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Commonwealth v. Stohr
522 A.2d 589
Pa.
1987
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*1 Because neither of aspects of such a transaction are scope within the II Code, Article it is unnecessary to determine which aspect predominates. case, either it is clear that the use of public pay telephone is not a in goods” “transaction under Article II Code, that the upon warranties which appellant has predicated her complaint do not apply. upon reasons,

Based the foregoing the order of the learned trial court is affirmed.10

522 A.2d 589 Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH of STOHR, Appellant. Edward Superior Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued June 1986.

Filed March 10. We note that we do not general decide here whether the law of negligence provisions (Second) or the of Restatement of Torts §§ (business (strict liability) liability or 402A product) for defective apply alleged to the facts complaint. e.g. the instant See Co., Realty Leichter v. Eastern 516 A.2d 1247 (reviewing scope liability); Co., of 344 Light § Schriner v. Pa. Power & supra (reviewing scope liability). of § 402A None of these theories of liability were available in applicable the instant case because the two year expired prior statute of filing limitations to the of the instant perhaps explains action. appellant’s This attempt bring the inci- warranty provisions dent under the carry of the Code which a four Thus, year statute of important limitations. it is to note that we have telephone not held company liability injuries is free from rather, pay telephone; caused merely a defective we have affirmed ruling liability the trial court’s warranty does not arise under the provisions of the Code. *2 McElhatton, appellant. for Philadelphia, P.

Daniel Philadel- Attorney, District Assistant Eisenberg, Ronald Com., appellee. phia, CIRILLO, and Judge, President

Before OLSZEWSKI, McEWEN, WICKERSHAM, BROSKY, JOHNSON, JJ. BECK, and MONTEMURO, KELLY WICKERSHAM, Judge: entered appeal judgment

This is an from the sentence N. the Honorable Thomas Shio- on November Philadelphia Pleas of County. mos of Court Common assault, expo- of indecent indecent Appellant was convicted sure, morals of a minor. affirm. corrupting and We Stohr, Edward is the natural father of the

Appellant, victim, four a half at the time of age who was Appellant incident. and the victim’s mother have been March 1979. Pursuant to the divorced since divorce decree, appellant granted privileges. visitation On 27, 1982, the her February visiting victim was father for the in Northeast appellant’s duplex weekend Philadel- produced at trial indicated that phia. Testimony while bathing daughter evening, appellant exposed his his erect into her penis ejaculated mouth onto *3 thereafter, vaginal Immediately area. the victim attempted to her telephone mother but was unable to remember her phone evening, appellant number. Later that when and the go asleep, appellant again victim were about to ejaculated daughter’s over his .this time his semen on vagina, rubbing body her and into her mouth.

Appellant following returned the victim to her mother the day, girl 1982. Her mother found the little to February uncharacteristically quiet behaving an unusual bath, manner. As her mother undressed the child for a she “crusty observed a clear and irritation substance” around pelvic region. her The child revealed to her promptly night mother the events that had occurred the before. She explained great put detail her had “magic how father soap” on her her and her mouth “hiney”, belly, get to clean. Her reported mother the incident to the Sex Crimes Unit at Jefferson Hospital.

Appellant charged was thereafter arrested and with inde- assault, cent indecent exposure, corrupting the morals of a minor, intercourse, involuntary deviate sexual and attempt- ed rape. Appellant not pleaded guilty charges. to all A held, trial jury was but a granted motion for mistrial was when the was to return a unanimous unable verdict. jury Appellant right by jury, then waived his to another trial and, 9, 1983, proceeded by Judge on June bench trial before Appellant adjudged of indecent as- guilty Shiomos. sault, of a exposure, corrupting indecent morals not Appellant guilty involuntary minor. was found devi- and attempted rape. ate sexual intercourse Post-verdict denied, three being appellant motions was sentenced to (1) probation with two conditions: he was years psychiatric legal without daughter authority to see his an outpatient program. he was attend guardian, timely appeal. appeal appellant filed a his Appellant for our following two issues review: raises finding complain- err in that the 1. Did the trial court the time ant, alleged old at ], who was [ 4V2 testify at trial competent incident was said event? the out of court ruling trial court err

2. Did the her mother [], by Complainant, made admissible, as evidence of a fresh although hearsay, were prompt complaint? court, order dated June at 3. This Appellant Brief for the court en banc. argument the case for before listed improper the trial court first contends that Appellant The averment the victim. testimony by admitted ly testify the child victim to allowing erred by lower court A is presumed the record. witness trial unsupported otherwise. Common proven unless competent testify (1974). When a 390, 326 A.2d 384 Riley, wealth v. *4 however, age, under fourteen witness is proposed to mental inquiry as searching judicial a there must be 581, 420 Short, Pa.Super. 278 capacity. capacity probe (1980). inquiry This will A.2d 694 remember, and a consciousness communicate, observe the witness’s in proportion the truth speak duty of the 615, Pa. McCoy, Rosche v. immaturity. chronological trial judge reflects that the (1959). The record 156 A.2d the child whether to determine inquiry such an did conduct As the holds competent testify. judge superior was opportunity proposed to evaluate the of a competency witness, made, once a determination is we will not disturb finding flagrant the court’s a absent abuse discretion. Pa.Super. Commonwealth v. 469 A.2d 604 Bailey, (1983). We find no such herein. abuse See N.T. of June 1983 at 13-21.

