Thе defendant appeals from his conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge abused his discrеtion by admitting in evidence repetitious gruesome photographs of the bodies of the victims. We affirm.
The jury could have found the following facts. During the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1980, the defendant, along with *378 Danny Keene, Paul Bowman, and Frank Cerasi, drove from Salisbury to Hampton, New Hampshire, in order for Keene to look at an automobile that his brother was interested in purchasing. In the presence of the others, the owner of the automobile told Keene that he had been arrested during a drug deal the previous week and that he suspected that Joey Salvatore had set him up. Keene stated that he would “take care of” Salvatore.
Later that morning, the defendant, Keene, and Bowman drove to the motel where Salvatore was staying. Keene was armed with a pistol. After some conversаtion in the motel room, Salvatore and his girl friend, Claire Goossens, left with the others, ostensibly to make a drug deal. The group drove to Rowley and walked to a hilltop in a wooded area. Bowman walked some distance from the others in order to relieve himself. He heard screams and, upon returning to the hilltop, saw Keene holding Salvatore and the defendant stabbing him. Keene then grabbed Goоssens, and the defendant stabbed her. The defendant, Keene, and Bowman then left and took steps to dispose of the defendant’s bloody clothes. After all three were arrested, Bowman agreed to testify against the defendant and became the Commonwealth’s major witness.
The defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failure to seеk inquiry into the effect of pretrial publicity on potential jurors, by his elicitation, during cross-examination of the State police lieutenant in charge of the investigation, of the statement that the defendant had chosen to remain silent after his arrest, and by his statement during closing argument, that the defendant “actually knows what happened. ’ ’ We conclude that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the shortcomings of counsel’s performance, considered individually and cumulatively, do not amount to the' ‘serious incompetency’ ’ which must be shown in order to prevail on a deprivation of effective assistance claim.
Commonwealth
v.
Saferian,
In order to prevail, the defendant must show that his attorney’s conduct fell “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,”
Commonwealth
v.
Saferian, supra,
and thаt “better work might have accomplished something material for the defense,”
Commonwealth
v.
Satterfield,
373
*379
Mass. 109, 115 (1977). Trial tactics which, from the vantage point of hindsight, can be seen to have failed do not amount to ineffectivе assistance unless “manifestly unreasonable” when undertaken.
Commonwealth
v.
Levia,
The defendant argues that defense counsel’s failure to seek inquiry into the effect of pretrial publicity on potential jurors was a dеnial of effective assistance of counsel. We note first that the defendant has not established that newspaper accounts of his crime were read and remembered by any juror. See
Commonwealth
v.
Paszko, ante
164,194 (1984);
Commonwealth
v.
Nolin,
Pretrial publicity is not per se prejudicial.
Delle Chiaie
v.
Commonwealth, supra.
Jurors need not be totally ignorant of the case they are to decide.
Commonwealth
v.
Jackson,
' The possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material was not such as to present a substantial risk that the case would be decided on extraneous grounds; even if pressed by counsel, the judge would not have been required to make inquiry under G. L. c. 234, § 28, second par.
Commonwealth
v.
Campbell,
The defendant next argues that defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State police lieutenant in charge of the investigation, by which it was revealed that the defendant chose to remain silent after his arrest, was manifestly unreasonable. In making this argument, appellate counsel asks us to engage in speculation as to whether trial cоunsel reasonably should have known what the police lieutenant’s response would be. This we decline to do. The form of the question posed by trial counsel strongly suggests that he anticipated the оpposite response.
1
The defendant may have told trial counsel that he had denied his guilt. Appellate counsel argues that, because trial counsel was entitled under a discovery agrеement to written or recorded statements of the defendant and any facts of an exculpatory nature known to the prosecutor, he could not have been unaware that the defendant had declined to make a statement. But a denial of guilt would not necessarily fall within either of these categories. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that trial counsel had reason to know that the defendant had made no statement. Thus, we do not reach the question whether counsel’s conduct amounted to ineffective assistance if he knew or should have known. Nor dо we determine whether, if counsel’s conduct was error, it was, on the strength of the evidence against the defendant, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare
Commonwealth
v.
Cobb,
*382
The defendant’s final claim аs to denial of effective assistance of counsel is based on trial counsel’s statement, in closing argument, that' ‘the defendant. . . actually knows what happened. ’ ’
2
Counsel’s remark was indisputably ineрt, but, considered in context, it does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. The defense was not predicated upon mistaken identity or alibi; there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant was at the scene. Rather, the defense effort was directed at creating a reasonable doubt as to the veracity of Bowman’s testimony by probing for inconsistencies and by suggesting thаt Bowman had reason to dislike Salvatore and to want to protect Keene. Counsel’s statement had no tendency to undermine this defense. The defendant was not left “denuded of a defense.”
Commonwealth
v.
Street,
The defendant’s final argument is that the admission in evidence of multiple preautopsy photographs of the bodies of the victims was an abuse of discretion. The judge conducted a voir dire and excluded certain photographs as cumulative and possibly prejudicial. He found the admitted photographs relevant to extreme atrocity or cruelty and to premeditation, both of which were in issue. We have examined the photographs and we agree that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect. There wаs no abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth
v.
Westmore-land,
*383 We have reviewed the whole case on the law and the evidence and find no occasion to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a nеw trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
The relevant portion of the colloquy between trial counsel and the police lieutenant was as follows:
Defense counsel: ‘ 1 Did you inquire of the defendant as to what happened? ’ ’
The witness: “Yes, sir.”
Defense counsel: “And the defendant tоld you he didn’t do it, didn’t he?”
The witness: “He chose to remain silent.”
Defense counsel: “Is that all he said — ‘I choose to remain silent?’ ”
The witness: “No. He just said he didn’t want to talk to us.”
Defense counsel: “Didn’t want to talk to you?”
The witness: “Yes.”
Counsel’s statement was made in the context of the following paragraph: “Now, at the outset, on Monday night, [the prosecutor] was there and interviewed the people that were present. And at some time [he] chose to believe what Mr. Bowman said. And so Mr. Bowman was here as a witness, not sitting right over here today, will not be present today; and is the only one, outside of Mr. Keene, who is not sitting here today, and the defendant who actually knows what happened. And at this point I would like to talk about Mr. Bowman’s testimony; and, at the same time, the things that he told to Mr. Cerasi, what he told the police, and what he told others. ’ ’ (Emphasis supplied.)