220 Pa. 401 | Pa. | 1908
Opinion by
The constitution of the United States, article IY, section 2, provides that: “ A person charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from, justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.” Pursuant to this constitutional provision and to carry it into effect, congress passed an act which provides that: “ Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, .... and cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent (of the demanding state) when he shall appear: ” Sec. 5278 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
The requisition of the executive of the demanding state must show that the accused has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of that state, and that he is a fugitive from justice. It must be accompanied by a copy of the indictment found or affidavit made before a magistrate charging the offense committed, and duly certified by the governor. In pursuance of
On receipt of a requisition in proper form it is the duty of the governor of the asylum state, under the act of congress, to issue his warrant for the arrest of the accused. When the sufficiency of the executive warrant is contested on a writ of habeas corpus, it should disclose on its face: (1) That a demand by the executive has been made for the party in custody as a fugitive from justice, and that the demand is accompanied by a copy of an indictment or affidavit charging him with having committed a crime within the demanding state; (2) that the copy of such indictment or affidavit was certified as authentic by the governor of the state making the demand;-(3) and that the person demanded is a fugitive from justice : Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642. On trhe application for a release, it is not a question óf
If the jurisdictional facts authorizing the extradition of the accused appear from the papers, the court on a hearing in habeas corpus proceedings will not go into the merits of the case, or determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is the duty of the asylum state to protect the liberty of its. citizens and not permit interstate extradition proceedings to be made a pretext for removing them to another jurisdiction for a purpose other than that within the intendment of the federal constitution. On the other hand, it is equally the duty of the state to aid in the punishment of crime committed in another state, by the prompt extradition of the guilty person found within its jurisdiction'as a fugitive from justice. Ho state can be the asylum of a fugitive from justice, and hence it should promptly honor the requisition of a sister state for the extradition of a prisoner legally accused of committing an offense against the laws of that state. If the court on habeas corpus inquires into the merits of the charge against the prisoner or into the motives which inspired the prosecution in the demanding state, it exceeds its authority under the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating the extradition of criminals. The mandate of the constitution requires “ a person charged in any state with a crime ” to be delivered by the
If an application had been made for the writ of habeas corpus to this court it would have been our 'duty on the hearing to have made the same investigation that the quarter sessions
But if the question was properly before us, we are clear that the quarter sessions was right in refusing to hear the evidence offered by the relator. The warrant disclosing that the extradition proceedings were in exact compliance with the constitution and laws of the United States, and it appearing that the relator was a' fugitive from justice, the' evidence offered would not have justified his release from custody if it had been received. It tendedlo “show, as claimed by his' counsel, that the relator whs hot guilty of the crime charged against him in the indictment, and that the prosecution was inspired by an improper motive. The quarter sessions of Philadelphia county was hot the proper forum to determine either of. these questions. The relator is charged with an offense against the laws of the state of New York, ahd the proper tribunal to determine his guilt or innocence is a court of that state, A,s said by Mr. Justice Hablan in Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, in a proceeding to extradite a prisoner for the crime of grand larceny, first degree, the same as alleged here
We need not consider or determine the constitutionality of the Act of May 24, 1878, P. L. 137, 2 Purd. (13th ed.) 1761. The relator was not restricted to the proof of his identity on the hearing before the quarter sessions, but was afforded every opportunity to show the illegality of the extradition proceedings and that he was not a fugitive from justice. In other words, he was given an opportunity to controvert the juris
It is to be regretted that the relator has been able by use of our judicial process to delay his return to the state of New York, and his consequent trial for the crime charged against him in that jurisdiction. He admits that he is the person named in the extradition warrant, and that he was in New York at the time the crime is alleged to have been committed. He does not allege that his return to New York is sought for religious or political reasons, nor that his indictment in that jurisdiction was prompted by such reasons. He does not claim that there is any prejudice existing against him in that state, or that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial in that jurisdiction for the crime charged there against him. His sole pretense for demanding a release from arrest and return to New York on the extradition warrant, as shown by his offers of evidence, is that the prosecution was not made in good faith and is for the purpose of collecting a debt. Conceding this allegation to be true, it simply goes to his guilt or innocence, and he manifestly must have that question adjudicated in the courts of the state against whose laws the crime is alleged to have been committed. Instead, therefore, of resist-. ing a return to the state of New York to be tried for the offense he should, under the facts disclosed in the record, have voluntarily returned to that jurisdiction and demanded an immediate trial on the indictment. He is charged with grand larceny, a disgraceful and heinous offense, and if he be innocent, as he alleges, he should have submitted himself at once to the jurisdiction where the crime was alleged to have been committed. He is, and has been since his arrest, which is more, than a year ago, within two hours of New York, where he can have a fair and impartial trial and his innocence declared by a court and jury of unquestioned jurisdiction. Yet, instead of seeking this opportunity to vindicate himself, he has, since the day of his arrest, invoked the aid of every court in this jurisdiction having cognizance of the matter, to prevent
It must be distinctly understood that this commonwealth cannot 'be madé an asylum for the criminal class of any state, domestic or-.foreign, and that when a member of that class seeks a refuge here, the processes of our courts may not be used; to prevent his return to the state or country whose justice he has fled. Such rule should be strictly enforced in interstate extradition proceedings. The provisions of the federal constitution and the act of congress should be enforced by the states in good faith to effect the purpose intended, and no technical or formal objection to extradition proceedings should be allowed to avail the accused in evading a speedy trial in the demanding jurisdiction when there has been a substantial compliance with the constitutional.and statutory requirements regulating such proceedings. The public welfare demands that crime' committed against the laws of any state should be punished, and while each state should carefully guard and protect the liberty of its citizens, yet it should yield a willing compliance to the request of a sister state for the return of a fugitive from justice. This will carry out the manifest intention of the compact between the states, and tend to establish better, and more harmonious relations between them. ' As correctly said by-Mr. Justice Harlan in Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227: “ The constitutional provision relating to fugitives from justice, as the history of its adoption will show, is in the nature of a treaty stipulation entered into ¡for the purpose of securing a prompt and efficient administration .of the criminal laws of the several States — an object of the '..first concern, to the people of the entire country, and which each State is bound, in fidelity to the constitution to recognize. A. faithful, vigorous enforcement of that stipulation is vital to the harmony and welfare of the States.”
The judgment of the Superior Court, affirming the order of the’ quarter sessions, is affirmed; and the record is remitted to the quarter sessions with directions that the said Richard C. Mower forthwith'surrender himself into the'custody to which