We next address in appellant’s allegation error admit- ting of the victim’s mother.1 The lower court opinion reveals that the court admitted the mother’s testi- mony gestae as res under the excited utterance exception to rule. To qualify a statement as an excited utterance the statement must be: spontaneous

‘a declaration by person whose mind has suddenly subject been made to an overpowering emotion caused some unexpected shocking occurrence, person which that had just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference phase to some of that occurrence perceived, which he and this declaration must be made so near the place occurrence both time and as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated whole in part Mack, from his reflective faculties.’ Allen v. (1942). Pa. Pronkoskie, 132, 137-38, Commonwealth v. (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Gallo- way, 448 A.2d 568 In the instant case, the trial court cites Nowalk, (1946), 50 A.2d 115 authority for its deci- sion to allow the mother’s Nowalk, testimony. three- old year girl told her she baby-sitter had been sexually Appellant avers in his second issue that the lower court erred in admitting hearsay “prompt complaint” evidence as a of the incident charged. A review clarity of the record does not establish with what evidentiary theory admissibility accepted by the lower court. (court See N.T. of June expresses 1983 at 50-55. But see id. at 55 ruling” Further, beyond “no proof). on the evidence the offer of opinion admissibility lower court advocates challenged testimo- 7-10, ny gestae, op. as res apparent see lower ct. conflict with We, therefore, appellant’s phrased. issue as will address the admissi- bility appeal "prompt complaint” evidence on under both a gestae analysis. res *5 assaulted by an adult neighbor. The baby-sitter told the child to tell her mother as soon as she arrived home. Finding the child’s timely statements to the mother upon her return part to be of the res gestae, the mother was permitted to testify to the same in court. The rationale therein was that the child victim had taken the first oppor- tunity to relate the events of the assault to her mother.

While accept we that a lapse time between an assault and the victim’s statements does not negate the indicia of relia bility which gestae rule, underlies the res Commonwealth v. Bailey, 353 A.2d 367 (plurality), it is certainly great significance. The requirement of is spontaneity question which turns on the particular circumstances of each case. Additionally, the requirement that the statement sufficiently contemporaneous is re laxed where the child declarant is the victim of a sexual Id., assault. Pa.Superior Ct. at 368. “Such a recognizes relaxation of the rule both the likelihood of a young child’s inability comprehend ... assault and the possibility of child’s hesitancy discuss the matter for incurring punishment.” fear of Pronkoskie, n. 383 A.2d at n. however,

Instantly, the victim was assaulted on Saturday night reported the assault to her mother on Sunday night, some 24 span hours later. The time between assault and the accusatory parent statements to her greater Nowalk, than that supra Commonwealth v. (approximately delay), a six hour and casts on the doubt spontaneous nature of the statement as res As this gestae. McIntosh, court stated (1978): did create a rule gestae allowing Nowalk new res admission of a child declarant’s out of court statement of when and under what conditions it was regardless made so to the long parent it was made child’s at the opportunity parent. child’s first to be alone with the To the res misapply a rule Nowalk apply such gestae exception. for admission gestae” "res basis

An excited utterance *6 circum- although particular case be tenuous this an admission. See establish such conceivably could stances (plurality) (fifty-five-hour supra v. Bailey, Commonwealth (Miss. State, 100 v. 427 So.2d Williams delay). See also to opportunity first 1983) (twelve-hour delay and reasonable (R.I.1983) 462 A.2d 980 v. complain); Creighton, State 414, 329 Padilla, 110 Wis.2d (fourteen-hour delay); v. State (1982) delay). But see Common- (three-day N.W.2d 263 107, McIntosh, Ct. at 392 Pa.Superior v. 258 wealth ("There not, is (Spaeth, concurring) A.2d at 706. J. exception’ be, an 'earliest opportunity should not rule.”). admit the persuaded [21 While we are not res under the excited utterance gestae of the mother as rule, clearly was exception the hearsay is well “prompt complaint.” of a It admissible as evidence affirm action appellate may established that an court a different rationale than advanced the lower court on its Common- support judgment. lower court 3,n. A.2d Meischke, 134, 139 416 Pa.Super. v. 273 wealth Whitehouse, 222 1126, (1979); v. 1128 n. 3 Commonwealth banc). is the (en 469 It Pa.Super. review, of our subject itself which is the judgment thereof. v. support reasons Commonwealth given Marks, (1971). A.2d 81 442 Pa. 275 complaint “competent of a of a sexual assault

Evidence evidence, to establish that a admitted when limited properly identify also to occurrence complaint made and charged.” the offense Commonwealth complained of with 475, 441 A.2d 1331 Freeman, Pa.Super. v. Green, (1982). v. See also Commonwealth supra; v. Com- (1979); Bailey, A.2d 371 Commonwealth 466, 402 A.2d 532 Pa.Super. Pettiford, monwealth v. Krick, (1979); v. case, In the the victim’s mother

A.2d instant testified her daughter’s corroborate concern- ing the assault and the identity of the defendant. courts

