This direct appeal is from the judgment of sentence imposed upon Appellant, Willie Sutton (hereinafter “Appellant”). We vacate and remand fоr resentencing.
On May 31, 1985, while escaping the robbery of a Philadelphia bank, Appellant shot Police Officer Joseph Corvi in the right side of the skull. On March 14, 1989, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault (the shooting of Officer Corvi), aggravated assault (the firing on a second officer), and possession of an instrument of crime. Appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty years for the first offense, a consecutive two to five years for the second, and a cоncurrent two to five years for the last offense.
Appellant filed an appeal, claiming that a ten to twenty year sentence for aggravated assault was constitutionally excessive. This is so, he contended, because it exceeds the maximum possible sentence for attempted murder, which, in Appellant’s opinion, is more serious as an offense than aggravated assault. As a result, Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the sentenсing statute, predicating his attack on the following theories: Federal and state equal protection, the federal proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment, and due process.
In its Letter Brief of August 21, 1990, the Commonwealth, upon study of Appellant’s subsequent petition to file a supplemental brief, conceded that the sentence on appeal must be vacated for the following reasons:
[Appellant] correctly alleges that his offense was committed on May 31, 1985, at which time the highest grade of aggravated assault was a second degree felony. [Appellant] was a fugitive until 1988; 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2702(а)(2) had been amended in February, 1987, and upgraded to a first degree felony. Since the upgrading of the offense from a second degree to a first degreе felony occurred after the crime, it was inapplicable to [Appellant], and the maximum sentence [Appellant] could face was five tо ten years. The ten to twenty term actually *294 imposed on Bill 2375 was accordingly outside statutory authority. Since the defect is clear, it is not necessary for [Aрpellant] to file an additional brief. Commonwealth Letter Brief of August 21, 1990, pp. 1-2.
An address of the balance of Appellant’s arguments is, as such, clearly unnecessary. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s concession does not entirely dispose of this matter. While the Commonwealth does advocate remand, in accordance with Appellant’s understanding of his case, it also argues—contrary to Appellant’s point of view— that “the sentences on all bills should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.” Commonwealth Letter Brief of August 21, 1990. 1 Appellant, on the other hand, urges that “[w]here this court vаcates an illegal sentence after the filing of an appeal on that information, it is improper to vacate other sentences which аre not before it, in order to allow resentencing on those unappealed informations.” Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, at p. 14. We disagreе.
The Commonwealth draws our attention to
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer,
The counts which Appellant was convicted of are self-evidently interdependent.
See, e.g., White v. State,
— Del. -,
The judgment of sentence is vаcated and the case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. The Commonwealth develops this position more thoroughly in its Letter Brief of August 31, 1990.
. Our Supreme Court elaborated:
The power to grant the relief sought by the Commonwealth is vested in our appellate courts by virtue of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706 ... Certainly a remand to reconsidеr a sentence, where the disposition by an appellate court has altered the sentencing scheme of the trial court, is within the purview of this statutory provision. Where one, convicted of several crimes, successfully challenges his judgment of sentence on appeal, remand for resentencing "may be just under the circumstances,” as it may further the sentencing court’s plans for protection of society from future criminal activity and rehabilitatiоn of the criminal and “reduce the possibility of disparate and *295 irrational sentencing.” [Citation omitted]. Goldhammer, at 593,517 A.2d at 1283 .
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706 provides:
An appellate court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any order brought before it for review, and may remand the matter and direct the entry of such appropriate order, or require such further proceedings to bе had as may be just under the circumstances.
. The defendant in Goldhammer appealed all of the informations against him.
.
See, e.g.,
the somewhat analogous case of
Commonwealth v. Vanderlin,
. It is axiomatic that our holding applies with equal force to a situation where the Commonwealth appeals only that portion of a multi-count sentence where the trial court fаiled to impose a mandatory minimum sentence. On appeal, the matter would be remanded for the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence, and, if the sentences on the remaining counts were not also vacated, the defendant could suffer imposition of a far greater total sentence thаn the sentencing court may have imposed had it originally imposed the mandatory sentence on the one count. In such case, the sentencing scheme would have been seriously upset to a defendant’s detriment.
. Under certain circumstances, it has even been held that the proscriptions against double jeopardy were not violated where the aggregate sentence was increased upon resentencing. Id.