COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harvey SILVER, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Nov. 3, 1978.
393 A.2d 1239
Submitted Sept. 29, 1977.
Appellee also filed a motion for a new trial which was not passed upon by the lower court. We find no grounds sufficient to support such a motion.1
The majority agrees that the arrest of judgment must be reversed. However, the majority is of the opinion that the case should be remanded for the purpose of considering the motion for new trial. I respectfully dissent. The evidence produced by the Commonwealth was more than sufficient to sustain the conviction and was completely unrebutted. The remand is not warranted.
PRICE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
Michael R. Stiles, Assistant District Attorney, and F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.
Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.
PRICE, Judge:
Appellant was convicted following a jury trial of rape,1 robbery,2 criminal conspiracy,3 and two counts of possession of instruments of crime.4 Post-verdict motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
On January 6, 1976, at approximately 12:00 p. m., a young black man entered a Philadelphia employment agency, operated by Mrs. Lila Fox, and requested an application. The only other person then in the office, Mrs. Loretta Collier, was also applying for employment. When Mrs. Fox went to the stairway to see her daughter off to lunch, she observed two other men lingering on the steps to the second floor office.
Mrs. Fox returned to her desk, and one of the men who had been on the steps entered the office within moments. At gunpoint, Mrs. Fox was ushered by the second intruder into a back room, where she was blindfolded and raped twice. The third man assisted robbing Mrs. Collier and removing company checks from the front office. Appellant and his brother, a co-defendant, were arrested several hours later at their home. Employment agency checks were recovered in a search of their living quarters.
Appellant‘s first contention is that the court below erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when Mrs. Collier unexpectedly identified appellant at trial. This was the first time that Mrs. Collier identified appellant. She was unable to identify appellant at the line-up and gave contradictory identifications at the preliminary hearing. Finally, at the suppression hearing, Mrs. Collier‘s testimony shows that she did not observe appellant‘s face when he first came into the office, because at that time his back was to her as he spoke to Mrs. Fox and forced her into the back room. The court below concluded that Mrs. Collier‘s in-court identification would not be suppressed because it did not follow identifications made in the former improper proceedings. The trial judge allowed the testimony but promised to give cautionary instructions, which he did.
Although identification evidence is clearly sufficient to support a conviction, even in the face of contradictory alibi evidence, Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954), there are evidentiary and constitutional parameters which must be respected. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the Supreme Court found that the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to identification confrontations conducted after the initiation of adversary proceedings. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), determined that some identification confrontations may be so impermissibly suggestive as to lead to irreparably erroneous identifications, and thus constitute deprivations of due process of law. A later in-court identification must have a basis independent from the infirm proceeding.
There are other cases which involve proper identification proceedings, resulting in no identification or qualified identification. In such a situation, the subsequent in-court identification is at once admissible. In these cases, however, the supreme court has cautioned:
[W]here the witness is not in a position to clearly observe the assailant, or he is not positive as to identity, or his positive statements as to identity are weakened by qualification or by failure to identify defendant on one or more prior occasions, the accuracy of the identification is so doubtful that the Court should warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must be received with caution. Commonwealth v. Kloiber, supra 378 Pa. at 424, 106 A.2d at 826.
The instant case presents an interesting blend of the two levels of identification evidence analysis. The pre-trial identification procedures were ruled impermissibly suggestive, thus indicating that an in-court identification would have to rest on an independent basis. At the same time, the witness exposed to those proceedings made no identifications at them, thus necessitating that a later in-court identification be accompanied by a Kloiber charge. Appellant insists that the protections of due process, first urged in relation to identification evidence in United States v. Wade, supra, must be extended in this case. Therefore, appellant maintains that the Commonwealth‘s failure to establish an independent basis for Mrs. Collier‘s in-court identification is fatal to the Commonwealth‘s case, and that a new trial is required.
Appellant points to Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198, 352 A.2d 17 (1976), in support of his position. In that case, photographs were repeatedly displayed to a murder victim‘s
Following a suggestive pre-trial identification procedure, a witness should not be permitted to make an in court identification unless the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the totality of the circumstances affecting the witness‘s identification did not involve a substantial likelihood of misidentification. (citations omitted)
. . . Trial testimony identifying one as the person observed at the time of a crime is a one-on-one confrontation involving circumstances even more suggestive than those present at pre-trial one-on-one confrontations. During the trial, the identifying witness knows that the defendant present in the courtroom has been accused, arrested, and is being tried for the crime. Prior to trial, such circumstances may not yet have occurred or may not yet be known to the witness. Thus, the testimony of a witness who will point an accusing finger at the defendant during the trial, should be prohibited unless the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence at a suppression hearing that the witness‘s proposed trial identification will be reliably based on the witness‘s observation at the time of the crime, and that the identification was not induced by events occurring between the witness‘s observations at the time of the crime and the witness‘s in-court identification. Whether the prosecution has met its burden requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Fowler, supra, 466 Pa. at 203-204, 352 A.2d at 19-20 (citation omitted).
