of error which refer to the charge of the court in reviewing the testimony and its expressions of opinion as to the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. We have carefully examined the testimony to which the charge of the court referred and are of opinion that it was fairly and impartially reviewed and commented upon by the court. It is not alleged that the testimony was misquoted, nor did the learned counsel for the defendants call the attention of the court to any mistakes or omissions in said recital, as they were required to do in case of an attempt to reverse the judgment upon such grounds. The difficulty with the position of the defendants was that the mere recital of their
This leaves to be considered the third question involved, viz: “Erroneous and prejudicial instructions on reasonable doubt.” This question is raised by the specification of error to the following language of the court, viz: “If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that not all of them perpetrated willful fraud but that one or more of them are guilty, you may find such guilty a,nd acquit those whom you do not believe to be guilty, or in respect to whom you entertain a reasonable doubt. Now, a reasonable doubt, let me say now once for all......one of the bugbears which we inherit from respectable antiquity, on which we are supposed to charge juries...... reasonable doubt is such as arises naturally in an honest, reasonable mind, after an honest, reasonable consideration of the testimony, a doubt which prevents such a mind from coming to a clear conviction of guilt. It is not a matter of surmise; it should not be a matter of sympathy; and it certainly should not be a refuge of cowardice.” In Commonwealth v. Devine, 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 434, we said: “It is undoubtedly true that in many cases the rule as to a reasonable doubt is strained and overdone, but it is a time honored safeguard upon which all defendants have the right to rely. It is well understood in the administration of our criminal law and should be neither stiffened nor relaxed in its interpretation. We think the remarks of the trial judge tended to belittle the rule itself by characterizing it as a great bugbear.” The Century Dictionary defines a “bugbear” as “Something that causes needless fright or apprehension.” The word seems to have been originally understood as meaning a hobgoblin in the shape of a bear.
The. judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.