Commonwealth v. Samuels

778 A.2d 638 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH SAMUELS, Appellant. Matthew Supreme Pennsylvania. Court Jan. 2001.

Submitted Aug. Decided Leach, Hill, Steven appellant. C. Drexel Stesis, Media, Louis Gary for appellee. FLAHERTY, C.J., ZAPPALA, CAPPY,

Before and CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, NEWMAN and JJ. OF THE

OPINION COURT FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.

This appeal from a conviction by for homicide vehicle while driving under the influence alcohol raises the issue of the state of necessary support mind a conviction of that offense. Appellant maintains that criminal negligence as defined crimes code is required and that trial failing court erred in to give jury effect, a instruction to that requested. he

The record contains following February evidence. On 26, 1997, appellant drinking was copiously1 in a bar with friends when James DiAmicis and friends Mr. entered. greeted date, DiAmicis appellant’s knew, whom he angering appellant and leading to a minor appel- confrontation. When bar, lant left couple he and a of his friends waited outside until Mr. DiAmicis left later one of his Appel- friends. lant pickup drove his truck parking across the lot into the car friend, of DiAmicis’s then reversed his vehicle headed for out, the exit. As he changed drove he direction to run over DiAmicis, him, Mr. killing then washed his truck at a car work, wash. morning The next appellant borrowed a testimony appellant There was drank at least ten or twelve vodka mixed drinks as well tequila evening as about half of a fifth of on the question. appre- car and fled to Colorado where he was coworker’s fugitive two months later on a warrant returned hended Pennsylvania. May, 1998, jury appellant involuntary convicted (DUI), manslaughter, driving under influence homicide DUI, involving bodily while accident death vehicle injury.2 aggregate He received an sentence five to eleven Superior appeal allowed the years. Court affirmed. We denying to consider whether the trial court erred in order appellant’s charge negligence on criminal as it requested pertains offense vehicle while DUI. position To his support the offense of homicide while DUI is not a strict liability offense but rather proof is, requires ignoring —that unjustifiable substantial and and involving gross risk devia tion from of person the standard care that a would reasonable appellant observe on relies Common circumstances — Heck, (1987). wealth v. 517 Pa. 535 A.2d 575 The Commonwealth, hand, on the other on relies Commonwealth v. (1999), 558 Pa. McCurdy, A.2d 681 this court wherein stated that of offense vehicle while DUI (1) requires § a conviction of pursuant DUI to 75 Pa.C.S. (2) proof death, that the violation caused the of neither requires showing which negligence. of The Commonwealth therefore concludes that appellant jury was not entitled to a error, negligence, instruction on criminal no there was trial judgment and the Contrary sentence should be affirmed. contentions, however, to the Commonwealth’s McCurdy does not mandate a different conclusion as the issue that did case for applicable requirement involve mens rea vehicular homicide offenses.3 3731, 3735, § §§ respective-

2. 18 Pa.C.S. 2504 and 75 Pa.C.S. and 3742 ly- McCurdy infirmity 3. The issue in was whether the constitutional of 75 3731(a)(5) § Pa.C.S. undermined the driver’s conviction under 3731(a)(1), implicate § specific presented and did not issue in this case, culpability § the minimum level of under Heck, posi- his by analogy, supports Appellant argues that Heck, where the a related issue tion. In this court addressed (not related), 75 Pa.C.S. by vehicle DUI offense was homicide here, statute, at issue that like the one Explicitly, § 3732. unintentionally. We that death be caused requires only is criminal held, however, culpability minimum level of that the Field, stating that Commonwealth negligence, (1980), already that 75 Pa.C.S. had established liability offense and 18 Pa.C.S. § was not a strict minimum level negligence criminal as the § 302 establishes culpability.4 motor is sound. The logic appellant’s argument

The homicide, code, defines vehicular vehicle Heck, who “Any person as follows: at issue in the offense while en- person death of another unintentionally causes the is except DUI] law any in the violation of gaged [motor vehicle, first a misdemeanor of homicide guilty of death.” The basis the violation is the cause degree, when 3735(a), conviction, DUI-related ve- appellant’s Pa.C.S. unintentionally homicide, who “Any person hicular states: of a violation person as the result causes the death of another felony of the second guilty 3731[DUI] of section ” material the cause of death.... the violation is when Heck, it If to the rationale language is identical. we adhere of criminal requires proof § 3735 would follow that 75 Pa.C.S. negligence. by refusing to trial court have erred

Although the is the charge jury vehicular homi of DUI-related the offense and a cide, is in this case any regard error in this harmless trial is not warranted. new doctrine, affirm error we will the harmless

Under if we spite the trial court judgment of sentence error challenge analyzed pursuant process based on 4. to a due Field I, of Article section 9 of the Constitution the law of the land clause Koczwara, 397 Pa. 155 A.2d Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. J., Field, (1959); (Flaherty, at 164 v. Commonwealth concurring). did not doubt the error beyond a reasonable conclude Wright, Commonwealth jury’s to the verdict. contribute (1999). to The trial court’s refusal 34, 742 A.2d 661 of homicide negligence criminal as an element charge on jury’s to contributed could have vehicle —DUI-related negligence jury on charged as the court verdict manslaughter charge5 and the involuntary pertained it jury’s finding of appellant of that offense. The jury convicted a involuntary manslaughter necessarily included guilt as trial any Thus error finding negligence. of criminal charge jury that criminal was failing court charge clearly is required also for the vehicular harmless.6 judgment Superior affirm Court.

Therefore we will Judgment affirmed. concurring opinion. a

Justice SAYLOR files concurring dissenting opinion Justice NEWMAN files joins. in which Mr. Justice Castille SAYLOR, Justice, concurring. provides opportunity for the Court appeal

This rea, of mens concept its a core reexamine decisions the area defining involuntary manslaughter, the offense of trial court 5. explained gross negligence as follows: grossly negligent when he should be aware A Defendant’s conduct unjustifiable will risk that death result from his substantial being grossly risk that it is unreasonable for him conduct. The is, perceive , recognize risk.... The to fail to Defendant — though be aware of the risk—of such a risk even he does not should actually perceive be of such a nature it. The risk of death must perceive disregard of the risk or failure to that the Defendant’s it, considering and the the nature and extent of his conduct circum- him, gross known involves deviation from the stances standard person conduct or care that a reasonable would observe in the Defendant’s situation. N.T., 5/22/98, at 73-74. Moreover, Heck, present unlike where the Commonwealth failed to culpability, of even the minimal level of in this case the evidence changed presented appellant the di- Commonwealth evidence that victim, him, killing rection of his vehicle order to run over wash, jurisdiction. washed his truck at a car then fled the 114 Newman, I

of the criminal law. Like Madame Justice do not Assembly a require believe that the General intended to finding negligence by of criminal a trier of fact to specific support a conviction for the offense of homicide driving persuades the influence. Careful review while under decisions, upon by majority reaching me relied own accord contrary supportable conclusion are not on their which follow. for the reasons Background Liability

I. Rea and Strict —Mens determining problem culpability re quired to establish elements of criminal offenses the ab express legislative prescription proved has to be a sence difficult for courts.1 The offense of homicide one 3735, vehicle/DUI, presents particular chal as, this lenge, example, past expressions for Court’s are whether, basis, concerning divided on what and to what extent liability imposed criminal is intended to and without regard predicate to fault in the context of the offense of influence, (“DUI”), 75 includ driving under the Pa.C.S. 3731 imposition to which such constitu ing the extent would meet Mikulan, requirements. tional Commonwealth v. See 244, 1339, 1347 260, (1983)(plurality). 470 A.2d

