*1 tended protected the sale and interests; sale was conducted in a unreasonable commercially and that manner; had been conducted properly there would have been proceeds sufficient satisfy appellee. debts both UCIT and af- Therefore, judgment the court below is firmed. Pomeboy
Mr. Justice took no part the considera- of this case. tion decision Appellant.
Commonwealth v. Simala, *2 Argued Mus- October 1968. Before Bell, C.J., O’Brien Eagen, Roberts, manno, Jones, Cohen, JJ. him William K. for Eekel, Persio,
Dino S. appellant. Attorney, District with him F. Bionas, Ferdinand t Attorney, Kelly, District. Assistan First P.
William appellee. Commonwealth, for
Opinion April Mr. Justice Roberts, 1969: body morning of March 1,1967, Thomas On the country Borough road near the on a found Serenko County. An of’ Portage in Cambria. of the begun Corporal Pelesky crime was a per- two An autopsy Police and other officers. State that body formed on the the deceased revealed cause of was a from a .22 caliber death bullet wound gun. re- during day Corporal Pelesky
Some time ceived a had seen with a report been .22 previous revolver obtained a day. Pelesky Ralph search warrant a .22 revolver from George, justice peace who served as and as Armed with Portage. and two warrant, Pelesky other officers arrived at appellant’s home around 11:00 1. p.m. March When asked about the gun, told that he had Pelesky it to one Robert Kline. *3 called Pelesky then the juvenile probation officer of Cambria County. Since seventeen years appellant, old at time, probation was juvenile as a of- the officer told fender, to him Pelesky take to the juvenile parole detention center for violating carrying took gun. Pelesky appellant to the office Mayor George he did Portage; not take appellant to detention center in because he Ebensburg first to wanted search Robert Kline’s in an home effort to recover gun that night.
Appellant remained with Mayor George while Pel- and esky the two officers went to home. Kline’s While appellant was sitting Mayor George’s office three other persons present; were Mayor George and two from police officers another municipality who were unconnected entirely with murder investigation or the search the .22 revolver. About a half hour after was to appellant brought the mayor’s office, him asked about Mayor George and gun, appellant he got him that from gun told a person named Ralph lived Johnstown. who then That ensued is critical admissibility an oral statement made by m substantially persons
appellant. testified. All three appel- place, and took effect as what to the same dispute seriously it. The not version does lant’s carrying on a con- officers were and the two George Mayor and themselves, versation between “sitting appellant, there who was looked over toward out of this world.” and looked his head down you Mayor George Mike, “What’s the matter, said: dumps; you to talk? in the want look kind of down do [appellant] I I said, I but can’t. He want said, to, appel- point you At talk.” to talk, want well, Mayor having orally killed Serenko. lant confessed George in an officers who were then notified adjoining thereafter a written statement and room, taken into evidence was which was not introduced of his Miranda from he had been warned after rights for the first time. suppression hearing appellant pre-trial at-
At a admissibility of the oral statement tacked the George’s Mayor ruled but the court below office, product not that the oral confession was “cus- interrogation” todial was that, therefore, rights necessary of his warn Appellant the statement. before he volunteered manslaughter voluntary and took convicted -appeal. *4 case is controlled the statement of the
This Supreme in Miranda Court of the United States that: may prosecution not use whether “[T]he statements, inculpatory, stemming exculpatory or from custodial interrogation defendant unless demonstrates procedural safeguards effective to secure the use against By privilege self-incrimination. custodial the questioning by interrogation, initiated mean we law person after a officers been taken enforcement deprived custody otherwise his freedom into way.” any significant Miranda v. in Arizona, action (1966). 86 S. Ct. 384 U.S. Since 1602, 1612 given it is conceded that was not warn- ings the before oral the issue must confession, decide is oral the whether confession was product interrogation.” of “custodial
The no Commonwealth claims there “custodial was interrogation” ap- although for three reasons: first, pellant custody, custody in he was in was the eventually crime to which he confessed; second, investigation of the had murder not focused on the suspect; questions by aas third, asked Mayor George interrogation. did not amount to by
The first contention is answered the United Supreme opinion States Court’s recent in Mathis v. United States, U.S. 88 S. Ct. questioned by
Mathis was
an Internal Revenue Service
agent
jail serving
while
an
sentence for
unrelated
offense about certain tax refunds Mathis had claimed
agent
give
the IRS
did not
Mathis his Miranda warn-
ings
questioning
him. Information elicited from
eventually
prosecution
Mathis
led to a criminal
filing
knowingly
conviction for
claims.
