30 Pa. Super. 1 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1905
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The defendant was indicted and convicted for having engaged in the occupation of a miner in an anthracite coal mine in the county of Lackawanna without having previously obtained a certificate of competency from the miners’ examining board of the district and without having been duly registered as provided by the act of July 15, 1897. The validity of the statute under which the defendant was convicted is challenged upon the ground:
1. That it is in contravention of the first clause of section 2, article IV, of the constitution of the United States ;
2. That it is in contravention of the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States ;
3. That it is an unreasonable and unequal exercise of the police power of the state.
The portion of the act alleged to be invalid is that part of the 5th section which provides that “ all persons applying for a certificate of competency or to entitle them to be employed as miners must produce satisfactory evidence of having had not less than two years’ practical experience as a miner or as a mine laborer in the mines of this commonwealth, and in no case shall an applicant be deemed competent unless he appear in person before the said board and answer intelligently and correctly at least twelve questions in the English language pertaining to the requirements of a practical miner and be properly identified under oath as a mine laborer by at least one practical miner holding miners’ certificates.” It is necessary at the threshold to determine the meaning of the phrase “ in the mines of this commonwealth ” in the clause of the statute above quoted. It appears from the verdict that at the time of the commission of the acts charged in the indictment, the defendant was a citizen of the state of Illinois; that he had had more than two years’ practical experience as a miner and iqine laborer in the bituminous coal mines of that state ; that there is no substantial
The language of the court in Pittsburg v. Kalchthaler, 114 Pa. 547, expressed in forcible terms the doctrine applicable here: “We think it is always unsafe to depart from the plain and literal meaning of the words contained in legislative enactments out of deference to some supposed intent or absence .of intent which would prevent the application of the words actually used to a given subject. Such a practice is really substituting the theories of a court which may, and often do, vary with the personality of the individuals who compose it, in place of the express words of the law as enacted by the law-making
“ The intention of a penal statute must be found in the language actually used, interpreted according to its fair and obvious meaning. It is not permitted to courts in this class of cases to attribute inadvertence or oversight to the legislature when enumerating classes or persons who are subject to the penal enactment, nor to depart from the settled meaning of the words or phrases in order to bring persons not named or distinctly described within the supposed purpose of the statute:” U. S. v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305 (20 Sup. Ct. Repr. 609); U. S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. 76.
Although no good reason may appear to the court why a ■limitation of the term used in the statute should have been omitted, and although it may seem highly improbable that an omission was intended, the court is not at liberty to enlarge the enactment to cover cases not within the clear and obvious meaning of the language. We are not warranted in assuming that the legislature did not attach value to experience in mines outside of the anthracite region, nor- is there any presumption to that effect. We feel constrained to hold, therefore, that the required two years’ practical experience as a miner or'mine laborer in the mines of this commonwealth, prescribed in the section under consideration, is not limited to experience in the anthracite mines of the commonwealth. It appears from the special verdict of the jury, as we have s,een, that the methods of mining coal in the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania are substantially the same as in the bituminous mines of Ohio, West Virginia and other states, and that experience as a miner in those states would as fully qualify a person to exercise the duties of a miner in the anthracite mines as would similar experience in the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania. The effect of the legislation is to discriminate against miners having experience in the bituminous mines of other states in favor of those engaged in the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania, and to make the latter eligible for examina
Among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States the right to labor and engage in lawful trade or business is one of the most fundamental. The object of the federal constitution was in the respect referred to, as held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168: “To place the citizens of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other states so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those states are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alien-age in other states; it inhibits discriminating legislation by other states ; .... it insures to them in other states the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those states in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness, and it secures to them in other states the equal protection of their laws.” Though the law be fair on its face, if it be so applied as to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is within the prohibition of the constitution: Williams v. Miss., 170 U. S. 213 (18 Sup. Ct. Pepr. 583).
When the effect of a statute is to grant privileges to citizens of the state in which the law is enacted and to deny these privileges to citizens of other states who are similarly situated, the statute cannot be supported under the constitution of the United States.
While the enactment under consideration is not in favor of citizens of this commonwealth, its effect is substantially the same as if the discrimination had been specifically in their favor. The direct and necessary result of a statute must be taken into consideration when deciding as to its validity, even
Our conclusion is that so much of the 5th section of the act under consideration as limits the eligibility of miners to an examination to those who have not had less than two years’ practical experience as miners or mine laborers in the mines of this commonwealth is repugnant to the constitution of the United States. It follows as a corollary that another portion of the same section, which directs that the applicant for examination be properly identified under oath as a mine laborer by at least one practical miner holding mine certificates, must also be considered invalid, for this latter requirement has manifest reference to mine laborers who have had at-least two years’ experience in mines of this commonwealth. The idenification required could only be given as to Pennsylvania mine laborers, and this provision necessarily falls with the other with which it is connected.
We are not willing to decide, however, that the whole statute must be rejected because a portion of it is found to be unconstitutional. It is in effect an amendment of the Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 142, and relates to a subject which has been recognized by numerous adjudications as a proper one for police regulation. The power of the legislature to classify coal mines and to legislate for each class separately is clearly established in Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, and in Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa Superior Ct. 362. The full consideration of the subject in the latter case renders unnecessary an extended discussion at this time. The doctrine there set forth is sustained in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (18
The defendant was charged in the first and fifth counts of the indictment with having engaged in the occupation of a miner in an anthracite coal mine without having previously obtained a certificate of competency and qualification provided for in the act of 1897; and in the third and fourth counts
It was the duty of the appellant by appropriate proceedings, to obtain judicial declaration that the law is void, so far as it excludes him from the privilege of showing that he is competent to work as a miner in anthracite mines, and not to nullify the statute by disregarding all its constitutional requirements. It may be that this would have involved expense and delay, but he assumed the risk that the statute would be held valid, and that the penalty would be imposed as required thereby. In so far as the act prevented him from appearing before the board for examination to establish his competency and qualification, and required him to identify himself as a mine laborer in the mines of Pennsylvania, it is void, and the courts were open to him to obtain protection against such void provisions, but having failed to avail himself of this redress, 'he has rendered himself liable to the penalty provided by the sixth section of the statute.
The judgment on the first and fifth counts is, therefore, affirmed and the record remitted to the court below to the end that the sentence may be carried out.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
While concurring in the clear opinion of Judge Henderson, I would go a step further and sustain the act of assembly in toto, as aü exercise of the power of police. The paramount purpose of the statute is the protection of miners of anthracite coal, and is well expressed in the title : “ To protect the lives
This statute does not prohibit, but designates the qualifications necessary for miners, and in stating these the main purpose of the statute is not to be ignored or infringed by construction of its details, which serve to give its purpose effect. “ When the calling, profession or business of parties is unattended with danger to others, little legislation will be necessary respecting it, ... . but when the calling or profession or business is attended with danger or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon its exercise: ” Justice Field, in Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (9 Sup. Ct. Repr. 207). The appellee cites from many United States Supreme Court cases to the same effect. Anthracite coal mining is especially hazardous, calling for experience in the business. It has outgrown primitive methods, and demands education of a high order, and can best be obtained by actual experience, which is akin to apprenticeship. This experience must be adequate to meet the demands, which cannot be supplied by scientists alone. It is folly to intrust the making of a watch to the unskilled laborer, and would be criminal to intrust the admixing of dynamite to strangers, unacquainted with that compound. These comparisons may be viewed as extreme illustrations, but they serve the purpose. The innu