Many driving hold that jurisdictions the offense of while intoxicated, providing well as related offenses more DUI, grading harm from a severe where actual results are impose liability requiring finding a specific intended without possessed culpable that the defendant state of mind.2 Crim intention, belief, recklessness, inal the absence or generally Dannye Holley, Culpability 1. See Evaluations in the State Assessment, Supreme Courts 1977 to 1999: A ‘‘Model” 34 Akron (2001)(reviewing many expressions among L.Rev. 401 state courts question specifically where not delineated on legislature). See, Johnson, 6, 1233, (2000)(stat- e.g., State v. 130 N.M. 15 P.3d 1239 ing public potential posed by that "the interest and harm intoxicated compelling drivers is so that the offense of DWI is a strict [New Mexico] crime”); Glass, 146, (N.D.2000)(North State v. N.W.2d 1376, DUI); 136, Ellenburg, Dakota State v. 283 Mont. 938 P.2d State, (Ind. (1997) (Montana DUI); Albaugh v. 721 N.E.2d 1999)(Indiana DWI); Fogarty, State v. 128 N.J. liability. absolute generally termed Lia is Strict Criminal Simons, When generally Kenneth W. Criminology Just?, bility 87 J.Crim. L. & law, in (Summ.1997).3 unique in liability is Strict crime, an of a this wrongful ordinarily intent is element that concept of mens in the fundamental principle being embodied Cordoba-Hincapie, v. F.Supp. 825 rea. See United States (E.D.N.Y.1993)(Weinstein, that 485, J.)(explaining “[t]he 489 rea,’ mind; wrongful ‘mens ‘a term, guilty or meaning guilty intent,’ shorthand for a broad network a criminal is a purpose; relationship between encompassing much of the concepts law”).4 of this intrin criminal Because the individual and the condemnation, and statutes culpability between sic connection Olmstead, 455, 277, DWI); (1992)(New Jersey 310 Or. 800 P.2d State v. 87, Garner, DUII); (1990)(Oregon People 781 P.2d 89 v. 281 Freeman, homicide); (Colo.1989)(Colorado 31 State v. vehicular Creamer, 93, 516, (1976); 26 Kan. N.C.App. 519 State v. 228 S.E.2d 339, 914, (2000)(Kansas involuntary manslaugh App.2d ter/DUI); 996 P.2d 343 399, State, (Tex.App.l998)(Texas Reidweg 981 S.W.2d 407 v. Annotation, Validity, manslaughter). generally Con See intoxication struction, Directly Driving Application Proscribing With Statutes Percentage, 54 A.L.R.4th Blood-Alcohol Level in Excess Established Annotation, 3(d) (2000); Alcohol-Related Vehicular Homicide: 149 166, (2000) Offense, §§ 64 A.L.R.4th 44-54 Nature and Elements of Hubbard, (Fla.1999)(indi cases); (collecting 563 State v. 751 So.2d cating prove the addition "the notion that the State would have to concept negligence appears species an alien in this al element of to be crime”); Driving 7 of unintended (1991)("[i]ntent Taylor, Defense Lawrence Drunk driving aspect of drunk that should be is another clearly required”); H. understood: None is Nichold, Drink Donald (Clark 1996)(stating Litigation Callaghan § 2.12 Boardman ing/Driving drinking/driving rea "is not an element of the mens criminal offenses]];] [o]ther criminal ... related offense as it is in most other crimes, which as vehicular homicide or traffic violations occur intoxicants, have been o[f] when the driver is under the influence crimes”). liability general referred strict or intent to as definition, law, subject qualification many in the is 3. This like others example, pure For a distinction is drawn between and elaboration. offenses, culpability required any liability to which no is as to strict as offense, impure liability, strict as to of the material elements of the required respect material which to at least one Simons, generally required as to others. See When is element but is not Just?, Criminology Liability L. & at 1081-82. Strict Criminal 87 J.Crim. 246, 250, States, generally 342 U.S. S.Ct. 4. See Morissette v. United 240, 243, (1952)(describing the of mens rea 96 L.Ed. 288 notion];] persistent provincial “no transient is as universal and [i]t generally Staples favored. See liability imposing strict are States, v. 600, 605-06, 1793, 1797, United U.S. S.Ct. Barone, (1994); Commonwealth 128 L.Ed.2d 608 Pa.Su (1980)(plurality)(describing per. “strong against penal responsibili common law tradition Indeed, strongly suggested, have and in ty”). commentators held, some instances courts have that there are constitutional ability legislative impose limitations branch to without fault. Cordoba-Hincapie, (reviewing on F.Supp. jurisprudence 515-16 federal subject characterizing such as and “une “uncertain” ven”).5 imposition

While the of strict is disfavored and of contexts, questionable validity recognized in some there are exceptions. example, widely accepted legis- For it is that the systems of law mature as belief freedom of the human will and a duty consequent ability and of the normal individual to choose between evil”); good Cordoba-Hincapie, F.Supp. (characterizing and at 488 Anglo-American as a "fundamental tradition that blameworthiness mind”);

hinges upon culpable (stating state of id. at 505 that "mens deep rea remains a reflection of the commitment within culture our regarding autonomy individual freedom and and the individual’s rela- tionship community”). to the Cordoba-Hincapie, setting history In after forth a of metis in the rea law, origins through from its the modern view with extensive works, scholarly Cordoba-Hincapie, references to influential see (now F.Supp. Judge Judge) at Senior Jack B. ex- Weinstein plained: illustrates, leading work of As the these authorities the mens rea remains, law, principle in the modern criminal a fundamental re- quirement. application history, Whatever the current of the mens rea recapitulation this brief establishes a critical baseline. constitutional By right jury process the time the to a trial and due was embedded Constitution, the first amendment mens rea constituted a protection against by fundamental of criminal abuse sanctions general guards deeply state. It is a rule of law that beliefs held freedom, responsibility duty. within our traditions of individual doctrines, however, grown sophisti- Like most ancient it has far more longer simply cated and nuanced than it once was. It can no application carefully explained many invoked. Its must be and its only developed distinctions must be considered. Not has the law an states, appreciation gradations openly in mental but it now also recognizes exceptions limited to a rule once characterized as admit- ting compromise. no Id. at 495-96. “public welfare liability for may impose absolute branch lative enforcing compli public welfare promote offenses” Morissette, at 342 U.S. See schemes. regulatory with ance Koczwara, Pa. 246; Commonwealth 72 S.Ct. statutory (1959)(“[s]uch so-called 825, 827-28 580, 155 A.2d machinery of attempt an to utilize reality are crimes regula for social enforcing as an arm criminal administration totally nature, punishment civil purely of a tion wrongdoing guilt”). of moral questions unrelated liability in this context strict application of for the justification offenses, regulatory penalties the observation includes minimal. See generally are upon reputation, impact as as well offenses, statutory as number of serious id.6 A limited treated, murder, in various felony have also been rape gener liability entailing strict elements. jurisdictions, as many juris F.Supp. at 497.7 Cordoba-Hincapie, ally analogous noted, recognized that offenses dictions, it is also 3732, DUI, vehicle, § 75 Pa.C.S. Pennsylvania’s vehicle/DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. and homicide 2, which, elements, note supra see entail below, easily with the square does not discussed as further of absolute imposition for the justifications traditional dimension. implicates concerns constitutional (then public welfare Judge) Blackmun summarized 6. Mr. Justice as follows: offenses doctrine federal crimi- emerges proposition that where a From cases [the] it to involve of intent and where seems nal statute omits mention is, imposed basically policy, where the standard what is a matter of circumstances, properly adherence thereto reasonable and under small, relatively penalty where expected person, where the besmirch, statutory crime is gravely where the does not conviction law, congressional and where taken over from the common not one as one not supporting, the statute can be construed purpose is element is then not The elimination of this requiring criminal intent. process due clause. violative of the States, 302, Cir.1960)(Blackmun, (8th Holdridge v. 282 F.2d United J.). perhaps liability offenses is of courts with strict 7. The uneasiness applica- in various statutory rape paradigm, where in the illustrated tions, permitted reasonable mistake many have a defense of courts fact, statutory by pertinent scheme. although not otherwise afforded Cordoba-Hincapie, F.Supp. at 497-98. Interpretation II. The Present of Sections 3732 and 3735 Embodying Requirement of the as Vehicle Code Negligence Criminal (homicide vehicle) (homi- by

Neither Section 3732 nor 3735 vehicle/DUI) by express element;8 cide contains an therefore, both for are candidates further examination to intended, was many juris- determine whether as majority review, dictions hold. however, by The avoids divining an requirement from the statutes intent in the form of criminal negligence. authority Two sources of are offered 1) 302(a) in support requirement: of such of the Code, Pennsylvania Crimes derived from the Model Penal 2) Code; and the decisions of this concluding Court that a negligence applies of criminal to the offense vehicle, by § homicide 75 Pa.C.S. 3732. See Commonwealth Field, (1980); 490 Pa. 417 A.2d 160 Commonwealth v. Heck, (1987). Although 535 A.2d 575 majori- ty’s holding avoiding has the effect difficult issues of and, statutory construction to a degree, preempt- substantial ing questions of compliance constitutional im- associated with posing offenses, absolute such serious its inherent weakness is that neither nor Crimes Code the cited which, prior 8. This was true to a recent amendment to Section 3732 Newman, noted express culpability requirement. Justice added an 20, 2000, time, § See Act of Dec. P.L. No. 108 1. Prior to such provided: Section 3732 Any person unintentionally person who causes the death of another engaged any while in the violation of law of this Commonwealth or municipal applying operation ordinance to the use a vehicle or regulation except (relating driving of traffic section 3731 substance) under the guilty influence of alcohol or controlled vehicle, degree, of the misdemeanor first when the violation is the cause of death. (superseded). phrase “except The section 3731 (relating driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled sub- stance)” was added in 1982 to accommodate the new homicide See 75 Statutory statute. Pa.C.S. vehicle/DUI Notes. Historical culpability requirement, addition to the insertion of a amendatory provisions gradation also result in an enhanced felony degree. analysis offense as a of the primarily third herein is statute, prior directed to the form of the since the earlier version is the subject pertinent cases. provides persuasive support requirement decisions for the imposed. negligence criminal 302(a) of

A. Section the Crimes Code Associated Culpability Provisions notes, 302(a) majority

As the Section of the Code Crimes does, fact, elemental, in culpability establish an minimum requirement negligence of criminal a support order to However, conviction for criminal general offenses as a rule.9 attachment criminal to individual as offenses Indeed, a culpability closely element is limited. Section 302 greater itself establishes a culpability, reckless- ness, as the default in instances which the General Assem- bly has not specified culpability and impose no intent 302(c).10 absolute can be discerned. § See 18 Pa.C.S. Negligence, hand, on the other is exceptional treated as “an basis of is liability,” and generally therefore excluded bases that will support culpability for an explic- offense unless itly prescribed by the legislature. See Model Penal Code 302(a) provides: 9. Section (a) requirements Minimum culpability. Except provided as — (relating Section scope culpability this title to limitations on requirements), person guilty is not of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, or as the law require, respect with to each material element of the offense. 302(a) §

18 Pa.C.S. 302(c) provides: 10. Section (c) required Culpability provided. unless otherwise the cul- —When pability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not law, prescribed by person element is if established acts intentionally, knowingly recklessly respect thereto. 302(c). 302(a), Significantly, unlike Section Section 302(c) negligence, does not establishing reference thus as recklessness general requirement. application default provi- of this default effect, subject statutory sion exceptions, discussed below. these

provisions represent a principle codification of the requir- common law crimes, ing statutory mens statutory rea even when the definition provide. generally does not so 2.05 cmt. Model Penal Code (describing compromised” as "too principle fundamental to be "[cjrime does and should mean condemnation and no court should pass judgment have to unless it can declare that the defendant’s act culpable"). was (Official 1962).11 Draft § 2.02 cmt. Since neither Section designates negli- 3732 nor Vehicle Code standard, gence 302 of Crimes supply culpability requirement not as an simply Code does this of element offenses. those however, is, plausible argument a to be made that