false
Mathis
admissibility
attacked the
of statements he had
agent.
government argued
there interrogation
no
custody
custodial
since Mathis was
for an offense unrelated to tax evasion. The
summarily rejected
argument:
Court
“We find
nothing
opinion
in the Miranda
which calls for a cur-
given persons
tailment of
under
interrogation
why
officers based
reason
person
custody.
speaking
‘custody’
opinion
language
unequiv-
of the Miranda
is clear and
ocal : ‘To
we hold that
summarize,
when an individual
custody
deprived
into
or otherwise
is taken
of his free-
any significant
way
dom
authorities
and is
subjected
questioning,
privilege against
self-
jeopardized.’
incrimination
U.S. at 478.” 391
*5
224
a
as
at
U.S. placed custody any must for he defendant is reason, interrogat- warnings his before he is inwas ed. We have no doubt while that, custody” Mayor George’s “in within the he was office, phrase meaning Miranda and in Escobedo and such given Miranda that he was entitled to be questioned police. being maintains that there is a second The Commonwealth investigation of factor we must consider—whether appellant. begun This the murder had to focus on the requirement from Escobedo v. 378 Illinois, is derived (1964) 84 S. Ct. 1764-65 : “We U.S. 478, 490-91, investigation that where, hold, therefore, here, longer general inquiry no a into an unsolved crime begun particular suspect, on a but has focus police suspect custody, the has been taken into process interrogations carry that out a lends itself suspect eliciting incriminating statements, requested opportunity to and been denied an consult effectively lawyer, with his and the have not right him of absolute constitutional warned his remain the accused has been denied ‘the As silent, of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amend sistance added.) (Emphasis Commonwealth ment. . . .” See v. Pa. 226 A. 2d 541, 545-46, Jefferson, particular Court clarified “By holding interrogation, in Miranda: custodial we questioning initiated law enforcement officers mean person custody taken into has been or other after any deprived significant freedom of action in wise y.” Footnote 4 “This is what states, we meant wa spoke of an when Escobedo accused.” 384 U.S. on an focused S. had interpret conjunction this mean, We at 1612. Ct. placed an individual when Mathis, interrogated custody he cannot be with reason, *6 being out first advised of Ms of rights regardless a whether focused on him investigation as in suspect particular crime. The test con focusing tinues to be relevant in in determining whether an dividual supra. see custody, Jefferson, this Court in Very Commonwealth v. Feld- recently, Pa. 248 A. 1 man, 432 2d “From 428, (1968), said: Escobedo and reading together becomes clear that whenever an individual is questioned while or custody object while of an of which he is the focus, any questioning begins the individual must be warnings established in Miranda [citing Thus need not authorities].” decide appellant whether was at the time of the in- cident in the mayor’s office the focus of an investi- gation appellant because was clearly occupying an “in status. custody” the Commonwealth
Finally argues statement was purely thus not voluntary within proscription Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 86 Ct. 436, 478, S. (1966) 1630 cf. ; Commonwealth v. supra; Commonwealth Feldman, ex rel. Vanderpool v. 426 Pa. Russell, 233 A. 2d (1967) Commonwealth v. ; 423 Pa. Fperjesi, A. 2d 216 (1966).1 this is not However, a case where began to blurt out appellant, unencouraged, his confes sion. Although appellant have may been tMnking something was him think confessing, making that he should and the first move not, was made not himby but appellant who to mayor urged “talk.” This should to necessitate Miranda sufficient warnings. Once look kind of “you said down in the dumps Vanderpool, Fperjesi appellants and Feldman were custody” deprived any “in or of their freedom of action in appellants way significant the time made the statements. bar, custody” “in the case at when he made the statement. want to he should also you talk, talk,”
... have inform consequences obligated been statement and of his constitutional right and to remain silent be assisted counsel. “[I]t is not plus simply custody ‘questioning/ such, plus calls for the Miranda but safeguards custody police conduct the mayor’s calculated [here conduct] In- to, expected likely evoke admissions.” to, to, stitute “Criminal Law Continuing Legal Education, and the Constitution —Sources and Commentaries” 356 (1968) (Emphasis original).