Our have disallowed “prompt complaint” testimo- ny exception’s which exceeds the See, limits. permissible Green, (all e.g., Commonwealth supra encompassing statement detective as it goes inadmissible iden- beyond tifying complaint nature); and its Commonwealth v. Petti- (detailed ford, supra testimony recounting victim’s rape was inadmissible proof complaint”). “prompt Instant- ly, the challenged testimony was, of the victim’s mother however, limited to “properly establishing complaint that a was made and to identifying the complained occurrence charged.” Commonwealth v. Bailey, offense (Hoffman, J. added). concurring) (emphasis Clearly the mother’s corro- *7 permitted borative was to include much “so of the as complaint identify will the occurrence of complained Krick, with the crime charged.” supra, Commonwealth v. 522, Pa.Super. 67 A.2d at of (admitting testimony rape describing father in case from statutory statements defendant). of daughter intercourse with the Additionally, an averment that of identification evidence is the of beyond scope “prompt complaint” defendant In Freeman, is meritless. Commonwealth v. panel a stated in dictum that identification evidence rule; however, the of this beyond scope special was Supreme is the the statement to state of law. Our contrary Green, supra, noted that there Court Commonwealth complaint, of authority admitting particulars is the a 328, id., 487 Pa. at identity. such as assailant’s See A.2d at 374. Commonwealth v. Bailey, See also slip op. n. 510 A.2d at 369 n. Pa.Super. at 396 Krick, (Hoffman, concurring); n. 2 J. Commonwealth v. admitted). defendant Identification (identification of supra collat- part admitted herein properly evidence identify to the occurrence eral which is admissible evidence offense charged. of with the complained graphical- that the victim summary, the record reflects her father and in the being to molested bath ly testified falling asleep. See N.T. of June a time before second mother corroborated that In addition her 1983 at 26-49. the child made to her testimony by relaying under the properly received victim. These statements were rule. exception hearsay to the “prompt complaint” Thus, the trial court’s enscribed agreeing with while testimony, ap- we for admission of the mother’s rationale We there- “prompt complaint.” its prove of admission as below.2 judgment fore affirm the of sentence entered affirmed. Judgment sentence today us determine whether a “tender 2. The Commonwealth asks adopted by years” exception hearsay the courts to the rule should be so, see, Although encouraged e.g., Pennsylvania. Common- to do Bailey, n. 369 n. 1 wealth v. Haber, (1986) (plurality); (Olszewski, J., upon dissenting), based we find that A.2d 273 presented, reach that determination as facts herein we will not existing appeal may caselaw. this be answered under present Pennsylva- appeal falls within the state While the instant law, protect recognize interests of victims we a critical need to nia present cases the trial court in child sexual abuse cases. Such usually only hearsay problems. The child is substantial evidence hearsay they one of the to the Unless fall within witness event. experiences relating exceptions, adult statements made to trusted hearsay. child is found Often a assault are inadmissible as give testimony. incompetent testify is unavailable to otherwise cases, is to statements inadmissible In those to rule prosecution. effectively terminate the law, existing present disposed are appeal of under we As the judicially pass by opportunity create a “tender constrained *8 surely legislation is needed years” exception. We add that in this area legislation urge legislature expeditiously propound the problem extraordinary appropriate of provide remedies for the See, (Supp. e.g. proof Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-25-129 § in this class of case. (Burns 1984); Supp.1986); Minn.Stat.Ann. Ind.Code Ann. 35-37-4-6 § 595.02(3) (Supp. (Supp.1986); § Laws Ann. 19-16-38 S.D.Codified § 1986); (Supp.1986); Ann. Utah Code Ann. Wash.Rev.Code § 76-5-411 Note, Testimony (Supp.1986). Child 9A.44.120 See also § Innovations, Legislative Prosecutions: Two 98 Victims Sex Abuse Comment, (1985); Doctrine the Harv.L.Rev. 806 A Tender Years for Way Sexually An to Protect the Abused Juvenile Courts: Effective Comment, Child, (1984); Comprehensive Ap- 249 A U.Det.J.Urb.L. Cases, Hearsay proach in Sex Abuse 83 Colum.L. to Child Statements Rev. 1745 J., OLSZEWSKI, files a concurring opinion.

KELLY, J., files a concurring opinion joined by McEWEN, J.

OLSZEWSKI, Judge, concurring: IWhile agree with the result reached the majority on issues, both I differ the Court’s rationale for admitting the testimony of the victim’s mother.

Today this Court is asked to determine whether the statements of a abuse child victim made to a trusted adult regarding the assault are admissible as hearsay. Although the Court’s decision to admit the statements of the victim to commendable, mother is I believe majority the errs in resting that determination on prompt the complaint excep- tion to the rule.

As the majority correctly states, supra, at the prompt complaint exception permits the use of hearsay statements to corroborate the fact “that a complaint was made and also to identify complained occurrence of with charged.” offense Freeman, (citations 441 A.2d (1982) omitted). Indeed, our “(t)here Supreme Court stated that some for authority” the admission of testimony regarding assault, occurrence of the place, its time and and the identity alleged attackers. Commonwealth v. Green, (citations Pa. omitted). However, though even the Court in ex- Green pressly declined to define the of the scope prompt complaint exception, any noted that Court which went beyond identifying complaint and its nature was inad- legislative evidentiary inadequacies We note do awareness serving present public law in sex welfare child abuse Assembly Pennsylvania cases. The Commonwealth of General recent- houses, ly passed governor signed Senate Bill No. both and the February the bill into law Act on No. 1986-14 amends Title (Judiciary Procedure) provides admissibility and Judicial of certain victims acts and witnesses criminal (relat- dependency proceedings Chapter initiated under 63 of Title enacted). matters). (as ing juvenile § See Pa.C.S. legislation beginning; This is a much more is needed. *9 Green, 409 A.2d 374. supra, 487 Pa. missible. complaint, it, the fact any testimony beyond I see As com- the nature of the complainant, name of the the exception. prompt complaint the by is not covered plaint hearsay a dimension to this has added new Today, the Court exception. bath- appellant testified that abused while

The victim evening. the victim’s mother ing that Further, the the details of that incident. corroborated victim, mother, she had been not the related what victim’s appel- incident which occurred while told second view, evening. my lant and the victim were bed far more than the of the mother established the and the nature of that was made complaint fact that complaint. is, however, determining means of acceptable

There sacri- statements without admissibility hearsay such to the tender rule. Pursuant ficing hearsay are admissi- of the victim exception, the statements court is satisfied that provided ble trial or, if reliable, testifies and the either sufficiently are of the act testify, corroborative evidence unavailable 42 Pa.Cons. Bill 1361 have amended presented. S. would Chap. Bailey, Stat.Ann. See n. 1 (plurality n. Haber, opinion); J., dissenting). (1986) (Olszewski, A.2d 273 power develop our As it is well within the of this Court method, I the time the case believe rules evidence law years excep- need for tender recognize has come exception. this accept in child abuse cases and tion I Accordingly, Bailey, for the reasons set forth Haber, I affirm the order of court below.