There operate aspects culpability other of the Crimes Code’s scheme To supply negligence. of criminal to the element understand reasoning, culpability this line of a closer of the review MPC scheme, derived, is which that Code is the Crimes necessary. culpability supplying provision addition to the default con-

recklessness, places express MPC substantial liability to application straints of strict or absolute Indeed, limit expressly criminal the MPC would offenses. “violations,” liability absolute to see Model Penal offenses 2.05(l)(a), § punishable by defined as infractions fine or Code sanction, by any possible forfeiture not incarcerative see but 1.04(5),12 § id. as well as statutes offenses defined other legislative purpose impose liability insofar as a to absolute 205(l)(b). § plainly appears, Correspondingly, see id. grade any MPC would offense defined reduce statute, liability imposed another as to which absolute with element, to a violation. id. respect any material See 205(2)(a). § charging The MPC allows for the nonetheless justification restricting application negligence The as a 11. culpability element is that it reflects a lesser of fault than other Grail, recognized degrees culpability. Robinson & J. See P. Element Analysis Defining Liability: Criminal The Model Penal Code and Beyond, (Apr.l983)(stating 7& n. 35 Stan. L.Rev. 695-96 unawareness”); "negligence refers to a state of see also Cordoba- Hincapie, F.Supp. ("negligence represent at 500 does not an principle rather abandonment of the mens rea but its extension to that, according include blame for the absence of a state of mind Packer, norms, (citing societal the actor should had” Herbert L. have Sup.Ct. Court, Supreme Mens Rea 143-45 and the Rev. original))). (1962)(emphasis in culpability apply respect MPC’s default scheme does with violations, 2.05(l)(a); accordingly, charging § see Model Penal Code proof represents application paradigmatic of strict of violations liability precepts. offense, commission” of such an see proof “culpable 205(2)(b); instances, culpability § must be estab- id. negligence. of at criminal See id. on the order least lished terms, provisions operate to reduce the By these either their requirement of grade implicate or to offenses subsequent “unless a statute otherwise 205(2). § provides.” id. commentary are described the MPC

Such restraints reflecting compromise legislative between the desire enact preservation crimes and elemental absolute association of a mens rea element with fairness ensured offenses, serious see 2.05 comment Model Penal Code (Official 1962), MPC, law, common Draft like the eschewing punishable by imprison- for offenses ment. See 2.05 comment generally Model Penal Code (characterizing 2.05 of the MPC as a “frontal attack” upon liability possibili- offense “whenever the carries conviction, ty probation of criminal for which a sentence of imposed”). imprisonment may be by Pennsylvania’s comprehensive The scheme established MPC, exception Crimes Code mirrors the with the substantial Assembly replaced concept of “violations” the General offenses,” “summary see 18 under the Model Penal Code with 302, 305, carry imprison- §§ Pa.C.S. which a maximum term of 106(c). Thus, ninety days. § of ment See Pa.C.S. Pennsylvania, liability generally may while absolute be im- posed only (summary on a limited basis offenses and offenses by defined statutes other than the Crimes “a Code where legislative purpose impose liability plainly to absolute ... (2)),13 305(a)(1), pursuant § appears,” 18 Pa.C.S. to the terms scope culpability 13. The text of Section entitled on "Limitations of provisions,” is as follows: (a) requirements inapplicable culpability summary When are to of- requirements by other statutes. —The fenses and to offenses defined alia,\ culpability by[, prescribed inter ... section title 302 of this (relating general requirements culpability) apply do not to: offenses, (1) summary unless the involved is included in applica- offense or definition of the the court determines that its defining tion is consistent with effective enforcement of the law offense; or Code, may with punishable such offenses be of the Crimes rule, culpable and up days general to 90 as a imprisonment by proof negligence may established commission be incarcerative sanctions. greater support imposition 305(b).14 commentary explains that § The official 18 Pa.C.S. title, (2) by other than this in so far as offenses defined statutes impose liability offenses or legislative purpose to absolute for such any plainly appears. respect with material element thereof (b) liability reducing grade of offense to sum- of absolute Effect existing mary Notwithstanding any provision law other offense.— provides: subsequent otherwise and unless a (1) statute any imposed respect to material is with when absolute by a statute other than this title and a element of an offense defined liability, upon offense constitutes a is based conviction offense; summary (2) imposed by respect although law with to one absolute elements of an offense defined a statute or more of the material title, culpable may be commission of the offense other than this charged proved, negligence respect event with to such in which sufficient and the classification elements constitutes imposed therefor convic- offense and the sentence (relating to classes of tion are determined offenses) section 106 of this title (relating disposi- Chapter 11 of this title to authorized offenders). tion of culpability provisions be noted that the 305. It should rule, general expressly applicable, Code are otherwise as a the Crimes 107(a). statutes. See 18 Pa.C.S. to offenses defined other 305, above, exceptions. pertinent contains the purpose Code defines for this as follows: 14. The Crimes negligently respect person to a material element of an A acts unjustifiable when he be aware of a substantial and offense should exists or will result from his conduct. risk that the material element nature and that the actor’s failure must be of such a risk it, considering his conduct and perceive the nature and intent of him, gross known to involves a deviation from the circumstances person a reasonable would observe in the standard of care that actor’s situation. 302(b)(4). heightened degree § This definition embodies Pa.C.S. setting, prevails negligence compared to that which in the civil of as justified by Penal Code as follows: the drafters of the Model sentence, people knowledge not to When have that conviction inadvertently creates speak punishment, follow conduct that of risk, improper they supplied with motive to take are an additional experience acting, on their care before to use their faculties and draw gauging potentialities contemplated conduct. To some in least, extent, may promote and thus be this motive awareness Moreover, can of control. moral defect effective as a measure where defendant acts out of properly imputed to instances “ MPC, to corollary in serves ‘tone like its Section whole,” liability penal in law as a since absolute strict down’ readily where the “cannot be defended responsibility § jail Pa.C.S. possible offense carries a sentence.” (like those significance, provisions these official cmt.15 Also MPC) subsequent “unless a statute other- operative are 305(b). § provides.” 18 Pa.C.S. wise 305(b)(2) therefore, vehi applies, If Section offense, culpable commission summary is a unless the cle/DUI charged proved, in which case the of the offense is culpability requirement minimum carry would elements 305(b)(2). viability § negligence. See Pa.C.S. construction, however, interpreta depends upon the of such it phrase subsequent provides,” statute as tion “unless 305(b). applicability conditions of Section Pa.C.S. 305(b), § 13. See Commonwealth supra generally note Parmar, 318, 331, (1998)(opinion support affirmance)(explaining in the General “[w]hen Assembly plainly legislative purpose impose to indicates 305(a)(2), liability, the Common pursuant absolute element”).16 rea wealth does not have to establish a mens insensitivity merely people, interests of other and not out of an grasp intellectual failure to them. generally 2.02 Comment at 243. See Cordoba- Model Penal Code Hincapie, F.Supp. (stating properly at 501 calibrated “[a] truly person standard that makes allowance for the faultless liability] accomplishes sweeping [as the same result strict without effect”). those whom the law can have no commentary appears directly 15. This to derive more from the MPC since, Code, noted, than the Crimes the latter would allow for imposition up ninety days upon of a term of incarceration of conviction of an absolute crime. While the MPC formulation attempt interpretive reflects an to minimize and constitutional difficul- limiting application ties situations that will raising imprisonment, not result so the stakes terms of the potential imprisonment, Pennsylvania unique scheme raises questions regard. in such 305(b)(2) application depends upon 16. The of Section also discernment legislative impose liability in of a intent to absolute connection with pertinent elements of the offense the first instance. See 18 Pa.C.S. 305(b)(2). question portion of this is deferred to a later Discussion Cho, (1984), Oregon P.2d 1152 v. 297 Or. State that, subsequent for a Supreme determined order Court 305(b)(2), to surpass Oregon’s equivalent to Section statute must, face, an clearly on its indicate intent subsequent statute requirement. See id. culpable to with a mental state dispense 305(b)(2) of interpretation, the Cho Section 1152. Under apply application to restrict the Crimes Code would culpability, legislative since a proof 3735 absent Section culpable mental state dispense to with a intent of the clearly indicated an examination terms Miller, However, in provision alone. State Or. (1990), appeal1 court to have Oregon P.2d 974 would process determining construct in the disregarded its Cho liability of that statute constituted a strict the state’s DUI Indeed, court’s dissenting jurist highlighted fense. and advocated abandonment of Cho’s divergence Cho Oregon equivalent to reasoning. argued The dissent 305(b) Section : that in statutes enacted outside the crimes code says me date], no January culpa whereiri [its after effective ..., violation, is a required ble mental state is the offense provides.” ... I would legislature unless the “otherwise legislature, by establishing that violation of assert that the has; misdemeanor, statute is a Class A otherwise the DUII is, constituting provided; exception referent is violation, culpable presence not to the absence á Thus, equiva requirement. under [the mental state Oregon 305(b)(2) applicable provi is the ] lent Section —which (a) is a strict crime because the statute sion —DUII (b) state, culpable legislature no requires mental provided that is a A has otherwise DUII Class misdemean- it approach, legislature or. this has done all Under post-1971 must do to make a statute outside the code a strict crime. Miller, (Carson, J., dissenting), 788 P.2d at 982-83 opinion, I conclude that the strictures of Section

this since would 305(b)(2) immediately inapplicable are for the reasons discussed below. Indeed, analysis.17 order this agree I instance, must abe 305(b)(2) first there apply Assembly intended that the General threshold determination some material respect with to at least impose strict 305(b)(2); § see also offense. See element from subse- such intent is discerned 13. Once supra note statute, that the rational to conclude it is quently enacted specified of application also the Assembly intended General policies precepts of Presumably, it is aware grading. directly thus and could into the Crimes Code incorporated corre- post-1972 offenses penalty provisions prescribe most were its intent. The policies if such sponding these then, Legislature is that the intend- interpretation, reasonable flexibility prescrib- of in a reasonable ed allow itself offenses, burdening with a rather than itself ing subsequent to avoid the effect required series of disclaimers cumbersome prior statutes. above, majority’s conclu- contrary To summarize 302(a) sion, support Code does not the Crimes Section associated attachment of a of homicide vehicle or homicide with the offenses vehicle/DUI, Code provisions nor do other the Crimes persuasive support. afford By Decisions