It attempt is not *7 simply enough mechanically ascertain what “interrogation” means without consid- the rationales behind Miranda and fifth ering and sixth amendments. Our basic of criminal law theory is that an accused should be assisted counsel and by not be convicted evidence from should his own mouth. Miranda requires that an be simply accused told of It in no rights. precludes way use of but voluntary confessions, requires the merely giv- of certain so that an ing warnings accused can make a decision whether knowledgeable confess. The re- of is quirement “interrogation” permit designed prosecution the use a confession that is without an accused given by before prompting, can warnings given.2
That the situation here. hardly is The mayor knew appellant for what exactly being is- held, having for the the search warrant gun sought sued as the a which the weapon, gun murder were informed appellant’s possession. Appellant had been never confession, accused blurts out a Even an where necessary any questions should be least are anything clarify already more than that do statements asked Continuing Legal Education, Institute See “Criminal made. and the Constitution —Sources Commentaries” 354 Law and he want until might confess suggested do dumps; said look kind of down in the major “you want to talk ... want to talk.” This you you talk, attempt part was not an innocent on the certainly up help strike conversation to friendly appellant pass the time until returned from their search. There no difference for constitutional purposes between an accused questioning outright more subtly that he incriminate suggesting himself without asked being specific Had questions. appellant been asked “did do it?” Miranda you warnings would be necessary. There is no reason they should not why also be required where you “will talk?” Talk about what? implication The was that clearly had committed the crime and would feel better if he confessed. In our any question view, likely to or expected to elicit a confession “in- constitutes terrogation” under Miranda. The question here was clearly and thus we believe that type, is entitled to a new trial.3 recently Court of the United States in prosecution dicated that it will not allow the to draw fine lines deny prisoners rights guaranteed by in order to Miranda. Texas, (1969), v. Orozco 394 U.S. L.W. 4260 Court *8 rejected argument suspect interrogated the that because a was room, house, in in his own not the station was he not entitled warnings, holding although suspect likely to Miranda that is pressure questioned be under when in increased the station house, right not this is not essential make self-incrim inatory here, although appellant may likewise statements. have apparently friendly questioning by with the
felt more secure the undergoing have he formal in than he would were terrogation, was in this the fact that the confession elicited manner scope Miranda. In take this case without the of not either does questioning gain just in Orozco—the aim of the was to event — information, triggers incriminating is and this what the need for warnings. Miranda included, the caveat that the Court Orozco relevant also for is by applies equally case before us: “a reversal this the appellant’s thus conclude that was confession We Miranda,. light in of of violation admitted pass appellant’s conten- need not other decision, tions. judgment Oyer of the Court and Terminer
The County and a trial of Cambria is reversed new granted. participate did not in
Mr. Justice Musmanno the of this decision case.
Dissenting Opinion Mb. Justice Jones: expressed majority agree I in the with the views respects: opinion following (1) in the the that, appellant’s then “in time of oral he was statement, custody” the that he entitled to be was (2) being questioned; and Miranda at the time of the that whether was Mayor George focus of in incident the office of require not our consideration an does clearly occupying an “in then because dis'agree, custody” I view status. however, opinion appellant’s expressed majority oral in the that con- and the not a volunteered statement statement was opinion appellant’s majority reached clusion of Miranda. violation was admitted oral statement determining key inquiry case at in the bar appellant’s admissibility oral statement purely volunteered state- was a such statement whether interrogation questioning an the result of ment or preceded warn- have been which should purely voluntary ings. was a If statement proscription it is within then statement, based, part on unconstitutional evidence a conviction Court retry the defendant without free to tainted State leaves n.4, L.W. at n.4. U.S. at 327 evidence.”
229
Miranda.
See: Miranda v. Arizona,
In the resolution of we look to the record for that which transpired, there is little and or no dispute as to that did transpire.
The remarks of Mayor George appellant which preceded appellant’s oral even in- statement, though quisitive not constitute nature, did an “interroga- tion” or a of the nature “questioning” contemplated by Escobedo or Miranda as a or “interrogation” which should “questioning” have been preceded by of his constitutional rights. Viewed totality circumstances present, appellant’s oral statement was a purely state- voluntary ment and did not arise from an interrogation ques- tioning by authorities.
The United States Court has not said that any statement volunteered by person “in custody” in the of police absence interrogation or questioning, and in the of Miranda absence warnings, is inadmissi- ble. Unless until it be so I decline held, to declare a statement such volunteered by the instant infirm. constitutionally my opinion, conviction was proper and should be sustained. Chief Bell
Mr. Justice joins this dissent.