The court thus indicated that the whole area of identification evidence is a particularly sensitive one, and that, no
It might be argued that because Mrs. Collier made no identification at either of the pre-trial proceedings, she remained unaffected by the suggestiveness therein. Therefore, a later identification could not be tainted by the earlier proceedings. It is clear, however, that it is the suggestive proceeding itself, and not the identification made or lack thereof, which could potentially taint a later identification.
Nevertheless, even if we were to conclude that both evidentiary and constitutional safeguards should be accorded in a case in which no identifications are made at impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification proceedings, but a later in-court identification is made, we are compelled to deny appellant the relief requested in the instant case.
The chief concern with identification evidence is its reliability. In this case, the jury was exposed to the surprise identification testimony by Mrs. Collier. When the court refused a mistrial at that point, defense counsel determined to establish the unreliability of that testimony, and in fact, counsel quizzed Mrs. Collier at length. The jury learned that Mrs. Collier was unable to identify appellant just two days prior to the trial because appellant‘s back had been to her. In addition, the lower court instructed the jury:
Where a witness is not in a position to clearly observe the assailant, or he or she is not positive as to identity, or his positive statements as to identity on one occasion are weakened by qualifications, or a prior failure to identify, the accuracy of the identification may be so doubtful as to be received by the jury with caution. And I will so charge you that you should receive the identification testimony of Loretta Collier with some caution.
The cross-examination and instruction served to alert the jury to the unreliability of Mrs. Collier‘s in-court identification. But the further fact of Mrs. Fox‘s unhesitating identification renders the admission of Mrs. Collier‘s harm-
Under the circumstances of this case and the test enunciated in Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978), we find that the admission of Mrs. Collier‘s in-court identification, accompanied by effective cross-examination and a Kloiber cautionary charge, was harmless error, at most. Finding that [t]he uncontradicted evidence of guilt [is] so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the improperly admitted evidence so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict, Story, 476 Pa. at 417, 383 A.2d at 168, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Appellant‘s second argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to permit testimony regarding the absence of seminal fluid on appellant‘s undershorts. Pursuant to
Appellant‘s final contention is that:
The court erred in interviewing tainted jurors in camera without the presence of the accused or counsel, and in refusing to grant a mistrial after it was established they had heard remarks deprecating appellant‘s defense from a court officer during the jury deliberations.
It is not necessary for us to address this issue at all because defense counsel did not raise the issue in post-trial motions. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). The issue was, however, presented to the court below in accordance with
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
CERCONE, J., concurs in the result.
HOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which SPAETH, J., joins.
The decision in this case was reached before the retirement of HOFFMAN, J.
WATKINS, former President Judge, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
HOFFMAN, Judge, dissenting:
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a witness identified him at trial.1 I should remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all identifications and physical evidence. After conducting a hearing, the suppression court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. It suppressed all identifications made at the line-up, reasoning that the line-up in which appellant appeared with his identical twin codefendant was impermissibly suggestive. The court also suppressed all identifications of appellant and his brother at the preliminary hearing which, the court concluded, was also conducted under suggestive circumstances. The court found that Ms. Fox‘s in-court identifications of appellant and his brother and Ms. Collier‘s in-court identification of appellant‘s brother had an independent origin and, therefore, were purged of the taint of the suppressed identifications. Because Ms. Collier did not identify appellant at the line-up, preliminary hearing, or suppression hearing, the court did not make any further determination.
Ms. Collier corroborated Ms. Fox‘s testimony in all material respects. She identified appellant and his codefendant as the men who robbed her while she was in Ms. Fox‘s employment agency on January 6, 1976. This in-court identification was the first time Ms. Collier unequivocally identified appellant after three pre-trial confrontations.6 When the witness identified appellant, counsel for appellant requested a side-bar conference during which he asked the court to declare a mistrial. After a discussion of the suppression order, the scope of the court‘s findings as to independent basis, and a request by counsel that the court conduct a suppression hearing to determine whether Ms. Collier‘s iden-
On July 13, 1976, the jury found appellant guilty of all crimes charged.8 Following denial of post-verdict motions, the lower court sentenced appellant to consecutive terms of imprisonment of two and a half to ten years on the rape and robbery convictions and suspended sentence on the remaining convictions. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that Ms. Collier‘s in-court identification testimony was constitutionally infirm because it stemmed not from her mental recollection of the crime, but from her observation of appellant at prior suggestive confrontations. Pennsylvania courts have addressed challenges to the admissibility of in-court identifications which follow pre-trial confrontations either as an evidentiary matter of credibility or as an issue of constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court has also noted this dichotomy: The reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the credibility of other parts of the prosecution‘s case is a matter for the jury. But . . . in some cases the procedures leading to an eyewitness identification may be so defective as to make the identification constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-443, fn. 2, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1128, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969).
