¶ 1 This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed after Appellant was convicted at a jury trial of aggravated assault, attempted murder, and possessing instruments of crime. Following sentencing, Appellant failed to file a direct appeal. Appellant later filed a PCRA petition seeking to reinstate his right to appeal nunc pro tunc, which was granted, and this appeal followed.
¶ 2 Appellant raises four issues in this appeal. The first is whether the Commonwealth acted improperly by engaging in ex parte communications with Appellant and whether this information was improperly considered by the sentencing court, thus warranting a new trial or, alternatively, resentencing.
¶ 3 The events giving rise to this issue occurred when an Assistant District Attorney for the Commonwealth, approached Appellant after Appellant’s conviction but before his sentencing hearing, seeking Appellant’s testimony as a witness in a separate matter. Appellant claims neither his counsel nor the court were notified of the Commonwealth’s contact with Appellant. The ADA testified at Appellant’s sentencing hearing regarding his lack of cooperation. Appellant claims that this testimony was improperly considered at sentencing. We note that Appellant’s trial counsel timely objected to this testimony given at sentencing.
¶ 4 “In deciding whether a trial judge considered only permissible factors in sentencing a defendant, an appellate court must, of necessity, review all of the judge’s comments. Moreover, in making this determination it is not necessary that an appellate court be convinced that the trial judge in fact relied upon an erroneous consideration; it is sufficient to render a sentence invalid if it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon such a factor.” Commonwealth v. Schwartz,
¶ 5 After careful review of the record in the instant case, it is apparent that the sentencing judge considered the information presented in the ADA’s testimony. The judge indicated her recognition of the questionable nature of the communication between the ADA and Appellant when she stated that she was declining to levy sanctions at that time. N.T., 11/09/00, at 23. Her ultimate consideration of the informa
¶ 6 Generally, the factors to be considered by the trial court when determining a defendant’s sentence include the character of the defendant and the particular circumstances of the offense in light of the legislative guidelines for sentencing. The sentence imposed must be consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Guth,
¶ 7 Appellant’s remaining claims each concern allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically he alleges that counsel faded to file post-trial motions, that counsel failed to call a witness to testify in support of Appellant’s self defense claim, and that counsel excessively urged Appellant to take a jury trial despite Appellant’s wishes not to be tried by a jury.
¶ 8 Because this is a direct appeal, this Court must forgo review of these issues of ineffective assistance of counsel at this time. “[A]s a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.” Commonwealth v. Grant,
¶ 9 Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Although this final claim is framed by Appellant as a deprivation of his constitutional right to a jury trial, it really challenges counsel’s actions in urging Appellant to seek a bench trial, and thus seeks a review of counsel's stewardship.