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Commonwealth v. Sourbeer
422 A.2d 116
Pa.
1980
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*1 for defense that a obtain reimbursement setting may county adjudged not guilty from estate of a defendant services services performing reason of Purcell was insanity. he Because Engel. for the benefit throughout only her estate Engel, pay rendered should services claim, therefore, lies in no against them. Purcell’s respect but estate. County only against Engel’s no fees to from paid There is basis for these be requiring In a proceeding funds instead of estate assets. County fees for involving court a claim for orphans’ attorney estate, services an court may rendered to incompetent’s deny either allow all or of the claim or it. But part court is without to direct that the fees be authority paid The County Allegheny. orphans’ third here the party, supervision court’s extends authority only (10). incompetent’s estate. See Pa.C.S. § JJ., KAUFFMAN, opinion NIX and in this join support of reversal.

422 A.2d 116 Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH SOURBEER, Appellant. Gregory Scott Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued Oct. 1979.

Decided Feb. 1980. 1, 1980. Dec. Reargument Denied *5 Smith, Lancaster, appel- M. Gingrich, F. John Henry lant. Browne, Jr., F. Edward Herr,

Louise Asst. Dist. Atty., G. Lancaster, for appellee. NIX, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, EAGEN, J.,

Before C. *6 FLAHERTY, and JJ. MANDERINO, LARSEN OPINION FLAHERTY, Justice. of murder in the first conviction from a

This is an appeal of Pleas Lancaster County of in the Court Common degree of life impris- of sentence on 1976. A judgment October imposed. onment was on a to transfer petition held trial, were hearings

Prior to of for commitment Court, on a petition the case to Juvenile in a or penal detained with a crime and charged a person a institution, suppress and on an application correctional entered the court were Denials statement and evidence. these. with to each of respect m. a police 8:36 25, 1976, p. at approximately March

On of a to the scene dispatcher his radio officer was directed by Columbia, Pennsylvania. residence fatal at a shooting m., found at 8:38 and p. at the scene The officer arrived Sourbeer, who was fourteen years Scott appellant, Gregory in a mother seated alone, Gregory’s and body age, of the residence. Sourbeer Gregory chair in room living shot his mother while accidentally told the officer that he alone, had the officer was gun. Gregory his Since cleaning 8:42 approximately at him to the station transported police to investigate at the residence m., remaining the officer p. the incident. m., in the 25, 1976, appellant, at 11:48 p.

On March brother, warnings Miranda given his was older presence read from a were warnings a officer. The state police form, acknowledg- and Sourbeer’s rights preprinted juvenile was rights of his constitutional ment of his understanding then conferred Gregory the officer. recorded thereon by this Following hour. for one half with his brother privately police they his brother told the conference, and appellant The attorney, attorney. with their family desired to consult after on midnight at the station sometime arriving police his brother 26, 1976, appellant conferred with March which m., following appellant a. 1:31 a. from 1:05 m. until of his presence to answer agreed police questions brother, and the attorney. Appellant, brother and the waiving appel- form juvenile rights all signed attorney lant’s remain silent. right to m. on police from 1:32 a. interrogated by was

Appellant m., when he indicated that he March 1976 until 3:03 a. the interrogation, to sleep. During was tired wanted smoke, and was made as was inquiry Gregory permitted m., drink, and, at 2:05 a. he he wanted food or to whether a break in the during questioning. drink given soft or if he was tired if When, m., 2:53 a. was asked at *7 the he that he he wished to continue indicated interrogation, of the investi- tired, continuing was but desirous somewhat a with the consultation attorney requested The gation. the were informed police after which appellant, privately, further and questions, did not wish to answer that appellant m. At 4:37 a. appellant was at an end. interrogation and informed rights was advised of constitutional again The appellant with murder. charged that he would be sometime magistrate, arriving the office of a transported to morning on the of March m. and a. m. between 5:15 a. 5:30 to detention center for 26,1976, and then taken a arraigned, juveniles. issues, considering

The but after all raises many merit, and, them, no accordingly, we find have they affirm the court below. it was error not transfer contends that

