OPINION
On Mаrch 31, 1989, appellant Aida Rosario was found guilty of possession and possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The charges stemmed from drug sales made out of appellant’s residenсe during her absence by a man who has never been charged, or indeed completely idеntified, in connection with this case. The sentence imposed, eleven and one half to twenty-three months house arrest, with a subsequent three year term of probation, was appeаled by the Commonwealth, and the Superior Court reused, concluding that the leniency of the sentence was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and remanded for resentencing,
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Appellant argues to this court that the Superior Court departed from the accepted course of apрellate review in its reversal of the trial court’s sentencing order. However, we may not cоnsider whether the sentence was properly imposed, or whether the reversal by the Superior Court was correct, since 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(f) deprives us of jurisdiction to address the discretionary aspects of a sentence.
Commonwealth v. Jones,
Appellant raises another matter concerning the validity of the Superior Court’s order which must command our attention. She contends that she was denied her constitutional right to appellate counsel, having lacked representation while the Cоmmonwealth pursued its appeal. Counsel representing appellant before this tribunal, аs well as the Defenders Association as amicus curiae, point out that subsequent to the sentencing proceeding, trial counsel disappeared from the case, without having first requestеd permission to withdraw per
Commonwealth v. Palmer,
Dеspite the fact that the original appeal to the Superior Court was taken by the Commоnwealth, not by appellant, it constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings at
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whiсh substantive rights might be preserved or lost. As such, the right to counsel attaches.
Commonwealth v. Holzer,
Here, no inquiry was made of the illiterate apрellant whether, in view of counsel’s failure to perform, she wished new counsel at all, could afford private representation, or whether assignment was necessary. Certainly no investigatiоn was made as to whether she was aware of the consequences of a choice. The prejudice inherent in counsel’s abandonment is obvious in view of the Superior Court’s attitude tоward the lack of a brief presenting appellant’s arguments, and in view of the fact that her аt-home sentence would, as Judge Cavanaugh points out, presumably be transmuted into incarcеration. No disavowal of responsibility, such as the Commonwealth has attempted, nor the Superior Court’s disregard for violation of appellant’s right to counsel can alter the fact that such a violation has occurred, and that relief is warranted.
Appellant’s final claim presents the argument that she has an objectively reasonable expectation of finality as to her sentence, so that imposition of further or different punishment would implicate double jеopardy. This issue is not ripe for our review, and will not become so absent the conclusion of a counselled appeal.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.