B. This Court’s Homicide Vehicle culpability provisions, the In addition to the Crimes Code’s predicated upon prior is determinations majority’s rationale Field, setting, principally this Court Heck, at 417 A.2d at 517 Pa. at Field, First, addressing argument A.2d at 575. pre- constitutional 3732 of the Vehicle Code violated Section in fact included a cepts, reasoned that the statute the Court deriving underlying from the sum- culpability requirement sidewalk, (there, driving violation on mary Vehicle Code however, agreement, proviso with the that it qualify 17. I would instance, application plainly apparent in the first must construction, legislature statutory that the intended lor precepts of Otherwise, culpability provisions apply. default would control. the Crimes Code 3703), § avoiding any Pa.C.S. thus constitutional impediment. id. at Field vague See A.2d 163.18 was in terms of identifying precise culpability requirement nature of the Heck, (noting discerned. See 517 Pa. at 535 A.2d at 578 that, Field, question required “the of what was unresolved”). was left

Field, however, simply unsupportable. 3703 of Section (like summary the Vehicle Code all other offenses under provisions of which lack a specific penalty the Vehicle Code term) summary punishable solely by constitutes offense imposition of a fine. See Pa.C.S. Pursuant $25 305(a) Code, culpabili- MPC the Crimes ty provisions wholly inapplicable are to such therefore infrac- 305(a). Together tion. Pa.C.S. with the strict penalty, any express limitation on the the absence of culpability requirement places squarely default such offense among purest the forms of violations intended to be treated are, and which beyond ques- absolute offenses almost tion, justifiable permissible scope within the and of absolute liability. supra See note 12 and accompanying text. See Parmar, 331, generally 551 Pa. at 710 A.2d at 1089 (opinion support of affirmance)(stating that criminal “[a] statute imposes liability typically absolute regulation involves of traf- laws”). fic liquor or at clearly Since the violation issue lacked any culpability requirement, Field’s attempt culpa- to derive a culpability analysis provided 18. proceeded The entire in Field as fol- lows: Attorney recognizes, requires theAs General section 3732 the Com- prove appellee monwealth to has deviated from the standard of 3703, by underlying provi- care established section the Vehicle Code allegedly provides: sion violated here. Section 3703 person any except human-powered "No shall drive vehicle a except upon permanent duly a sidewalk or sidewalk area a driveway." temporary authorized culpability requirement, Consistent with the section 3703 for a leaves knew, known, appellee determination at trial whether or should have engaged he in the conduct claimed to in violation of that section. Thus, example, for it remains to be decided if a driver reasonable could, exit, congestion in view of the at the terminal know where the or, indeed, sidewalk was if a sidewalk existed. Field, 524-25, (footnotes omitted). 490 Pa. at 417 A.2d at 163

127 underlying vehicle from the bility requirement homicide justification. driving infraction lacks on sidewalk Pennsylvania confusion in courts on account Field caused designate of its reasoning its virtue failure to flawed culpability necessary support a conviction for the Heck, 198-99, 517 Pa. at 535 A.2d at by vehicle. See divided, Ultimately, this en banc decision 578. culminated Court, Koch, Pa.Super. Superior Commonwealth 350, (1982)(plurality). after opinion, A.2d the lead expressing disagreement reasoning, his Field’s see id. at that, effect, supreme 443 A.2d at 1160 (stating “[i]n our process challenge court has section 3732 saved due Judge without aby bootstrap analysis”), fault effectively Court Wickersham concluded that this had inserted culpability requirement civil into akin to 354-57, Judge Spaeth id. at at 1159-61. concurring opinion identifying filed Field’s also errors Koch, reasoning, Pa.Super. at 443 A.2d at see J., (Spaeth, 1162-65 concurring), arguing that the decision represented persuasive precedent, “neither a nor one that validity attack forecloses further on constitutional creating statute Id. at crime of homicide vehicle.” J., (Spaeth, concurring). A.2d at 1162 This attempted provide Court to answer criticisms Heck, clarification in 517 Pa. at A.2d upon by second of decisions majority relied confusion, present Although acknowledging case. Field, rather, Court to no flaw in but admitted maintained that “definitively Field answered issue whether requires culpable conduct to sustain conviction.” See id. at 197, at 535 A.2d 578. The then confu- Court stated that the Superior sion as a result occurred of the Court’s reliance decision, dicta from Field and another Commonwealth v. Houtz, (1981). 345, Specifical- 496 Pa. 437 A.2d 385 See id.19 expounded upon reasoning the Field as follows: Houtz legislative "expansion” by

Th[e] [of for homicide by accomplished any vehicle] was the elimination of involuntary manslaughter, by the elements of crime of a relax- but concerning the erroneous ly, in criticism responding the culpability requirement derivation of a from the offense under stated, charge, lying “[t]his the homicide the Court of culpabili criticism because the discussions was unwarranted which had ty in Field ... were not relevant issues been Further, at Id. at 535 A.2d 579. the Court presented.” constitutionality past upholding its indicated that decisions culpability effectively ques of 3732 had resolved the that, (stating “without tion. See id. at of presented with issue the level of having ever been prior § tenor our culpability required under challenges to statute opinions rejecting constitutional (citing would to have resolved the issue” Common appear (1983))). Hicks, A.2d wealth v. The Court critical permit indicated that it would not nonetheless by implication answered and offered the follow question ing conclusion: ordinary negligence will not

We now hold that sustain for the The conviction offense vehicle. applicable requirements rea those mens are 302(a). § in 18 Pa.C.S. enumerated

* * * “ as ‘Negligently5 The Comment to that Official states (b)(4) used in is intended to mean criminal Subsection did not Legislature clearly intend negligence.” phrase encompass concept tort “negligently” to To in this negligence. extent decisions Common otherwise, they expressly wealth be construed are overruled. proof existing culpable two ation elements: involuntary manslaughter, The crime of conduct and causation. here, engaged charged requires proof Vehicle actor manner,” grossly negligent in a "reckless or and that Code violation By Pa.C.S. the death was caused "as a direct result.” vehicle, contrast, under the crime of homicide it must be shown known,” “knew, only engaged actor that he that the or should have that, Code, violation the conduct claimed be in of the Vehicle least, very "probable consequence” at the death was a of the conduct.

Houtz, 496 Pa. at 437 A.2d at 387. Heck, (emphasis origi- 535 A.2d at 580 in nal). view, Heck, Field, my reasoning

In that of like merits examination, Upon such I would conclude that critical review. suffers, instance, reasoning Heck’s the first for its initial Field, definitively answering as reliance 3732, since, noted, question presented by as Field’s Section 302(a) Heck’s reasoning is unsound.20 reference Section above, further, conclusory; the Crimes Code is as discussed IIA, see Section 302 of the Crimes Code does not supra employ negligence culpability require- a default ment, provisions apply subsequently nor do its at all to Assembly enacted offenses as to which the General intended (rather, instances, liability in such impose absolute provisions). Accordingly, 305 contains Field and the relevant required analysis, namely, Heck lack a critical element of the principles statutory construction to application deter- Assembly apply intended to mine whether General subsequently in a in a enacted offense contained provision Pennsylvania law outside the Crimes Code. Cf. Cheatham, 603, 610, Commonwealth v. 419 Pa.Super. Heck, (1992)(Cirillo, that, in J.)(observing Penn- “[t]he sylvania Supreme Court rehabilitated the vehi- [homicide is, by adding requirement statute a mens rea on cle] what statute”). face, Parmar, its a strict generally (opinion support Pa. at 710 A.2d at 1089 of affir- mance)(setting pertinent analytical principles forth the vis-a- legislative vis the determination intent relation to abso- liability). lute above, summary contrary majority’s present

analysis, provides persuasive Field nor Heck support neither proposition Assembly the General intended for a inconsistent, appears internally own assessment of Field Heck’s to be Court, hand, “definitively as the on the one stated that Field answered conduct,” Heck, requires culpable the issue of whether see 578, and, other, Pa. at 535 A.2d at on the stated that “the culpability in ... discussions of Field were not relevant to the issues presented,” which had been and were thus dicta. See id. at A.2d at 579. of criminal contexts.

or homicide vehicle/DUI Assembly Intend to Include Strict III. Did the General By Homicide Liability in the Vehicle Elements By Statutes? Homicide Vehicle/DUI noted, question involves Vehicle Code present the As since Code, and Crimes promulgation the provisions enacted after attach- culpability requirements express lack provisions such elements, intent of necessary it is to examine the ing to their liability was whether strict Assembly to determine the General intended. by

