Lead Opinion
Thе sole meritorious issue in the instant appeal is whether the Commonwealth proved appellant’s conscious dominion and control over a sizeable quantity of hashish, necessary to prove his possession of the controlled substance with the intent to deliver.
The facts relating to appellant’s arrest are not in dispute. On May 21, 1973, United States Customs officials in Nеw York City, using a dog specifically trained to sniff out narcotics, became suspicious that a package addressed to Mrs. Donald Farr, c/o Mr. and Mrs. James Sterling, R. D. 1, Lehoy Forest Drive, Leola, Pennsylvania, contained contraband. The Customs officials opened the package and found a pewter antique pitcher, sealed with wax. A test boring through the paraffin rеvealed that the pitcher contained a large quantity of hashish.
The Customs officials repackaged the pitcher and notified a Philadelphia Customs official, a Postal Inspector assigned to Philadelphia, and State Police located in Lancaster, that they were forwarding the pitcher. Before delivering the package, the State Policе made another test boring to verify that the pitcher contained hashish and sprinkled the pitcher with fluorescent powder. The Postal Inspection then arranged with the rural postal carrier to attempt delivery of the package at appellant’s home. At the same time, State Trooper Carl Harnish swore out a warrant authorizing a search of aрpellant’s home.
Police set up a surveillance of appellant’s residence as soon as the package was delivered at 3:30 p. m., on June 7, 1973. Appellant and his wife arrived at about
Trooper Harnish found the package unopened in the kitchen. Appellant told the trooper that he had no knowledge of what was in the package. He did tell the trooper that he had recently received a postcard from friends who were vacationing in Holland; the postcard stated: “Hi y’all. Amsterdam hasn’t changed a bit, Lots of young people here. Can’t understand it. Keep your eye peeled for souvenirs, and we’ll be seeing [you] in a couple of weeks.” After the trooper seized the package, he asked appellant whether he had any other contraband in the house. Appellant retrieved from one of the bedrooms a plastic bag contаining approximately 90 grams of marijuana. The officer then explained that he was not authorized by the warrant to search further and requested that appellant consent to a search of the house and his automobile. Appellant signed a consent form and permitted the search. That search netted some mari j uana seeds, pipes used for smoking marijuana, and some “roaches,” (marijuana cigarette “butts”). Concerning the package, appellant told the trooper that he suspected that it might contain drugs, but that he had no intention of opening it. Upon further investigation, the police estimated that the retail value of the hashish was about $9000.00.
Appellant was charged with three separate offenses under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act:
Appellant concedes that he was properly convicted of the charge of possession of marijuana. However, he challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence on the charge of possession of hashish with intent to deliver.
“In determining whether the evidence is sufficient in law to prove that a defеndant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged, we must, after a verdict of guilty, accept as true all of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, upon which the trier of facts could properly have based the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Fortune,
We have frequently considered cases in which several people had equal access to contraband, thereby negating the inference that the accused possessed the contraband. For example, in Fortune, “no narcotic drugs were found
The instant case raises a slightly different version of the same problem as presented in Fortune: there is nо question that appellant and his wife were in possession of the hashish. One of them carried the package into their residence;
Notes
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 1 et seq., as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.
. It is interesting to note that the Commonwealth made no effort to pursue prosecution of appellant’s wife, despite the fact that all of the evidence admissible against appellant would also have been admissible against appellant’s wife. During the search of the house, Trooper Hamish apparently advised appellant’s wife that she would not be prosecuted: “Q. Did you mention or say anything to [appellant’s wife] as to whether she would be prosecuted for possession?
“A. I think at that time we indicated that we would not. That would be more persecution than anything.”
