This is а timely appeal by the Commonwealth of a trial court Order granting appellee’s motion to suppress physical evidence recоvered during a warrantless search. The Commonwealth has properly certified the pre-trial suppression Order substantially handicaps the prоsecution of this case, making this appeal a proper appeal from a final Order of court.
Commonwealth v. Dugger,
On January 28, 1988 at 1:00 p.m. two Philadelphia рolice officers were conducting an undercover narcotics investigation. While driving down the street the officers observed appellee and another woman, Elida Santiago, on a sidewalk with appellee yelling “White tape, white tape,” which phrase indicated they were selling cocaine in bags sealed with white tape. The officers pulled up and Santiago approached to ask what they wanted. They hаnded her a prerecorded $20 bill and she gave it to appellee who entered 645 West Shiller Street after unlocking the door by using a key. Appеllee reappeared within seconds and handed two bags to Santiago who then gave them to the officers. The officers kept the smallеr $20 bag and returned the larger bag. After driving away, the officers field tested the substance in the bag and confirmed it was cocaine. The officers returnеd to the place of sale with other officers in a marked police car and approached appellee, who dropped the keys to the house when she saw them approaching her. As appellee was placed under arrest, two officers went to the house and inspected the premises through the windows of the house and concluded the house was abandoned because no curtains, window shades, or furniture could be seen. They entered with the keys appellee had dropped and discovered 93 bags of cocaine sealеd with white tape, weigh *3 ing a total of two pounds. The prerecorded $20 bill was also retrieved inside the house.
The Commonwealth’s sole issue on aрpeal is whether the warrantless search of the house was legal under the circumstances, requiring reversal of the trial court’s suppression Order. The Commonwealth argues that because the evidence established appellee did not own nor live in the vacant house in which the drugs were found and had abandoned the key which gave entry to the house just prior to her imminent arrest, the subsequent warrantless search was not an unreasonаble governmental intrusion into any legitimate expectation of privacy. The Commonwealth urges the storing of narcotics in a vacant property without permission of the owner or anyone else authorized to allow entry does not establish a constitutionally protected right to privacy of possessions placed therein which would give rise to reasonable expectations that police would not enter the vacant house. Further, the Commonwealth contends the trial court’s ruling that “exigent circumstances” justifying the warrantless search were not present is erroneous considering the officers’ belief that others might be in the house at the time of appellee’s arrest.
In reviewing a suppression Order:
Our scope of review is limited primarily to questions of law. We are bound by the suppression court’s findings of fact, if those findings are supported by the record. In determining whether the findings of fact аre supported by the record, we are to consider only the evidence of the appellees and so much of the evidence of the appellant which, as read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. It is for the suppression court as the trier of fact, rather than the reviewing court, to determine credibility.
However, we are “not bound by findings wholly lacking in evidence.” Nor are we bound by the suрpression court’s conclusion of law.
*4
Commonwealth v. White,
Appellee contends in her brief and at argument that she has “automatic standing” under
Commonwealth v. Sell,
It is well-established that “no one has a standing to complain of a search and seizure of propеrty that he has voluntarily abandoned.”
Commonwealth v. Shoatz,
Appellee had no ownership rights to the аbandoned house other than her set of keys which allowed her access to the premises. By abandoning the keys when the officers approached, appellee effectively relinquished all rights she had in the premises and the items stored in the house were no longer protectеd by any expectation of privacy on appellee’s part. In
Commonwealth v. Anderl,
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
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See e.g. Rakas v. Illinois,
