6 A.2d 279 | Pa. | 1939
Plaintiff, M. Louise Hetrick, filed a petition for a writ of alternative mandamus commanding the defendant, the Board of Directors of the School District of the City of Sunbury, to acknowledge her as a lawful, duly qualified, professional employee and teacher of music, and to execute a written contract with her as provided by the Teachers' Tenure Act of April 6, 1937, P. L. 213. The Board of School Directors filed an answer admitting that plaintiff had been employed, but averred that she had been employed only as a supply teacher to temporarily fill a vacancy that occurred during the school term, and denied that she was entitled to a contract under the Tenure Act. The court below found that plaintiff was a regular, full-time, professional employee within the meaning of the Act and entered a decree ordering the defendant to execute the contract prayed for. From that decree defendant has appealed.
The vacancy which plaintiff was engaged to fill occurred during the 1937-8 school term by reason of the resignation of the regular music teacher. At a meeting of the Board of School Directors, held October 29, 1937, plaintiff was selected to temporarily fill that vacancy. The minute of the Board, as recorded, reads: "It was moved by Mr. Glosser that M. Louise Hetrick be selected as supply teacher in Junior High School Music for the remainder of the 1937-8 school term." The motion was seconded and carried by the affirmative vote of all the directors. On November 1, 1937, she entered upon her duties and taught continuously for the remainder of the school term, ending June 3, 1938. It was not until after the termination of the first semester that she asked for a permanent contract, at which time the secretary reported her request to the Board, which, as the minutes show, took the following action on April 11, 1938: *9 "Miss Louise Hetrick, who had been doing substitute teaching . . . made application for a regular position . . . the Secretary was authorized to advise her that her services would not be required after June 3, 1938, and it was not the intention of the Board to elect her as a regular teacher." Later, a meeting on June 20, 1938, the Board passed the following resolution: ". . . that Louise Hetrick be released as a substitute teacher in Junior High School as of July 1, 1938; she having had no contract as a teacher." She received prompt notice in writing of this action. The following August her first formal written demand for a contract proved unavailing and when her services were refused at the beginning of the next term, she thereupon brought this action.
According to the minutes of the School Board, the plaintiff was selected as a supply teacher for the balance of a school term, and not permanently. "The action of the board is the basis of liability of the school district. When it is lacking, no recovery can be had": Parnell v. School Board of ClymerBorough,
In order to establish a valid appointment, a teacher is required to show the affirmative vote of a majority of the board, duly recorded on the minutes, showing how each voted:Com. ex rel. Ake v. Blough,
The plain and usual meaning of the word "supply" is substitute.1 The word connotes a temporary appointment, rather than the "regular" status which falls within the purview of the Tenure Act. The court below based its conclusion that plaintiff was a regular teacher upon evidence, extraneous from the minutes, of certain actions taken by various school officials which purported to enlarge plaintiff's status from that of a "supply teacher" for a limited period to that of a regular employee. It is clear, however, that this finding cannot be sustained, since proof of plaintiff's appointment is the minutes, and the terms of her selection cannot be supplemented or enlarged by extraneous evidence or by the actions or declarations of the officials of the School District: SchoolDist. of Denniston Twp. v. Padden,
The fundamental policy of our public school system is to obtain the best educational facilities for the children of the Commonwealth. To this end must be subordinated all personal and partisan considerations: Walker's Appeal,
If a school board cannot hire a substitute teacher on probation except by incurring the obligation of permanent tenure, it would mean that when a teacher died the school board would be forced to leave the pupils without a teacher until a regular one could be found and hired, because any substitute sent in for a day or a week would become a regular teacher and entitled to a permanent contract. Such a result would be absurd, because no sensible school management could prosper under it. As was pointed out in Taggart v. School Dist. No. 1,
As we have already stated, the purpose of the Tenure Act was "to maintain an adequate and competent teaching staff, free from political and personal arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers might feel secure and more efficiently perform their duty of instruction," but it was not the intention of the legislature "to have the Tenure Act interfere with the control of school policy": Ehret v. KulpmontBoro. School Dist.,
This conclusion is not in conflict with our decision inJones v. Kulpmont Borough School District,
Plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to a contract since the Board in hiring her as a supply teacher was merely attempting to evade the Tenure Act is without merit. The election of plaintiff as a supply teacher was not a mere subterfuge to escape the obligations imposed by the Act; it was precisely what it purported to be — the creation of a temporary relationship not prohibited by the Act. Plaintiff cannot complain when the Board has availed itself of the opportunity of doing what the law permits: See Arbuckle'sEstate,
Decree reversed.