We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review limited to whether the defendant’s conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child under the
Background facts. We present the essential facts the jury could have found. In 2005, the defendant moved in with his girl friend and her four children, two boys and two girls. The victim, who was nine years old, shared a bed with her sister in one bedroom. The two boys also shared a bedroom down the hall from the girls’ bedroom.
On December 28, 2005, the victim watched television until 8 p.m., her usual bedtime. The defendant had just returned home. The victim, wearing shorts and a tank top, joined her sister, who was already in bed.
While she slept, the victim felt someone hit her face and move her over to the edge of the bed. Although the bedroom light was off, the light coming from the kitchen and through the window illuminated her room so that she could see the defendant kneeling next to her side of the bed. When the defendant asked her to move over closer to him, the victim recognized his
The victim got out of bed and was making her way down the hall to her brothers’ room when she saw the defendant in the bathroom. As she passed by, the defendant told her not to tell her family because they would “put [him] in jail” or “kill [him].” He also stated that he had two daughters of his own and that he would “never do that to them.”
The victim continued down the hall to her brothers’ room, then went with one of her brothers to the living room, where they began watching a movie to “get [her] mom’s attention.” The mother, who was awakened by the defendant’s coming to bed, saw the lights on in the dining room through the bottom of the door and got up to shut them off. When she saw the children in the living room, the victim told her something “really, really serious” had happened. After being told what had occurred, the mother telephoned 911. The victim was taken to a hospital for examination.
On February 22, 2006, an Essex County grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant with rape of a child with force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B. The Commonwealth amended the two indictments to include the specific acts related to the charges. For the indictment alleging a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A, the charges stated, “having] sexual intercourse and/or unnatural intercourse with . . . a child under sixteen years of age, ... to wit: by means of oral penetration or digital penetration.” For the indictment alleging a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, the charges stated, “commit[ting] an indecent assault and battery on ... a child under fourteen years, to wit: by moving the child’s shorts and underwear to the side.”
The defendant moved for required findings of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and the close of all evidence, and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury’s verdicts, arguing that his conduct was not separate and distinct because the moving of the clothing was necessary to the rape. Citing to the facts, the Superior Court judge denied the defendant’s motions.
The judge instructed the jury: “The alleged proof of [indictments] 1 and 2 must be based on proof of wholly separate acts. Stated another way, [indictments] 1 and 2 cannot be proven by a single act.” He also instructed that the jurors “must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged.” After the jury found the defendant guilty of both charges, the judge sentenced the defendant to from four to five years in State prison for the rape conviction, to be followed by ten years’ probation for the indecent assault and battery conviction.
Discussion. The Commonwealth argues that the defendant’s convictions should be upheld because the evidence supported convictions of both crimes, and the jury, after being properly instructed that the crimes “must be based on proof of wholly separate acts,”
The defendant asserts, as he did below, that his conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen should be vacated because it is duplicative of his conviction of rape of a child under sixteen and violates his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He argues that his actions were “so closely related in fact as to constitute in substance but a single crime.” Commonwealth v. St. Pierre,
“Under our long-standing rule derived from Morey v. Commonwealth,
We conclude, and the parties do not contest, that where a child is under the age of fourteen, the crime of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, is a lesser included offense of the crime of rape of a child under sixteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23.
We conclude that, in the circumstances here, convictions of the greater offense of statutory rape, and the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery, were not based on separate and distinct acts. See Commonwealth v. King,
The prohibition against duplicative convictions ensures that “the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for a single legislatively defined offense.” Commonwealth v. Crocker,
We next address the issue whether a jury or a judge should decide whether a defendant, who has been charged with indecent assault and battery on a child and statutory rape, has committed actions that are sufficiently separate and distinct as to factually comprise different crimes. See Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 662-663 (1979). The Commonwealth points out that
Whether the Commonwealth has presented facts to support each charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter for the jury, and the judge must instruct the jury on separate and distinct acts. See Commonwealth v. Roderiques,
Our conclusion should not be interpreted to mean we wish to impinge on the Commonwealth’s right to prosecute where a single criminal event may result in charges for a number of crimes. “The Commonwealth has broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a case; judicial review of these decisions must proceed circumspectly lest we intrude on a function constitutionally vouchsafed to another branch of government.”
Conclusion. An appropriate remedy in a case such as this, in order “to prevent multiple punishments, is to vacate both the conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense, and to affirm on the more serious offense.” See Commonwealth v. Valliere,
So ordered.
Notes
The docket incorrectly reflects the defendant’s conviction of rape of a child under sixteen by force, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and should be modified to show his conviction of statutory rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23. “Under Mass. R. Grim. P. 4 (d),
The verdict slips submitted to the jury reflect the same language.
Where there is a question whether the defendant’s conduct constituted separate and distinct acts or was part of a single criminal episode, the jury must be instructed accordingly. Commonwealth v. Maldonado,
We have also concluded that indecent assault and battery on a child over fourteen is a lesser included offense of forcible rape of a child under sixteen
The elements of indecent assault and battery on a child are “(1) indecent assault and battery on (2) a child under the age of fourteen.” Commonwealth v. Knap, 412 Mass. 712, 714 (1992). The “elements of statutory rape are (1) sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with (2) a child under sixteen years of age.” Commonwealth v. Roby,
See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Hoyt,
The Commonwealth states that the charges against the defendant were fairly brought because the defendant was indicted on one charge of rape,
For example, we note that, in the circumstances of this case, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of indecent assault and battery but not rape.