A. Homicide Vehicle Field, in a divided en banc decision Prior to this Court’s an just undertook examina- Superior Court panel the 3732. context of Section in a fashion the comprehensive tion Barone, 282, 419 A.2d Pa.Super. See Commonwealth by authored then- opinion, The lead (1980)(plurality).21 Cercone, advocated proposition, the Judge endorsed President herein, Assembly did not that the General by majority vehicle, but liability by for homicide absolute impose intend neg- of criminal rather, culpability requirement incorporated 297, at 465 Barone, Pa.Super. at 419 A.2d ligence. See P.J.). his discus- (Cercone, Judge opened Cercone President against strict strong common law tradition by noting the sion of such tradition and the embodiment penal responsibility, Code, and, culpa- correspondingly, the the Model Penal within id. at Pennsylvania Crimes Code. See bility provisions of the of Section 290-91, Regarding at 462. the directive 305(a)(2) the Crimes Code’s to the effect stat- to offenses defined other requirements apply do not impose absolute legislative purpose as a utes “insofar respect any or material such offenses with 305(a)(2)(em- 18 Pa.C.S. plainly appears,” thereof element constitutionality Centrally, Barone concerned the measured, alia, statute, against the contention that inter non-culpable by encompassing process precepts offended due statute conduct. added); Judge President Cercone supra see note phasis proscription. 3732’s apparent found no such intent word instance, significant the use In the first he deemed enactment, given traditional “homicide” the title and fault. concept of criminal homicide association between the Barone, 419 A.2d at 462-63.22 Pa.Super. See word “unintention- acknowledging placement While statute, note ally” supra within see Pa.C.S. Judge dissenting opinion, infra, focus of see President context, that, taken the word denoted Cercone concluded causing death was not undertaken solely that the conduct Barone, Pa.Super. at purpose design. P.J.). (Cercone, positions Addressing 419 A.2d at 463 judges to by concurring dissenting taken the effect that Legislature, President was intended grounding Judge position Cercone reasoned that such lacked and, therefore, policy, social its effectuation was reasoned likely scope purpose underlying not within the the intended the statute.23 concurring opinion, Judge Spaeth expanded upon point In his this as follows: always required degree culpability. Criminal homicides have some Code, Under is defined as “intentional- the Crimes ly, caus[ing] knowingly, recklessly negligently the death of another "murder, being,” voluntary human and includes ... involun- [and] Thus, 2501(a) (b). tary manslaughler.” legisla- and the "homicide,” defining ture's use of the word the crime of “homicide vehicle,” legislature supports the the conclusion that intended to require proof culpability, legislature of some for where the presumably adopts ... "borrows terms of art it knows and the cluster body of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the learning meaning convey from it was the will which taken and its use judicial to unless the mind otherwise instructed.”

Barone, 314-15, J., Pa.Super. (Spaeth, 419 A.2d at 474-75 concurring). Judge explained 23. President Cercone that: imprudent goal protect public if the ultimate is to the driver conduct, purpose punishing operator then what is to be served an may reasonably prudently who have and under the circum- acted demonstrate, failing left-right-left the rule stances!?] To to adhere to others; however, merging when into traffic involves more risk to in a jury peers civil action find it defendant's that was unreasonable to omit to observe this rule when the defendant is hold, rushing injured person hospital. an to a To as the [d]issent Further, Assembly’s specify failure to light of the General offense, Judge for President Cercone element construction, examining statutory specific principles of invoked enactment, harm surrounding the circumstances object sought to be regulated prevented, sought to be constructions, and the obtained, consequences particular at 463. history. id. at germane legislative enactment, surrounding Pertaining circumstances to the from the recognized its derivation Judge Cercone President an to reform in connection with effort Vehicle Code Uniform regulation. scheme of traffic Pennsylvania’s comprehensive that, (reasoning “[i]n 419 A.2d at 464 See id. at legislation was not an isolated retrospect, subject ... solely by the Motor Code motivated Vehicle amendment our involun roadways ‘inadequacy’ and the carnage on our statuteQ] [rjather, the vehicular homicide tary manslaughter overhauling of all of a massive proviso aspect was but one road”). concurring Addressing Pennsylvania rules Assembly that the chose dissenting positions General governing vehicular homicides re enact a distinct offense roadways, Judge President Pennsylvania fatalities on duce reasoned that: Cercone by reading the jeopardized are not weighty

these concerns dispensing as not with the subject statute culpable. causing harm violation must nevertheless be legislature with an intent directly, More credit roadways on our is to ac- endangering conduct deter life punishment to be efficacious knowledge that order provision, predicated upon it must be just under this his of the factors which made the accused’s awareness conviction, Thus, and sen- punishment, criminal. conduct with an addi- may provide inadvertent violators tence well evaluating to more care in both tional incentive take does, may criminally punished without that this same defendant If, simply with of mind does not make sense. reference to his state perception opera- evaluation of and of the reference to the accused’s factors, socially acceptable what his conduct conforms to is tive circumstances, mark him as similar how does this under the same or punishment? one who needs to suffer Barone, Pa.Super. at 419 A.2d at 463. they which unrea- consciously create and those thsy risks case, however, the as- sonably perceive. to either fail is the actor punishment underlies sumption which to creating a risk of harm factors in ignored operative the violator imprisonment, with others. Confronted through densely a prior speeding think twice indeed hand, suggest On the other populated neighborhood. [djissent chose to legislature intentionally our does that is to utility the driver’s conduct disregard social shortsightedness a impute legislature to the harshness always some risk associat- While which we cannot. there auto, legislature we do not think that the driving with an ed abrogate the possibility in its intended to collective wisdom risk under the of a that the taken was reasonable finding particular circumstances. (Cercone,

Barone, 295-96, at 419 A.2d at 464-65 Pa.Super. P.J.).24 Judge ultimately acknowledged President Cercone Assembly’s effectuating the stat- purpose that the General involuntary likely inadequacies in the perceived ute related manslaughter He statute relative to vehicular homicides. concluded, however, Assembly to fill that the General intended by criminalizing only void violations as such entailed care, or, in required standard of “gross deviation” from the words, culpability as defined other criminal 302(b)(4). Code, provisions of the Crimes Barone, 465-66.25 Pa.Super. at 419 A.2d at statute, manslaughter efficacy involuntary Related to the Judge President Cercone also observed that [cjourt recently investigation ruled convenience of [t]his has that the ascertaining prosecution polestar what essential is not the elements are or must accom- of an offense what history proviso pany of this confirms them. We concede legislative judgment was that a distinct offense needed due involuntary manslaughter juries reluctance to convict for fatal cases; however, history supports dispute traffic that this accident we difficulty legislature further this proposition that as result of every punish proverbial threw in towel and deemed it essential no violator how his conduct. matter reasonable

Barone, (Cercone, P.J.). Pa.Super. 419 A.2d at Judge acknowledged presented to 25. President Cercone the difficulties charged discriminating juries recklessness between Contrary to view expressed opinion, Judge the the lead concurrence, Spaeth, in Assembly’s concluded that the General impose liability pursuant intent was to absolute to Section Barone, of the Vehicle 276 Pa.Super. Code. See at J., (Spaeth, 419 A.2d at concurring).26 467-68 From federal cases, and Judge Spaeth practice, state discerned resolv ing questions the intertwined imposition whether the strict liability legislature criminal was intended the and the consistency imposition of such process, with constitutional due of examining: policy and legislature; intent of the offense; origins of the the reasonableness of the standards imposed; and punishment stigma and to a attached convic 306-07, tion. id. See at 419 A.2d at 470.27 In implementing test, Judge Spaeth first noted that the mere omission of any mention of intent should be construed as dispensing it, see id. at 419 A.2d at proceeded to focus general policy Legislature toward strict liabili ty crimes; the common law origins history specific issue; crime at legislative history. the relevant id. See considerations, In evaluating Judge Spaeth these discerned an even balance factors for and against between conclusion legislature that the apply intended to strict criminal implementation of the Section 3732 offense. id. See however, negligence; expressed pleas he confidence in the common Barone, ability appropriate courts’ to formulate instructions. Pa.Super. at 297 n. 419 A.2d at 465 n. 26. concluded, however, Judge Spaeth ultimately 26. imposition that such Barone, process Pennsylvania violated due under the Constitution. See 323-34, J., Pa.Super. (Spaeth, at concurring). A.2d at 479-85 case, analysis directly implicated Such present is not in the since Appellant pursued challenge. has not a constitutional regard, Judge Spaeth In this discussed federal courts’ treatment express culpability requirements. of offenses which lacked He exam- application ined instances of of this test in terms of cases which legislative body courts had impose determined that intended to process; and found it consistent with due those statute; requirement in which a of intent was read into the and those in statute, which a of intent could not be read into the but the 308-09, process. statute was deemed to violate due See id. at Judge Spaeth Pennsylvania 471-72. further noted that had courts consistently applied analysis the same utilized in the federal courts. See id. at 419 A.2d at 472. principle penal addition to statutes general are construed, strictly acknowledged other factors mili- he several tating against legislature the conclusion intended to legislative impose liability, including: policy strict criminal the against liability;28 history strict of criminal the the term opinion, supra “homicide” as the lead see 22 described note text; as accompanying legisla- well as the discussions tors with the Assembly’s connected General decision not to 316-18, driving, create the crime of careless see id. at at 475-76.29 construction, liability