Appellant The Juvenile Act1 states to the Division. case Juvenile part: relevant proceeding it to the Court a criminal appears “[I]f child, murder, defendant is the case that the charging and the this Act provisions be transferred may similarly ” . applied . . 11 P.S. 50-303. § 27, 42 repealed 1978 now June Pa.C.S.A. 1. P.S. 50-303 effective § 6322. § 662, 101, 613, 342 A.2d v. Pyle, In Commonwealth we said: (1975), from the jurisdiction been excluded always Murder has 711, 12,1913, P.L. Act of July courts. See of the juvenile Case, 430 Pa. Gaskins 11 as amended P.S. § § 175 Pa.Super. Mont. Appeal, also (1968). 244 A.2d 662 See to place continued Having (1954). 103 A.2d 460 involved, within is offender murder, young even where court, of the adult exclusive jurisdiction and original and discipline legal for adult that the need assumption nature also contin- of this heinous restraint exists in cases juvenile’s burden in mind it becomes ues. With this In in the criminal court. does not belong show that he he prove who must words, other it is the youth his need and showing setting by in the belongs juvenile care and supervision, “program to the amenability In as a juvenile. which he would receive rehabilitation” demonstrate affirmatively evidence does not the event the benefit from the who would that he is the kind of youth court sys- of the juvenile features and special programs exists for tem, sparing event no reason special (as punishment prosecution from adult youth retardation) juris- illness or instance, evidence of mental within the criminal court diction would remain necessarily system. *8 did not meet this

The record discloses that appellant testified that own psychiatrist burden of proof. Appellant’s estimate of questionable he could a and give very rough only to overcome his person- how it would take for long Gregory disorder, immaturity, which was described as ality persistent and authority, unreliability, with inappropriate relationships result in prevarications rationalizations for behavior which defense and prosecu- which believes to be true. Both the he a having passive-ag- tion as diagnosed Gregory psychiatrists prose- tendencies. The with anti-social gressive personality act out appellant might cution’s testified that psychiatrist violence. his with underlying aggression 26 a time give was asked to psychiatrist

When the appellant’s in significant change Grego- would be a when there period a that such disorder, say he could only ry’s personality ages of the vicinity thirty- in the could be change expected This, with the fact five or forty. coupled to subject therefore be the old and would fifteen years more years, three only juvenile system authority for transfer to of this petition the denial amply supports Juvenile Court. for further request psychiatric

Regarding appellant’s states evaluation, 7402(a) set forth in 50 P.S. the standard § part: in relevant a crime charged been with a who has person

Whenever unable to understand is be substantially found to him or to against proceedings nature or object defense, he shall be deemed in his and assist participate as tried, or sentenced so long to be convicted incompetent such continues. incapacity knew his testimony, according psychiatrist’s

Appellant, psychia- Although what was happening. understood diagnosed appel- and defense trists for both prosecution liar, this is not sufficient as pathological lant v. Ken- In Commonwealth itself to establish incompetence. 487, 890, (1973) this Court 305 A.2d 483, nedy, it when said: stated test for competency Pa. v. Maroney, rel. Hilberry In ex Commonwealth follow- stated the (1967), pertinently we 227 A.2d 159 must defendant establish: to what the with ing respect suffi- determining legal test to be applied “[T]he trial, or enter a plea to stand of his mental capacity ciency or involved, M’Naghten ‘right is at the time not his posi- his to comprehend test but rather ability wrong’ with cooperate murder and tion as one accused of rational defense. See Common- counsel, making [(1955)], Pa. 117 A.2d 96 Moon, supra, v. wealth Hilberry Maroney, supra, rel. and Commonwealth ex way, 794. Or stated another 534 at 207 A.2d Pa. time to at the pertinent did he have sufficient ability

27 consult with his with a reasonable lawyers degree rational and have a rational as understanding, well as factual of the understanding proceedings against him. States, See v. Dusky 402, 788, United 362 80 4 U.S. S.Ct. (1960). Otherwise, L.Ed.2d 824 the proceedings would lack due States, process: Bishop 961, United 350 U.S. 76 440, S.Ct. 100 L.Ed. (1956).” Id., 495, 424 Pa. at A.2d at 160. also Harris, See Commonwealth v.

114,243 A.2d (1968). also See Commonwealth v. Harper, Pa. 387 A.2d 824 (1978).

The was psychiatric testimony that appellant was not psychotic. The prosecution’s psychiatrist testified that ap- pellant I.Q. had an of 122 and could consult with his attor- in his neys defense. Although both psychiatrists agreed that appellant’s inclination toward prevarication would hinder his defense, were also in they agreement that appellant was cognizant truth, and that appellant’s prevaricating was a defense mechanism to rationalize his behavior. The trial found, court as properly supported record, appellant a being liar is pathological no more a to handicap an attorney’s ability prepare defense than having client who lies to counsel.

