142 Mass. 71 | Mass. | 1886
In order to show that the pond in which the defendants were alleged to have fished was one which had been leased by the commissioners of inland fisheries, the government offered in evidence what purported to be a lease of said pond by them to the inhabitants of North Reading, together with a
The Pub. Sts. c. 91, § 16, provide that the commissioners shall have the custody of all leases that may be made by them under the provisions of that chapter. By c. 169, § 70, “ copies of books, papers, documents, and records in the executive and other departments of the Commonwealth, duly authenticated by the attestation of the officer having charge of the same, shall be competent evidence in all cases equally with the originals thereof, if the genuineness of the signature of such officer is attested by the Secretary of the Commonwealth under its seal.” That which the certificate of the Secretary is to attest is the authenticity of the signatures of those officers having charge of the document of which copies are to be offered in evidence, and who themselves are to attest the authenticity of the copies. It is as the proper custodians of the document that they attest its authenticity, and not as having themselves executed it; and the Secretary does not attest the signatures of those who signed the original, but of those who now have it in charge. The government did not seek to put in evidence a copy authenticated by
The lease offered in the case at bar was not in the lawful custody of those persons who are now the commissioners of inland fisheries. It had been left in the custody of the town officers, and it was by putting the original in evidence that the government sought to establish its case. It was necessary to establish the fact that at least those who signed as commissioners were such at the date of the lease, and to prove their handwriting. The certificate of the Secretary did not aid in this. If the records of his office enabled him to state who were the commissioners at a former time, when the lease was executed, he may properly certify the record which shows this, but he cannot certify that this fact appears by the record. A certificate from a public officer that certain facts exist, or appear by the records of his office, is not competent evidence of such facts. Robbins v. Townsend, 20 Pick. 345. Wayland v. Ware, 109 Mass. 248. Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 336. Nor is the certificate of the Secretary competent upon the question whether the signatures to the original lease are genuine. He is not authorized by law to attest them. As to matters which he is not authorized by law to attest, his certificate is extra-official, can have no higher weight than that of a private citizen, and is therefore inadequate to make the proof required. Oakes v. Hill,
We proceed to consider briefly such other questions, raised by the bill of exceptions, as it seems probable may hereafter be presented. The motion to quash the complaint was properly overruled. It followed the language of the statute, and comes within the well-settled rule, that an indictment may be made in the words of a statute, without a particular detail of facts and circumstances, when, by using those words, the act in which an offence consists is fully, directly, and expressly alleged, without any uncertainty or ambiguity. Pub. Sts. c. 91, § 27. Commonwealth v. Welsh, 7 Gray, 324. Commonwealth v. Barrett, 108 Mass. 302. Commonwealth v. Tiffany, 119 Mass. 300.
The defendants further contend that, even if the lease or a proper copy be admitted, the facts do not furnish any evidence that the inhabitants of North Reading were the proprietors or lessees of the pond. There was no formal vote to accept a lease of the pond, but there were repeated votes appropriating money to stock the ponds with fish, there being another pond included in the lease, choosing committees to stock the ponds, and other committees to look after the ponds, receiving and acting on the reports of their fish committees, accepting the rules and regulations made by them for the use of the ponds, changing the times of fishing therein, and directing their fish committee to apply for changes to the commissioners on inland fisheries. These facts, taken in connection with the fact that the lease was in the possession of the town officers, and produced by them at the trial, and appeared to have been recorded on the town records, afforded ample evidence, as against the defendants, that the inhabitants were lawfully the lessees of the pond.
The request for an instruction that fishing for any other fish than land-locked salmon (which was the only useful fish alleged to be cultivated in the pond) would be no offence, should not have been granted. The taking of any other fish there would be illegal. Pub. Sts. .c. 91, §§ 12, 24, 27.
The request for an instruction that Harnden could not be convicted on evidence that he was only paddling the boat was
Exceptions sustained.