In favor of Judge Spaeth the strict upon elaborated the derivation of statute from the the Uni- form in terms of development Vehicle Code the the uniform provision, tracking law its through modification from 1956 1962 from proscribing disregard,” “negligent one “reckless homicide,” to of any municipal “violation or ordi- state law Barone, 319, 276 Pa.Super. nance.” See at 419 A.2d at 477 J., (Spaeth, concurring). Judge Spaeth, According to changes made it “clear the drafters Uniform to change crime, Vehicle Code intended character of the crime, and to it liability requiring proof make into a strict no any more than a violation of mere traffic ordinance that (citing resulted the death another.” Id. Commentary, (1978)). Contrasting 1 Pennsylvania’s Homicide Vehicle experience preserved efforts of other states that have express elements of within vehicular their (or statutes equivalent), Judge Spaeth indicated: regard, Judge Spaeth emphasized In this attack the MPC strict 28. liability incorporated stringency and the Code in Crimes terms of Barone, implementation. its Pa.Super. at A.2d at 474 J., (Spaeth, concurring)("[t]he requirement this section that the (or ‘absolute’) intention to create ‘plainly strict criminal must appear’ strong legislative policy against manifests a crimes”). respect. Spaeth In such Judge history indicated that "[t]his manifests 29. legislature part a desire on subject not citizens to make Barone, for mere Pa.Super. sanctions carelessness.” at J., (Spaeth, concurring). 419 A.2d at 476 It should be noted that Legislature subsequently driving summary added careless punishable by imposition $25 offense §§ of a fine. See Pa.C.S. assume, believe, Pennsylvania I must when We history it aware of the legislature enacted section was or and the states that added of that section Ohio other negligent- that the act retained some defendant easily Yet, although very could have ly recklessly. or it so, requirement of legislature any did not add done section, nor did it enact negligence or recklessness to the ll-903(a) of the Uniform Vehicle the 1956 version of section adopt its intent to Thereby legislature indicated Code. revision, traffic proof no more than a requiring the 1962 causing violation death. J.,

Barone, (Spaeth, at 477 Pa.Super. A.2d that, if Finally, Judge Spaeth observed concurring). Assembly to limit criminal violations General had intended actors, negligent 3732 to it need under Section reckless all, already since defendants have enacted the section at those involuntary prosecution manslaughter. for subject were 320-21, at (citing id. A.2d 477-78 at 419 2504). regard, In this indicated: he involuntary manslaughter of of a consideration the crime probably explanation me a correct provides what seems to criminal why legislature of the intended to create strict section 3732. The cases demonstrate under convic- difficulty obtaining Commonwealth has had involuntary manslaughter, traffic proof tions for of a for gross negli- not of or proof violation recklessness 3732, gence. probable enacting section It seems difficulty by broaden- legislature intended to overcome this persons of those who ing scope include merely North violated traffic ordinances. The Carolina Freeman[, 228 N.C.App. 31 516 court in State S.E.2d (1976),] just an North attributed intent to the Carolina legislature. J.,

Barone, Pa.Super. (Spaeth, at 419 A.2d at 478 276 omitted).30 and citations concurring)(footnotes Judge Spaeth quoted Supreme Court as follows: 30. the North Carolina resulting operation deaths of motor vehicles number of alarming highways an extent. Indictment for on the has increased to analysis re- Judge by his substantive Spaeth concluded 305(a)(2), language turning “plainly appears” of Section that, text, concluding supra see accompanying 13 and note in contemplation history statute view the probable broadening liability Assembly’s purpose General involuntary manslaughter provi- beyond that contained in the Code, me, appears enough.” it plainly “for sion the Crimes Barone, J., (Spaeth, Pa.Super. at A.2d at regarded that he his decision concurring). acknowledged He Id,.31 regard “exceedingly in this close.” dissented, Judge opening with observation that Wieand language require culpability further statutory does violation, Barone, underlying than that associated with the (Wieand, J., dissenting)(“the Pa.Super. at 419 A.2d at 486 criminal legislature responsibility depen- to make determined on upon necessarily dent violation of a traffic law and not manslaughter proved the common law crime of has ineffective as a operation repressing in motor means of caus- ing public thoroughfares. generally death The motorist citizen, reputable wrong by brings him which committed his death is most often an violation of a someone to unintentional ordinance, prohibitory unaccompanied by or statute recklessness or nature, possible consequences dangerous when tested the rule prevision. apparent of reasonable Thus it is that the intention of the legislature enacting [homicide was to define a crime of vehicle] manslaughter responsibility lesser wherein criminal dependent upon presence culpable death vehicle is not negligence. Barone, J., Pa.Super. (Spaeth, at 419 A.2d at 478 concur- Freeman, 519). ring)(quoting S.E.2d Judge following Spaeth concluded his discussion with the observa- regarding policy underlying imposition tions the the of absolute in the Section 3732 context: argued policy, It has been that matter of would be most as a it unwise appellee’s impose to as strict criminal conduct such [namely, yield right way]. entirely I an failure to the of unintentional agree; permit my opinion policy but I on a matter of to here, long my legislature lawfully, affect the acts decision for so as it court, policy. duty Our is entitled to decide matters of as a not to decisions, legislature’s examine the wisdom of enactment, as in its the reflected meaning to then but determine and enforce the of that enactment. Barone, 322-23, J., Pa.Super. (Spaeth, 419 A.2d at 478-79 (citations omitted). concurring) culpable negligence”), emphasizing or criminal legisla authority tive to so proof define crime of criminal intent necessary, particularly is not in an unique legislative area of concern, highway safety. 335-36, such as id. at 419 A.2d Judge at 485-86. comparable Wieand observed that statutes adopted jurisdictions in similarly other have been construed to culpable conduct; further, eliminate a of he cited Superior precedent to Legislature Court the effect that the intended to culpability necessary reduce the of support a conviction of homicide vehicle. See id. at Trainor, (citing 419 A.2d at 486 Commonwealth 252 Pa.Su per. 332, (1977)). 337 n. 947 n. 4 Referencing of Code, derivation the statute from the Uniform Vehicle “[ujnder Judge section, Wieand indicated that this grava men of the offense was intended be the violation of a traffic law which in resulted death.” Id. at 419 A.2d at 487. Judge agreed Judge Spaeth’s Wieand view that “the history provision in other merely states confirms that legislature Pennsylvania in deliberately premise chose responsibility violation,” id.; solely upon a traffic however, contrary colleague’s view, to his Judge con Wieand comported cluded the statute precepts. with constitutional See id. at 419 A.2d at 487-88. seems, me,

It at least to that each of positions expressed represents Barone displaying a defensible view due and reasoned pertinent legislative consideration intent.32 Ultimately, I would position Judges endorse the essential Spaeth and Wieand to the effect that Assembly General fact liability offense, intended to create a strict placing partic- ular emphasis upon the derivation of the statute Uniform Vehicle Code as it had grounded evolved from one reckless conduct to containing one no culpability requirement; juxtaposition existing the offense crime jurists I believe that appellate efforts of of the intermediate courts on Cercone, the order of Judge Judge Spaeth, those offered President Judge worthy acknowledgment Wieand in Barone are and should encouraged, they Pennsylvania jurisprudence generally, benefit jurisprudence particular by informing and the this Court our own decisions.

139 states of other experience manslaughter; involuntary see requirement, culpability express an have added which J., (Spaeth, 419 A.2d at Barone, at Pa.Super. finding jurisdictions of other the decisions concurring); and attempt impose embody an similarly provisions worded purpose strong legislative upon the liability based absolute Freeman, See, at 228 S.E.2d driving. e.g., encouraging safe for serious providing statutes certainly such 519.33 While para- from the MPC departure a marked represent penalties MPC of the the introduction clear that since digm, quite it is underlying and its penal law legislation, the into crimes state offenses, more proliferation with the changed have policies generally sentencing See enhancements. grading, and severe The Idea Dubber, Panopticon: Dirk Penal Markus 53, 53-54 Code, 4 Buff.Crim. Model Penal Modem L.Rev. “[sjince concep- in publication its (2000)(arguing that in form and in collapsed has Code foundation of the Model tual substance”). conception MPC Notably, by replacing the attach) with (to imprisonment which no term violations days), imprisonment upof (permitting summary offenses 106(c), upon enactment of the Crimes even see 18 Pa.C.S. Assembly conveyed a Pennsylvania General Code liability than of strict or absolute substantially view broader § IIA.34 supra MPC envisioned. the drafters of the Barone, I read the positions in would of the 33. As reflected various killing, “unintentionally" Section 3732 as related former word crimes such as of homicide from intentional distinguishing this form manslaughter voluntary or murder. analysis include position should recognize Judge Spaeth’s I constitutionality imposition of strict of the of the an assessment 1922(3). generally 1 Pa.C.S. determining legislative intent. See in However, imposition in the fairly widespread of strict given the deaths, resulting highway and the gradation offenses enhanced concerning conform- levels clarity federal and state at the lack severity given precepts of such with constitutional ance F.Supp. Cordoba-Hincapie, at generally penalties imposed, see term, that, Assembly omitting culpability the General appears it permissi- stringent culpability requirement sought impose the least course, Legislature to preferable, of for the ble. It would be far would assure as to expressly indicate its intentions —this from which a clear baseline greater precision in the law and establish addressed, fostering greater ac- could be considerations constitutional Staples, (“[hjistorically, U.S. S.Ct. at 1802 penalty significant under statute has been a consid- imposed determining eration in whether the statute should be con- rea”). dispensing strued as mens with Finally, emphasizes, year as Justice Newman last the Gen- Assembly specific eral a culpability requirement inserted into argued the homicide vehicle statute. It could be that such prior change, constitutes manifestation of its intent. This however, in occurred connection with an enhancement grading of from a first-degree the offense misdemeanor third-degree felony. argued, therefore, It could also be that Legislature that culpability requirement believed was necessary imposition greater penalty. legisla- of a The however, history, suggest tive would that neither of the above example, For prior be case. on Senate vote legislation, Mellow, do-sponsor, the Honorable Robert J. passage emphasis advocated its penal- the enhanced provided salutary ties and the effect of such enhancement of encouraging driving.35 pertinent terms safe analy- bill countability legislative judicial of both the branches in terms of pronouncements. their mandates and situation, statutory analysis proceed this I believe that the need not assessment, interdependently Judge Spaeth's with the constitutional analysis ultimately Accordingly, own question reflects. I would reserve the stringent culpability requirement of what permissi- least questions presented ble for a case in which the constitutional are in a See, Michaels, meaningful e.g., direct and fashion. Alan C. Constitu- Innocence, (Feb. 1999)(describing tional 112 Harv. L.Rev. one rea). proposed theory for a constitutional doctrine of mens Such would, course, questions reopened if this Court were to determine liability Legislature that absolute inwas fact intended in the first example, instance. For Field and Heck do not answer constitution- terms, question al on these as both read criminal into the satisfy statute and indicate that its inclusion suffices to constitutional concerns; recognizes impose stringent neither an intent to the least culpability requirement permissible, provides analysis of constitu- precepts requirement. Cordoba-Hincapie, tional to describe such Cf. F.Supp. (noting generally clearly at 508 that courts fail to divide statutory interpretation jurisprudence from constitutional law in the red). mens describing resulting After the circumstances of a fatal accident violation, explained: a Vehicle Code Senator Mellow Now, President, Mr. I think we have to extend to violators of the thing Motor Vehicle Code the same that we have extended to viola- was culpability requirement of a that the insertion suggests sis courts had of what interpretation an predicated upon than a reflection Gen- required was rather determined Assembly’s prior own intentions.36 eral Decisis Stare B. Field decisions suggested