KELLY, Judge, concurring: in the but not majority, concur result reached significant legal rationale. social and its Because *10 issues raised this I appeal, write to separately explain my reasoning express and to my concerns regarding the approaches in taken majority the and concurring opinions.

I. appellant first contends that the trial court abused its in discretion permitting the child testify. victim to Appel- lant argues that she competent was not testify to because 1) she failed to demonstrate: that she had an appreciation of the moral responsibility truth; 2) to speak and that she had sufficient capacity perceive, remember, to recount the incidents about which she I testified. agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, flagrantly or' otherwise. would add to its as analysis follows.

In witnesses, Pennsylvania, including witnesses, are presumed competent, and it is upon incumbent the party challenging testimony to establish incompetency. Com- Short, 586, v. 694, monwealth 278 Pa.Super. 420 A.2d (1980), 696 v. citing McCoy, 615, 619-20, Rosche 397 Pa. 156 (1959); A.2d 309 also see Riley, v. 458 390, 393, Pa. (1974); Commonwealth v. Fox, A.2d McCoy, supra, Supreme Rosche v. our held Court while a trial has judge broad discretion regarding deter- mination of the competency of witnesses to testify, absolute, discretion is rather than legal cases where old, the witness is under fourteen years there must be a inquiry careful as to the capacity mental 310; Id., 621-622, witness. Pa. at A.2d see also Gaerttner, Commonwealth v. (1984); Short, 586-587, However,

Pa.Superior Ct. 420 A.2d at 696-97. rigid, unreasonable construction the rules admissibility testimony present of children’s un- necessary and barrier to the enforce- particularly onerous designed protect ment of laws to children from young physical important sexual abuse. It is that the note is intended McCoy, supra, forth in set Rosche standard to admission children’s a barrier present so are the child’s when the defects only of its outweigh evidentiary value substantial admission. perception, memory defects presence

The mere finding compe of testimonial preclude narration does child has suffi Rather, the question is whether tency. hear the to make it worthwhile to capacity mental cient stated, the question is whether testimony; child’s otherwise observe, remember, and recount was capacity the child’s knowl additional probably bring the child could such that McCormick, the fact of the facts before finder. edge Cf. *11 Moreover, 1984). we Evidence, (E. Rev. Cleary 62 156 § that, judge the trial “[bjecause consistently recognized have superior a much ruling has competency makes the who witness, of the child competency to assess the opportunity ruling, never reverse the virtually court should appellate face on its being accept to practice the better finder.” the fact credibility of to and leave the matter 249, 260, 469 A.2d Pa.Super. 322 v. Bailey, Commonwealth Short, 604, v. (1983); 610 587, (1980); Commonwealth 420 A.2d at 696 Superior Ct. at 202, 205-06, 378 A.2d Pa.Super. 250 Mangello, Evidence, 1821 at (1977). Wigmore, VI 898-99 See also § at 156 (Chadbourn Rev.1976); McCormick, supra, § (exclusion primitive”). “inept seems reveals victim’s argues that

Appellant comprehend concepts or appreciate she did that It is true responsibility” “moral “divine retribution.” was not familiar not understand the oath and that she did However, it upon be sworn. with which was Bible not, incompetent declared constitutionally, be person may (or lack religious his or her beliefs testify on the basis of him unless, thereof), religious impel her beliefs would his or Chuck, tell the truth. Commonwealth v. or her not to See (1974). Thus, the child A.2d 123 Pa.Super. concept the Bible or familiarity victim’s lack of “divine retribution” presents no bar to testimony. Nor is an understanding abstract concepts such as an “oath” or “moral responsibility” prerequisite to a finding of a sufficient “consciousness a duty to speak the truth.” See Gaerttner, Commonwealth v. supra, 335 Pa.Superior atCt. 98; A.2d at Commonwealth v. Payton, 258 (1978). To the extent that Rimmel, Commonwealth v. 221 Pa.Super. 84, 289 A.2d (1972), could be construed to require such under- it standing, should expressly overruled. case, the instant the child victim demonstrated her

ability lies, to distinguish truth from and testified that she knew she would be punished if she told lies. Although she could not say how she would be punished, she stated that she did not punished want to be and that she would tell judge the truth. We have found such affirmations sufficient evidence of a “consciousness of a duty speak the truth” in past. See Short, 588-589, Pa.Superior Ct. 420 A.2d at 697-98 cases); (citing Commonwealth v. Allabaugh, 162 185-86 I would not hesitate do so in the instant case.

Appellant also claims child victim was incompe- to testify tent because she did not have sufficient mental capacity at the time of the trial to remember and recount *12 the incident which about she was It is true testifying. that testimony her weakened in by perception, was some defects However, memory, and narration. the record also reveals cooperative that she an and intelligent was witness. She question when candidly admitted she did not understand a or when she did not remember a fact. Appellant’s know her, permitted fully counsel was to cross-examine and was testimony. to reveal her In effectively able weaknesses weaknesses, her clearly of those was rele- spite testimony I that mental vant and material. would find sufficient (See the of the trial in the capacity appears time record. 26-49). N.T. 6/9/83 like that, the child witness appellant argues

Finally, case lacked in the instant Rosche, the child victim remember the mental to observe capacity sufficient is, however, factually it occurred. Rosche event at the time Rosche, seven-year-old a witness was distinguishable. acci- pedestrian/vehicle upon testify regarding to called three she had witnessed involving strangers which dent had not four old. She years she was earlier when witnessing the since anyone discussed matter occasions, trying with counsel occurrence, except on two 623-624, 156 397 Pa. at McCoy, Rosche v. case. case, one-half the five and 311-12. In the instant A.2d at upon testify regarding victim called year old was her her father upon of sexual abuse committed incident detailed state- she made Significantly, one earlier. year twenty-four her incident to mother regarding the ments capacity observe after the incident. Sufficient hours incident was established. the time of the remember at II. court erred trial appellant next contends testify mother to the child victim’s

permitting (24) hours twenty-four victim made child below, I find For set forth the incident. the reasons after or as gestae, admissible as res was not assault; a sexual addi- prompt complaint evidence adoption proposed I am convinced that tionally, unnecessary inappropriate. years exception tender admissible as Instead, would hold that the to corrob- statements offered prior evidence consistent testimony. in-court orate the victim’s A. Res Gestae

