74 Pa. Super. 192 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1920
Opinion by
The defendants, Spillman, Hays and Coggins, were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted on the charge of conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Central Trust Company of Pittsburgh. Separate appeals were properly taken, but as precisely the same questions are raised on all the appeals and they were argued together, we will dispose of them in one opinion.
The defendants offered no evidence’ at the trial, but at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, moved for binding instructions on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. The same position was
On January 1, 1915, the defendants, Spillman and Hays, secured control of the First National Bank of Aspinwall, an institution with a capital of $25,000, deposits of $141,550, and assets of $195,000. The defendant, Coggins, either was or became a depositor and large borrower at said bank, as well as at the Monongahela National Bank of Pittsburgh; his deposits and loans being carried not only in his own name, but in the name of his wife, Laura Y. Coggins, and of M. O. Coggins Company, under which name he carried on the produce business.
About the middle of May, 1915, Spillman and Hays began to negotiate for the purchase of the Central Trust Company, with the result that they made an agreement with those in control of said trust company for the purchase of a majority of its shares at $70 per share, and; agreed to buy all the stock that was offered prior to the next annual meeting in January, 1916, at the same price. They stated that responsible business men were associated with them in the purchase and that they had the money to pay cash for all the shares. The capital stock of the Central Trust Company was $150,000, divided into 3,000 shares of $50 par value; the surplus was $50,000, and the undivided profits $22,000. On June 1,1915, they
The learned counsel for the appellant in his very able and interesting argument in this court, laid stress on the fact that no loss was suffered from the Coggins kiting operation until July 12, 1916, or two days after Spillman resigned from the trust company as president and director. As long as the trust company supplied the means or credit required for the ever increasing float, of course, no loss would be discovered from the operation, but the liability of the trust company was approximately as great the week before Spillman’s resignation as it was on the day the checks were returned, and the loss was potentially incurred when the kite was started with the knowledge and consent of Spillman and Hays, and persisted in despite the protests of the State banking commissioner. Nor was it necessary that the unity of purpose or design requisite to secure a conviction of conspiracy should be manifested by an equal sharing of the spoils among the conspirators or a use of the funds thus obtained in the same enterprise. If the actions of the conspirators showed a common design that one of their number should specially profit as a result of their illegal operations, there was present sufficient unity of purpose or design to secure-a conviction. Nor was it essential that it should have been the purpose of the conspirators to wreck the trust company when they embarked on their common enterprise; it was sufficient if there was present a common design to divert the funds of the trust company improperly to their benefit or the benefit of any of them, or to secure profits to themselves or any of them by devious and unlawful methods to the injury of the trust company: Com. v. Cotter, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 554,
The assignments of error complaining of the admission of certain evidence on the trial might well be disregarded as they are not referred to in the statement of questions involved: Rule XXIII; Henning v. Keiper, 37 Pa. Superior Ct. 488; Bousquet’s Est., 206 Pa. 534; and as to the fourth specification, no exception was taken to the ruling of the court below. We have, however, carefully considered them all and are not satisfied that the evidence thus admitted was not relevant as throwing some light on the whole transaction and evidencing to some extent the guilty knowledge and intention of the defendants in connection therewith. Nor are we able to see any force in the contention of the appellant’s counsel that the charge of the court was inadequate, misleading and unfair to the defendants. On the contrary, it appears to us to have been full and fair, and a careful and adequate presentation of the issue being tried and the law applicable thereto. Special emphasis was laid by the trial judge on the fact that the burden was on the Commonwealth to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants; that they could not be convicted for lack of knowledge of scientific banking, for errors of judgment, nor for mere negligence in the operation or management of the institution, but only if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they or any two of them had conspired, i. e., had formed a common design or purpose to cheat and defraud the institution. A full and correct explanation of what was meant by reasonable doubt was also given and if the counsel for the defendants wished any further and more explicit instruc
The assignments of error are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed, and it is ordered that the appellants severally appear in the court below at such time as they may be called and be by the court committed until they have complied with their respective sentences.