The assertions that the trial court erred in failing suppress the statements of the appellant as not voluntarily made are without merit. totally After been having read his Miranda rights, appellant had the advice of counsel and his brother, an adult interested in primarily welfare, his thus, we are satisfied that all standards were fully complied with.

We are next asked to review whether the statement should have been suppressed for unnecessary delay between appellant’s warrantless arrest and his arraignment. When the police arrived at the m., scene at 8:38 p. they found appellant alone and took him to the police station. Appel lant was not under time, arrest at the nor did the police disbelieve that he had accidentally shot mother. At 11:48 m. p. on March read his *10 advised again was appellant At 4:37 a. m.

Miranda rights. charged told he was to be and his constitutional rights to the local transported then with was Appellant murder. he was between arraigned where office of a District Justice of March 1976. morning a. a. m. on the 5:15 m. and 5:30 m., at 11:48 the p. his rights to the reading Prior to the every courtesy shows that the extended police record from appellant’s appri- of time The total amount appellant. was five arraignment to his rights of his constitutional sal time was lapse believe this forth minutes. We hours and shown by the circumstances under justifiable necessary this record. it to refuse to that was error is further raised

It police. seized the by evidence items of suppress physical in plain items seized were found the The trial court correctly consent a result a valid view, or were seized as they search. in the house being clearly justified

The were police police and while the reported, been shooting where the had certain all doors and making were residence securing seized ten items in closed, they were locked and windows into evidence at admitted view, of which two were only plain shells four containing shotgun was a box trial. One these four on a shelf approximately found in bedroom appellant’s These shells depth. inch in feet in an box one high open of the shotgun in the chamber shell spent matched was bracketed two This shelf were to defendant. traced the shelf in order to pass so it was necessary windows seized and admitted The other item to secure the windows. was found on the sink a can of oil which at the trial was also fourteen items There were next the kitchen counter. the house where the dead room of seized from the living view. found, plain body certainly were consent of the residence searches Subsequent brother, and, although person older by appellant’s ed in the decedent’s executor who consent was a named gave been issued at the time of will, had not letters testamentary challenges authority Appellant consent. being granted to letters executor to consent give prior executor, names a decedent to law. Where one an according named, has trust so reposed special person expressly and must be to have intended presumed authority during under death and actual certain period probate between Estate, circumstances. We held in In Re Purman’s 238, 5 A.2d 906 that letters testamenta- (1939), example, so as to validate acts previous- when relate back ry, granted, so as are for the long they the executor ly performed by *11 Here, conservation and administration of the estate. the affected, administration of the estate would be in that mother, if convicted of intentionally killing Gregory, would be from in the distribution of participating excluded Act, 20 his mother’s estate. The Pa.C.S.A. 8801et Slayer’s § Furthermore, under assorted circumstances someone seq. official of grant must be in a to act to the position prior letters, and, presented at least under the circumstances had facts, these we hold that named executor sufficient the was, thus, authorized to pro- control over the premises search. ensuing vide the consent for the necessary for it was error the trial court to Appellant argues Rule of refuse to the Criminal sequester Pennsylvania jury. 1111(a) Procedure provides: discretion,

“The in his order judge sequestra- trial may, tion of trial in the interest of jurors justice.” Absent a of from the refusal to showing potential prejudice the discretion of the trial court will not be sequester jury, Bruno, 245, disturbed. v. 466 Pa. 352 A.2d Commonwealth is All in this record that several (1976). that appears on voir dire that one of the prospective testified jurors A had worked with the decedent. review prospective jurors in- judge the trial adequately record discloses that from or reading, watching, structed each to refrain juror incident, and sequestered to media accounts of the listening We see no abuse of discre- deliberation. jurors during tion under the facts of this case. it to admit is that was error issue raised

A further v. In Commonwealth body. of the victim’s photographs we (1974) A.2d Petrakovich, said: of admissi- held that consistently question

We have is a in homicide cases of a corpse of bility photographs an only of the trial judge discretion matter within the reversible error. will constitute abuse of that discretion grue- with is confronted judge When the trial . the test photographs, inflammatory some or potentially is he apply which must admissibility their determining of essential are such “whether or not photographs outweighs need clearly value that their evidentiary minds and passions inflaming likelihood Powell, 428 Pa. at 278- supra, Commonwealth jurors.” 121. 279, 241 A.2d at white were Petrakovich, photographs three black and

