In this аppeal, we are called upon to determine whether a defendant is denied due proсess of law where the trial judge failed to disclose that he had previously accepted bribes from other defendants. We find no due process violation instantly, and affirm.
The facts and procedural histоry may be set forth as follows. On January 8, 1986, appellant was arrested and charged with robbery, theft and assault following an altercation in a bar. Appellant was tried and convicted of these charges аfter a bench trial. Appellant thereafter was sentenced but no subsequent review of the judgment of sentence was sought.
Subsequently, appellant filed the instant petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Nеw counsel was appointed to represent him, and he filed an amended petition which was deniеd. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal appellant raises the following issues: 1) whether appellant was denied due process of law, where, in a non-jury trial in which he was found guilty, the trial judge failеd to disclose that he demanded and/or accepted bribes from other defendants in 1986, at or neаr the time of appellant’s trial, in order to render results favorable to bribe-paying defendants, and whether the appearance of impropriety requires a new trial, and 2) whether trial defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel where in a highly contested case he failed to call all of the witnesses to testify, where one available witness would be an employеe of the bar where the incident occurred.
Initially, appellant contends that he was denied due process by the trial judge’s failure to reveal that he had *343 been taking bribes in other cases, 1 thus preventing appellant from obtaining knowledge of grounds for a recusal. We cannot agree.
In
Commonwealth v. Hewett,
[I]n order for appellant to prevail, he must establish there was a nexus between the activities being investigated by the JIRB and the trial judge’s conduct аt trial. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson,424 P.2d 414 (Okl.1967) (the petitioner had the burden of convincing a constitutional majority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the judgment under review clearly was entered under circumstances of judicial wrongdoing, i.e. the former justice accepted a bribe in return for his vote). Moreover, even where appellant dеmonstrates the above requirement, he must still allege and establish that bias, prejudice or partiality infеcted the [fact finder] or otherwise deprived him of a fair trial.
Applying this standard instantly, we find no merit in appellant’s claim. Appellant’s claim of bias,
i.e.
that bеcause the trial judge “solicited and received bribes” in some cases, he had to convict without regard to guilt or innocence in other cases to “show [ ] that there is a real need for the bribe to оbtain a favorable result,”
see
Appellant’s Brief at 9, is wholly unsubstantiated in the record before this Court on aрpeal. Appellant’s mere speculation is not sufficient.
See Commonwealth v. Hewett, supra,
Appellant’s second contention is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and produce certаin witnesses at trial. Appellant’s claim is entirely without merit.
The standard for ineffectiveness of counsel claims is well settled. In order to establish a claim of ineffectiveness, appellant must establish that:
“... by aсt or omission, counsel was arguably ineffective; counsel’s act or omission could not have had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interest, and appellant was prejudiced by the act or omission in that but for the arguably ineffective act or omission there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Petras,368 Pa.Super. 372 , 374,534 A.2d 483 , 485 (1987); Commonwealth v. Pierce,515 Pa. 153 , 155-156,527 A.2d 973 , 975-76 (1987).
Commonwealth v. Thomas,
Instantly, the witnesses appellant claims counsel should have called would have offered no more than cumulative *345 testimony to thе testimony offered by the witnesses counsel did produce. (N.T. 12/15/88, at 10). Therefore, appellant has not еstablished how counsel’s failure to call these witnesses prejudiced him in any way. Appellant cannot show how this testimony may have altered the verdict or aided in his defense. Thus, appellant’s second claim must fail.
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying appellant relief under the Post Conviction Hеaring Act is affirmed.
Order Affirmed.
Notes
. In May, 1988, the presiding judge was convicted of extortion for accepting money from thе Roofer’s Union and an attorney.
See United States v. Shiomos,
. We note that appellant’s reliance on
In the Interest of McFall,