Although declines admit the majority gestae mother the res testimony of the child victim’s under that, under the majority particular does state exception, by the case, the statements made circumstances this after the twenty-four mother hours child victim *13 308

incident could “conceivably” be admitted as excited utter- ances under the gestae exception. res Majority Opinion at 299. I cannot agree. Under particular circumstances case, of this I application find gestae res exception manifestly inappropriate.

A true gestae res statement is a spontaneous utterance by an individual mind whose has suddenly been made sub- ject to an overpowering emotion caused some by unex- pected shocking act. See Cody v. Industries, S.K.F. Inc., 558, 447 563-65, Pa. 772, (1972) 291 A.2d 775 (citing cases); see also Pronkoskie, Commonwealth v. 132, 137-38, 858, 383 (1978) A.2d 860 (overpowering emo- tion); Clark, 200, 204, Commonwealth Pa.Super. v. 355 512 1282, (1986) A.2d 1284 (overpowering trauma, emotional hysterical mind). short, state of “In they [the declarations] be, must not narration or attempted explanation past of a occurrence, emotional, but in the nature of an impulsive spell outburst made under the of excitement or shock by caused occurrence which relate and they uttered before the processes intellect the opportunity have had Kasnot, into play.” 580, 583-84, come Haas 371 v. Pa. 171, (1952); Kasko, A.2d see also Commonwealth v. 62, 70-71, 322 Pa.Super. 469 A.2d Ordinarily, where there opportunity reflection the statements design, may not be admitted as excited utterances under the exception. res See Common- gestae wealth v. 510 A.2d Bailey, (48 interim, delay, 371-72 play during question- hour mother); ing Haber, Commonwealth v.

79, 82-83, (1986) (unknown but substan- children); delay, tial mothers questioned Kasko, 469 A.2d at 185-86 Pa.Superior Ct. (unknown delay, questioning prolonged but substantial mothers); Gore, children Pa.Su- (three delay, hour discus- per. others, including attorney). sion of event with though, majority delay twenty- agree, statements, standing four hours event and between

809 finding that were alone, the statements preclude does not of emotion. overpowering product and the spontaneous with strictly contemporaneous must be “That utterances cause, rule, fallacy, they the is a to be exciting the within is not time it, there subsequent providing be may sway dissipated.... its and exciting influence to lose be the time. Furthermore, and limit of there is no definite fixed Pitts- its own facts.” Powe v. depend Each case must on (1931), Co., 796 burgh Rys. A. 303 Pa. see also (2nd Ed.); Evidence Wigmore, III citing § Gladden, Cambell Gore, Commonwealth v.

(1955) (citing cases); 547-548, I also Pa.Superior Ct. 396 A.2d at 1305 may that it be the effect of agree reasonable assume that exciting event will sway an hold over child of tender circumstances; in longer than adult the same conse- longer involving in quently, delays may permitted be cases years,1 long of tender so as the of circum- totality children indicate that the statements spontaneous.2 stances were agree strictly contemporaneous I that statements need not be While 1. utterances, strongly sugges- qualify disagree any excited to tion that requirement the of be relaxed in spontaneity or should involving years. Although Supreme children of tender our cases Court Pronkoskie, suggested in dicta (1978), n. 383 A.2d at 863 of the at 142 n. that relaxation Pa. "recognizes requirement of a both the likelihood contemporaneousness inability comprehend purpose the young child’s of the assault matter,” hesitancy to of the child’s discuss the neither of possibility the these factors necessarily the establishes existence or continuance of Rather, recognize I would overpowering emotion. the existence of evidence, only delay where spite expert of or spontaneity otherwise, the excitement caused the incident established victim. sway over continued to hold involving years, children tender I note that cases In sexual abuse be determining should considered in which the factors some of spontaneous may considered include: the whether the length maturity; delay intelligence between age, child’s events and the event; statement; physical the nature child; whether statements are accom- emotional condition of distress; whether the signs statements were panied by emotion question; language and the response volunteered or were made in Myers, Legal Response to Child and character statement. cases); (citing Abuse, generally see & n. 24 Fam.L.J. Annotation, Admissibility Affecting Statements Time Element As Of Of Gestae, Spontaneous As Res Complaint By Crime Made Victims Sex Of However, case, the instant the Commonwealth failed to proper establish a foundation for admission of the hearsay- statements under the res gestae exception. While propriety and concern for the child victim’s privacy interests prevent detailed recitation and review of the testimony in this published opinion, it is necessary to note that the only indication of an response emotional to the incident by the child victim the child victim’s mother that, her daughter had finally revealed to her the after incident, details of the her daughter stated that she did not *15 it, like and then began cry. (N.T. 66). 6/9/83 at No. other evidence (expert otherwise) of any emotional or physical distress presented;3 nor did the Common- ask wealth the child victim’s mother to upon elaborate her statement daughter that her began (N.T. to cry. 6/9/83 at 66-68).