In the upper One showed picture non-inflammatory. held be which was uniform covered waitress body half the nude depicted two photographs blood stained. The other entered and left. The where bullets showing torso upper are case much appellant’s white black and photographs *12 in The of body Petrakovich. than those objectionable less in a chair. The and seated clothed fully the victim in the wound was only not contorted and victim’s face was at range. were not taken close the neck. The photographs (1970) Collins,440 Pa. 269 A.2d 882 v. In Commonwealth not se per a are inflam- corpse held of photographs we that in here the depicted The photographs question matory. victim, from which the angle shotgun the position of of the furniture fired, been the arrangement would have room, cleaning equip- and the gun the shotgun, the living from in- far Thus, were the only photographs ment. not value, and their admis- probative but of clear flammatory, quite into evidence was proper. sion introduced testi the trial the Commonwealth During the appellant forged of to show various individuals mony had previ- account and that he checks on his bank mother’s with rat poison. to kill his mother The ously attempted error, as, introduction of this did not constitute testimony here, under the these acts were presented probative record show were not remote in motive and intent. The acts incidents; thus, time the trial did judge and not collateral not abuse his the evidence of other admitting discretion crimes in this instance. contends it was error to introduce the

Appellant entire statement of given beyond context by appellant In admission contained therein. Commonwealth v. Cristina, 44, 53, (1978) said, Pa. 391 A.2d we an admission or confession shown to be false bemay “[e]ven admissible to other than the prove something matter falsely confessed”, and, further, Bolish, Commonwealth 500, 524, said, 113 A.2d we (1955) or “[F]alse statements the accused are admissible since contradictory were jury infer therefrom that made with an may they intent to divert suspicion or to mislead the or other police authorities, innocence, or to establish an alibi or and hence are The statement indicatory guilt.” appellant’s here was an admission and was admitted to show correctly that stated account of the incident was false. shooting

It is that the Court was in error argued not allowing which to rebut the testimony sought presumption crime, of a child to commit capacity apparently based on an of a child to assumption capacity commit a criminal act differs that of other from individuals. While it is law true we the common rule that a recognize child under presumed seven is to lack age conclusively crime, to commit a that there is a rebut- capacity table that a child between the of seven presumption ages crime, and fourteen is incapable committing the appel lant, fourteen and eleven months at the time of the years act, was responsible as an adult for his criminal actions. We *13 see no error issue of Regarding here. the diminished capaci the of the court was ty, charge perfectly proper.2 judge charged jury 2. The trial the as follows: nature of a demurrer was

At trial a motion the of the Commonwealth’s case, which made was at close to present denied. The then a case proceeded not this of error inas allegation defense. We need discuss Ilgenfritz, held in Commonwealth we much as circumstances, that, such (1976) under A.2d 387 is an on demurrer not available ruling correctness of the requires charged a with which that “When a is a crime defendant specific be in order to or mental state established certain constitute the intent crime, degree you must take all the crime or of if, the time and determine therefrom at evidence into consideration committed, allegedly suffer- when the defendant was the crime condition, ing caused, physical or however from some mental abnormal forming specific prevented intent him from essen- which degree is or which he tial to constitute the crime of crime with If, charged. capacity, of diminished and because evidence, you the defendant’s a doubt whether the from all the defendant was the defendant the benefit such have reasonable intent, you give capable forming specific of such must not of the and find that he did have doubt specific intent. alleged you If from the time crime find the evidence that at substantially capacity, mental whether the defendant had reduced cause, defect, you by abnormality, any must mental or other caused consider capacity had on the defendant’s what effect this diminished ability specific any are essential to form mental states that Thus, you charged. find the defendant’s elements of the crime if that you capacity have a was diminished to the extent that mental did, maturely meaningfully, to whether he and reasonable doubt as premeditate, deliberate, gravity upon of his contem- reflect act, kill, you guilty him plated cannot find or form an intent willful, degree. premeditated of the first deliberate and murder Also, you capacity if was diminished to the find that his mental you he did a reasonable doubt whether harbor extent have guilty aforethought, you find him of murder of either cannot malice the first Further, degree. you or if find that the defendant’s third capacity he neither har- was diminished to the extent that mental aforethought kill nor an intent to at time of bored malice had crime, guilty alleged tary manslaughter, guilty. you murder or find him either volun- cannot acquit not and find him but must the defendant aforethought if is the evidence shows that due There no malice capacity mental illness or diminished caused the defendant’s defect, capacity to the mental state killing he did not have the attain constituting aforethought, though the was inten- even malice deliberate, tional, premeditated unprovoked. voluntary, you capacity If due to find that the defendant has diminished disorder, may personality you capacity be considered this diminished determining doubt as to the or not there is reasonable whether 1192-1195) (R. charged.” guilt defendant’s of the crime