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I dissent. The appellant was charged with three different violations of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act:
On May 21, 1973, United States Customs in New York City conducted a routine examination of a brown paper package. A customs agent, employing a canine specially trained to detect narcotics, determined that the package contained a cоntrolled substance. The package, measuring 6 inches by 6 inches by 12 inches, was addressed from Mrs. Martha Cooper, 17 Hickory Street, Wellesley,
The pitcher was subsequently re-packaged, placed in a shipping container sealed by rotary lock, and shipped via registered mail to Philadelphia. A customs official and a postal inspector in Philаdelphia, as well as the Pennsylvania State Police in Lancaster, were informed of the imminent arrival of the package. Before attempting delivery of the package, the state police made another test boring, verified that the pitcher contained hashish, and sprinkled the pitcher with fluorescent powder. The postal inspector, working with thе rural postal carrier, arranged for a controlled delivery to the appellant’s residence on June 7, 1973. Delivery was attempted, but the appellant was not at home and the package was returned to the Leola Post Office at 12:40 p. m. the same day. State Trooper Carl Harnish obtained a warrant to search the premises occupiеd by the appellant and his wife. The affidavit upon which the warrant was issued contained, in addition to the details mentioned above, averments that there was no existing Massachusetts address matching the return address on the package and that there was no knowledge that Mrs. Donald Farr, the addressee, lived at the appellant’s residence.
At approximately 3:30 p. m., surveillance of the appellant’s residence commenced. The postal inspector placed the package in the appellant’s outdoor mailbox, the door of which could not be closed due to the size of the package. At about 6:45 p. m. the appellant returned with his wife, stopped his car in the driveway, took the packаge as well as several envelopes from the mailbox, drove
After deliberately waiting some forty-five minutes, Trooper Harnish, at 7:26 p. m., served the search warrant on appellant, who was sitting on the porch. Several minutes after the search had begun appellant turned over the packаge, which had been lying unopened in a corner of the kitchen. The appellant told Trooper Har-nish that he had no knowledge of the contents, sender or addressee of the package. He did admit, however, that he had recently received a postcard from friends who were vacationing in Europe. The text of the card was “Hi y’all. Amsterdam hasn’t chаnged a bit. Lots of young people here. Can’t understand it. Keep your eye peeled for souvenirs, and we’ll be seeing [you] in a couple of weeks.” The card was signed “Gary and Jo.” After the package was recovered, Trooper Harnish asked the appellant if any other drugs were in the house. Appellant entered one of the bedrooms and returned with a plastic bag containing approximately ninety grams of marijuana. At this point, the officer explained that no further search was authorized under the warrant, and he asked appellant to consent to a search of his house and automobile. Appellant signed a consent form, and the subsequent search yielded numerous marijuana seeds, several pipes used for smoking marijuana, and some “roaches” (marijuana cigarette butts). Appellant admitted ownership of the above items, but stated that he had nothing to do with the hashish being mailed to his house. He indicated that the reason he had not opened the package “was because I thought I knew what was inside.”
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of James Moss, a customs agent from Philadelphia, Clark C. Evans, a Philadelphia postal inspector, and Trooper Harnish. These three witnesses provided the previously-stated account of the events prior and subsequent to the
Appellant’s first allegation of error is that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had “conscious dominion” over the contraband involved herein, as required in Commonwealth v. Fortune,
In the instant case, the appellant’s physical possession of the package containing hashish was established beyond dispute. He was observed removing the package from the mailbox and taking it into his house, where it was found. Evidence of appellant’s conscious dominion over the hashish was provided by the mysterious postcard, which included the portentous words “[k]eep your eye peeled for souvenirs . . . . ” Appellant admitted that “Gary and Jo” were his friends, and that Gary’s wife “lived in relatively the same area in Massachusetts” as his own wife. The return address on the package, interestingly, is likewise in Massachusetts. As previously stated, the return address was non-existent and the appellant disclaimed any knowledge of a “Mrs. Donald Farr.” Approximately ninety grams of marijuana, several pipes, usable in connection with either marijuana
The appellant testified that he had no prior knowledge that the hashish would be sent to him and that there had been no plan or agreement concerning such a transfer. Although he admitted smoking marijuana, appellant denied ever having smoked or otherwise come into contact with hashish. He likewise denied having sold or otherwise distributed either drug at any time. Several witnesses for the appellant testified to his reputation as an honest and law-abiding citizen. “The law is well settled that it is the exclusive province of the trier of facts to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. . . . We will not disturb such a finding on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Garvin,
Appellant’s second contention is that there was insufficient evidence to cоnvict him of possession [of hashish] with intent to deliver. It has been held that, in controlled substance cases, the quantity and value of the narcotic drug involved is admissible as circumstantial evidence of the intent with which it was possessed, and may support an inference of intent to distribute, in contrast with mere possession for personal use. Commonwealth v. Santiago,
I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 1 (35 P.S. § 780-101) et seq.