While the record indicates that the child victim may have been confused or disturbed by unpleasant incident, it does not support finding that the child victim experienced shock, revulsion, the kind of or overpowering emotion which naturally accompanies a similar assault on an older more

Exclamation, Utterance, (1977 Or Excited Supp. 89 ALR 3d 102 & Annotation, 1986); Rape Complaint Fact That Victim’s Or Statement Response Affecting Character, Questions Was Made In To As Res Gestae (1977 Supp.1986). 89 ALR 3d 369 & is, however, suggest 3. There evidence to that the child was not under sway overpowering emotion of between the time of the incidents hurt; and the statements. The child victim testified that: she was not pains; cry she had no aches or and that she did not after the incident. 42; (N.T. 41-42). at see also N.T. at She also 6/9/83 6/9/83 crying dropped testified that she was not when her father her off at house, she was a little sad her mother’s but that that her father did not (N.T. Furthermore, 42-43). family anymore. live with her at 6/9/83 promptly report did not an assault child victim to her mother. Rather, mother, prolonged questioning reluctantly after she acknowledged played "game” that she and her father had which she 29, 66-68; (N.T. generally did at see not like. N.T. at 6/9/83 6/9/83 mother, 62-69). testimony by appellant, There was also his and appellant’s family played his brother that the child victim visited and during with her the time between the incident cousin and her state- 94-112; (N.T. 64). ments. see abo N.T. 47 & 6/9/83 6/9/83 Because the Commonwealth individual.4 sexually aware the declar- perspective failed to establish from consequent “over- ant, “exciting event” there was as could not be admitted emotion,” the statements powering regard- exception gestae the res an excited utterance under elicited. less of were they when how Prompt B. Complaint were admissible

The holds that the statements majority assault under of a of a sexual prompt complaint as evidence First, in agree. I cannot complaint rape exception. this, inappli- exception analytically I find the cases such Second, applicable, if were exception even cable. exceeded the find that the detail of the statements exception. of the scope cogently explained by rule was prompt complaint Freeman, 295 Pa. Cavanaugh in Commonwealth v.

Judge (1982), 467, 441 A.2d 1327 as follows: Super. alleged following ‘hue and cry’ victim’s

Evidence admissible at common Hue and long has been law. rape rape to follow like smoke fire. thought follows cry is circumstantial former evidence of the Proof lack Conversely, unexplained evidence hue latter. to ensue might expect rape casts one cry *16 from rape existence on the doubts itself.

Fresh, undetailed, are rape, particular a complaints significant provides circumstan- cry hue and form of subsequent alleged victim’s for the support tial complaints are classi- Such raped. that she was fresh consistent statements. prior as evidentially fied involving years, children of tender cases abuse sexual In non-violent figures, is common authority it for the child parents, or relatives incident, part to relate the incident as for the report to not that it was a traumatic or any indication day’s activities without episode a sexual view do children unusual event. ”[M]ost Comment, Compre A See shocking particularly unusual.” or even as Cases, Sexual Abuse Hearsay Statements Approach hensive to Child (1983); cited in Com 1745, 92-105 & nn. 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1756-57 89, 505 A.2d at Haber, Ct. Pa.Superior supra, monwealth v. (Olszewski, Pronkoskie, dissenting); J. see also 9, n. 9. supra, 477 Pa. at 142 n. A.2d at 295 Pa.Superior 476, Ct. at 441 A.2d at 1332. (Emphasis added).5

In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 491- (1985), 571-72 this Court extended the prompt complaint exception to include prompt complaints of sodomy. In Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, excep- tion applied to a involving case charges of indecent assault and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Pa.Superior Ct. at (Hoffman, J., 510 A.2d at 369 concurring). The trend has been to recognize the exception in sexual assault cases in general. McCormick, See supra, 45; 297 at 859 n.& see Wigmore, also IV supra, § 1135(2) (noting at 303 applicability rule other § crimes). However, sex I would find that underlying for the prompt complaint basis exception does not exist involving cases a non-violent sexual assault upon a child of tender years by parent, a authority relative or similar figure. for the underlying basis rule is the fact presumed hue cry

that absence of following sexual assault is (because circumstantial evidence that no assault occurred cry” “hue and follows such assaults “like smoke follows fire”). Freeman, See Commonwealth v. 295 Pa.Su- perior However, Ct. at 441 A.2d at 1327. cry hue and aby naturally child victim does not follow a inevitably sexual assault aby parent, non-violent relative or similar Because hue and authority figure.6 cry reasonably cannot cases, in such expected cry be absence of hue and considered as rise giving should not be inference prompt complaint may 5. The rules evidence of be summa prompt complaint follows: the fact of a and the facts rized as necessary identify complaint charged may with the offense testifies; evidence if the victim the details admitted as corroborative may evidence if the be offered as corroborative victim’s and, only impeached; if the evidence meets an established may exception, it be admitted as substantive evidence. Common Freeman, Pa.Superior Ct. at 477 n. 441 A.2d at wealth v. 297-314; 4; Wigmore, supra, see also IV 1134-40 §§ 1332 n. 516, 521-22, Krick, *17 A.2d v. Commonwealth 749-50 4, supra. 6. See note inference such Thus, no because not occur. did assault excep- complaint cases, prompt the in these drawn

can be that the Com- To the extent reasonably apply. tion cannot nonetheless, this draw may, jury that a feels monwealth that an request may inference, the Commonwealth improper included this issue be regarding instruction appropriate hold that evidence I would Consequently, charge. jury the if it admissible only in such cases complaint prompt aof exception specific hearsay under a admissible is otherwise for the admis- the rules general or under res (e.g. gestae) statements. consistent prior sion rule prompt complaint the Assuming, arguendo, case, I find that the detail would still in the instant applied the construction exceeded even broadest statements of the Supreme that our Court Common- rule. It is true of the (1979), acknowl- Green, 409 A.2d 371 v. wealth admit, in addition authority was some edged that there of the the time and date complaint, prompt the fact of a assailant. the of the Commonwealth identity assault However, 328, 409 A.2d at 374. Green, 487 Pa. at v. relied, there Green, upon in the cases which Green identify the which between was a distinction drawn facts and the charged, offense details complaint the with the Green, v. complaint. See Commonwealth 374-75; 328-329, 409 A.2d at Pa. at 746, 749-50 516, 521-22, Krick, identify (1949)(admit as will complaint “so much of the only charged”); IV the crime complained the occurrence of the (“admit only the fact 1136 at 307 Wigmore, supra, § details”). ig- has been This distinction complaint, not the nored majority. by the of the to the characterization

