83 Mass. 575 | Mass. | 1861
1. Evidence of another act of embezzlement by the defendant, during the same week in which that charged in the second count of the indictment was alleged to have been committed, was competent only for the single purpose of proving a guilty intent in the mind of the defendant in the commission of the principal act. It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another. For this reason, it is essential to the rights of the accused that, when such evidence is admitted, it should be carefully limited and guarded by instructions to the jury, so that its operation and effect may be
2. The more important question presented by the report is, whether the evidence was sufficient in law to support a conviction of the defendant upon the second count in the indictment. The manner in which the case is reported for our consideration is not favorable to a clear and correct apprehension of the facts to which it is our duty to apply the legal principles on which the decision of this part of the case must turn. A full and careful statement of the evidence, in its bearing on the points in issue, would have presented the question in a much more intelligible form; but a loose and disconnected detail of the facts proved, which cannot be understood without reference to long schedules of figures and an inspection of numerous and complicated accounts, affords a very inadequate and imperfect view of the case, and renders it difficult to determine with accuracy the question of law which it is the object of the report to present for our adjudication. Perhaps this difficulty is attributable to the nature of the evidence adduced at the trial. We have referred to
The defendant was convicted only on the second count in the indictment. By it he was charged, under St. 1846, c. 171, § 1, with the offence of fraudulently taking and secreting, with ntent to convert to his own use, certain bank-bills of the amount of one hundred dollars, and certain gold coins of the same amount, a description of which was unknown to the grand jury. It is obvious that this was intended as a charge of fraudulently taking and secreting certain specific bills and coins, being a particular, designated amount or sum of money belonging to and in the possession of the bank ; and was not meant to be a general allegation of taking money of the bank with a fraudulent intent, authorized by the second section of the act above cited, under which any taking with such intent, committed within six months after the time alleged in the indictment, might be proved. It was treated at the trial as a charge of taking and secreting a specific sum. The proof offered by the government tended to show that the sum of $200 was deposited in the bank by one John Woods, on the 9th day of April 1857; $100 of it being in bank-bills, and $100 in gold coin. It was this sum which the government sought to prove was fraudulently taken and secreted by the defendant.
It is unnecessary, in the present case, to define with accuracy the precise distinction between a fraudulent conversion of money and a fraudulent taking and secretion with intent to convert it, which are the two offences against which the penalties of St. 1846, c. 171, are aimed. The second count in the indictment, on which the defendant was convicted, sets out the latter offence. It was therefore necessary to prove a fraudulent taking of the specific money, as well as a secretion by the defendant with intent to convert it to his own use. The main evidence connected with the principal transaction, on which the government relied to obtain a conviction, was an alteration in the entries made in the books of the bank in relation to this deposit of money by Woods. Upon this point it was proved that the
Verdict set aside.