Opinion by
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
On December 10, 1959, at around 7:00 p.m., two police officers of the Borough of Braddock, Krehely and Reaves, while patrolling in thе vicinity of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks on Braddock Avenue, received a call to proceed to 226 Halket Avenue — 100 yards from the B. & O. Railroad tracks. They testified that when they arrived at that address twо minutes later, they found a Mrs. Barbara Martin, aged 76, who had been “brutally beaten”. She had two black eyes, a swollen chin, severe lacerations and bumps all over her face, she was bleeding about her face, nose and one arm, and she was in a hysterical condition. She told them she thought her arm and shoulder were broken.
Mrs. Martin, in reply to a question from one of the officers, said that not more than five minutes earlier *270 she had been grabbed by “a young black man” * near the watchman’s shanty at the 11th Street crossing over the B. & O. tracks, that she had been dragged to the right of the shanty, struck by her assailant, and as a result had fallen on the “fast” track. The assailant then took her handbag (containing $2 and a fifth of whiskey) from her. She had been returning home from a visit to a drug store at 11th Street and Braddock Avenue, a distance of about 500 yards from the tracks and after the assault had dragged herself to Mrs. Kotvas’ home at 226 Halket Avenue, which was the nearest dwelling house.
Mrs. Josephine Kotvas, who was 87 years old, was present when Mrs. Martin’s statemеnts were made. However, at the time of the trial she was in a hospital suffering from a stroke and advanced senility, and her doctor stated her condition was such that she could not testify.
Mrs. Martin was taken immediately to а hospital where she died ten days later. An autopsy was performed by a pathologist who testified that death resulted from a “subdural and subarachnoid intercranial hemorrhage and cerebral necrosis following contusions of the face and body.” According to the pathologist, the hemorrhages were the result of the application of severe and extensive force and that they could not have been сaused by a fall “unless she would fall from a high place and meeting obstructions on the way down, . . . because the bruises were too widely distributed.”
Approximately a year and three months after this crime, defendant was arrested in connection with another crime of which he was suspected. On March 20, 1961, he was interrogated for several hours at the Allegheny County Detective Bureau. At first he denied *271 any connection with the assault of Mrs. Martin, hut аfter several hours made orally and thereafter signed a full confession. In this confession he denied striking Mrs. Martin but admitted “bumping” her “pretty hard”, and said that as a result she fell on her face, and that he then took her pocketbook and whiskey. After stating these facts orally, defendant informed his interrogators that he could read and write “only a little bit,” and consequently he wanted the statement read to him when it was written. When the statement was transcribed, it was read to defendant by James B. DeStout, Chief of Allegheny County Detectives, in the presence of several other detectives, a reporter and a radio commentator. Defendant requested that the written statement be changed in respect to the bottle of whiskey, and after this had been corrected, he signed the written statement. All the witnesses to defendant’s oral and written statements testified that when he mаde them he appeared to be normal and had even requested the correction in the written statement above mentioned.
The day after the aforesaid statement or confession, defendant wаs taken to the area where the assault had allegedly occurred. There, according to the Commonwealth’s evidence, defendant voluntarily described his movements, pointed out the location of thе assault and where the pocketbook and bottle had been thrown. Photographs taken in connection with this “walk-through” were admitted as exhibits.
Defendant testified at the trial that he had not attacked Mrs. Martin; that he did not understand the written statement although it was read to him; and that after signing it he had informed the detectives that he should not have done so. He recalled the “walk-through”, but denied knowing where Mrs. Martin had been attacked. He аlso testified that the photographs were taken after he had been told to point to *272 particular locations. Defendant produced testimony that when tested at school several years previous to his trial, he had an I.Q. of 46 and a mental age of approximately 6y2 years.
Defendant raises several important questions. The first is that the statement taken by the officers from Mrs. Martin was inadmissible. The Court had admitted it as part оf the res gestae. Defendant contends that Mrs. Martin’s oral statement was not spontaneous, but on the contrary consisted of a narrative which was the result of reflection and premeditation or design; that it was made at least five minutes after the attack and at a place 100 yards from the place of the crime; and that she had the presence of mind and normality of condition to describe her assailant in the Slоvakian language (out of apparent deference to Officer Reaves). There is no merit in this contention.
In
Commonwealth v. Noble,
“Spontaneous exclamations or declarations uttered during or immediately preceding or following the actual infliction of wounds or springing out of the actual commission of the crime, are admissible as within the res gestae rule: Commonwealth v. Rumage,
“No definite time-limit or distance from the crime or event in issue can be fixed by the Courts to determine what spontaneous utterances are admissible; each case must depend on its own facts and circumstances: Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Stallone,
Decedent’s statement to the police officers made five minutes after the assault and robbery when she was in a hysterical condition as a result of the terrible beating, was undoubtedly spontaneous and not the result of reflection and premeditatiоn or design, and hence was admissible under the res gestae rule.
The second ground of defendant’s appeal is that his confession was inadmissible because at the time it was offered the Commonwealth had not yet рroved the corpus delicti. The law is well settled that a confession is inadmissible until the corpus delicti has been prima facie proved:
Commonwealth v. Ross,
In
Commonwealth v. Kravitz,
(Pages 201-203) “The test of the sufficiency of the evidence — irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial — is whether accepting as true all the evidence upon which, if beliеved, the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, i.e., the murder of Max Kravitz: [Citing cases].
“. . . ‘It has become custоmary for a defendant in his argument before an Appellate Court to base his claims and contentions upon his own testimony or that of his witnesses even after a jury has found him guilty. This, of course, is basic error. After a plea or verdict of guilty, “we accept as true all of the Commonwealth’s evidence upon which, if believed, the jury could have properly based its verdict: [Citing cases].”’
(Page 208) “ ‘. . . “. . . Proof by eye witnesses or direct evidеnce of the corpus delicti or of identity or of the commission by the defendant of the crime charged is not necessary. ‘. . . It is clearly settled that a man may be convicted on circumstantial evidence аlone, and a criminal intent may be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which are of such a nature as to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: [Citing cases.]’ ” ’
*275 (Page 209) “ ‘The Commonwealth hag the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing in order to constitute murder in the first degree. . . .’
(Page 210) “. . .
‘It
sometimes happens the circumstances attending the act may be consistеnt with crime, suicide or accident. In such cases, ... it is not necessary to show by affirmative proof that the latter two possibilities do not exist before evidence as to who did the act is admitted: Com. v. Puglise, [
(Page 212) “While dеfendant . . . concedes that the law is that which is hereinbefore set forth, she nevertheless contends in effect that there must be proof by eyewitnesses that she committed the crime charged, or, as she sometimеs expresses it, that the Commonwealth has to exclude the possibility that some third party committed this murder. Careful consideration, analysis and all the hereinabove quoted and cited decisions of this Court demonstratе that this is not the law.”
The trial Judge instructed the jury that if the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was committed either in or as a result of the perpetration of a robbery, or was a wilful, deliberаte and premeditated killing, they could find defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. No complaint is made by defendant or could successfully be made to the Judge’s charge. The Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §701, as amended, 18 P.S. §4701;
Commonwealth v. Hart,
*276 The evidence above recited demonstrates that the corpus delicti was proved before defendant’s confession was admitted in evidence. The aforesaid authorities likewise clearly and unequivocally dispose of all the defendant’s contentions. Furthermore, the evidence was amply sufficient to prove defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Mrs. Martin spoke In English except for the four words which she mentioned in Slovakian language — which was spoken by Officer Krehely — possibly because officer Reaves is a colored man.