33 and waived, on not appeal. properly presented issue Also appeal, charge for is the issue of the failure to on jury manslaughter. involuntary

A review of the record demonstrated that the verdict was evidence; from we weight thus, far of need against not in regard. delineate this

Further waived from review is the assertion that the presentence trial did not order a second judge investigation psychiatric evaluation of appellant concerning whether he was sentenced, to be as was not competent it raised filed objections directly after Com sentencing. Shoemaker, 342, monwealth v. 462 Pa. 341 A.2d 111 (1975). Walls, 1, Commonwealth v. 481 Pa. 391 A.2d 1064 (1978). challenges the Lastly, appellant of constitutionality life for murder in the mandatory imprisonment degree. first McKenna, Our 428, decisions Commonwealth Pa. 476 383 A.2d (1978) 174 and Commonwealth v. Moody, 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977) invalidated the death penalty por tion of 18 1102(a) Pa.C.S.A. but did not address the § of constitutionality life mandatory imprisonment under the of remaining portion sentencing statute. This is penalty not cruel and for unusual it is not an punishment excessive and unnecessary punishment disproportionate to the crime and does not shock the moral conscience of the community.. considerations, These coupled with the fact that life sen tences lack the ponderous finality the death penalty, induce us to uphold life sentences for murder mandatory the first life sentences on degree. imposed life Mandatory prisoners conviction assault were upheld Supe Dessus, rior Court in Commonwealth v. 262 Pa.Super. where, A.2d (1978) 396 1254 from quoting Commonwealth v. 239 361 Pa.Super. (1976), A.2d 350 Bryant, Superior Court stated:

“. . . the legislature sought has fit to specify [sic] life as mandatory imprisonment punishment for assaults committed by prisoners life We do already serving terms. not believe that is punishment such so disproportionate to and unusual punishment. to cruel as to amount

the offense to serve as a deter- intended clearly is punishment Such substitute of this Court to it not the rent, province is properly assembly an judgment its for the judgment at Pa.Super. legislative powers. its exercising at A.2d 352.” same 1257. We believe the 450, 396 A.2d at Pa.Super. at *15 in life sentences for murder to mandatory

reasoning applies and so hold. the first degree which provision appel under To the extent that conflicted with sentenced, 1102(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. lant was § minimum and which that required 19 P.S. 1057 former § set, is be resolved be the conflict maximum sentences “Whenever the 1 which states: 1936 Pa.C.S.A. applying § differ enacted finally or more statutes of two provisions latest the statute Assemblies are irreconcilable ent General 19 Since P.S. prevail.”3 enactment shall in date of final in 18 amended 1923 and in 1911 and 1057 was enacted § 1974, in the latter section enacted 1102 was Pa.C.S.A. § takes precedence.4 of sentence affirmed.

Judgment in in the decision MANDERINO, J., did not participate this case. result.

EAGEN, J., concurs in the C. NIX, J., which ROBERTS, J., dissenting opinion filed joins.

ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. believe, like not, any would is as the majority Appellant Rather, because of mental who “lies” to counsel. client Nonetheless, the his “lies.” believes disability, added, 6, 1972, 707, 230, 1970, 25, of Act Dec. No. 3. Act of Nov. P.L. 1339, 290, 3, (1979 Supp.) 1 Pa.C.S.A. 1936 § P.L. No. § amended, 1055, 6, 19, 1911, 19 P.S. § as § of June P.L. 4. Act 1321(e)). 1978, (1964) (repealed version at 18 Pa.C.S.A. current 2, 213, 46, 26, 1974, § 18 Pa.C.S.A. P.L. No. § Act of March (1979 Supp.) that court majority properly concludes trial denied ap- for further evaluation pellant’s request pursuant psychiatric Act, to the Mental Health Procedures Act July seq. P.L. 101 et 7101 et seq., (Supp.1979). P.S. §§ §§ I own must dissent. Even Commonwealth’s psychiatrist recognizes appellant’s makes him unable to disability assist counsel a defense. preparation Consistent 402(a) Act, with section of the Mental Health Procedures for further evaluation should have appellant’s request been vacated, should granted, sentence be and the judgment case should be remanded for consistent with proceedings section 403 of the Act.

NIX, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

422 A.2d 124 *16 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH WADZINSKI, Appellant. Frank J.

Supreme Court Pennsylvania.

Argued April 1980.

Decided Sept. 1980.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Sourbeer
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Feb 1, 1980
Citation: 422 A.2d 116
Docket Number: 759
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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