Contrary mother of the victim’s majority, the inci- after hours daughter’s twenty-four fact of establishing beyond merely dent went far of the assailant. complaint identity and the complaint, to the fact victim’s mother testified assailant, assault, identity time and date of *18 314

and in detail as to her daughter’s statements events before, during, (N.T. the incident. after 56-70). at 6/9/83 Because the testimony beyond went of a complaint and the facts necessary identify fact complaint charged, the offense and included details of find complaint, would that the testimony was not admissible under the prompt complaint exception. See Green, 328, supra, Commonwealth v. 487 Pa. at 409 A.2d 374-75; at v. supra, Pa.Superi Commonwealth 353 Bailey, 395, 369; at or Ct. 510 A.2d at Commonwealth v. Rodri 492-493, quez, supra, Pa.Superior 343 Ct. at 495 A.2d at 572; Freeman, Commonwealth v. 295 supra, Pa.Superior 475, 1331; Ct. 441 A.2d at 265 Pettiford, 466, 468, 532, Pa.Super. (1979); 402 A.2d 533 Common Sanders, 591, 260 Pa.Super. wealth v. 394 A.2d 594 Prior

C. Consistent Statements While I do not find the admissible under the rule, I would hold that the testi- special prompt complaint prior was admissible as evidence a consistent mony of the child victim’s statement offered corroboration impeached testimony. of witnesses are prior consistent statements

“Generally, or corroborative evi- not admissible as either substantive Gore, Pa.Superior 262 supra, dence.” v. Commonwealth cases); 549, (citing generally, A.2d at 1306 see IV Ct. at 396 However, at 254-297. seq. 1122 et. Wigmore, supra, § a witness such statements are admissible corroborate having faulty memory, impeached has been who Common- testimony. fabricated the See having recently at 512 Clark, Pa.Superior 355 Ct. wealth v. Ravenall, 448 Pa. 1284; v. A.2d at see also Commonwealth Pa. 159 (1972); 398 Byers, v. Keefer Handbook, Binder, (1960); Hearsay generally see A.2d 49-51, (1983 Cum.Supp.1986). & 2.14 at § is a matter consistent prior

The admission in light trial to be decided judge, the discretion of the left to impeachment. Common- degree character (1968); A.2d 868 Marino, v. wealth Pa.Superior Gore, supra, 262 v. see Commonwealth also necessary It is 550, Ct. at on attack serious enough it is explicit, allegation infer such fact-finder to enables cross-examination Cain, v. allegation. Clark, (1986); Commonwealth

202, 516 A.2d 1284; A.2d at Com- Pa.Superior Ct. *19 atCt. Pa.Superior Bailey, supra, v. monwealth Gore, 613; v. 469 A.2d transcript 1307. The 550, 396 A.2d at Ct. at Pa.Superior cross-examined extensively was victim reveals that juror a reasonable from this cross-examination and that she was implying infer that defendant could not remember “coached,” accurately that she could 31-48). testimony Her was also (N.T. 6/9/83 at incident. the incidents al- appellant’s testimony by impeached occur, of presentation testimony did leged morning mother and brother that on the appellant’s from occurred, the child appel- incidents visited with after the played acted her cousin. family, normally lant’s 94-112). Cain, (N.T. 6/9/83 See Commonwealth 202, 516 Pa.Superior Ct. at A.2d at 1254. witnesses, Moreover, the credibility unlike adult of wit ques are children of tender might nesses who be age on the alone. by jurors tioned basis witnesses’ is a delay When there substantial between the event trial, there is an question and increased likelihood that young discredit a witness’s as the jurors may product decaying distorted or memory. Common Wilson, 588, 603-04, 394 Pa. wealth v.

(1959), denied 361 U.S. 80 S.Ct. cert. L.Ed.2d (1959), Howser, and Commonwealth v.

(1865), Supreme held that a par our Court or a prisoner could doned convict’s be with corroborated even having impeached, been out as the witness’s status alone that, question raised the find credibility. would sound to the discretion of the subject trial a child of judge, tender years testifying as a complainant or may witness entitled to have corroborative evidence similarly admitted.

As noted supra, the child victim’s mother testified in detail as to her daughter’s statements regarding the events (See before, during, and after the incident. N.T. 6/9/83 at 56-70). Appellant argues that the mother’s testimony not only daughter’s corroborated her testimony, but went on to provide additional details and to expand upon it. Specifical- ly, appellant contends that the mother “testified concerning an alleged assault which took place when the defendant and the complainant went to bed” even though, “the complain- ant never even mentioned the incident in her testimony.” (See 20). Brief of Appellant at The majority states that the child victim “graphically testified being molested in the bath her father and a second time falling before Opinion added). at 301. asleep.” Majority (Emphasis record, however, any is devoid of reference by the child (See victim to the second incident. N.T. 26-49). 6/9/83 at Nonetheless, I find that the mother’s testimony was corroborating admissible as evidence.