The second group of cases concerns the scope of constitutional protection against the admission of evidence derived from suggestive identification procedures. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: As a general rule, the identification testimony of one who has actually observed a crime is admissible and it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the testimony is worthy of credence. A different rule applies, however, where improper police suggestions may have influenced the witnesses to identify an innocent suspect. Limits on the admissibility of identification testi-
I must now determine whether we should analyze appellant‘s contention using evidentiary or constitutional principles. At first blush, the instant case resists categorization. On the one hand, to hold that the issue of the witness‘s in-court identification was a matter solely for the evaluation of the trier of fact would ignore the possibility that the unconstitutionally suggestive pre-trial confrontations created or unfairly reinforced the witness‘s perception that appellant was the robber. On the other hand, because the witness did not identify appellant at those prior confrontations, the present case does not seem appropriate for classification in the second category of cases, which deal, typically, with in-court identifications which follow unlawful pre-trial confrontations and identifications. However, upon closer examination, I conclude that the facts and circumstances of the instant case present compelling reasons why appellant‘s contention should be controlled by the constitutional analysis contained in the latter category.
In Foster v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court recognized that an in-court identification may be irreparably tainted by unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial confrontations even though those proceedings did not produce an immediate identification. In Foster, the sole witness to
The significance of Foster resides in the principle that it is the manner in which the pre-trial confrontation or procedure is conducted which is the source of the suggestiveness and constitutional infirmity, regardless of whether that confrontation yields an out-of-court identification. Therefore, although the first two confrontations in Foster produced no positive identification, the Supreme Court held that the procedures were so conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the eventual identification was tainted by the earlier infirmity.
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198, 352 A.2d 17 (1976), also demonstrates that an in-court identification may be
In a pre-trial suppression motion, appellant claimed that the daughter‘s identification was the product of the suggestiveness arising from the pre-line-up photographic displays and the line-up itself. More specifically, he contended that the repeated displays of his photograph to the victim‘s daughter created the risk that her eventual identification stemmed from her memory of the photographic image rather than from her mental image of him at the scene of the crime. Therefore, he asserted that she should not have been permitted to identify him in court. The court denied the suppression motion.
United States v. Coades, 468 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1972), reinforces the reasoning of Foster and Fowler. In Coades, appellant was placed in approximately six line-ups and his picture was placed in three or four photographic displays. The witness identified appellant numerous times. Although there were no constitutional violations in the manner in which each of the photographic displays and line-ups was conducted, appellant argued that the multiplicity of viewings was unduly suggestive and conducive to misidentification. The Court of Appeals, echoing the language of the Supreme Court in Foster, said: We have no doubt that repeated viewings of a defendant can suggest to a witness that ‘this must be the man.’ supra, at 1063. The danger was not only that such repetition could lead to misidentifications prior to trial, but also that it could contribute or even dictate an in-court misidentification. Therefore, even though none of the confrontations occurred under constitutionally infirm circumstances, the Court required a showing
The instant case incorporates the elements of the foregoing cases which utilize a constitutional, rather than an evidentiary analysis. It contains the suggestivity denounced in Fowler and Foster as well as the repetition condemned in Neil, Coades, and Foster. The only variable missing in the present case is a pre-trial identification. This omission, however, does not negate the impact of the suggestivity and repetition which characterized the pre-trial confrontations. In fact, it is all the more reason to be vigilant in scrutinizing the validity of the witness‘s in-court identification. Presumably, the existence of a clear mental image of appellant in the witness‘s mind would have resulted in an in-court identification at all pre-trial confrontations. The failure to make such a pre-trial identification suggests that the in-court identification stemmed from repetitive suggestive confrontations of witness and accused rather than a pre-existing recollection from the scene of the crime. In short, the necessity for dispelling the nexus between a suggestive procedure and an ultimate in-court identification is not dependent solely upon the existence of a pre-trial identification; equally as important is the presence of the witness at a series of suggestive confrontations even though the witness failed to identify appellant at those earlier confrontations. The harm to be prevented, the likelihood of a misidentification, is already complete when a witness attends suggestive and repetitive pre-trial confrontations which stamp a particular person as a prime suspect. It is at this point that the witness is apt to retain the image of the person viewed at the confrontation rather than the memory of the person
Accordingly, I should hold that, in the instant case, before Ms. Collier made an in-court identification, the lower court should have determined that, according to the totality of the circumstances, the in-court identification had a basis independent of the taint of the infirm prior confrontations.13 Therefore, I should vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing in order to afford the Commonwealth the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Collier‘s identification was based upon her observation of appellant at the scene of the crime, rather than upon her recollection of the participants in the suppressed pre-trial confrontations. In making this determination, I should have the lower court weigh the considerations outlined in Wade. If the court were to determine that Ms. Collier‘s identification is admissible under these guidelines, appellant could appeal that determination and raise to us other issues properly preserved for our review. Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 457 Pa. 631, 326 A.2d 379 (1974).
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.