I above this Court’s have and fail to address the and Fleck inadequate reasoning contain Assembly intend- consideration of whether the General central principles 3732 via impose ed conventional anal- statutory construction and absolute however, acknowledge, decisions constitute ysis. I that such are sound to adhere precedent, and there reasons generally if perfectly even reasoned. authorities Tennessee, 808, 827, Payne v. 501 U.S. S.Ct. (1991)(emphasizing precedent the role of 115 L.Ed.2d evenhanded, and furthering predictable, “the consistent devel- decisions, judicial ... on legal principles, of reliance opment the of tors of the Motor Vehicle Code who have been under influence drugs.... alcohol and/or lightly particular I not think that these incidents should be treated. do this, we it as a misdemeanor. With the enactment of Prior to treated bill, third-degree give changed felony, which will this it will be to judge sentencing. presiding much more discretion that, President, So, bring it we are to Mr. I am thankful able very important piece legislation. I It is a am floor of Senate. [involved], people very sorry family at least can tell for but we Pennsylvania you going speed that if are to and drive out control involved, very fatality you going pay a and is a that are to there Pennsylvania. healthy price in Journal, 11, 2000). (October Legislative Senate example, Republican analysis 36. For of the bill leads with the setting forth offense of homicide ''[t]his statement section only pass interpreted require if it is to vehicle can constitutional muster rising to of misconduct the level conviction (1999 negligence.” Republican Analysis Bill for Senate Bill 1312 Session, 20, Regular posted 2000)(citing Nov. various decisions of courts). appellate analysis indicates that Pennsylvania The Democratic changes currently for vehicular homicide "SB 1312 the standard causing ‘unintentionally’ of another 3732 of Title 75 from the death ‘recklessly gross person negligence’ to conform state regarding Supreme decisions what constitutes Court Analysis for Democratic Bill Senate sustain a conviction of homicide.” 20, Session, 2000). (1999 Regular posted Bill Nov. and ... the actual perceived integrity judicial process”). instances, however, There are also which call for prior reconsideration of decisions. For example, as this Court has stated:

[t]he doctrine of stare decisis was never intended to be used as a principle perpetuate erroneous principles of law. fully While we ascribe to Lord Coke’s evaluation of the importance certainty law, in the obviously this end cannot outweigh necessity of maintaining purity law. The court’s function interpret is to legislative enactments Where, not to promulgate here, them. our ... decisions the Court distorted the clear intention of the legislative enactment and interpretation erroneous permitted policy of that legislation to be effectively frustrated, we now have no rectify alternative but to our pronouncements earlier blindly adhere to the past rulings out of a antiquity. deference to Coon, 128, Mayhugh 135, 460 Pa. (1975); A.2d see also Ayala Ed., v. Philadelphia Bd. Pub. (1973)(“the doctrine stare decisis is not a for perpetuating error, but a legal rather concept which responds to justice and, thus, the demands of permits orderly growth processes flourish”). of the law to generally Cordobar-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 501 (warning of “dangers in patchwork criminal codes and decisions that lack internal consistency and leave basic questions unan- swered”). above,

Given the expressions by jurists engendered by Field and the continuing Court’s reliance these Heck>37 See, Heck, e.g., (McDermott, J., 517 Pa. at 535 A.2d at 580 dissenting)(characterizing majority holding analysis as "without usurpation citation” and a Assembly’s power General to define Koch, crimes); 360, 367, Pa.Super. at 443 A.2d at J., (Spaeth, concurringXadvocating reasoning reconsideration of Field’s, accurate, as "propositions so that such will become more and only command respect,” positing, obedience but and with reference Field, cause, jurisprudence that "if a rational has become a lost we're Koch, indeed”); deep in trouble Pa.Super. 443 A.2d at 1166 (Cercone, P.J., concurring dissenting)(stating Supreme that "the statutes, requirements of other culpability to assess decisions principles of statuto- desirability analysis employing of an precepts developed ry construction and related context, implications of the and the constitutional I requirements, of mens rea believe or absence presence a fuller assess- providing served in this would be well Court by by and homicide in the homicide vehicle ment of context. vehicle/DUI by offense of homicide summary, I would hold that the embody Assembly to by the

vehicle was intended General conclusion, I this would liability, although, light absolute statute concerning constitutionality reserve decision appropriate for an case. by Homicide

C. Vehicle/DUI by was intend- I concluded that homicide Since have a strict Assembly operate by ed the General offense, by should be it that homicide follows vehicle/DUI Recently, dissenting opinion in his construed likewise. (2001), Collins, 764 A.2d 1056 Commonwealth Nigro Mr. summarized the derivation Section Justice relationship between the described the Section provisions as follows: Assembly mechanically, reposited the General

Although, separate in a by provisions section homicide vehicle/DUI Code, import of this act was to the essential Vehicle ... grading of homicide increase vehicle/DUI years mandatory sentence of three provide minimum Further, imprisonment. the act amended Section (homicide vehicle) by adding “except the words 3731(DUI).” Thus, clearly indicated that Legislature any commission of traffic that resulted while the violation offense, driving the loss of human life was a serious under greater social evil and therefore implicated the influence penal- concomitantly greater and more certain warranted ty. mire of unconsti- pulled vehicle statute out Court

tutionality proverbial bootstraps”). by its Collins, 153, 564 Pa. at 764 A.2d at 1061.38 The statutes only being material operated identically, with the difference offense, and, in predicate the nature of the the case of Section 3735, generally implicate itself would a predicate offense greater degree Accordingly, agree of blameworthiness.39 I majority’s culpability with the conclusion that the assessment same; my merely should be the in the nature of difference in the assessment the first instance.40 majority analysis, 38. The in Collins did not take issue with this but rather, merger by concluded that there was no homicide vehicle/DUI, by underlying predicate since traffic violation Collins, the homicide vehicle conviction must be other than DUI. See 150, (emphasizing legislature 564 Pa. at 764 A.2d at 1059 that "the statutory mutually crafted the sive”). elements of the two offenses as exclu- justified penalties 39. Some courts have severe associated DUI by treating creating presumption and related offenses the statutes as a See, liability. People culpability imposing e.g., rather than as absolute Lardie, 656, that, (1996)(concluding N.W.2d Mich. eliminating gross negligence question "[i]n the issue of as a of fact for jury, [legislature essentially driving presumed has while law”). gross negligence interpreta- intoxicated is as a matter of Such availability reflecting tion facilitate the of defenses an absence of blameworthiness, involuntary exigent moral circumstances; such as intoxication ("[t]he gross negligence presumption see id. at 665 (1) only voluntarily if the act itself is reasonable the defendant (2) knowing decided to drive and he drove had consumed an substance”). However, intoxicating liquor interpre- or controlled weighed light Assembly’s probable tation must be of the General and, proof perhaps desire to ease the Commonwealth’s burden of (such correspondingly, pretextual policy avoid the assertion of defenses Court, emphasized Jersey Supreme has been discerned and the New see, 627). Moreover, e.g., Fogarty, 607 A.2d constitutional con- concerning employment presumptions cerns are not avoided elements, they implicate law offense questions since the criminal constitutional presented liability akin in the to those strict context. See Franklin, generally Francis v. 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. (1985); Cordoba-Hincapie, F.Supp. (characterizing pre- at 508 a as, effect, sumption standard”). culpability prima "in strict facie It should be noted that various commentators an "ele- advocate analysis analysis opposed determining ments” to an “offense” legislative arena, compliance intent and in the constitutional Grail, Analysis, generally see Robinson & Element 35 Stan. L.Rev. (distinguishing analysis attempting at 715-18 between a form of offense, assign single culpability element to an overall which one offense), assigns element to each element an and the Grail, approach. generally MPC follows this Robinson & Element Conclusion IV. commentator,