“Substantive evidence” is adduced for the purpose “[t]hat issue, proving opposed a fact in given evidence *20 purpose discrediting (i.e., a witness that he showing belief), corroborating is or of his unworthy testimony.” (rev. 1979). Black’s Law 5th ed. Dictionary, “Corrob- evidence,” hand, other orating on the is defined as “[e]vi- dence supplementary already given tending to that or confirm it.” Law strengthen Dictionary, supra, Black’s at 311. case, testimony supplied the instant the child victim’s every to establish each and element of

sufficient evidence (N.T. 26-49). The fact of charged. the offenses 6/9/83 at the second incident was not offered as substantive evidence rather, it charged; an element of an offense to establish testimony regarding offered to reconcile the child’s her moth- activities after the first incident the bath and evidence discovered testimony concerning physical er’s returned home hours later. daughter twenty-four when her (See 64). When, here, 36-37 prior N.T. 6/9/83 at & as as consistent statement offered rather than corroborative evidence, substantive it is not See hearsay. Common Freeman, v. Ct. Pa.Superior wealth additionally, A.2d at 1332. I that the child victim—the note declarant of prior previously consistent statement —had testified and on was available to be called rebuttal if appellant he desired testi challenge had her mother’s mony prior consistent regarding the statement. Com Cf. Sanders, monwealth v. Ct. at Pa.Superior 594-95, 394 A.2d at quoting Dugan, J., (Spaeth, concurring).

Consequently, I would find that were properly admitted as of prior evidence consistent state- ments offered to the child impeached corroborate victim’s testimony.

D. Tender Exception Years

Because I find the testimony regarding the child victim’s out of prior court consist- statements admissible statements, ent agree I we not decide here need whether the years exception adopted tender should be stands, Pennsylvania. exception As it now has not been adopted. Haber, note, See I supra.7 however, my majority’s dissent from the to the admonition legislature to “expeditiously propound legislation provide appropriate extraordinary problem remedies proof in such cases.” Majority Opinion n. 2. agree legislative that continued review of the serious prob- years exception unquestionable I note that while the tender has appeal, emotional it lacks the uniform well-defined indicia of reliabili- ty qua existing exceptions. which are the sine non of the Neither being being a child of tender nor the victim of sexual assault inherently makes one’s out-of-court statements more less reliable. *21 Moreover, years exception, the proposed, single tender is not a exception, but an authorization for excep- the creation of innumerable tions the Myers, trial courts on an ad supra hoc basis. See at note 215-216, 228-229; Note, at Testimony Child Victims in of Prosecutions, Sexual Abuse 96 Harv.L.Rev. & 821-22 nn. 96-107.

lems of child sexual is physical and abuse needed. How- ever, I feel is for manifestly inappropriate it the to to the as to judiciary attempt legislature instruct which public of several “reforms” best the proposed will serve majority interest.8 what the has done precisely This years Although Pennsylvania statutorily adopted the almost tender (see Haber, exception Pa.Superi in 280-281), legislature or Ct.at 505A.2dat the adopted has since many comprehensive respects approach to and more the different in problem. legislature enacted a bill which: the legislature to invest child victims and announced the intent rights protections of crimes with additional and child witnesses during (42 system justice the criminal Pa.C. their involvement with 5981); S.A. § persons qualified act behalf of designation of to on authorized the the her by explaining proceedings child victim and his or to the child regarding ability family, by advising the court child's by assisting proceedings, or cooperate court and and in understand family coping securing child’s for the child and the assistance subsequent proceedings impact and with the of crime emotional (42 authorized, 5983); Pa.C.S.A.§ shown, videotaped depositions good the use of cause for preliminary use hear- witness for of the child victim or child (42 5984); ings, § Pa.C.S.A. of for use trial and the child victim shown, authorized, good the use of closed-circuit testimo- cause 5985); (42 ny § child witness Pa.C.S.A. the child victim or authorized, proceedings under Title the use dependency in civil describing by a victim witness statements made involving the child or another member acts of sexual abuse child’s content, time, and circum- family, court finds that if the reliability (42 provide indicia of sufficient stances of the statement added); 5986) (emphasis Pa.C.S.A.§ anatomically a child correct dolls to assist use of authorized the 5987); (42 testifying § abuse cases Pa.C.S.A. in sexual victim in employees to disclose the officers and a a court made it crime for abuse, unless the court physical or sexual victim name of child otherwise orders, provided court records contain- further public open to the unless ing a victim will not name of such 5988). (42 § Pa.C.S.A. otherwise orders the court Act, 1986-14, 1986; published Act No. Victim and Witnesses See Child (to seq.). et at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 5981 Pa.Leg.Serv. be codified prob- approach comprehensive legislature's In addition lem, specifically the tender legislature restricted note that authorizing the than dependency proceedings, rather exception to civil Apparently, the judicial proceedings. hearsay in all use such modify its earlier to reconsider legislature found reason has Thus, date, the years exception. tender position judicially statutorily nor years exception has been neither tender Pennsylvania. proceedings in adopted for use criminal *22 to its admonition citations appending general to statutes supported articles enacted or single and law review which exception. “reform” —the tender proposed years Majority Opinion 301, n. 2.

CONCLUSION changes I in court rules and agree While that some that the need or procedures may required, agree cannot desire for convictions in child sexual abuse cases warrants or relaxation of the established rules of wholesale revision rules contain the of hundreds of evidence. These wisdom experience inquiry. They have jurisprudential refined, tested, proven been to be effective tools for of the truth and the of the accused protection divination relaxa- from unfair trial and conviction. While the unjust existing evidentiary tion or elimination of rules result in a dramatic increase undoubtedly rates, conviction the innocent as the guilty as well would be swept up the tide of such reform. Such trade-off Haber, unacceptable. See Commonwealth v. 81-88, 275-278.

Pa.Superior Ct. at 505 A.2d at Moreover, legislature while the has a crucial role perform process, powers the reform its revise circumscribed the need to strictly rules of evidence are af- rights invariably the constitutional which are preserve Ultimately, responsibility fected by proposed changes. proposed evidentiary for final approval rejection courts, governmental in the inter- changes resides where ests, interests, rights of the accused the victim’s considered, must be and a delicate balance achieved. McEWEN, J., joins.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Stohr
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 6, 1987
Citation: 522 A.2d 589
Docket Number: 3339
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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