According complexities involved one analysis in strict statutory and constitutional the construction complexity of our moral liability criminal arena reflect “the in legal and of the structure those blaming judgements which Is Crimi- Simmons, When Strict judgements are embedded.” Criminology Just?, Liability nal L. at 1137. The 87 J.Crim. & Assembly clearly beyond moved the Pennsylvania has General MPC in of comparatively comfortable framework of the terms in context. imposition liability the of absolute the law gradations penal- enhanced and Correspondingly, and are the constitutional stakes are raised. See increased, ties are F.Supp. Cordoba-Hincapie, (recognizing “[t]he at 515 that cases, nature, despite impart message uneven a their clear continuing importance that there is a constitutional mens rea principle^] permissible outer limits of what is [t]he exist”).41 drawn, certainly not been but such limits The have Analysis, (stating general culpability L.Rev. at 683 "[t]he Stan. that recognize provisions single of Penal Code ... that a offense the Model may require culpable a different state of definition mind for each offense”); (stating jurisdictions objective element of the id. that that adopted ‘‘apply analysis Code have the Model Penal must an element liability”). theory pertinent analysis each offense and of The would revisiting question liability entail is a the whether DUI itself strict offense, Mikulan, subject opinion of the Court's divided say, my present concurring at 1339. Suffice it A.2d at posture, jurisdictions adopted that a substantial number of have offense, position liability particularly strict DUI is a where the see, legislature per proof, e.g., has se included method of 3731(a)(4). supra disagree note 2. I would also with the lead 302(b)(5) should, opinion of that Section of the Crimes Mikulan Code terms, operate application its as a restriction on the Additionally, in Section for the reasons stated IIA herein. a recent survey pleas repre- informal of the common courts indicates DUI (as percent percentage between sents 20 and of the caseload cases) weight The total most counties. substantial such caseload supports Legislature further the conclusion that the intended to mini- upon government pertaining to mize the burden trials in this context. Cordoba-Hincapie’s concerning culpability final in the conclusions drug widely accepted appear context of offenses to be federal does However, Judge dispute federal courts. could circuit no court involved, grasp integrity Weinstein's of the issues fundamental squarely to deal and breadth his effort constitutional issues presented liability in context. strict

majority, it, and Field and Heck successfully before surmount- complexities ed the divining here involved indicated, doing where none was so without refer- ence the conventional tools of statutory construction or strict analysis. salutary The an approxima- effect is tion of the common upon law and MPC restraints strict liability by inserting middle-ground concept pertinent Packer, into the offenses. See Mens Rea generally Court, and the Supreme Sup.Ct. (1962)(argu- Rev. ing that “the idea of criminal responsibility upon based carefully actor’s failure to act as as he should affords an important largely avoiding tyran- unutilized means for ny law”). difficulty, the criminal however, that, reasoning provided, based there is no Assembly assurance that the General intended such middle ground achieved, and, indeed, to be much of the evidence not expressly by taken into simply account the Court tois Thus, contrary. appearance arises that the Court be functioning lawmaker, as a rather than within its constitution- al as interpreter role of the lawful Legisla- enactments of the problem compounded ture. This is as it increasingly becomes apparent in various contexts that some form of strict intended, legislatively example, instances which per proof se methods of employed. Ultimately, are in light of the reposited breadth criminal offenses in the Crimes Code statutes, other I believe that the constitutional questions will squarely need be confronted.

As I would hold that the Assembly General intended present case, in the no constitutional challenge is raised, and, (and by on facts majority as stated based upon his conviction for involuntary manslaughter), Appellant’s moral can hardly disputed, blameworthiness I believe that the trial court’s instructions were sufficient.

Accordingly, join affirming I Superior Court’s order. NEWMAN, Justice, concurring dissenting.

I respectfully disagree majority the conclusion of the negligence that criminal is the mens rea for

147 alcohol, 75 driving influence of Pa.C.S. while under the vehicle legislative that an enact- § 3735. I believe examination 3735.1, § assault governing aggravated ment 75 Pa.C.S. influence, driving and the under the recent vehicle while statute, of the homicide Pa.C.S. amendment require legislative proof § intent not demonstrates to sustain a conviction for 75 of criminal order § Pa.C.S. 3735. McCurdy, v. 558 Pa. 735 A.2d 681 Commonwealth (1)

(1999), requiring proof: § we described Pa.C.S. pursuant driving of a conviction for under influence (2) § Pa.C.S. that this violation caused death. case, present majority, relying Id. at In the on Heck, (1987), 535 A.2d 575 Commonwealth questionable premise holds that Heck’s that the former 75 required proof negligence, Pa.C.S. of criminal notwith- standing language, “unintentionally that statute’s causes” con- trols this Consequently, case. because similarly penalizes “unintentionally driver who causes” the influence, driving majori- death another while under ty engrafts onto two McCurdy’s elements the prove the Commonwealth also that the defendant acted negligence. with criminal construction, statutory majori-

As a matter of I believe the ty’s position provides “any is incorrect. person unintentionally person who causes the death another (relating to driving as the result of a violation of section 3731 substance) under the influence alcohol or controlled and is violating guilty felony convicted of section 3731 is of a ” is degree second when violation the cause death.... Noticeably “negli- absent this definition is the word gence.” “negligence” of the term not a legisla- absence is mere oversight. by legislative

tive As evidenced to amendments 3735.1, § § Pa.C.S. the enactment 75 Pa.C.S. require the legislature proof when intends to of criminal offense, puts for an it the words statute. 3735.1, legislature § 75 Pa.C.S. which enacted creat- ed a “aggravated new offense for assault vehicle driving while under the influence.” provides: Section 3735.1 [a]ny person who negligently injury causes serious bodily to person another of a the result violation of section 3731 (relating driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3731 commits felony of the second when the violation is injury. the cause of the 3735.1(a) added). §

75 Pa.C.S. (emphasis The inclusion of the “negligence” term in this statute legisla- demonstrates a clear require tive intent proof of criminal negligence for a conviction. tellingly, More legisla- December of by vehicle, ture amended the statute for homicide Formerly, 3732.1 the statute read: [a]ny person who unintentionally causes the of an- death person engaged other while the violation any law of this or municipal Commonwealth applying ordinance to the operation or of a regulation use to the of traffic except section (relating driving under the influence substance) of alcohol or controlled is guilty of homicide vehicle, a degree, misdemeanor the first when the viola- tion is the cause of death. 18, 2001, February

Effective 75 Pa.C.S. provides: now' [a]ny person who recklessly gross or with negligence causes the death of person engaged another while in the violation any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance (cid:127) applying operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating driving substance) under influence of alcohol or controlled guilty vehicle, felony degree, the third when the violation is the cause of death. Legis. (S.B.1312) (Purdon’s) Serv. Act 2000-108 added).

(emphasis The deletion of “unintentionally causes” from the former statute and its replacement “recklessly gross or with negligence” further illustrates that when the legislature proof intends of criminal negligence as part of the Heck, supra. 1. The statute at issue in

149 offense, viola- in connection with specifically of an elements Code, it so in clear and unmistakable does tions Vehicle language. therefore, construction, should statutory matter of we

As a to a criminal offense where the supply not additional elements to in legislature sought fit include them the statute. has 3735, legislature’s 75 should Respecting § Pa.C.S. we read unchanged this as indicative decision leave section legislative require proof negligence. not to criminal intent negli- legislature require proof If wished 3735, it § could gence to establish violation of 75 Pa.C.S. 1996, it 75 Pa.C.S. done so either in when enacted have proof aggravated assault require negligence § 3735.1 2000, influence, in under when driving vehicle while require proof § 3732 to of criminal it amended 75 Pa.C.S. by vehicle. for a conviction for homicide negligence however, change. legislature, no such made I in to be of also find this Court’s decision Heck doubtful involving matter. If one reads Heck as utility present statutory I actions of only interpretation, then believe the concluding that legislature since Heck show that we erred negligence Crimes the definition of criminal contained Code, 302(b)(4), § into statute.2 must be read Pa.C.S. If, however, holding process Heck one reads as due requires criminal as mens for a violation of negligence rea 3732, present I § the former 75 Pa.C.S. then would use the of Heck opportunity interpretation case as an to disavow this previous upholding constitu inconsistent decisions Hicks, tionality § 3732. v. Commonwealth Cf. (1983) equal A.2d (rejecting protection 502 Pa. ,to 3732); v. challenge former 75 Pa.C.S. Commonwealth (1980) Field, (rejecting vagueness 417 A.2d 160 3732). challenge to former Pa.C.S. But Common cf. O’Hanlon, (1995) Pa. wealth Opinion Justice McDermott made this criticism in his Dissention Mr. Heck, believe) (correctly, majority "usurp- he I accused the where ing legislative “culpabil- power to define crimes” noted ity requirement in the [former 3732] contained word ”, 'unintentionally’ 535 A.2d at 580. requiring, process (interpreting grounds, proof Heck as on due of criminal to sustain a conviction for violation of 3782). § process former Pa.C.S. Due does not mandate that criminal rea for the mens which crime the statute describes the as “unintention- causes,” ally clearly adequately and which otherwise prohibited Accordingly, describes conduct. to the extent opinion suggests process that the Heck this due majority and the with respect follows this rationale to 75 3735,1 disagree. must Pa.C.S. reasons,

For I concur majority these in the decision of the affirm but join analysis require- do not its the mens rea ment of 75 Pa.C.S. 3735. joins concurring

Justice CASTILLE dissenting this opinion.

778 A.2d 664 TAYLOR, Individually Roberta and as Executrix for Taylor, Deceased, Appellant, Estate Lee of Robert Byrne SOLBERG, M.D., Dworkin, D.O., Gerald E. Edmund T. M.D.,

Delguerico, Fitzgerald Mercy Hospital, Mercy Catholic Center, Joseph M.D., Smiley, Jerry Hubsher, Medical V. W. Powers, M.D., M.D., Meyer, M.D., Donald Nephrology Allen E. Associates, Ltd., Appellees, Medical

Community Dialysis Services Landsdowne. Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of Argued Jan. 2001. Sept.

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Samuels

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Aug 28, 2001

Citation: 778 A.2d 638

Docket Number: 91 M.D. Appeal Docket 2000

Court Abbreviation: Pa.